NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-2580-23
MARIO QUESADA,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
COMPASSION FIRST PET HOSPITALS, and RED BANK VETERINARY HOSPITAL, 1
Defendants-Respondents. _________________________
Submitted February 24, 2026 – Decided March 12, 2026
Before Judges Sumners and Chase.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Hudson County, Docket No. L-2597-19.
Peter A. Ouda, LLC, attorney for appellant.
1 Veterinary Services of New Jersey, P.C., d/b/a Red Bank Veterinary Hospital and Veterinary Specialists of North America, LLC, d/b/a Compassion First Pet Hospital, i/p/a Compassion First Pet Hospital and Red Bank Veterinary Hospital was incorrectly pled as Compassion First Pet Hospitals and Red Bank Veterinary Hospital. Haworth Barber & Gerstman LLC, attorneys for respondents (Richard Barber and Joelle Tadros, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Plaintiff Mario Quesada appeals from a final judgment following a jury
verdict of no cause found in favor of defendants Compassion First Pet Hospitals
and Red Bank Veterinary Hospital (RBVH). After reviewing the trial record
and relevant law, we find no reversible error and affirm.
I.
Plaintiff adopted his cat, Amor, in 2013, as a therapy cat who provided
emotional support following traumatic personal losses. In 2014, Amor was
diagnosed with heart disease.
In June 2017, plaintiff returned home to his apartment, where he lived
with his mother, father, and Amor. Amor could not move and appeared
paralyzed, though he was able to drag himself with his front two paws. Plaintiff
brought Amor to RBVH, where staff examined Amor.
Afterwards, the veterinarian, Dr. Gregory Brethel, explained to plaintiff
that Amor had gone into heart failure, and that he had a blood clot cut off the
blood supply to his back legs. Dr. Brethel recommended euthanizing Amor.
A-2580-23 2 After speaking with his father by phone, plaintiff consented to proceed
with the euthanasia process. Plaintiff was able to say goodbye to Amor, who
was then euthanized. Staff then escorted plaintiff to a bereavement room, where
Dr. Brethel brought the now-deceased Amor to plaintiff.
Dr. Brethel came back after some time and, upon consent from plaintiff,
removed Amor. A few minutes later, Dr. Brethel returned to explain to plaintiff
that Amor had bitten a technician before he was euthanized and they were
obligated by law to perform a rabies test. Dr. Brethel explained that rabies
testing required a brain tissue sample sent to the lab.
While at RBVH, plaintiff filled out paperwork for Armor to be cremated
at Hamilton Pet Meadow (HPM). Plaintiff inquired about viewing Amor before
the cremation, and the RBVH staff member explained that he would have to
arrange things directly with HPM. Plaintiff then left the building to return home.
Days later, Amor's negative result for rabies came back from the lab.
RBVH staff then explained to plaintiff that they were going to transport Amor
to HPM. Plaintiff then spoke to the staff at HPM and scheduled a viewing to
see Amor.
Plaintiff drove to HPM for his viewing and a staff member named Debra
Bjorling walked out to greet him in the parking lot. Bjorling explained the
A-2580-23 3 process to plaintiff, stating that he could watch the cremation on a television
screen, and that there was a towel over Amor. Plaintiff questioned the need for
the towel, and Bjorling revealed that the towel was to cover up the mess due to
Amor no longer having his head. Bjorling directed him to the viewing room
while she took a phone call. Plaintiff then proceeded to enter the room to find
Amor on a table with a blue towel. When Bjorling returned and began showing
him around the room and pointing out the television, plaintiff asked why the
head was missing, and Bjorling explained that the RBVH always removed the
head for the rabies test.
Following Bjorling's recommendation, plaintiff called RBVH who
confirmed that, for rabies testing, the hospital was required by law to send the
head to the Department of Health (DOH). RBVH explained that they always
requested for the head to be sent back, but that the DOH had never sent one
back. Plaintiff then called the DOH multiple times trying to locate Amor's head.
