Mark Wilson v. Candace Wheeler

Ninth Circuit

Mark Wilson v. Candace Wheeler

584 F. App'x 365

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

DecidedJuly 30, 2014

Docket12-36006

StatusUnpublished

Cited by3 cases

This text of 584 F. App'x 365 (Mark Wilson v. Candace Wheeler) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Mark Wilson v. Candace Wheeler, 584 F. App'x 365 (9th Cir. 2014).

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Opinion

MEMORANDUM **

Oregon state prisoner Mark James Wilson appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging that defendants violated his constitutional rights in connection with his hearing before the Oregon Board of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal on the basis of Eleventh Amendment immunity. Cholla Ready Mix, Inc. v. Civish, 382 F.3d 969, 973 (9th Cir.2004). We may affirm on any ground supported by the record. Thompson v. Paul, 547 F.3d 1055, 1058-59 (9th Cir.2008). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Wilson’s constitutional claims against defendants in their official capacities because those claims are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See Flint v. Dennison, 488 F.3d 816, 824-25 (9th Cir.2007) (state officials sued for damages in their official capacities are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity); see also Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 67-69, 106 S.Ct. 423, 88 L.Ed.2d 371 (1985) (distinguishing claims for prospective and retrospective relief and explaining that claims for retrospective relief are barred by the Eleventh Amendment).

*366 To the extent that Wilson sought prospective injunctive relief with regard to his informational privacy claim, dismissal of that claim was proper because Wilson failed to state a claim. See Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341-42 (9th Cir.2010) (though pro se pleadings are to be liberally construed, a plaintiff must still present factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief); see also United States v. Guerrero, 693 F.3d 990, 998 (9th Cir.2012) (explaining that “there is no authority for the proposition that a defendant’s preference that his personal history be kept personal justifies denial of public access to criminal proceedings”); Seaton v. Mayberg, 610 F.3d 530, 534-35 (9th Cir.2010) (imprisonment results in “the circumscription or loss of many significant rights,” in particular a loss of privacy in prison treatment records).

AFFIRMED.

**

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

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MEMORANDUM **

Oregon state prisoner Mark James Wilson appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging that defendants violated his constitutional rights in connection with his hearing before the Oregon Board of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal on the basis of Eleventh Amendment immunity. Cholla Ready Mix, Inc. v. Civish, 382 F.3d 969, 973 (9th Cir.2004). We may affirm on any ground supported by the record. Thompson v. Paul, 547 F.3d 1055, 1058-59 (9th Cir.2008). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Wilson’s constitutional claims against defendants in their official capacities because those claims are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See Flint v. Dennison, 488 F.3d 816, 824-25 (9th Cir.2007) (state officials sued for damages in their official capacities are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity); see also Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 67-69, 106 S.Ct. 423, 88 L.Ed.2d 371 (1985) (distinguishing claims for prospective and retrospective relief and explaining that claims for retrospective relief are barred by the Eleventh Amendment).

*366 To the extent that Wilson sought prospective injunctive relief with regard to his informational privacy claim, dismissal of that claim was proper because Wilson failed to state a claim. See Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341-42 (9th Cir.2010) (though pro se pleadings are to be liberally construed, a plaintiff must still present factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief); see also United States v. Guerrero, 693 F.3d 990, 998 (9th Cir.2012) (explaining that “there is no authority for the proposition that a defendant’s preference that his personal history be kept personal justifies denial of public access to criminal proceedings”); Seaton v. Mayberg, 610 F.3d 530, 534-35 (9th Cir.2010) (imprisonment results in “the circumscription or loss of many significant rights,” in particular a loss of privacy in prison treatment records).

AFFIRMED.

**

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

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