Mark Anthony Mall v. Adrienne Marie Waibel, et al.

D. Arizona

Mark Anthony Mall v. Adrienne Marie Waibel, et al.

DecidedDecember 17, 2025

Docket2:25-cv-04693

StatusUnknown

This text of Mark Anthony Mall v. Adrienne Marie Waibel, et al. (Mark Anthony Mall v. Adrienne Marie Waibel, et al.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Arizona primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Mark Anthony Mall v. Adrienne Marie Waibel, et al., (D. Ariz. 2025).

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1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 Mark Anthony Mall, No. CV-25-04693-PHX-JJT

10 Plaintiff, ORDER

11 v.

12 Adrienne Marie Waibel, et al.,

13 Defendants. 14 15 At issue is pro se Plaintiff Mark Anthony Mall’s Request for Service by USPS 16 Certified Mail and Email Confirmation by the District Court (“Service Request”) (Doc. 4), 17 Application to Proceed in Forma Pauperis (“First Application”) (Doc. 7), and Application 18 to Proceed in District Court Without Prepaying Fees or Costs (“Second Application”) 19 (Doc. 8). The Court denies the Service Request as premature, grants the Second 20 Application, denies the First Application as moot, and dismisses Plaintiff’s underlying 21 Complaint to Quiet Title and for Declaratory Relief (Doc. 1, Compl.) for lack of subject- 22 matter jurisdiction with leave to amend. 23 I. IFP APPLICATIONS 24 The Court may authorize a party to commence a civil action without prepaying court 25 fees—to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”)—if the person submits an affidavit attesting to 26 their poverty. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). Although a plaintiff seeking IFP status need not be 27 “absolutely destitute,” he or she “must allege poverty with some particularity, definiteness 28 and certainty.” Escobedo v. Applebees, 787 F.3d 1226, 1234 (9th Cir. 2015) (citation 1 modified). “[T]here is no formula set forth by statute, regulation, or case law to determine 2 when someone is poor enough to earn IFP status.” Id. at 1235. The determination is within 3 the district court’s discretion. Cal. Men’s Colony v. Rowland, 939 F.2d 854, 858 (9th Cir. 4 1991), rev’d on other grounds by 506 U.S. 194 (1993). 5 Here, Plaintiff submits two IFP Applications that contain mostly the same 6 information, except that the Second Application was prepared on the court form with 7 itemized expenses. On both, Plaintiff reports that his monthly expenses exceed his monthly 8 self-employment income. Plaintiff demonstrates an inability to pay filing fees, so the Court 9 will grant Plaintiff’s Second Application and deny the First Application as moot. 10 II. SUBJECT-MATTER JURISDICTION 11 For cases like this one in which a party is permitted to proceed IFP, 28 U.S.C. 12 § 1915(e)(2) provides that a district court must screen that party’s complaint for, among other 13 things, whether the complaint states a claim for which relief may be granted. Lopez v. Smith, 14 203 F.3d 1122, 1127–29 (9th Cir. 2000). In addition to screening IFP complaints under 15 Section 1915, “[f]ederal courts have an independent obligation to ensure that they do not 16 exceed the scope of their jurisdiction, and therefore they must raise and decide jurisdictional 17 questions that the parties either overlook or elect not to press.” Henderson ex rel. Henderson 18 v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428, 434 (2011). “If the court determines at any time that it lacks 19 subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). 20 The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing the court’s jurisdiction over his claims. 21 Subject-matter jurisdiction can be established in one of two ways. First, the plaintiff may 22 assert that the defendants violated the Constitution, a federal law, or treaty of the United 23 States, i.e., the court’s “federal question” jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Alternatively, 24 a plaintiff may invoke the court’s “diversity” jurisdiction, which applies “where the matter 25 in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is 26 between . . . citizens of different States.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). The plaintiff must state 27 the basis for the court’s jurisdiction in “a short and plain statement” in his pleadings. Fed. R. 28 Civ. P. 8(a)(1). 1 Here, Plaintiff asserts1 that “[t]his Court has federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 2 28 U.S.C. § 1331 because this action arises under the laws of the United States, including 3 the interpretation and legal effect of a Federal Land Patent and federal supremacy 4 principles.” (Compl. at 2.) Therefore, the action must “arise[] under federal law either where 5 federal law creates the cause of action or where the vindication of a right under state law 6 necessarily turns on some construction of federal law.” Unite Here Local 30 v. Sycuan Band 7 of the Kumeyaay Nation, 35 F.4th 695, 702 (9th Cir. 2022) (citation modified). 8 Plaintiff sets forth a claim for “quiet title” under 28 U.S.C. § 1655, and “declaratory 9 judgment” under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201–02. (Compl. at 4–5.) Neither of those statutes establish 10 federal question jurisdiction. First, Section 1655 “is a personal jurisdiction provision” that 11 sets forth notice procedures in a lien action but does not create an independent cause of 12 action. Cutlip v. Deutche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co., No. 15-cv-01345-BLF, 2015 LEXIS 114867, 13 at *6 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 2015) (“Plaintiff must establish that the Court has subject-matter 14 jurisdiction over this dispute before he can invoke § 1655 . . .”). Second, Sections 2201 and 15 2202 are “procedural device[s] only and require[] a separate independent basis for 16 jurisdiction.” Unite Here Local 30, 35 F.4th at 702. These two statutes do not create an 17 independent cause of action, and Plaintiff identifies no state law that would require 18 construction of either of these statutes to vindicate his alleged property right. 19 Because the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over this matter, the Court will 20 dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint. It is possible that Plaintiff can amend these defects, so the 21 Court will grant him leave to amend no later than fourteen days from the date of this Order. 22 See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1127–30. 23 III. SERVICE REQUEST 24 Plaintiff additionally requests that, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25 5(b)(2)(C)–(D), the Court order that “Defendants serve all pleadings, motions, notices, and 26 other papers in this action upon Plaintiff by United States Postal Service (USPS) Certified 27

