Mark Juarez v. DG Strategic VI, LLC, et al.

Opinion

Mark Juarez, No. 1:23-cv-00142 KJM CDB Plaintiff, ORDER v. '4 | DG Strategic VIL, LLC, et al., 1S Defendants. Mark Juarez alleges DG Strategic VI, LLC (Dollar General) violated California employment discrimination laws when Dollar General terminated his employment.' Dollar General has moved for summary judgment. As described more fully below, the court grants in part and denies in part Dollar General’s motion. I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY On December 14, 2021, Juarez submitted his administrative complaint to the Department of Fair Housing and Employment and received an immediate right to sue letter. See Notice of Removal at 37, ECF No. 1.2 On December 8, 2022, Juarez filed a civil complaint against Dollar

' Juarez also named DOES 1-100 as defendants but has not moved to substitute named individuals in their stead. The court thus dismisses all DOE defendants without prejudice. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m) (providing for dismissal if a defendant not served within 90 days after complaint filed); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a) (complaint must “name all the parties’). ? Pages cited here are those applied at the top right by the CM/ECF system.

General in Kern County Superior Court. See generally Notice of Removal Ex. A (Compl.). The crux of Juarez’s complaint is Dollar General constructively terminated his employment because of a back injury he suffered while working in Dollar General’s warehouse in the spring of 2020. See id. ¶¶ 1–25. While Dollar General officials initially begrudgingly tolerated his work accommodation requests, after the initial month during which he was given light duty Juarez claims Dollar General was no longer willing to accommodate or even engage in an interactive process with Juarez over his requests for accommodation by the summer of 2021. See Opp’n at 11–15, ECF No. 19. Juarez claims Dollar General made no attempt to accommodate him after his formal leave expired at the end of September 2021. See id. at 15. The end result was Dollar General forced Juarez to work in a full duty capacity at the warehouse, his back got worse, he had to take more leave than he had allotted to him to try to heal his back, and he was immediately fired when his leave expired. See generally Opp’n; Compl. In his first claim, Juarez alleges Dollar General violated California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) by:  Failing to provide Juarez reasonable accommodations. See id. ¶ 27(a).  Failing to engage in an interactive process with Juarez to identify a reasonable accommodation based on his disability. See id. ¶ 27(b).  Discriminating against Juarez based on his physical disability. See id. ¶ 27(f).  Harassing Juarez based on his physical disability. See id.  Retaliating against Juarez based on his disability by terminating his employment. See id. At hearing, Dollar General's counsel took the position Juarez did not give Dollar General notice of his request for a reasonable accommodation claim or for an interactive process, arguing that references to reasonable accommodation or interactive process claims in the complaint are at best conclusory, and not meet the plausibility threshold. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678–79 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). ///// ///// ///// In his second claim, Juarez alleges Dollar General violated the California Family Rights Act (CFRA) by:  Retaliating against Juarez for taking CFRA leave. See id. ¶ 42(a)–(b).  Discriminating against Juarez for taking CFRA leave. See id. ¶ 42(a).  Harassing Juarez for taking CFRA leave. See id. ¶ 42(a). Third, Juarez alleges Dollar General terminated his employment in violation of public policy. See id. ¶¶ 53–63. Fourth, Juarez seeks declaratory relief. See id. ¶¶ 64–70. Juarez seeks general damages, punitive damages, medical expenses, loss of earnings, loss of earning capacity, attorneys’ fees, as well as injunctive and declaratory relief. See id. (Prayer for Relief). On January 30, 2023, Dollar General removed the case to this court based on diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Dollar General alleges complete diversity. Juarez is a citizen of California, see Compl. ¶ 1, who began working at the Dollar General Warehouse in Lebec, California, in 2019,3 see Russell Decl. Ex. A (Defs.’ Juarez Dep.) at 4, 112. Dollar General is a limited liability company organized under the laws of Tennessee, whose sole member, Dollar General Corporation, is incorporated in Tennessee and whose principal place of business is in Goodlettsville, Tennessee. Defs.’ Notice of Removal ¶ 13. It sells “basic consumable goods, seasonal items, and home products.” Massey Decl. ¶ 2. See generally Notice of Removal. Juarez has not contested removal. The court finds it has jurisdiction as the parties are completely diverse and Dollar General has plausibly asserted the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. See id. ¶¶ 16–20; Dart v. Cherokee Basin Operating Co. LLC v. Owens, 574 U.S. 81, 89 (2014) (notices of removal must include “a plausible allegation that the amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional threshold”). On June 7, 2024, Dollar General moved for summary judgment on Juarez’s FEHA discrimination, harassment and retaliation claims, his CFRA discrimination, harassment, and retaliation claims, his wrongful termination claim, his declaratory relief claim and his request for

3 The court has compared the parties’ respective statements of fact and the underlying record and reviewed the relevant deposition transcripts. Defs.’ Stmt. Undisp. Facts; Joint Stmt. Undisp. Facts; Pl.’s Stmt. Undisp. Facts; Massey Decl., ECF No. 16-1; Russell Decl., ECF 16-2; punitive damages. See Mot. at 16–30, ECF No. 16. Dollar General argues Juarez was not qualified for his work position when Dollar General terminated his employment on October 28, 2021, and that Juarez can provide no evidence of harassing behavior by Dollar General employees. See Mot. at 16–20; Reply at 8–11, ECF No. 20. Juarez opposes the motion, arguing there is a dispute of material fact regarding whether he was qualified to work in his position when he was terminated and that Dollar General discriminated against him when it fired him. See Opp’n at 15–19, ECF No. 19. Juarez also argues there is a dispute of material fact over whether several comments made by his supervisors constituted harassing conduct. See id. at 27–28. The motion is fully briefed. See Mot.; Opp’n; Reply. On October 11, 2024, the case was reassigned to the undersigned. See Order, ECF No. 25. On May 8, 2025, the court heard oral argument on Dollar General’s motion for summary judgment. Alex Hadjian appeared for Juarez. See Mins. Mot. Hr’g, ECF No. 32. Andrew Russell appeared for Dollar General. See id. II. CLARIFYING THE RECORD: EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, litigants who move for or oppose summary judgment must cite “particular parts of materials in the record” to show specific facts are disputed, undisputed or cannot be proved, as the case may be. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). This district’s local rules implement that rule by requiring a separate statement proposing undisputed facts. See E.D. Cal. L.R. 260(a). The separate statement must “cite the particular portions” of the record that establish each proposed fact as “undisputed.” Id. The opposing party must then respond to each proposed fact on the list and either admit or deny that the fact is undisputed. See E.D. Cal. L.R. 260(b). If the opposing party contends the fact is disputed, it must cite “the specific particular portions” of the record showing the fact is disputed. Id. Dollar General has complied with Local Rule 260(a) and the parties also have submitted a joint statement of undisputed facts. See Defs.’ Stmt. Undisp. Facts, ECF No. 16-3; Joint Stmt. Undisp. Facts, ECF No. 16-4. Juarez has filed objections and his own statement of undisputed facts. See Pl.’s Response, ECF No. 19-2 Pl.’s Stmt. Undisp. Facts, ECF No. 19-3. In its reply, Dollar General has objected on authentication grounds to exhibits D and C attached to the declaration of Juarez’s attorney Alex Hadjian; Dollar General also has objected to a number of Juarez’s undisputed facts. Defs.’ Objs., ECF No. 20-2; Defs.’ Response to Pl.’s Stmt. Undisp. Mat. Facts (Defs.’ Response), ECF No. 20-3. Juarez also has filed an amended declaration by Alex Hadjian that includes exhibits Hadjian had meant to attach to the deposition transcripts Juarez submitted in opposition to Dollar General’s motion for summary judgment. See Hadjian Am. Decl. at 2, ECF No. 21. Dollar General objects to the amended declaration, arguing it is untimely because Juarez submitted the amended declaration after Dollar General had already submitted its reply brief. See Defs.’ Evid. Objs. to Hadjian Am. Decl. at 2, ECF No. 22. Dollar General also objects to the new exhibits on authentication, foundation and relevancy grounds. See id. at 2–4. The court overrules Dollar General’s objections to the amended declaration, finding it does not constitute the kind of improper sandbagging that would warrant striking. The exhibits Juarez submitted with the amended Hadjian declaration are work emails about Juarez’s employment, phone records that Juarez claims show he attempted to contact Dollar General about his leave in October 2021, and evaluations of Juarez’s work performance while he was employed at Dollar General. See Hadjian Am. Decl. Exs. 6, 13–14, 16–17, 32, 38, 42, 47, 49 at 52–84; Exs. 6, 11–13, 16, 22, 33 at 158–208. All of these documents are discussed at length in the deposition transcripts Juarez initially submitted in opposition to Dollar General’s motion for summary judgment, and Dollar General had an opportunity to substantively respond to them in its reply brief. Dollar General also had an opportunity to object to the exhibits themselves on evidentiary grounds. See generally Defs.’ Evid. Objs. to Hadjian Am. Decl. Because Dollar General has not shown it was prejudiced by the delay, the court overrules its timeliness objection and will consider Juarez’s late-filed exhibits in the interests of reaching the merits. See Doe by and through Tanis v. San Diego, 576 F. Supp. 3d 721, 730–31 (S.D. Cal. 2021) (finding court may has discretion to consider late filed exhibits if opposing party cannot show it was “substantively prejudiced” by the delay).. The court also overrules the remainder of both Dollar General’s and Juarez’s objections. The most common objections Dollar General makes are on grounds of relevance and materiality. Yet “objections to evidence . . . that it is irrelevant, speculative, and/or argumentative, or that it constitutes an improper legal conclusion are all duplicative of the summary judgment standard itself.” Burch v. Regents of University of California, 433 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1119 (E.D. Cal. 2006). If a fact is not material, i.e., if it is irrelevant or a legal conclusion or speculative, it is not germane to a Rule 56 analysis. See, e.g., Defs.’ Response No. 12 (objecting to Juarez’s assertion that Massey was unaware of whether Juarez’s restrictions ever expired as being “irrelevant”). An objection is unnecessary. Similarly, an objection based on “incompleteness”—the most common objection advanced by Juarez—is just another way of saying the fact is disputed. See Burch, 433 F. Supp. 2d at 1119; see, e.g., Pl.’s Response No. 16 (objecting to Dollar General’s assertion Juarez did not return to work on October 1, 2021, as being “incomplete”). Many of Dollar General’s objections relate to the form in which Juarez provides the evidence. Defs.’ Objs. (objecting to Hadjian’s submission of two Dollar General emails for failure to authenticate the emails). But “to survive summary judgment, a party does not necessarily have to produce evidence in a form that would be admissible at trial, so long as the party satisfies the requirements of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 56.” Fraser v. Goodale, 342 F.3d 1032, 1036–37 (9th Cir. 2003). If the party would be able to offer the evidence in admissible form at trial, then the court considers it as part of the evidentiary record. See id. The court cannot conclude on this record the evidence submitted by Juarez cannot be reduced to an admissible form at trial. See id. Dollar General and Juarez’s evidentiary objections are overruled. Unless otherwise stated, the following facts are undisputed. Juarez began working at the Dollar General Warehouse in Lebec, California, in 2019,4 see Russell Decl. Ex. A (Defs.’ Juarez Dep.) at 4, 112. Dollar General sells “basic consumable goods, seasonal items, and home products.” Massey Decl. ¶ 2. Juarez’s job with Dollar General was to fulfill orders by retrieving merchandise and dropping it off at the warehouse’s shipping dock. See Defs.’ Juarez Dep. at 13. In March 2020, Juarez injured his back at work while grabbing a box of bleach. See id. at 20. On

4 The court has compared the parties’ respective statements of fact and the underlying record and reviewed the relevant deposition transcripts. Defs.’ Stmt. Undisp. Facts; Joint Stmt. Undisp. Facts; Pl.’s Stmt. Undisp. Facts; Massey Decl., ECF No. 16-1; Russell Decl., ECF 16-2; March 11, 2020, he went to a doctor who wrote Juarez a note stating Juarez received treatment for his injured back and that he was not to return to work until March 14, 2020. See Hadjian Am. Decl. Ex. 11 at 163. Juarez alleges he gave the doctor’s note to his managers and to Chay Bridges, the human resources manager at the Lebec warehouse. See id. at 162; Hadjian Decl. Ex. A (Pl.’s Juarez Dep.) at 36. On March 24, 2020, Juarez emailed another doctor’s note to Bridges. See Hadjian Am. Decl. Ex. 11 at 160–61; Pl.’s Juarez Dep. at 36. The March 24 note stated Juarez was restricted to lifting less than 20 pounds while at work. See Hadjian Am. Decl. Ex. 11 at 160–61. Juarez was then given light duty. See Pl.’s Juarez Dep. at 13–14. The warehouse uses large carts or wheeled carriers, known as “rolltainers,” to transport merchandise from the warehouse shelves to the Dollar General stores where customers buy the goods. See Hadjian Decl. Ex. B. (Massey Dep.) at 82–83. Juarez initially was assigned the duty of “cycling”: taking the rolltainers back from the stores on trailers and returning them to the warehouses so workers could stock them once again. See id. On April 14, 2020, Elizabeth Varela, the Inbound- Outbound manager of the Lebec warehouse emailed Matthew Martinez and Anthony Rivera, the two general managers of the warehouse, as well as Bridges with concerns about Juarez’s light duty status. She asked, “How long are we accommodating Mark for his personal injury? I don’t have a need for cycling at this time and do not want to create a job for a personal injury. Please advise.” See Hadjian Am. Decl. Ex. 12 at 164.5 Ten days later, Elizabeth Arreola, the operations supervisor, reached an accommodation with Juarez: Juarez would work on “rolltainer repair,” work that involved opening the rolltainers, setting them up for other employees and loading the rolltainers onto various trucks and forklifts as necessary for repairs to be done on them. See Hadjian Am. Decl. Ex. 12 at 165; Pl.’s Juarez Dep. at 13–14; Massey Dep. at 85. Juarez alleges Dollar General had an employee who worked exclusively on rolltainer repair for several years. Pl.’s Juarez Dep. at 14.