Finally, the DOH returned plaintiff's call, but stated it was too late to recover
the head as it had been disposed of as medical waste.
Plaintiff left HPM and returned to his home. Distressed, plaintiff
contacted family, friends, a counselor, and eventually the police, who conducted
A-2580-23 4 a welfare check and provided a crisis hotline number after he declined going to
the hospital.
Plaintiff utilized the crisis hotline in June, July, and August of 2017.
Finding it unhelpful, plaintiff searched and found services through a licensed art
therapist, a licensed therapist, a licensed psychologist, a licensed social worker,
and two psychiatrists. He was eventually diagnosed with post-traumatic stress
disorder, generalized anxiety, and major depressive disorder.
Plaintiff then filed a complaint against defendants for negligent infliction
of emotional distress, various other negligence claims, and bailment.
Defendants filed a motion in lieu of answer to dismiss the complaint for failure
to state a claim. The trial court dismissed plaintiff's complaint and in an
unpublished decision, we reversed the trial court's dismissal of plaintiff's
complaint and remanded for further proceedings. Mario Quesada v. Compassion
First Pet Hospitals and Red Bank Veterinary Hospital, A-1226-19 (April 1,
2021).
With the complaint reinstated, defendants filed an answer and a renewed
motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint in February 2022. The trial court granted
defendants' motion to dismiss as it related to certain negligence counts, finding
that plaintiff was required to file an affidavit of merit for three of those counts,
A-2580-23 5 but denied the motion to dismiss on all remaining counts. The remaining counts
that survived were for negligent infliction of emotional distress, negligence for
misleading and concealing information regarding rabies testing, negligence for
failure to provide adequate information, and bailment.
Defendants moved for summary judgment on the remaining counts and to
bar plaintiff's expert testimony on the standard of care. Plaintiff cross-moved to
bar defendant's expert on the standard of care. The court denied defendants'
motion for summary judgment. The court found expert testimony would be
useful to help establish the applicable standard of care and denied both requests
to bar the parties' respective experts.
The parties filed multiple motions in limine, including one by defendants
to bar photographs and videos of Amor, and one by plaintiff to bar defendants'
use of testimony from another expert, Dr. Michael Laikin. The court addressed
plaintiff's motion to bar defendants' use of Dr. Laikin's testimony and
subsequently denied the motion. The court also granted defendants' motion to
bar photographs and the video of Amor.
Jury trial was held from March 5 to 14, 2024. The jury found defendants
not negligent in a five-to-one verdict. This appeal follows.
A-2580-23 6 II.
In seeking to set aside the verdict plaintiff argues on appeal that: (1) the
jury instruction and verdict sheet tainted the jury's consideration of negligence
and proximate cause; (2) the admission of expert veterinarian testimony was
inappropriate; and (3) the trial court erred in excluding photographs and videos
of Amor. We are not persuaded that these arguments, either singularly or in
combination, mandates reversal and a new trial. We discuss each of them in
turn. Before doing so, we recite some overarching principles concerning the
limited scope of our review and the stringent requirements for granting a new
trial.
A.
Jury trials are the bedrock of our system of civil justice, and the jury's
fact-finding function deserves a high degree of respect and judicial deference.
See Caldewell v. Haines, 136 N.J. 422, 432 (1994). Typically, a narrow scope
of review applies to civil jury verdicts. Jacobs v. Jersey Cent. Power & Light
Co., 452 N.J. Super. 494, 502 (App. Div. 2017). Jury verdicts are "entitled to
considerable deference and 'should not be overthrown except upon the basis of
a carefully reasoned and factually supported and articulated determination, after
canvassing the record and weighing the evidence, that the continued viability of
A-2580-23 7 the judgment would constitute a manifest denial of justice.'" Risko v. Thompson
Muller Auto. Grp., Inc., 206 N.J. 506, 521 (2011) (quoting Baxter v. Fairmont
Food Co., 74 N.J. 588, 597-98 (1977)). See also Boryszewski v. Burke, 380
N.J. Super. 361, 391, (App. Div. 2005) (citations omitted), certif. denied, 186
N.J. 242, 8 (2006). In assessing the strength of the proofs, a jury verdict is
"impregnable unless so distorted and wrong, in the objective and articulated
view of a judge, as to manifest with utmost certainty a plain miscarriage of
justice." Doe v. Arts, 360 N.J. Super. 492, 502-03, (App. Div. 2003) (quoting
Carrino v. Novotny, 78 N.J. 355, 360 (1979)); see R. 4:49-1.
