Mario V. v. Alisal Union School District

• Court: District Court, N.D. California
• Decided: May 12, 2021
• Docket: 5:18-cv-00041
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 SAN JOSE DIVISION 7 MARIO V.; GERALDINE JULIE B.; 8 I.G.V., a minor by and through Case No. 18-cv-00041-BLF Guardian Ad Litem MARIO V.; OSCAR 9 G.; CHRISTINA G.; O.D.G., a minor by and through Guardian Ad Litem ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT 10 CHRISTINA G.; Y.P., a minor by and GARCIA’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY through Guardian Ad Litem CHRISTINA JUDGMENT; AND DENYING 11 G.; HUGO P.; ALICIA P.; A.P.H., a DEFENDANT ARMENTA’S MOTION minor by and through Guardian Ad FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 12 Litem ALICIA P.; and other Similarly Situated Plaintiffs, [Re: ECF 73, 74] 13 Plaintiffs, 14 v. 15 HENRY ARMENTA and DIANA 16 GARCIA, 17 Defendants. 18

19 20 This putative class action was filed after an elementary school teacher performed blood 21 sugar testing on students without their parents’ knowledge or consent. Several students and 22 parents brought suit against the teacher, the school principal, the school, and the school district. 23 The school and the school district thereafter were dismissed, leaving only the teacher, Henry 24 Armenta, and the school principal, Diana Garcia, as defendants in the case. Armenta and Garcia 25 are sued in their individual capacities. 26 Garcia has filed a motion for summary judgment, which is joined by Armenta. For the 27 reasons discussed below, the motion for summary judgment is GRANTED as to Garcia and 1 I. BACKGROUND 2 Armenta taught fifth grade at Oscar F. Loya Elementary School (“Loya” or “the school”). 3 See Armenta Dep. 13:15-14:23, Bonner Decl. Exh. 3, ECF 75-4. He ran an after school program 4 in his classroom for students who needed help with their homework or a place to do homework. 5 See id. 15:1-11. Armenta is diabetic, and he tests his blood sugar levels in the afternoon with a 6 glaucometer. See id. 22:16-21. The test involves pricking a finger with a lancet. See id. 71:11-25. 7 In 2011, Armenta began offering to administer glaucometer tests to students who came to his 8 classroom after school and volunteered to be tested. See id. 14:16-24. Armenta rewarded children 9 who agreed to the testing with Gatorade, potato chips, and other treats. Id. 70:18-71:10. Armenta 10 did not notify the children’s parents that he would be pricking their fingers with a lancet, nor did 11 he obtain parental consent for the blood testing. See id. 26:16-24. 12 On February 6, 2017, the parents of a Loya student informed the school principal, Garcia, 13 that Armenta had performed blood testing on their child and on other children. See Garcia Decl. ¶ 14 2, ECF 73-2. Garcia reported the information to the school district, to Child Protective Services, 15 and to the Salinas Police Department. See id. ¶¶ 3, 7. Garcia also interviewed the child of the 16 reporting parents, as well as six other students. See id. ¶ 4. Garcia spoke with Armenta, who 17 admitted to doing blood sugar testing on students. See id. ¶ 5. Garcia directed Armenta to report 18 to the school district. See id. ¶ 6. Armenta has not taught at Loya since February 6, 2017. See id. 19 Armenta now works as a Lyft driver. See Armenta Dep. 13:14-19, Bonner Decl. Exh. 3, ECF 75- 20 4. 21 Several students (“Minor Plaintiffs”) and their parents (“Parent Plaintiffs”) filed this action 22 on January 3, 2018. See Compl., ECF 1. The operative SAC asserts two claims under 42 U.S.C. 23 § 1983. Claim 1, against both Garcia and Armenta, is a § 1983 claim for violation of Plaintiffs’ 24 Fourteenth Amendment rights. Claim 2, against Armenta only, is a § 1983 claim for violation of 25 Minor Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment rights. Plaintiffs seek to litigate these claims on behalf of 26 themselves, all similarly situated Loya students who were subjected to blood testing by Armenta, 27 and those children’s parents. 