5 Juarez calls Varela “Elizabeth Arreola” in his opposition brief. See Opp’n at 11. But the name of the inbound-outbound manager is clearly Elizabeth Varela. See Hadjian Am. Decl. Ex. 12 at 164. Elizabeth Arreola was the operations supervisor at Dollar General. See id. Ex. 12 at 165. By the end of April, however, Juarez says Dollar General’s patience with him came to an end. Martinez told Juarez he needed to return to full duty, and he could not work if he could not do “one hundred percent active duty.” Pl.’s Juarez Dep. at 16. When Juarez complained to Rivera about Martinez, Rivera seemed to be unaware of Juarez’s work restrictions. See id. at 40. After that exchange, Juarez claims he was forced to return to full duty, lifting the same heavy objects in the same that had injured his back in March. See id. at 13. The record is not entirely clear on when Juarez returned to full duty. According to Dollar General, citing Juarez’s deposition, Juarez was not returned to full duty until June 15, 2021. See Defs.’ Juarez Dep. at 57. Juarez says he had an email exchange at the end of July 2020 with Rivera and Bridges over whether he had been unjustifiably absent from work on two Saturdays that month; in an email he stated—and Rivera and Bridges ultimately agreed—he was on light duty and therefore was not required to work Saturdays. See Massey Dep. at 86; Hadjian Am. Decl. Ex. 13 at 166. Later in 2020, Juarez was listed as an “RT builder (light duty)” on the warehouse work schedule suggesting a position similar to the one Juarez had been given the previous April. See Hadjian Decl. Ex. C. In December 2020, Juarez was given the job of scraping labels off the floor, a job first proposed by the managers of the warehouse for a light duty employee. See Massey Dep. at 90; Hadjian Am. Decl. Ex. 22 at 185. In any event, whether or not Juarez had been on full duty or light duty or a combination of the two at the end of 2020, his back continued to bother him in 2021. Juarez claims he had to take personal leave in late February and early March 2021 so his back would heal. See Defs.’ Juarez Dep. at 44. Several weeks after that, he took two more weeks of personal leave in an attempt to heal his back. See id. at 51. On June 15, 2021, tensions boiled over at Dollar General. On a coaching form, called a “Non Conveyable Order Puller Observation” form, Juarez wrote in response to what he thought was negative feedback that he had not met the speed requirement for pulling orders: “back is messed up and I’m pissed off.” Pl.’s Juarez Dep. at 24–25; Hadjian Am. Decl. Ex. 32 at 60. On the back of the form, Juarez wrote “My back is messed up, never released off light duty. Ya’ll know why!” Hadjian Am. Decl. Ex. 32 at 61. Rivera signed both sides of the of the form. See Massey Dep. at 93; Hadjian Am. Decl. Ex. 32 at 60–61. There is no evidence in the record regarding Rivera’s or Martinez’s response to Juarez’s comments on the evaluation form, and Juarez claims Dollar General did not investigate the comments or ask him about the comments. See Massey Dep. 95–98. The next month, Juarez had to take yet another week off to try to heal his back and his now-ailing hip. See Defs.’ Juarez Dep. at 60. Not long after he returned to work, on July 23, 2021, Juarez obtained a note from his doctor, this time stating he had to take leave from work until October 23, 2021. See id. at 64–65; Hadjian Am. Decl. Ex. 38 at 62. Juarez provided the doctor’s note and submitted a leave request for that period to Matrix Time Management, Dollar General’s third-party leave administrator. See Defs.’ Juarez Dep. at 64–65. On August 6, 2021, Matrix sent Juarez a letter informing him his leave request was approved through August 19, 2021, but denying the balance of the request for approximately an additional two months, given that Juarez had by that point exhausted his Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA) and CFRA leave. See id. at 65–66. Juarez does not dispute his FMLA/CFRA leave ran out on August 19, 2021. See id. at 71. Also on August 6, 2021, Matrix emailed Juarez and advised him he was approved for company medical leave as provided by Dollar General policy. See id. at 68. The company leave would begin once his FMLA/CFRA leave expired on August 19, 2021, but the company leave would expire on October 1, 2021, about three weeks shy of the date through which Juarez’s doctor said he should remain on leave. See id. at 68–69. Juarez never returned to work. See id. at 75. Juarez claims he called Dollar General twice on October 1, 2021, to discuss his options with the company as his leave was about to expire. See Hadjian Am. Decl. Ex. 49 at 70 (Juarez’s phone records showing him calling 1-855-275-3447, or “855-ASK-DGHR,” twice on October 1, 2021); Pl.’s Juarez Dep. at 43–44. Juarez claims Dollar General did not call him back and it appears from his records he did not receive an incoming call from the Dollar General hotline in October 2021. See Hadjian Am. Decl. Ex. 49 at 77–82. On October 7, 2021, Matrix sent Juarez a letter informing him he needed to call within ten days to discuss his intent to return to work. See Hadjian Am. Decl. Ex. 42 at 63. Juarez claims he did not receive the letter until October 18, 2021. See Pl.’s Juarez Dep. at 32–33. That same day, Juarez says he called Dollar General’s human relations hotline and eventually spoke to someone named “Edgar.” See Pl.’s Juarez Dep. at 42–44, 49–50; Hadjian Am. Decl. Ex. 49 at 79 (showing Juarez called 1-855-275-3447 or “855-ASK-DGHR” on October 18, 2021). Juarez claims he told Edgar he was able to return to work but Edgar informed Juarez he had already been terminated. See Pl.’s Juarez Dep. at 34; see also Hadjian Am. Decl. Ex. 42 at 199 (Personnel Action Form showing Juarez had been terminated on October 17, 2021). The company actually had given Juarez a ten-day extension until October 28, 2021, to return to work but Juarez alleges no one ever told Juarez about the extension. See Massey Dep. at 111; Hadjian Am. Decl. Ex. 42 at 192. When he did not return to work on October 28, 2021, Dollar General officially terminated his employment. See Massey Dep. at 116; Hadjian Am. Decl. Ex. 42 at 203. Dollar General has moved for summary judgment on all of Juarez’s other claims and for summary adjudication of his request for punitive damages. See generally Mot. To succeed at summary judgment, Dollar General must show “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and [Dollar General] is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A dispute is “genuine” if “a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A fact is “material” if it “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Id. The court views the record in the light most favorable to Juarez and draws reasonable inferences in his favor. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587–88 (1986); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970). Summary adjudication is evaluated under the same standard, “giving the nonmoving party in each instance the benefit of all reasonable inferences.” Am. Civil Liberties Union of Nev. v. City of Las Vegas, 333 F.3d 1092, 1097 (9th Cir. 2003). A. FEHA Allegations (Claim One) The court first clarifies the scope of Dollar General’s summary judgment motion, which circumscribes the extent of the court’s decision as reflected in this order. Under the FEHA, the state of California prevents employers from discharging or discriminating against employees with a “physical disability.” Cal. Gov’t Code § 12940(a). The FEHA makes it an unlawful employment practice for employers to not provide those with disabilities reasonable accommodations and requires that employers engage in an interactive process with employees to find such an accommodation. See id. ¶ 12940(m)(1), (h). The FEHA also prevents employers from retaliating against an employee who has opposed discriminatory practices. See id. § 12940(h). Finally, the FEHA prevents employers from harassing an employee on account of his physical disability or failing to stop harassment of an employee on account of his physical disability by other employees. See id. § 12940(j)(1). Because these provisions of the FEHA are substantially similar to federal employment discrimination laws, “California courts look to pertinent federal precedent when applying [their] own statutes.” Guz v. Bechtel Nat’l, Inc., 24 Cal.4th 317, 354 (2000). As noted above Juarez’s FEHA claim comprises a number of alleged violations: that Dollar General discriminated against Juarez because of his disability, harassed Juarez because of his disability, retaliated against Juarez because of his disability, failed to provide Juarez a reasonable accommodation, and failed to engage in the interactive process with Juarez. See Compl. ¶ 27. At oral argument, without having briefed the issue, Dollar General expressed surprise when the court asked about Juarez’s FEHA claims of failure to provide reasonable accommodation and failure to engage in the interactive process, on which Dollar General did not move for summary judgment. When the court pointed out the allegations in the complaint making those claims, see Compl. ¶ 26(a)–(b), Dollar General responded the allegations were too conclusory to plausibly state interactive process or reasonable accommodation claims under the FEHA. But Dollar General never moved to dismiss these claims, let alone for summary judgment, and has not provided any fair reason for the court to consider summary judgment of Juarez’s interactive process and reasonable accommodation claims now, given that the language in Juarez’s complaint was more than enough to put Dollar General on notice “of what [Juarez’s] claim[s] [are] and the grounds upon which [they] rest[].” Pac. Coast Fed’n of Fisherman’s Assocs. v. Glaser, 945 F.3d 963, 968 (9th Cir. 2006). The court does resolve summary judgment ///// ///// to the extent Dollar General has moved with respect to other aspects of Juarez’s FEHA claim, namely his discrimination, retaliation and harassment claims.6 The court considers first whether there is a genuine dispute of material fact over whether Juarez was qualified for the position with reasonable accommodation in October 2021 when Dollar General terminated him as that threshold question determines whether Juarez can raise a genuine issue of material fact over his FEHA discrimination and retaliation claims. Then the court will analyze whether Juarez has provided sufficient direct evidence of discrimination for his FEHA discrimination claim creates a genuine dispute of material fact. Next, because Juarez relies on the same evidence to support his FEHA retaliation and indirect discrimination claims, and both require similar burden-shifting analyses, the court analyzes them together. The court addresses Juarez’s FEHA harassment claim last. 1. Qualifications for the Position Dollar General claims Juarez was not qualified for the position in October 2021, even with reasonable accommodations. See Mot. at 19. If Juarez was undisputably not qualified for the position, Dollar General could not, as a matter of law, be held liable for discriminating against him by terminating Juarez’s employment as the FEHA does not protect employees with disabilities that render them “unable to perform his or her essential duties even with reasonable accommodations . . . .” Green v. California, 42 Cal. 4th 254, 262 (2007). Taking the facts in the light most favorable to Juarez, as the court must at this stage, the court concludes a reasonable factfinder could find Juarez was qualified for his assigned position with reasonable accommodations provided. It is undisputed Juarez was qualified in the first instance because he was hired for and worked at the position since 2019. See Defs.’ Juarez Dep. at 4, 112. He received an accommodation for his back in the spring of 2020 but returned to full duty at some point, although the date of his return is disputed. Compare Pl.’s Juarez Dep. at 13 (saying returned in May 2020) with Defs.’ Juarez Dep. at 57 (saying returned to full duty on June

6 Because Dollar General has not asserted Juarez’s interactive process and failure to provide reasonable accommodation claims are precluded from going to trial based on a failure to exhaust administrative relief, the court has not considered this question. 15, 2021). Juarez continued to work for Dollar General throughout 2020. See id. at 15. While Juarez took leaves of absence in 2021 related to his back injury, they were not indefinite leaves of absence. He returned and worked again at the warehouse off and on until the end of July 2021. See Defs.’ Juarez Dep. at 44, 51. This is not a case in which an employee goes on leave and then indefinitely seeks to extend that leave. See Rosado v. Leprino Foods Co., 22-2302, 2025 WL 1017529, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 4, 2025) (collecting cases). In those kinds of cases, the employer need not provide a reasonable accommodation as “the FEHA does not demand employers ‘wait indefinitely for an employee’s medical condition to be corrected.’” Id. (quoting Hanson v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 74 Cal. App. 4th 215, 226–27 (1999)). However, a leave of absence to recover from an injury, such as the one Juarez experienced while working at Dollar General, can be a reasonable accommodation. See Hanson, 74. Cal. App. 4th at 226 (“[A] finite leave can be a reasonable accommodation under FEHA, provided it is likely that at the end of the leave, the employee would be able to perform his or her duties”). Indeed, Dollar General admits it generally treats leave requests that extend beyond the leave an employee legally is entitled to as a request for an accommodation. See Massey Dep. at 61. Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Juarez, a reasonable factfinder could find he could have returned to work on October 23, 2021, based on his doctor’s note, and Dollar General was on notice of this intended return date. See Defs.’ Juarez Dep. at 79; Hadjian Decl. Ex. D; Hadjian Am. Decl. Ex. 38 at 62. It is for a jury to decide the dispute of material fact regarding whether Juarez was qualified for the job in October 2021. 