Negligent infliction of emotional distress "can be understood as negligent
conduct that is the proximate cause of emotional distress in a person to whom
the actor owes a legal duty to exercise reasonable care." Decker v. Princeton
Packet, Inc., 116 N.J. 418, 429 (1989). The basic elements of an action of
negligent infliction of emotional distress are: "(a) defendant owed a duty of
reasonable care to plaintiff; (b) defendant breached that duty; (c) plaintiff
suffered severe emotional distress; and (d) defendant's breach of duty was the
proximate cause of the injury." Dello Russo v. Nagel, 358 N.J. Super. 254, 269
(App. Div. 2003) (citing Decker, 116 N.J. at 429).
A-2580-23 8 B.
Applying these principles, we begin with plaintiff's claim, raised for the
first time on appeal, that the court committed reversible error because the jury
charge and jury verdict sheet tainted the jury's consideration of the issues of
negligence and proximate cause. Specifically, plaintiff argues the court
improperly combined duty, breach, and proximate cause in one question and that
instruction and verdict sheet was improper. We disagree.
We review a "trial court's instruction on the law de novo." Palmer v.
Flagship Resort Dev. Corp., 481 N.J. Super. 465, 479 (App. Div. 2025) (quoting
Sackman Enters., Inc. v. Mayor & Counsel of Belmar, 478 N.J. Super. 68, 75
(App. Div. 2024)). "[I]n construing a jury charge, a court must examine the
charge as a whole, rather than focus on individual errors in isolation." Viscik v.
Fowler Equip. Co., 173 N.J. 1, 18 (2002) (citing Ryder v. Westinghouse Elec.
Corp., 128 F.3d 128, 137 (3d Cir. 1997)). "The test to be applied . . . is whether
the charge as a whole is misleading, or sets forth accurately and fairly the
controlling principles of law." State v. Jackmon, 305 N.J. Super. 274, 299 (App.
Div. 1997) (quoting State v. Sette, 259 N.J. Super. 156, 190-91 (App. Div.
1992)).
A-2580-23 9 Although our review of the jury charge is de novo, where a party does not
object to a jury instruction, "there is a presumption that the charge was not error
and was unlikely to prejudice the [party's] case." State v. Montalvo, 229 N.J.
300, 320 (2017) (quoting State v. Singleton, 211 N.J. 157, 182 (2012)). If the
appealing party did not object to the jury instruction, the review required is by
the plain error standard. Willner v. Vertical Reality, Inc., 235 N.J. 65, 80 (2018);
State v. Wakefield, 190 N.J. 397, 473 (2007). The plain error standard means
that "[a]ny error or omission shall be disregarded by the appellate court unless
it is of such a nature as to have been clearly capable of producing an unjust
result." R. 2:10-2.
Plaintiff did not object to the trial court's verdict sheets as presented. The
first question on the jury verdict sheet read, "[W]as the defendant negligent, and
was that negligen[ce] a proximate cause of harm?" Defendants, not plaintiff,
objected to the language, seeking for it to be broken down to separate the
questions and arguing that, as written, it presumed defendants were negligent .
