Marjorie Konda Lolong v. Alberto Gonzales, Attorney General

400 F.3d 1215, 2005 WL 627779
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
DecidedMarch 18, 2005
Docket03-72384
StatusPublished
Cited by31 cases

This text of 400 F.3d 1215 (Marjorie Konda Lolong v. Alberto Gonzales, Attorney General) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Marjorie Konda Lolong v. Alberto Gonzales, Attorney General, 400 F.3d 1215, 2005 WL 627779 (9th Cir. 2005).

Opinion

BETTY B. FLETCHER, Circuit Judge.

Marjorie Konda Lolong seeks asylum. Immigration Judge (“IJ”) Miriam Hayward granted relief, but the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) reversed. We grant the petition for review because compelling evidence establishes that Lolong has a well-founded fear of future persecution on account of her Chinese ethnicity were she returned to Indonesia. Specifically, Lolong has demonstrated that Indonesians of Chinese ethnicity are a significantly disfavored group and that she is particularly at risk because she is also a Christian and a woman.

I.

Lolong has provided a voluminous record that documents ongoing discrimination and violence" against the ethnic Chinese minority in Indonesia. We commented in detail on the long history of ethnic Chinese-Indonesian persecution in a similar case, Sael v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 922 (9th Cir.2004). In Sael, we noted that there is a “cycle of waxing and waning violence” against ethnic Chinese-Indonesians. Id. at 929. During periods of heightened social, economic, or political unrest, anti-Chinese sentiment erupts into wide-scale, se-vére violence, but even during periods of “relative calm,” ethnic Chinese-Indonesians suffer discrimination and harassment, as well as violent attacks. Id. at 925-26, 929. When anti-Chinese violence erupted in May 1998, over a thousand ethnic Chinese-Indonesians were killed. Id. at 925-26.

Although the Indonesian government has made some overtures to the ethnic Chinese community, official anti-Chinese discrimination persists, and various forms of anti-Chinese violence continue to occur. Numerous signs of economic, social, and political instability indicate that more severe anti-Chinese violence is likely to erupt again in the future. There is also evidence that rogue elements within the armed forces continue to.provide support to the nongovernmental forces that are responsible for ethnic and religious persecution.

While all ethnic Chinese who remain in Indonesia face some risk of future persecution, two sub-groups are particularly at risk: ethnic Chinese women and Christians. Even during periods of relative calm, ethnic Chinese women can expect to be subjected to racial and sexual harassment whenever they leave their homes. During the 1998 riots, at least dozens, possibly hundreds, of ethnic Chinese worn- *1218 en were systematically raped. None of the perpetrators have been prosecuted. Should anti-Chinese sentiment erupt into more severe outbreaks of violence again, women will most likely be targeted again. Meanwhile, an Islamic fundamentalist movement continues to gain strength in Indonesia, and interreligious conflict has been increasing. Not surprisingly, the combination of religious intolerance and ethnic prejudice has caused violent forces to target churches and homes in ethnic Chinese communities.

Lolong left Indonesia after completing high school, because quotas limit the number of ethnic Chinese who are admitted to universities there. She was studying in the United States in May 1998, when the worst anti-Chinese rioting in Indonesia’s history occurred. After learning that one of her friends had been raped and her uncle had been severely beaten, Lolong decided to apply for asylum. In December 1998, Lolong filed a timely application. On November 16, 2000, after conducting an extensive hearing, Judge Hayward held that Lolong was eligible for asylum. She found Lolong to be fully credible and Lolong’s fear of future persecution on account of her ethnicity to be both subjectively and objectively reasonable. Subsequently, in a divided opinion (2-1) the BIA sustained the Service’s appeal and vacated the petitioner’s application for asylum. Lolong timely petitioned for review.

We have jurisdiction over Lolong’s petition pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a). Because the BIA issued a reasoned opinion after conducting its own review of the record, we review the BIA’s decision for substantial evidence. Andriasian v. INS, 180 F.3d 1033, 1040 (9th Cir.1999). In doing so, we accept Lolong’s testimony as true. Navas v. INS, 217 F.3d 646, 652 n. 3 (9th Cir.2000) (“Where the BIA does not make an explicit adverse credibility finding, we must assume that the applicant’s factual contentions are true.”).

II.

In order to be eligible for asylum, Lolong must establish that she is a refugee — a person unable or unwilling to return to Indonesia “because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account, of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” Sael, 386 F.3d at 924; 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A). The source of the persecution must be the government or forces that the government is unwilling or unable to control. Mashiri v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 1112, 1119 (9th Cir.2004).

To be “well-founded,” an asylum applicant’s “fear of persecution must be both subjectively genuine and objectively reasonable.” Sael, 386 F.3d at 924. “An applicant satisfies the subjective component by credibly testifying that she genuinely fears persecution.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Lolong satisfied this requirement with her credible testimony that she fears being hurt, raped, or killed in Indonesia.

An asylum applicant “generally satisfies the objective component in one of two ways: either by establishing that she has suffered persecution in the past or by showing that she has a good reason to fear future persecution.” Id. While a well-founded fear must be objectively reasonable, it “does not require certainty of persecution or even a probability of persecution.” Hoxha v. Ashcroft, 319 F.3d 1179, 1184 (9th Cir.2003). “Even a ten percent chance that the applicant will be persecuted in the future is enough to establish a well-founded fear.” Sael, 386 F.3d at 925 (quoting Knezevic v. Ashcroft, 367 F.3d 1206, 1212 (9th Cir.2004)).

*1219 If not relying on a showing of past persecution, an asylum applicant’s fear of future persecution may be based on either individualized or group-based risk of persecution. 1 See, e.g., Hoxha, 319 F.3d at 1182-83.

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400 F.3d 1215, 2005 WL 627779, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/marjorie-konda-lolong-v-alberto-gonzales-attorney-general-ca9-2005.