Marino v. Ragen

Supreme Court

Marino v. Ragen

332 U.S. 561, 68 S. Ct. 240, 92 L. Ed. 2d 170, 1947 U.S. LEXIS 1513

CourtSupreme Court of the United States

DecidedJanuary 12, 1948

Docket93

StatusPublished

Cited by148 cases

This text of 332 U.S. 561 (Marino v. Ragen) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of the United States primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Marino v. Ragen, 332 U.S. 561, 68 S. Ct. 240, 92 L. Ed. 2d 170, 1947 U.S. LEXIS 1513 (1948).

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Opinions

Per Curiam.

Petitioner sought a writ of habeas corpus in the Circuit Court of Winnebago County, Illinois, alleging that his conviction in 1925 on a charge of murder was the result of a denial of his rights under the Federal Constitution. That court, after a hearing, quashed the writ; and as its order cannot be reviewed by any higher Illinois court under Illinois practice, this petition for a writ of certiorari is properly addressed to this Court. See Woods v. [562]*562Nierstheimer, 328 U. S. 211; 15 U. of Chic. L. Rev. 118, 122.

The facts conceded by respondent are as follows:

The common-law record recites that petitioner was arraigned in open court and advised through interpreters of the meaning and effect of a plea of guilty and that petitioner signed a statement waiving jury trial and pleading guilty. He was sentenced to life imprisonment. It does not appear, however, that an attorney was appointed to represent him. The waiver was not in fact signed by him, and no plea of guilty was entered at the trial. He was 18 years old at that time and had been in this country only two years. He did not understand the English language and it is doubtful that he understood American trial court procedure. The arresting officer served as an interpreter for petitioner at the original trial.

The State of Illinois speaking through the Attorney General admits the foregoing facts, confesses error, and consents to a reversal of the judgment below. He states that the writ of habeas corpus is a proper remedy in Illinois in this case because the facts, which he concedes to be a denial of due process of law under the decisions of this Court, were known to the court at the time of the original trial, though they were not a matter of record at the trial. Whether or not on this showing habeas corpus is an appropriate remedy in the court to correct a denial of due process is a question of state law as to which we accept the concession of the State’s Attorney General.

In light of the confession of error (see Young v. United States, 315 U. S. 257; Bozza v. United States, 330 U. S. 160; cf. Baltzer v. United States, 248 U. S. 593) and the undisputed facts, we conclude that petitioner was denied the due process of law which the Fourteenth Amendment requires.

[563]*563Permission to proceed in forma pauperis is granted. The petition for a writ of certiorari is granted and the judgment below is vacated and remanded to the Circuit Court.

So ordered.

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Per Curiam.

Petitioner sought a writ of habeas corpus in the Circuit Court of Winnebago County, Illinois, alleging that his conviction in 1925 on a charge of murder was the result of a denial of his rights under the Federal Constitution. That court, after a hearing, quashed the writ; and as its order cannot be reviewed by any higher Illinois court under Illinois practice, this petition for a writ of certiorari is properly addressed to this Court. See Woods v. [562]*562Nierstheimer, 328 U. S. 211; 15 U. of Chic. L. Rev. 118, 122.

The facts conceded by respondent are as follows:

The common-law record recites that petitioner was arraigned in open court and advised through interpreters of the meaning and effect of a plea of guilty and that petitioner signed a statement waiving jury trial and pleading guilty. He was sentenced to life imprisonment. It does not appear, however, that an attorney was appointed to represent him. The waiver was not in fact signed by him, and no plea of guilty was entered at the trial. He was 18 years old at that time and had been in this country only two years. He did not understand the English language and it is doubtful that he understood American trial court procedure. The arresting officer served as an interpreter for petitioner at the original trial.

The State of Illinois speaking through the Attorney General admits the foregoing facts, confesses error, and consents to a reversal of the judgment below. He states that the writ of habeas corpus is a proper remedy in Illinois in this case because the facts, which he concedes to be a denial of due process of law under the decisions of this Court, were known to the court at the time of the original trial, though they were not a matter of record at the trial. Whether or not on this showing habeas corpus is an appropriate remedy in the court to correct a denial of due process is a question of state law as to which we accept the concession of the State’s Attorney General.

In light of the confession of error (see Young v. United States, 315 U. S. 257; Bozza v. United States, 330 U. S. 160; cf. Baltzer v. United States, 248 U. S. 593) and the undisputed facts, we conclude that petitioner was denied the due process of law which the Fourteenth Amendment requires.

[563]*563Permission to proceed in forma pauperis is granted. The petition for a writ of certiorari is granted and the judgment below is vacated and remanded to the Circuit Court.

So ordered.

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Bluebook (online)

332 U.S. 561, 68 S. Ct. 240, 92 L. Ed. 2d 170, 1947 U.S. LEXIS 1513, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/marino-v-ragen-scotus-1948.

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