In response to defendants' objection, the trial court reasoned, "So duty, breach,
causation[,] all of those things are in the charge itself, but I don't think it's
necessary. Because to find they were negligent you have to find there was duty,
you have to find there was a breach and then you have this question of
A-2580-23 10 causation." When asked his position, plaintiff's then-counsel stated, "I agree
with [the] Court." In essence, plaintiff deferred to the trial court's discretion for
choosing the jury instruction language. After closing arguments, prior to
deliberations, the trial court instructed the jury:
If you find that [RBVH] was negligent, you must find that the hospital's negligence was the proximate cause of the injury before you can find that [RBVH] was responsible for Mario Quesada's claimed injury. If is the duty of — it is the duty of Mario Quesada to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the negligence of [RBVH]was a proximate cause of the injury alleged to have resulted from [RBVH]'s negligence.
There was no objection to this charge by defendant. Therefore, this matter is
reviewed for plain error.
The jury instructions utilized in this case were not capable of producing
an unjust result. Plaintiff's concern is that the compound question to the jury
left open-ended whether the jury found defendants negligent but not a proximate
cause of plaintiff's harm, or whether they did not find defendants negligent at
all. However, any step of the way, if the jury responded "no" to duty, breach,
or causation, the outcome remains the same. See Russo, 358 N.J. Super. at 269.
A-2580-23 11 Plaintiff also argues that the jury instruction erroneously required the
jurors to consider whether defendants' negligence was "the" proximate cause, as
opposed to "a" proximate cause, of plaintiff's injury. We are not convinced.
The trial court's explanation of proximate cause very clearly represented
the notion to the jury that it only needed to find that defendants' negligence was
a proximate cause, not the sole cause of plaintiff's injury. While giving the jury
instructions, in addition to the instruction above, the court also provided further
explanation to the jury, instructing them that they had to determine whether
defendants' "negligence was a substantial factor that singly or in combin ation
with other causes" injured plaintiff. Furthermore, when the trial court read the
jury verdict sheet to the jury, all phrases stated "a proximate cause."
When evaluating the jury instruction as a whole, there is no question that
the correct legal standard was conveyed to the jury. See Viscik, 173 N.J. at 18.
The instructions defined negligence and proximate cause, making it clear that
proximate cause was not required to be one singular cause. The jury instructions
correctly reflected that in the verdict sheet, and that even if duty, breach, and
proximate cause had been separate questions, the outcome would have been the
same.
A-2580-23 12 C.
Plaintiff next contends that a new trial is warranted because the admission
of expert testimony confused the jury, was unnecessary, and inappropriate. He
argues that whether defendants were negligent was within the common
knowledge of a lay jury and, therefore, it was improper to permit veterinary
experts to testify. Plaintiff's arguments are unavailing.
"In general, the trial court's decision to admit expert testimony is entitled
to deference and reviewed for an abuse of discretion." Biunno, Weissbard &
Zegas, Current N.J. Rules of Evidence, cmt. 1.2.5 on N.J.R.E. 702 (2025-2026);
see State v. Kuropchak, 221 N.J. 368, 385 (2015). There is an abuse of
discretion when a finding is "'made without a rational explanation, inexplicably
departed from established policies, or rested on an impermissible basis.'" Iliadis
v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 191 N.J. 88, 123 (2007) (quoting Flagg v. Essex Cnty.
Prosecutor, 171 N.J. 561, 571 (2002)).
N.J.R.E. 702 provides that "[i]f scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine
a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience,
training, or education may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise."
Ibid. For expert testimony to be admissible,
A-2580-23 13 (1) the intended testimony must concern a subject matter that is beyond the ken of the average juror; (2) the field testified to must be at a state of the art such that an expert's testimony could be sufficiently reliable; and (3) the witness must have sufficient expertise to offer the intended testimony.
[Landrigan v. Celotex Corp., 127 N.J. 404, 413 (1992) (citing State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 208 (1984)).]
"In most negligence cases, the plaintiff is not required to establish the
applicable standard of care." Davis v. Brickman Landscaping, Ltd., 219 N.J.