1 II. LEGAL STANDARD 2 “A party is entitled to summary judgment if the ‘movant shows that there is no genuine 3 dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’” City of 4 Pomona v. SQM North America Corp., 750 F.3d 1036, 1049 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. 5 P. 56(a)). “The moving party initially bears the burden of proving the absence of a genuine issue 6 of material fact.” In re Oracle Corp. Sec. Litig., 627 F.3d 376, 387 (9th Cir. 2010). “Where the 7 moving party meets that burden, the burden then shifts to the non-moving party to designate 8 specific facts demonstrating the existence of genuine issues for trial.” Id. “[T]he non-moving 9 party must come forth with evidence from which a jury could reasonably render a verdict in the 10 non-moving party’s favor.” Id. “The court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to 11 the nonmovant and draw all reasonable inferences in the nonmovant’s favor.” City of Pomona, 12 750 F.3d at 1049. “Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find 13 for the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue for trial.” Id. (internal quotation marks and 14 citation omitted). 15 III. DISCUSSION 16 Garcia has filed a motion for summary judgment on Claim 1, the only claim asserted 17 against her. Armenta, against whom Claim 1 also is asserted, has filed a joinder. The Court 18 addresses the merits of the summary judgment motion first as to Garcia, and then as to Armenta. 19 A. Garcia 20 Claim 1 is for violation of Plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment right to family association. 21 See SAC ¶¶ 33-36. “Parents and children have a well-elaborated constitutional right to live 22 together without governmental interference.” Wallis v. Spencer, 202 F.3d 1126, 1136 (9th Cir. 23 2000). That right to family association is an essential liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth 24 Amendment. See id. “The right to family association includes the right of parents to make 25 important medical decisions for their children, and of children to have those decisions made by 26 their parents rather than the state.” Id. at 1141. 27 Plaintiffs assert that Armenta violated this right by testing students’ blood without parental 1 Garcia, Plaintiffs allege that she “knew or should have known about the unsafe medical practices, 2 including pricking the fingers of multiple students using a blood sugar testing device to extract 3 blood from minor fifth (5th) grade students, happening on school premises for several years.” 4 SAC ¶ 38. Plaintiffs further allege that Garcia “fail[ed] to take action to stop or correct Defendant 5 ARMENTA’s abusive conduct.” Id. 6 Garcia contends that she is entitled to summary judgment because there is no evidence that 7 she knew about Armenta’s blood testing of students before any of the named Minor Plaintiffs were 8 pricked. Garcia also contends that Plaintiffs’ allegations that she “should have known” about 9 Armenta’s conduct are insufficient to raise a constitutional claim. Finally, Garcia argues that 10 Minor Plaintiffs have not alleged a violation of their protected liberty interests. 11 In opposition, Plaintiffs argue that there is a factual dispute as to when Garcia learned 12 about Armenta’s blood testing activities. Plaintiffs do not dispute Garcia’s contention that 13 allegations as to what she “should have known” are insufficient to raise a constitutional claim. 14 Plaintiffs argue only that there is evidence that Garcia knew Armenta was performing blood 15 testing on students without notice to or consent from their parents. Plaintiffs also argue that Minor 16 Plaintiffs have alleged a violation of their protected liberty interests under the Fourteenth 17 Amendment. 18 1. Knowledge of Armenta’s Conduct 19 There is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983. See Preschooler II v. Clark Cty. 20 Sch. Bd. of Trustees, 479 F.3d 1175, 1182 (9th Cir. 2007). However, a supervisor may be liable 21 for the constitutional violations of his or her subordinates if the supervisor participated in or 22 directed the violations, or knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them. See id. In 23 Preschooler II, the Ninth Circuit held that plaintiffs could pursue § 1983 claims against a school 24 principal and other school officials based on their alleged knowledge that a teacher was abusing a 25 student and their failure to report or take corrective action against the teacher. See id. at 1183. 