28 1 Even if Plaintiff stated that the Court had diversity jurisdiction, Plaintiff does not assert, nor does this Court find, the requisite citizenship of the parties or the amount in controversy. 1|| Mail, Return Receipt Requested, sent to Plaintiffs mailing address.” (Doc. 4 at 1.) 2|| Plaintiff's Service Request assumes that this Court has jurisdiction to enter such orders, || which it currently lacks. Therefore, the Service Request is premature and will be denied without prejudice.

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1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 Mark Anthony Mall, No. CV-25-04693-PHX-JJT

10 Plaintiff, ORDER

11 v.

12 Adrienne Marie Waibel, et al.,

13 Defendants. 14 15 At issue is pro se Plaintiff Mark Anthony Mall’s Request for Service by USPS 16 Certified Mail and Email Confirmation by the District Court (“Service Request”) (Doc. 4), 17 Application to Proceed in Forma Pauperis (“First Application”) (Doc. 7), and Application 18 to Proceed in District Court Without Prepaying Fees or Costs (“Second Application”) 19 (Doc. 8). The Court denies the Service Request as premature, grants the Second 20 Application, denies the First Application as moot, and dismisses Plaintiff’s underlying 21 Complaint to Quiet Title and for Declaratory Relief (Doc. 1, Compl.) for lack of subject- 22 matter jurisdiction with leave to amend. 23 I. IFP APPLICATIONS 24 The Court may authorize a party to commence a civil action without prepaying court 25 fees—to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”)—if the person submits an affidavit attesting to 26 their poverty. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). Although a plaintiff seeking IFP status need not be 27 “absolutely destitute,” he or she “must allege poverty with some particularity, definiteness 28 and certainty.” Escobedo v. Applebees, 787 F.3d 1226, 1234 (9th Cir. 2015) (citation 1 modified). “[T]here is no formula set forth by statute, regulation, or case law to determine 2 when someone is poor enough to earn IFP status.” Id. at 1235. The determination is within 3 the district court’s discretion. Cal. Men’s Colony v. Rowland, 939 F.2d 854, 858 (9th Cir. 4 1991), rev’d on other grounds by 506 U.S. 194 (1993). 5 Here, Plaintiff submits two IFP Applications that contain mostly the same 6 information, except that the Second Application was prepared on the court form with 7 itemized expenses. On both, Plaintiff reports that his monthly expenses exceed his monthly 8 self-employment income. Plaintiff demonstrates an inability to pay filing fees, so the Court 9 will grant Plaintiff’s Second Application and deny the First Application as moot. 10 II. SUBJECT-MATTER JURISDICTION 11 For cases like this one in which a party is permitted to proceed IFP, 28 U.S.C. 12 § 1915(e)(2) provides that a district court must screen that party’s complaint for, among other 13 things, whether the complaint states a claim for which relief may be granted. Lopez v. Smith, 14 203 F.3d 1122, 1127–29 (9th Cir. 2000). In addition to screening IFP complaints under 15 Section 1915, “[f]ederal courts have an independent obligation to ensure that they do not 16 exceed the scope of their jurisdiction, and therefore they must raise and decide jurisdictional 17 questions that the parties either overlook or elect not to press.” Henderson ex rel. Henderson 18 v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428, 434 (2011). “If the court determines at any time that it lacks 19 subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). 20 The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing the court’s jurisdiction over his claims. 21 Subject-matter jurisdiction can be established in one of two ways. First, the plaintiff may 22 assert that the defendants violated the Constitution, a federal law, or treaty of the United 23 States, i.e., the court’s “federal question” jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Alternatively, 24 a plaintiff may invoke the court’s “diversity” jurisdiction, which applies “where the matter 25 in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is 26 between . . . citizens of different States.