395, 406 (2014) (citing Sanzari v. Rosenfeld, 34 N.J. 128, 134 (1961)). Those
cases ordinarily involve facts where "a layperson's common knowledge is
sufficient to permit a jury to find that the duty of care has been breached without
the aid of an expert's opinion." Giantonnio v. Taccard, 291 N.J. Super. 31, 43
(App. Div. 1996). In those cases, "[t]he applicable standard of conduct is then
supplied by the jury[,] which is competent to determine what precautions a
reasonably prudent man [or woman] in the position of the defendant would have
taken." Sanzari, 34 N.J. at 134. However, in some cases, "the jury is not
competent to supply the standard by which to measure the defendant's conduct."
Id. at 134-35. Generally, an appellate court "will not set aside civil verdicts on
this basis unless the court has abused its discretion, including with respect to
A-2580-23 14 issues of the admissibility of expert opinion." Jacobs, 452 N.J. Super. at 502
(citing Hisenaj v. Kuehner, 194 N.J. 6, 16 (2008)).
To determine if expert testimony is necessary, the court properly considers
"whether the matter to be dealt with is so esoteric that jurors of common
judgment and experience cannot form a valid judgment as to whether the
conduct of the [defendant] was reasonable." Butler v. Acme Mkts., Inc., 89 N.J.
270, 283 (1982). In its decision in Butler, our Court considered expert testimony
to be "an aid to a jury and its use is encouraged in future cases. But its absence
is not fatal." Ibid. There, the Court determined that "[t]he jury's finding on the
reasonableness of defendant's behavior was one where 'fair minded men may
honestly differ as to the conclusion drawn from disputed facts'" and therefore,
expert testimony would be helpful to the jury. Ibid.
Plaintiff provides no support for his argument that the expert testimony
confused the jury. The conduct and communication regarding detailing rabies
testing to pet owners was called into question by plaintiff. Moreover, "[t]he
opinion of witnesses, possessing peculiar skill, is admissible whenever the
subject matter of inquiry is such, that inexperienced persons are unlikely to
prove capable of forming a correct judgment upon it, without such assistance."
Cook v. State, 24 N.J.L. 843, 852 (E. & A. 1855). At issue here was whether
A-2580-23 15 Dr. Brethel was negligent in telling plaintiff that Amor required a brain tissue
sample for rabies testing when the process involved removing Amor's head and
sending it to the DOH. Dr. Brethel testified he softened his language when
describing this process because plaintiff was "distraught" and "still crying and
wailing, and very, very emotional."
Ultimately, both sides called experts to testify to the standard of care in
advising a pet owner of what a rabies test entailed. Without having the benefit
of veterinarians providing their opinions, the jury would have nothing to
compare Dr. Brethel's practice to, which could have led to confusion as to what
was a common and accepted practice. Whether Dr. Brethel was correct in
mitigating his language rather than telling a distraught individual that the
individual's beloved pet required decapitation for rabies testing was "beyond the
ken of the average layman." Biunno et al., cmt. 1.2.5 on N.J.R.E. 702.
The use of expert testimony here gave two independent opinions as to how
veterinarians should tell a pet owner that their beloved animal required
decapitation for rabies testing. Defendant's expert opined Dr. Brethel's softened
language was appropriate. In contrast, plaintiff's expert opined that the owner
needed all the facts regardless of how upset the owner presented. Neither
opinion confused the jury. The motion judge did not abuse its discretion when
A-2580-23 16 it determined that experts could testify to help a jury understand the general
practice and lack of strict standard for addressing the situation with a pet owner.
D.
We are also convinced the court did not err in excluding photographs and
a video of Amor. The "admission of photographs having some probative value,
even where cumulative and somewhat inflammatory, rests within the discretion
of the trial judge." State v. Moore, 122 N.J. 420, 466-67 (1991) (quoting State
v. Belton, 60 N.J. 103, 109 (1972)). "On appellate review, the decision of the
trial court must stand unless it can be shown that the trial court palpably abused
its discretion, that is, that its finding was so wide of the mark that a manifest
denial of justice resulted." State v. Carter, 91 N.J. 86, 106 (1982).