26 Plaintiffs therefore may assert a § 1983 claim against Garcia on the theory that she knew Armenta 27 was testing students’ blood sugar but did not report him or take corrective action against him. 1 activities are insufficient to assert a constitutional violation. As Garcia points out, “Mere 2 negligence or lack of due care by state officials in the conduct of their duties does not trigger the 3 substantive due process protections of the Fourteenth Amendment and therefore does not state a 4 claim under section 1983.” Woodrum v. Woodward Cty., Okl., 866 F.2d 1121, 1126 (9th Cir. 5 1989). Plaintiffs’ opposition brief does not address their claim that Garcia “should have known” 6 of Armenta’s conduct, and Plaintiffs therefore have abandoned that claim. See Ramirez v. City of 7 Buena Park, 560 F.3d 1012, 1026 (9th Cir. 2009) (failure to address claims in opposition to 8 summary judgment constitutes abandonment). 9 Garcia has the initial burden on summary judgment to show that Plaintiffs cannot prevail 10 on their claim that she knew Armenta was blood testing students but failed to take corrective 11 action. Garcia submits her declaration that she learned about Armenta’s activities for the first time 12 on February 6, 2017, when parents of a student who had been subjected to blood testing 13 complained to her. See Garcia Decl. ¶¶ 9-10, ECF 73-2. Garcia states that she never observed or 14 was informed of Armenta’s testing of students’ blood sugar prior to that date. See id. ¶ 9. On 15 February 6, 2017 – the date Garcia states she first learned of Armenta’s conduct – Garcia reported 16 Armenta to the school district, Child Protective Services, and the Salinas Police Department. See 17 id. ¶¶ 3, 6-7. Armenta has not taught at Loya since February 6, 2017. See id. ¶ 6. 18 In addition to submitting her declaration, Garcia addresses record evidence that Parent 19 Plaintiff Christina G. called the school during the 2015-2016 school year to report that Armenta 20 had pricked the fingers of her two children, Minor Plaintiffs Y.P. and O.D.G. See Christina G. 21 Dep. 25:10-15, 31:1-9, Exh. A to Bengtson Decl., ECF 73-3. Christina G. testified that she spoke 22 to a school receptionist, Lydia, who promised “to speak to somebody about it.” Id. 31:1-9. Garcia 23 counters Christina G.’s deposition testimony with the declaration of the receptionist in question, 24 Lydia Valtierra, who states that she has no recollection of receiving the call described by Christina 25 G., is “confident” that she did not receive such a call, and is “confident” she never told Garcia that 26 Armenta was testing the blood of Loya students. Valtierra Decl. ¶¶ 2-3, ECF 73-1. 27 This evidence is sufficient to meet Garcia’s initial burden on summary judgment. The 1 Plaintiffs submit Christina G.’s deposition testimony, in which she described in some 2 detail the call she remembers making to Lydia Valtierra during the 2015-2016 school year. See 3 Christina G. Dep. 33:21-34:13, Exh. 1 to Bonner Decl., ECF 75-2. Christina G. testified that she 4 was embarrassed about making the call, and that she asked to use her manager’s office so that she 5 could have privacy. See id. 33:24-34:5. Christina G. trusted Valtierra, however, because Valtierra 6 was the volleyball teacher for Christina G.’s child Y. P. See id. 31:1-4. Christina G. specifically 7 remembers saying to Valtierra, “you have a daughter,” when discussing how upset Christina G. 8 was about the blood testing. See id. 34:8-13. Valtierra reportedly assured Christina G. that she 9 would tell someone about Armenta’s conduct. See id. Plaintiffs also submit Valtierra’s 10 deposition, in which she testified that she is a mandated reporter and that if she had been told 11 Armenta was testing students’ blood, she would have reported it to the principal, Garcia. Valtierra 12 Dep. 36:5-24, Exh. 2 to Bonner Decl., ECF 75-3. Plaintiffs argue that this evidence is sufficient to 13 create a triable issue of fact as to whether Christina G. reported Armenta’s blood testing activities 14 to Valtierra during the 2015-2016 school year and whether Valtierra in turn reported those 15 activities to Garcia. 