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). The plaintiff must state 27 the basis for the court’s jurisdiction in “a short and plain statement” in his pleadings. Fed. R. 28 Civ. P. 8(a)(1). 1 Here, Plaintiff asserts1 that “[t]his Court has federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 2 28 U.S.C. § 1331 because this action arises under the laws of the United States, including 3 the interpretation and legal effect of a Federal Land Patent and federal supremacy 4 principles.” (Compl. at 2.) Therefore, the action must “arise[] under federal law either where 5 federal law creates the cause of action or where the vindication of a right under state law 6 necessarily turns on some construction of federal law.” Unite Here Local 30 v. Sycuan Band 7 of the Kumeyaay Nation, 35 F.4th 695, 702 (9th Cir. 2022) (citation modified). 8 Plaintiff sets forth a claim for “quiet title” under 28 U.S.C. § 1655, and “declaratory 9 judgment” under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201–02. (Compl. at 4–5.) Neither of those statutes establish 10 federal question jurisdiction. First, Section 1655 “is a personal jurisdiction provision” that 11 sets forth notice procedures in a lien action but does not create an independent cause of 12 action. Cutlip v. Deutche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co., No. 15-cv-01345-BLF, 2015 LEXIS 114867, 13 at *6 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 2015) (“Plaintiff must establish that the Court has subject-matter 14 jurisdiction over this dispute before he can invoke § 1655 . . .”). Second, Sections 2201 and 15 2202 are “procedural device[s] only and require[] a separate independent basis for 16 jurisdiction.” Unite Here Local 30, 35 F.4th at 702. These two statutes do not create an 17 independent cause of action, and Plaintiff identifies no state law that would require 18 construction of either of these statutes to vindicate his alleged property right. 19 Because the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over this matter, the Court will 20 dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint. It is possible that Plaintiff can amend these defects, so the 21 Court will grant him leave to amend no later than fourteen days from the date of this Order. 22 See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1127–30. 23 III. SERVICE REQUEST 24 Plaintiff additionally requests that, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25 5(b)(2)(C)–(D), the Court order that “Defendants serve all pleadings, motions, notices, and 26 other papers in this action upon Plaintiff by United States Postal Service (USPS) Certified 27

28 1 Even if Plaintiff stated that the Court had diversity jurisdiction, Plaintiff does not assert, nor does this Court find, the requisite citizenship of the parties or the amount in controversy. 1|| Mail, Return Receipt Requested, sent to Plaintiffs mailing address.” (Doc. 4 at 1.) 2|| Plaintiff's Service Request assumes that this Court has jurisdiction to enter such orders, || which it currently lacks. Therefore, the Service Request is premature and will be denied without prejudice. 5 IT IS ORDERED granting Plaintiff's Application to Proceed in District Court 6 || Without Prepaying Fees or Costs (Doc. 8). 7 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED denying Plaintiff's Application to Proceed in Forma 8 || Pauperis (Doc. 7) as moot. 9 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED denying without prejudice Plaintiffs Certified Mail 10 || and Email Confirmation by the District Court (Doc. 4) as premature. 11 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED dismissing Plaintiff's Complaint to Quiet Title and || for Declaratory Relief (Doc. 1) with leave to amend. Plaintiff may, within fourteen days of 13 || the date of this Order, file an amended complaint. If Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint within fourteen days of the date of this Order, the Clerk of Court shall dismiss 15 || this matter without further notice. 16 Dated this 17th day of December, 2025. CN 17 “wok: 18 wefehlee— Unifga StatesDistrict Judge 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

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