A photograph must be relevant, meaning it must "hav[e] a tendency in
reason to prove or disprove any fact of consequence to the determination of the
action." N.J.R.E. 401. If it is relevant, it "may be excluded if its probative value
is substantially outweighed by the risk of: (a) [u]ndue prejudice, confusion of
issues, or misleading the jury; or (b) [u]ndue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence." N.J.R.E. 403.
Plaintiff submitted forty-five photographs with the intention of proffering
them to show plaintiff happy, smiling, and relaxed. In reviewing the
A-2580-23 17 photographs, the court confirmed that some photographs had not been provided
to the defense. The court then ruled that anything that hadn't been turned over
in discovery would not be allowed.
The court then asked for plaintiff to choose two or three photographs to
focus on during the argument. Plaintiff chose three photographs. The first one
showed there was another cat in the home at some point in time during Amor's
time in the home. Plaintiff argued that photograph proved he had another cat
and therefore could not be painted as being "too overly attached to one cat." The
second photo depicted plaintiff smiling, which plaintiff argued "establishes that
prior to this incident he was –– to the extent that the photo can show –– not
necessarily suffering from a mental health disorder that causes him to be the
way he is now, not necessarily, constantly morose, panicky, angry." The court
barred the second photograph, reasoning, "I don't find that that establishes what
you're saying it establishes." As to the third photograph, which depicted
plaintiff's mother and Amor, plaintiff put forth the same argument. In denying
the use of that photograph, the court reasoned, "Again I don't find — without
another purpose for them being offered one photograph of him smiling doesn't
negate what the expert is saying. Testimony can be established through him
and/or his father as to his condition prior to this incident happening".
A-2580-23 18 In addressing the videos, plaintiff conceded that, despite submitting five
videos for use at trial, he only intended to introduce one of them. Plaintiff
argued that the video, not submitted on appeal, showed plaintiff before the
incident, playing with his mother and his cat, acting normally. In denying the
introduction of the video, the court found that "[i]t's twenty-one seconds. You
. . . .can't even see your client in the video. I don't see how that helps establish
better than testimony would how he was prior to this incident. So[,] I just don't
see that that is relevant and should be admitted either."
Plaintiff's contention was that the photographs would show plaintiff as a
"fully functional person" prior to the incident. The photographs in question
depicted snapshots of plaintiff, Amor, and plaintiff's parents. "Day in the life"
tapes may assist jurors in determining "the impact of the injuries upon the
subject's day-to-day activities." Schiavo v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp.,
282 N.J. Super. 362, 368 (App. Div. 1995). However, those tapes are typically
only admitted after "the trial judge has examined the content to determine
whether it is relevant and probative and is an accurate representation." Ibid.
The video plaintiff submitted to the court did not depict plaintiff. It could
not be considered a "day in the life" presentation to present the impact of
plaintiff's injuries on his day-to-day activities. Furthermore, the photographs
A-2580-23 19 plaintiff sought to admit did not establish that, prior to the events in question,
plaintiff was not suffering from a mental health disorder. Plaintiff submitted
forty photographs; however, only six depict plaintiff. The photographs would
only be cumulative evidence because both plaintiff and his father testified as to
the differences between how plaintiff was before the event and after. Velazquez
v. Jiminez, 336 N.J. Super. 10, 43 (App. Div. 2000) (finding that the information
depicted in video tapes sought to be presented at trial was cumulative in view of
the extensive testimony provided by the witnesses, where the plaintiff testified,
her husband testified, and nurses testified at length). The photographs and
videos did not establish any fact of consequence as it relates to plaintiff's
negligent infliction of emotional distress claim. As such, the court did not abuse
its discretion in barring the photographs and video.
To the extent we have not specifically addressed any other contentions
raised by plaintiff, they lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in this
opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(B) and (E).
Affirmed.
A-2580-23 20