2. Direct Evidence of Discrimination Dollar General argues Juarez cannot establish either direct or indirect discrimination. See Mot. at 20–22; Reply at 9–10. Juarez claims his FEHA disability discrimination claims survive summary judgment because he has submitted both direct and indirect evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could find discrimination. See Opp’n at 16-19. Employment discrimination claims may be proven with either direct or circumstantial evidence. See Morgan v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 88. Cal. App. 4th 52, 67 (2000). Direct evidence “is evidence which, if believed, proves the fact [of discriminatory animus] without inference or presumption.” Id. (quoting Godwin v. Hunt Wesson, Inc. 150 F.3d 1217, 1221 (9th Cir. 1997)) (alterations in original). Here, Juarez may rely on direct evidence to defeat summary judgment, but that evidence must be “directly tied to the adverse employment decision.” See France v. Johnson, 795 F.3d 1170, 1173 (9th Cir. 2015) (citing TransWorld Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 1985)). “Stray remarks” not tied to an adverse employment decision “are not direct evidence capable of defeating summary judgment.” Id. (citing Merrick v. Farmers Ins. Grp., 892 F.2d 1434, 1438 (9th Cir. 1990)). Juarez claims he has provided direct evidence of discrimination by pointing to what Martinez told him sometime in late April 2020, that Juarez needed to be on “one hundred percent active duty,” and also by pointing to Rivera’s claiming in roughly the same time period he did not know about Juarez’s work restrictions. See Opp’n at 17 (citing Pl.’s Juarez Dep. at 16, 40). Dollar General argues Juarez’s evidence at best amounts to “stray remarks” insufficient for his discrimination claim to survive summary judgment. See Reply at 10. The court finds Juarez has not provided sufficient direct evidence for his FEHA disability and retaliation claims to survive summary judgment. Typically, direct evidence encompasses the employer’s use of insidious racial or gendered slurs or adoption of policies that are facially discriminatory. See Chuang v. Univ. of Cal. Davis Bd. of Trustees, 225 F.3d 1115, 1128 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding use of racial slur constituted direct evidence of discrimination sufficient for plaintiff to survive summary judgment); Enlow v. Salem-Keizer Yellow Cab Co., Inc., 389 F.3d 802, 812 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding cab company’s insurance policy to be facially discriminatory because it did not cover drivers over the age of seventy). By contrast, a reasonable factfinder in this case could find Rivera actually did not know about Juarez’s disability and Martinez believed the timeframe for Juarez’s restrictions had come to an end. See Pl.’s Juarez Dep. at 16, 40. Additionally, their remarks were made over a year and a half before Juarez’s termination and, standing alone without other corroborating evidence, cannot be tied indisputably to the adverse employment decision. At best they are “stray remarks” and insufficient to withstand summary judgment. See France, 795 F.3d at 1173. 3. Indirect Evidence of Discrimination and Retaliation Juarez therefore needs circumstantial evidence Dollar General discriminated and retaliated against him that could persuade a reasonable factfinder he should prevail on these claims. Circumstantial evidence of discrimination implicates a “system of shifting burdens to aid the presentation and resolution of such claims.” Morgan, 88 Cal. App. 4th at 68 (citing Hersant v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. 57 Cal. App. 4th 997, 1002 (1997)). Juarez must make out a prima facie case by “(1) . . . proving that [he was] a member of a protected class, (2) [he was] qualified for [his] position, (3) [he] suffered an adverse employment action, and (4) some other circumstance suggests discriminatory motive.” Guz, 24 Cal.4th at 355 (citations omitted). Retaliation claims implicate a similar burden-shifting framework. Juarez must show (1) he was engaged in a protected activity; (2) he was subject to an adverse employment decision; and (3) there was a causal link between the two. See Nadaf-Rahrov v. Neiman Marcus Grp., Inc., 166 Cal. App. 4th 952, 989 (2008) (citing Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc., 36 Cal. 4th 1028, 1042 (2005)). Juarez has provided sufficient evidence to support a jury’s finding he made a prima facie case of disability discrimination. Juarez has alleged he was physically disabled owing to his back injury suffered in March 2020. See Defs.’ Juarez Dep. at 20. As discussed above, there is a dispute of material fact over whether Juarez was qualified for the position as he was initially qualified when he began working at Dollar General, had several leaves of absence in 2021 but had a planned return to work date. It is undisputed Juarez suffered an adverse employment decision in that he was terminated. See Massey Dep. at 116; Hadjian Am. Decl. Ex. 41 at 203. That leaves the fourth prong of the prima facie case requirement: whether there were other circumstances suggesting discriminatory motive. Dollar General claims Juarez cannot meet this last prong because Juarez does not remember an employee of Dollar General ever making a disparaging remark about his disability. See Reply at 11 (citing Defs.’ Juarez Dep. at 90–91). But Juarez does not need to point to this kind of direct evidence of discrimination, and he has instead provided circumstantial evidence that a jury could find shows management was upset with having to accommodate Juarez’s disability, did not respond to Juarez’s complaints about being put back on active duty and used the expiration of Juarez’s leave time as an excuse to terminate him. See Pl.’s Juarez Dep. at 25; Hadjian Am. Decl. Ex. 32 at 60. Juarez also points to evidence a reasonable jury could find shows Dollar General did not accommodate his injury by granting him leave in October 2021 and refused to engage in an interactive process with him over his requested accommodation. See Hadjian Decl. Ex. D; Defs.’ Juarez Dep. at 79. This is enough for a reasonable jury to find Juarez has made out a prima facie case of disability discrimination. See Guz, 24 Cal. 4th at 355 (describing plaintiff’s burden in making out prima facie disability discrimination case as not being “onerous”). This same evidence also is sufficient for a reasonable factfinder to find for Juarez on his FEHA retaliation case. As Juarez notes, pursuing one’s rights under the FEHA constitutes a protected activity and there is evidence to show Juarez pursued his rights to a reasonable accommodation and an interactive process in the summer of 2021 when he complained about his back injury and sought leave from work for a three month period. See Opp’n at 28 (citing Pardi v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, 389 F. 3d 840, 850 (9th Cir. 2004)). Further a causal link “between a protected activity and the alleged retaliatory action ‘can be inferred from timing alone’ when there is a close proximity between the two.’” Thomas v. City of Beaverton, 379 F.3d 802, 812 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Villiarimo v. Aloha Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 1054, 1065 (9th Cir. 2002)). The proximity in time between Juarez’s desiring an accommodation in the form of an extended leave and his firing immediately after his leave ran out is enough to raise a dispute of material fact as to whether Juarez was terminated for requesting an accommodation for his disability. If a jury were to find Juarez satisfied the requirement of a prima facie case with respect to each of his discrimination and retaliation claims, the burden of production then would shift to Dollar General, who would need to show a credible nondiscriminatory reason for terminating Juarez. See Guz, 24 Cal. 4th at 333; Nadaf-Rahrov, 166 Cal. App. 4th at 989. Dollar General points to Juarez’s leave having expired and evidence it says shows he was not qualified for his position, at least when he was terminated in October 2021. See Defs.’ Juarez Dep. at 79.. Juarez does not contest that Dollar General has offered sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could find a credible nondiscriminatory reason for Dollar General’s termination of Juarez. The court finds Dollar General has provided sufficient evidence at this stage to meet its burden of production on both Juarez’s discrimination and retaliation claims. For both discrimination and retaliation claims, the court considers whether Juarez ultimately can survive summary judgment assuming the burden shifts back to him, to show a reasonable jury could find Dollar General’s nondiscriminatory rationale for Juarez’s dismissal is pretextual. See Guz, 24 Cal. 4th at 353. In general, California courts require evidence for pretext to be “substantial responsive evidence that the employer’s showing was untrue or pretextual.” Hersant, 57 Cal. App. 4th at 1004 (internal citations and quotations omitted). The court finds Juarez has met this burden, for purposes of summary judgment. Juarez argues he satisfied pretext based on the evidence supporting his overall narrative, reviewed above: Dollar General begrudgingly offered accommodations to him in 2020 but then shut them off in 2021 and refused to help Juarez further in identifying accommodations, engaging in an interactive process, or investigating his complaints on an evaluation form. Dollar General then terminated him without discussion or much communication in October 2021 because it did not want to employ a person with a back injury in its warehouse. See Opp’n at 17–27 (reviewing Dollar General’s alleged dissatisfaction with placing Juarez on light duty, Juarez’s complaints on his Non-Conveyable Order Puller Observation Form, Dollar General’s alleged failure to investigate his complaints, and Juarez’s attempts to reach his employer after his leave expired in October 2021). Dollar General responds with its position, that Juarez had not been cleared to return to work in October 2021, that he never called the Dollar General human resource hotline to complain about a lack of accommodations, and that he has not identified Dollar General employees who were treated better than him. See Reply at 11–13 (reviewing Juarez’s deposition testimony admitting no employee made a disparaging comment to him and he did not have a doctor’s note allowing him to return on October 1, 2023, when his leave expired) . As noted above, whether or not Juarez could return to work in late October is a dispute of material fact. It also is disputed whether Juarez complained about his back in the summer of 2021 through the proper channels at Dollar General, given Dollar General argues Juarez should have called its human resources hotline to investigate and work with Juarez at supplying him with an accommodation. See Pl.’s Juarez Dep. at 25; Hadjian Am. Decl. Ex. 32 at 60. Given the disputed evidence relevant to the question of pretext, the court finds Juarez has identified substantial evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could find pretext, so as to survive summary judgment. Dollar General’s motion for summary judgment on Juarez’s disability discrimination and retaliation claims under the FEHA is denied. 4. FEHA Harassment (Claim 1) To prevail on a harassment claim under the FEHA, Juarez must show, among other things, that he experienced harassing conduct based on his disability and that conduct interfered with his ability to perform his job. See Ortiz v. Dameron Hosp. Ass’n, 37 Cal. App. 5th 568, 581 (2019) (citing Thompson v. City of Monrovia, 186 Cal. App. 4th 860, 876 (2010)). Harassing conduct by supervisory employees, under California law, “consists of conduct outside the scope of necessary job performance, conduct presumably engaged in for personal gratification, because of meanness or bigotry, or for other personal motives.” Janken v. GM Hughes Elecs., 46 Cal. App. 4th 55, 63 (1996). As Dollar General notes, Juarez admits he does not remember experiencing negative comments at work about his disability. Mot. at 17; see Defs.’ Juarez Dep. at 90–91. Juarez responds by arguing the email from Varela, who seemed impatient about giving Juarez light duty for his back injury, as well as the evidence of his conversations with Martinez and Rivera who both challenged Juarez’s light duty accommodation, support a finding there is a dispute of material fact over whether harassing conduct took place. See Opp’n at 28; Massey Dep. 81–82; Pl.’s Juarez Dep. at 15, 40. Juarez also points to aspects of the record that are silent in ways that support his position, namely his claims of Dollar General’s failure to accommodate or engage in an interactive process with him in the summer and fall of 2021. See id. at 23–26. The emails or comments Juarez points to, however, all were made by supervisors and all of the comments related to essential job performance questions: whether Juarez needed light duty or other accommodations. See Massey Dep. at 81–82; Pl.’s Juarez Dep. at 15, 40. They were not “outside the scope of necessary job performance.” Janken, 46 Cal. App. 4th at 63. Even if they were, Juarez fails to show these comments about his disability interfered with his job performance: he does not allege, for example, that he felt compelled to resign, was passed up for a promotion or received negative performance reviews as a consequence of the comments. See Ortiz, 37 Cal. App. 5th at 583 (finding dispute of material fact over harassment claim when reasonable trier of fact could conclude the “working conditions were so intolerable that a reasonable person in her position would have felt compelled to resign”). Juarez does not point to sufficient evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could find for him on his harassment claim. The court grants Dollar General’s motion for summary judgment on Juarez’s harassment claim. In sum, the court denies Dollar