16 The Court agrees that Plaintiffs’ evidence is sufficient to create a factual dispute as to 17 whether Garcia learned of Armenta’s blood testing of students during the 2015-2016 school year, 18 rather than on February 6, 2017 as she claims. Garcia’s evidentiary objections to Valtierra’s 19 testimony as too speculative is OVERRULED. Valtierra properly may testify that, as a mandated 20 reporter, she would have told Garcia about Armenta’s conduct had it been reported to her. A 21 reasonable jury could credit Christina G.’s testimony that she made the call in 2015-2016 over 22 Valtierra’s testimony that she has no recollection of receiving such a call. Further, a reasonable 23 jury could infer that upon receiving Christina G.’s call, Valtierra performed her duty as a 24 mandated reporter and informed Garcia of the claims. 25 However, even assuming for purposes of this motion that Garcia was informed of 26 Armenta’s conduct during the 2015-2016 school year, there is no evidence that the named Minor 27 Plaintiffs were tested after Christina G. called the school, thus rendering this disputed fact 1 I.G.V., O.D.G., Y.P and A.P.H. Two of the four, Y.P. and O.D.G., were pricked only once, the 2 day before Christina G. telephoned the school and spoke to Valtierra. See Christina G. Dep. See 3 id. 24:16-22, 27:11-28:8, Exh. 1 to Bonner Decl., ECF 75-2. According to Christina G., Y.P. and 4 O.D.G. never went back to Armenta’s classroom after that. See id. 24:16-22. The other two 5 Minor Plaintiffs, I.G.V. and A.P.H, cannot remember when they were pricked by Armenta. See 6 I.G.V.’s Response to Garcia’s Special Interrogs., Set 1, at 2, Exh. F. to Bengtson Decl., ECF 73-3; 7 A.P.H’s Response to Garcia’s Special Interrogs., Set 1, at 2, Exh. G to Bengtson Decl., ECF 73-3. 8 Absent some evidence that Garcia knew about Armenta’s blood testing of students prior to the 9 time the named Minor Plaintiffs were pricked, no reasonable trier of fact could find Garcia liable 10 for violating Plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment rights. 11 Accordingly, Garcia’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. The possibility that 12 other unnamed class members were injured after Christina G.’s call to the school does not save 13 this claim. Prior to class certification, if it is found that the defendants are entitled to summary 14 judgment on the named plaintiffs’ individual claims, “there is no further action for the district 15 court to take.” Corbin v. Time Warner Ent.-Advance/Newhouse P’ship, 821 F.3d 1069, 1085 (9th 16 Cir. 2016). Summary judgment for Garcia therefore is appropriate regardless of Plaintiffs’ class 17 allegations, as this action has not been certified. 18 2. Minor Plaintiffs’ Protected Liberty Interests 19 As an alternative basis for summary judgment against Minor Plaintiffs, Garcia argues that 20 Minor Plaintiffs have failed to allege a violation of their protected liberty interests under the 21 Fourteenth Amendment. In Claim 1, Plaintiffs cite California Education Code §48200 for the 22 proposition that “[s]tudents have an inalienable right to attend safe, secure and peaceful campuses 23 because of the compulsory nature of education.” SAC ¶ 40. Plaintiffs further allege that “[a] 24 special relationship is formed between a school district and its students, resulting in the imposition 25 of an affirmative duty on the school district to take all reasonable steps to protect its students.” Id. 26 According to Plaintiffs, this duty was breached by Garcia and Armenta. See SAC ¶ 41. 