Marine Products Co. v. United States

42 Cust. Ct. 154
CourtUnited States Customs Court
DecidedMay 14, 1959
DocketC.D. 2080
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 42 Cust. Ct. 154 (Marine Products Co. v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Customs Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Marine Products Co. v. United States, 42 Cust. Ct. 154 (cusc 1959).

Opinions

Donlon, Judge:

Merchandise invoiced and entered as canned pimientos was imported from Mexico at San Diego, Calif. Classification was claimed under the eo nomine provision for pimientos, prepared or preserved, of paragraph 775 of the Tariff Act of 1930, with duty at 6 cents per pound. The collector, however, classified the merchandise as vegetables, prepared or preserved, not specially provided for, with duty under the not-specially-provided-for classification of paragraph 775 at 35 per centum ad valorem.

Five cases have been consolidated for trial. Plaintiff’s protests renew the entry claim for eo nomine classification as pimientos. By protest amendment, plaintiff claims also that duty should be computed only on the net weight of the pimientos, excluding the liquid or other packing material in the cans.

Plaintiff introduced the testimony of two witnesses; also four exhibits. Defendant’s case consists of one exhibit. Plaintiff filed a [155]*155brief. Defendant elected not to do so. This is not to say, however, that defendant failed to participate actively in the trial. Through cross-examination of plaintiff’s witnesses and frequent objection to evidence which plaintiff adduced, defendant has indicated what its position is.

Government counsel stated to the court: “It’s not a question whether it [this merchandise] is a chile or whether it is a pimiento. The Government doesn’t say that it is a chile. The Government says that it is a hybrid, and, therefore, it is not a pimiento.” (K. 60.)

In our view of the matter, tariff classification is not necessarily determined, as defendant asserts, according to botanical status. There are other considerations, and those we shall weigh after first considering this contention on the part of defendant.

It is not established by proof that the merchandise is, in fact, a hybrid. Assuming arguendo that it is a hybrid, as defendant asserts that it is, the issue raised by defendant is whether this fact alone, absent other proofs, removes the merchandise from eo nomine tariff classification. In our opinion, it does not.

Modern botanical science has concentrated on the improvement of species and varieties through hybridization. This is matter of common knowledge, of which judges are not unaware. Farmers, and many other people, know about hybrid corn. Gardeners are familiar with hybrid roses and other hybrid plants. To suggest that hybrid corn is not corn, botanically, or a hybrid rose is not, botanically, a rose, would probably surprise and puzzle both scientists and laymen.

But we do not have to decide whether hybrid corn, roses, or pimientos are or are not, in a botanical sense, corn, roses, or pimientos. We are not called upon to decide, now, whether hybrid corn is corn in the tariff sense, or a hybrid rose is a rose in the tariff sense. If this merchandise is, in fact, pimientos in the tariff sense, we hold that the selective inbreeding of species, or varieties, which constitutes hybridization, does not ipso facto remove the pimientos from eo nomine tariff classification as such.

This leaves for our consideration the chief issue, which is whether or not these vegetables are pimientos for tariff purposes.

The label description of the merchandise is “Hybrid Chile Pimientos.” It is alleged that this desciiption was required by the United States Food and Drug Administration. Whether or not this is so, characterization of imported merchandise by governmental agencies for other than tariff purposes does not determine tariff classification. United States v. Mercantil Distribuidora et al., 43 C.C.P.A. (Customs) 111, C.A.D. 617.

The record is fairly clear that this merchandise is bought and sold, in the usual course of commerce, as pimientos (exhibit 3); that it [156]*156is used as pimientos are used (R. 26); that it is red, like a pimiento (R. 55, 58); that it can be eaten as a pimiento is eaten, that is, it is tolerable in the mouth, and tastes more like a pimiento than like a chile (R. 21, 42, 57, 62); that the texture of the vegetable flesh resembles that of a pimiento (R. 67).

Eo nomine meaning, established when a tariff act was enacted, embraces subsequently developed variations which come within that meaning. In Davies Turner Co. v. United States, 45 C.C.P.A. (Customs) 89, C.A.D. 669, our appeals court said:

The meaning of eo nomme provisions is to be determined as of the date of enactment but, when so determined, that meaning will embrace all subsequently created articles which fall within it. Tariff acts, therefore, are made for the future in the sense that they embrace articles not in existence at the time of enactment, but the meaning of words used in such acts is fixed at the time of enactment and does not fluctuate as the meaning of words might subsequently vary. [Pp. 41, 42.]

What, then, was the meaning which Congress intended, in 1930, in making eo nomine provision for pimientos ?

The first eo nomme provision for pimientos was in the Tariff Act of 1922. Previously, imported canned pimientos, described as “pimientos morrones,” had been judicially classified as canned or preserved vegetables. Austin, Nichols & Co. v. United States, 6 Ct. Cust. Appls. 9 (1915).

In the 1922 act, eo nomme provision was for “whole pimientos, packed in brine or in oil, or prepared or preserved in any manner,” and this was inserted in the paragraph for “Spices and spice seeds.” Tariff Act of 1922, paragraph 779.

Congressional restriction of the 1922 eo nomine provision to whole pimientos and its location in the paragraph for spices, viewed in conjunction with the prior judicial classification of pimientos as vegetables, gave rise to litigation in order to determine how pimientos that were not whole should be classified under the 1922 act. Considering what Congress intended by the tariff term “whole pimientos,” our appeals court said, in Von Bremen, Asche & Co. v. United States, 12 Ct. Cust. Appls. 407 (1924) :

If Congress had intended by the new provision to cover parts of pimientos as well as whole ones, it were easy to have said so. It will be presumed to know that such parts of pimientos as are here involved would be dutiable as vegetables prepared or preserved under the opinion of this court in the Austin, Nichols case, and if it intended to exclude the same from the effect of that decision apt and unambiguous language was at hand with which to express that intent.
The view most favorable to the Goverment as to the meaning of the term “whole pimientos” is that it is ambiguous, and so conceding, without admitting, the importer is entitled to the benefit of the doubt as to its interpretation.
[157]*157We feel clear, however, that the term “whole pimientos” does not include the pimientos here which have been deprived of their shin, core, seeds, and part of the pulp, and thereby reduced in weight at least SO per cent, perhaps more. [P. 410.]

Subsequently, in La Manna, Azema & Farnan v. United States, 14 Ct. Cust. Appls. 289 (1926), the court gave judicial effect to a proved commercial meaning for “whole” pimientos, under the 1922 act.

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42 Cust. Ct. 154, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/marine-products-co-v-united-states-cusc-1959.