General’s motion for summary judgment on Juarez’s FEHA claims asserting disability discrimination and retaliation. The court grants Dollar General summary judgment on Juarez’s FEHA harassment claim. B. CFRA Claims (Claim Two) The CFRA allows an employee to take leave “from work for certain personal or family medical reasons without jeopardizing job security.” Faust v. Cal. Portland Cement Co., 150 Cal. App. 4th 864, 878 (2007) (quoting Nelson v. United Techs., 74 Cal. App. 4th 597, 606 (1999)). The applicable statutory language bars employers of 50 or more employees from refusing to grant a leave request by an employee for up to 12 weeks within any 12-month period. See id. (citing Cal. Gov’t Code § 12945.2(a), (c)(2)(A)). CFRA claims generally are divided into two types: claims relating to interference with the plaintiff’s right to take 12 weeks of leave and claims relating to discrimination, retaliation, and harassment as a consequence of a plaintiff’s taking their entitled CFRA. See Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 248 Cal. App. 4th 216, 233 (2016) (quoting Rogers v. County of Los Angeles, 198 Cal. App. 4th 480, 487–88 (2011)). Interference claims do not require the court to engage in a burden-shifting analysis while discrimination and retaliation claims do require such an analysis. See Faust v. Cal. Portland Cement Co., 150 Cal. App. 4th 864, 879 (2007). Juarez makes both types of claims: that Dollar General interfered with his right to take CFRA leave, and that Dollar General discriminated, retaliated, and harassed Juarez because he took CFRA leave. See Compl. ¶¶ 27(c), 42(a). The court addresses Juarez’s interference claim first and as above, addresses Juarez’s discrimination and retaliation claims together as they rely on the same factual allegations and evidence, and both involve a burden-shifting analysis. The court addresses Juarez’s CFRA harassment claim last. 1. CFRA Interference In its briefing, Dollar General only seeks summary judgment on Juarez’s CFRA retaliation, discrimination, and harassment claims. See Mot. at 25–27; Reply at 14–15. The court resolves only what Dollar General has presented in its motion.7 2. CFRA Discrimination and Retaliation As noted above, Juarez has not presented sufficient evidence for a reasonable factfinder to find he experienced direct discrimination. Thus, for his CFRA discrimination and retaliation claims, as with his FEHA discrimination and retaliation claims, Juarez must show there is a dispute of material fact based on the indirect evidence in the record. The court evaluates that evidence through a burden-shifting analysis. While they have different elements, Juarez’s CFRA discrimination and retaliation claims both require Juarez show causation for him to make out a prima facie case. See Dudley v. Dep’t of Transp., 90 Cal. App. 4th 255, 264–65 (2001). Specifically, Juarez needs to show there is a dispute of material fact for a jury to decide, regarding whether Dollar General discriminated against him or retaliated against him because he took CFRA leave. See id. And as with his FEHA claims, if Dollar General provides sufficient evidence to support a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for his termination, Juarez would need to show through substantial evidence that a jury could find the reason is pretextual. See id. There is very little in the record to support a causal link between Juarez’s termination and his taking of CFRA leave. It is undisputed Dollar General gave Juarez his full allotment of CFRA leave and each time after he took leave through July 2021, Juarez came back to his position. See Defs.’ Juarez Dep. at 71. When Juarez’s CFRA leave ran out, Dollar General gave

7 Here as well, because Dollar General has not asserted this claim is precluded from going to trial based on a failure to exhaust administrative relief, the court has not considered the question. him additional leave up to the maximum as provided by its company policy. See Defs.’ Juarez Dep. at 68. It also is undisputed that Juarez cannot remember anyone at Dollar General making disparaging remarks about Juarez’s taking CFRA leave. See id. at 90–91. Juarez’s argument for causation focuses on the timing of key events: the evidence shows he was terminated within three months of taking CFRA leave. See Hadjian Am. Decl. Ex. 42 at 199 (Personnel Action Form showing Juarez terminated on October 17, 2021). As with FEHA retaliation claims, evidence of proximity in time can support a CFRA retaliation or discrimination claim. See Villiarimo, 281 F.3d at 1065 (collecting cases). But even if Juarez could prove up a prima facie case with respect to his CFRA claims, Dollar General has provided an unrebutted non-discriminatory reason for Juarez’s termination: that he was unqualified for the position in October 2021 and had exhausted his leave. See Mot. at 23–24. Juarez has no evidence of pretext because, while he has provided substantial evidence Dollar General did not want to provide him with reasonable accommodations or engage in an interactive process with him, that evidence would not allow a reasonable factfinder to conclude Dollar General fired Juarez because he took CFRA leave, given that Dollar General granted Juarez his CFRA leave and allowed him to return to work every time after he exhausted his CFRA leave for a given period of time. See id. at 23. Indeed, the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to Juarez, instead shows Dollar General granted Juarez leave to the full extent available but declined to go any further in accommodating him. The court grants Dollar General summary judgment on Juarez’s CFRA discrimination and retaliation claims. 3. CFRA Harassment Juarez’s CFRA harassment claim requires meeting the same elements as a FEHA harassment claim. See Lurie v. Konica Minolta Bus. Solutions U.S.A., Inc., No. 16-0787, 2016 WL 7508183, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 14, 2016). As noted above, Juarez has not provided any evidence of harassing behavior, whether or not related to his CFRA leave. Further, Juarez admits to not being able to remember anyone at Dollar General making disparaging comments about him taking his CFRA leave. See Defs.’ Juarez Dep. at 90–91. The court grants summary judgment to Dollar General on Juarez’s CFRA harassment claim. In sum, the court grants Dollar General summary judgment on Juarez’s CFRA claim to the extent covered by Dollar General’s motion. C. Termination in Violation of Public Policy (Claim Three) Among other requirements, a termination in violation of public policy or “Tameny” claim, see Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal.3d 167 (1980), requires a plaintiff show a termination or adverse employment action was a violation of public policy. See Lavin v. United Techs. Corp., No. 2:13-cv-09384, 2015 WL 847392, at *19 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 23, 2015) (citing Holmes v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 17 Cal. App. 4th 1418, 1426 (1993)). To prove a wrongful termination in violation of public policy claim, a plaintiff can show the policy is “supported by either constitutional or statutory provisions.” Stevenson v. Sup. Ct., 16 Cal. 4th 880, 889–90 (1997). The California Supreme Court has held disability discrimination under the FEHA constitutes a public policy for the purposes of a Tameny claim. See City of Moorpark v. Sup. Ct., 18 Cal. 4th 1143, 1161 (1998). Dollar General argues Juarez’s Tameny claim fails because his FEHA claims also fail. See Mot. at 27. But, as noted above, the court has found Juarez’s FEHA disability discrimination claim survives summary judgment and thus his Tameny claim also survives summary judgment. Dollar General’s motion for summary judgment on Juarez’s wrongful termination claim is denied. D. Declaratory Relief (Claim Four) Dollar General seeks summary judgment on Juarez’s request for declaratory relief, arguing such relief is redundant of Juarez’s damages request and is inapplicable as Juarez is only alleging past wrongs rather than ongoing or prospective harm, the focus of declaratory and other types of equitable relief. See Mot. at 27–28. While it is true that ultimately Juarez may not obtain both declaratory relief and damages, under California law, because FEHA discrimination claims are rooted in a “fundamental public interest” in preventing and deterring discrimination in the workplace, Juarez can maintain alternative theories of relief through trial even though his alleged harms only happened in the past. See Harris v. City of Santa Monica, 56 Cal. 4th 203, 225–26 (2013). If a jury ultimately decides Dollar General discriminated against Juarez but also had a non-discriminatory reason for terminating his employment, the court could still award Juarez declaratory relief and attorneys’ fees even if did not obtain a damages award. See id. at 211. The court denies Dollar General’s motion for summary judgment on Juarez’s request for declaratory relief and allows Juarez to maintain alternative theories of relief through trial. E. Punitive Damages Dollar General seeks summary judgment on Juarez’s request for punitive damages, arguing he has not alleged facts that amount to oppressive conduct on the part of Dollar General and that he has not identified a managing agent at Dollar General who engaged in such conduct. See Mot. at 28–30; Reply at 6–8. “In an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud or malice, the plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may recover damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant.” Cal. Civ. Code § 3294(a). However, “an employer shall not be liable for [punitive] damages . . . unless the employer had advance knowledge of the unfitness of the employee and employed him or her with a conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others or authorized or ratified the wrongful conduct . . . .” Id. § 3294(b). For corporate employers, the person showing conscious disregard of the rights of others must be an “officer, director, or managing agent.” Id. Managing agents are corporate employees who “exercise substantial independent authority and judgment over decisions that ultimately determine corporate policy.” White v. Ultramar, Inc., 21 Cal. 4th 563, 573 (1999). Juarez has identified three managers, Martinez, Rivera and Varela, who allegedly discriminated against him. See Massey Dep. at 81–82; Pl.’s Juarez Dep. at 15, 40. He also deposed Carey Massey, the Senior Director of Supply Chain Human Resources for Dollar General. See Massey Decl. ¶ 2; see generally Massey Dep. A reasonable jury could find that any one of these four managers maliciously discriminated against Juarez by intentionally not granting him the accommodations he needed to continue working, by deliberately avoiding engaging with him in the interactive process, and by intentionally refusing to interact with Juarez in October 2021 when he attempted to contact Dollar General about his employment status, or by ratifying any of the foregoing conduct. See Pl.’s Juarez Dep. at 16, 40; Am. Hadjian Decl. Ex. 12 at 164; Massey Dep. at 111; Hadjian Am. Decl. Ex. 42 at 192. A reasonable jury also could find any of these four persons was a qualifying managing agent under California law, and thus award him punitive damages. See White, 21 Cal. 4th at 573. Dollar General’s motion for summary judgment on Juarez’s punitive damages request is denied. For the reasons stated above, the court grants Dollar General’s motion for summary judgment in part and denies the motion in part. Specifically, the court orders the following: • The court overrules all of Dollar General’s and Juarez’s evidentiary objections. • The court resolves Dollar General’s motion for summary judgment on aspects of Juarez’s FEHA claim (claim one) as follows: o It grants summary judgment on the FEHA harassment claim, and o Denies summary judgment on the FEHA discrimination and retaliation claims. • The court grants Dollar General’s motion for summary judgment on Juarez’s CFRA discrimination, retaliation and harassment claims (claim two). • The court denies Dollar General’s motion for summary judgment on Juarez’s wrongful termination in violation of public policy claim (claim three). • The court denies Dollar General’s motion for summary judgment on Juarez’s request for declaratory relief (claim four). • The court denies Dollar General’s motion for summary adjudication on Juarez’s request for punitive damages. • All DOE defendants are dismissed without prejudice.  The court sets the final pretrial conference for October 17, 2025, at 1:30 pm in Courtroom Three at 501 I Street, Sacramento, California, 95814. The parties shall meet and confer and file a joint pretrial statement no less than 7 days prior to the final pretrial conference. The provisions of Local Rule 281 shall apply with respect to the matters to be included in the joint pretrial statement. At least one of the attorneys who will conduct the trial for each of the parties shall attend the final pretrial conference. All motions in limine must be identified with particularity in the joint pretrial statement. In most cases, motions in limine are addressed and resolved on the morning of the first day of trial. The parties may alert the court at the final pretrial conference and in their final joint pretrial statement that a particular motion or motions should be resolved earlier. At the final pretrial conference, the court will set a briefing and hearing schedule on the motions in limine as necessary. The parties are reminded that a motion in limine is a pretrial procedural device designed to address the admissibility of evidence. The court looks with disfavor upon dispositional motions presented at the final pretrial conference or at trial in the guise of motions in limine. Also in the pretrial statement, the parties should let the court know their position regarding court- convened settlement and whether they request referral to a settlement conference presided over by another judge of the court. This order resolves ECF No. 16. DATED: September 16, 2025.