27 Garcia points out that § 48200, which provides that children between the ages of 6 and 18 1 safe school campus. Garcia contends that § 48200 does not give rise to a Fourteenth Amendment 2 liberty interest in a safe school campus. In their opposition brief, Plaintiffs abandon their 3 Fourteenth Amendment claim based on § 48200, instead arguing that all Plaintiffs, including 4 Minor Plaintiffs, have a Fourteenth Amendment right to family association. In reply, Garcia 5 argues that Claim 1 alleges violation of the right to family association only on behalf of Parent 6 Plaintiffs, and not on behalf of Minor Plaintiffs. 7 At the hearing, the Court engaged Plaintiffs’ counsel in a colloquy regarding the manner in 8 which the right to family association is pleaded in the SAC. In particular, the Court pointed to 9 language in Claim 1 suggesting that the right is asserted only on behalf of Parent Plaintiffs. For 10 example, Claim 1 alleges that “[p]arents and children have a fundamental right to family 11 association under the liberty interest of the 14th Amendment which includes the right to make 12 important medical decisions for their children.” SAC ¶ 35 (emphasis added). Other allegations 13 likewise are framed in terms of Parent Plaintiffs’ rights to make medical decisions for their 14 children. See SAC ¶¶ 36-38. Plaintiffs’ counsel clarified that Claim 1 is intended to assert 15 violations of the Fourteenth Amendment right to family association on behalf of both Parent 16 Plaintiffs and Minor Plaintiffs. Counsel’s assertion is consistent with Ninth Circuit authority 17 holding that “parents have a right arising from the liberty interest in family association to be with 18 their children while they are receiving medical attention,” and “children have a corresponding 19 right to the love, comfort, and reassurance of their parents while they are undergoing medical 20 procedures.” Wallis, 202 F.3d at 1142 (emphasis added). Accordingly, while Claim 1 could be 21 pleaded more artfully, the Court finds that when liberally construed Claim 1 encompasses a 22 Fourteenth Amendment claim for violation of the right to family association on behalf of both 23 Parent Plaintiffs and Minor Plaintiffs. 24 The Court declines Garcia’s invitation to disregard the language in Wallis as erroneous or 25 mere dicta. Moreover, the Court finds Garcia’s argument that children do not have a right to make 26 their own medical decisions to be a mischaracterization of Minor Plaintiffs’ claim. Under Wallis, 27 Minor Plaintiffs had the right to have their parents make medical decisions for them, and to have 1 family association includes the right of parents to make important medical decisions for their 2 || children, and of children to have those decisions made by their parents rather than the state.”). 3 Minor Plaintiffs have asserted a violation of protected liberty interests based on Armenta’s testing 4 || of their blood without parental consent. 5 Garcia’s alternative motion for summary judgment against Minor Plaintiffs is DENIED. 6 || As discussed above, however, Garcia is entitled to summary judgment on other grounds. 7 B. Armenta 8 Armenta joins Garcia’s motion for summary judgment. The bulk of the motion, addressing 9 || Garcia’s knowledge of Armenta’s conduct, does not apply to Armenta. However, Armenta joins 10 || the portion of the motion arguing that summary judgment against Minor Plaintiffs is appropriate 11 as to Claim 1, because California Education Code §48200 does not give rise to a Fourteenth 12 || Amendment liberty interest in a safe school campus. 5 13 As discussed above, Plaintiffs have abandoned their Fourteenth Amendment claim 14 grounded in § 48200. However, the Court finds that when liberally construed Claim 1 3 15 encompasses a Fourteenth Amendment claim for violation of the right to family association on 16 || behalf of both Parent Plaintiffs and Minor Plaintiffs. Consequently, Armenta is not entitled to 3 17 summary judgment against Minor Plaintiffs on Claim 1. 18 Armenta’s motion for summary judgment is DENIED. 19 IV. ORDER 20 (1) Garcia’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED; 21 (2) Armenta’s motion for summary judgment is DENIED; and 22 (3) This order terminates ECF 73 and 74. 23 24 || Dated: May 12, 2021 han an Koh Ln fame BETH LABSON FREEMAN 26 United States District Judge 27 28