1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 MARIAN ANTHONY, Case No.: 25-CV-1551 JLS (AHG)
12 Plaintiff, ORDER (1) GRANTING MOTION 13 v. TO DISMISS COMPLAINT WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND 14 MICHAEL HUBBARD, AND (2) DENYING AS MOOT 15 Defendant. PROPOSED PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS 16
17 (ECF Nos. 4, 9) 18 19 Presently before the Court are Defendant Michael Hubbard’s Motion to Dismiss 20 Complaint (“Mot.,” ECF No. 4) and Request for Judicial Notice in Support of Motion to 21 Dismiss Complaint (“RJN,” ECF No. 4-2). Also before the Court are Plaintiff Marian 22 Anthony’s Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Complaint (“Opp’n,” ECF No. 5) 23 and Defendant’s Reply in support thereof (“Reply,” ECF No. 14). The Court has also 24 received Plaintiff’s Proposed Petition for Writ of Mandamus to Compel Disclosure of 25 Judicial Administrative Records (“Pet.,” ECF No. 9). For the reasons stated below, the 26 Court GRANTS WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF 27 No. 4) and DENIES AS MOOT Plaintiff’s Petition for Writ of Mandamus (ECF No. 9). 28 / / / 1 BACKGROUND 2 Plaintiff Marian Anthony filed this lawsuit against Defendant Michael Hubbard, a 3 Senior Deputy Clerk for the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division 4 One (“Court of Appeal”), for “behaving willfully repugnant to the professional duties and 5 conduct of a senior deputy clerk,” thus preventing Plaintiff from filing legal documents 6 and pursuing his appeal. Compl. ¶ 1. Plaintiff alleges that from January 16, 2025, to May 7 30, 2025, Defendant, “acting under color of state law, engaged in a pattern of illegal[,] 8 abusive, hostile, and obstructive conduct,” “including yelling, emotional embroilment, 9 refusing filings without valid lawful reasons, and denying motions as a judicial officer 10 without judicial authority.” Id. Plaintiff brings civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 11 and seeks monetary and injunctive relief, including punitive damages against Defendant. 12 Id. ¶¶ 17–32. Now before the Court is Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. 13 MOTION TO DISMISS 14 I. Legal Standard 15 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) permits a party to raise by motion the 16 defense that the complaint “fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” To 17 survive a 12(b)(6) motion, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as 18 true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 19 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is 20 facially plausible when the facts pled “allow[] the court to draw the reasonable inference 21 that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. That is not to say that the claim 22 must be probable, but there must be “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has 23 acted unlawfully.” Id. Facts “‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability” fall short of 24 a plausible entitlement to relief. Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). 25 Though this plausibility standard “does not require ‘detailed factual 26 allegations,’ . . . it [does] demand[] more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully- 27 harmed-me accusation.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). In other words, a 28 complaint will not suffice “if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual 1 enhancement.’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). Put 2 differently, “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” 3 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. 4 Review under Rule 12(b)(6) requires a context-specific analysis involving the 5 Court’s “judicial experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. In performing 6 that analysis, “a district court must accept as true all facts alleged in the complaint, and 7 draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.” Wi-LAN Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 8 382 F. Supp. 3d 1012, 1020 (S.D. Cal. 2019). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not 9 permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has 10 alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. 11 at 679 (second alternation in original). If a complaint does not survive Rule 12(b)(6), a 12 court grants leave to amend unless it determines that no modified contention “consistent 13 with the challenged pleading could . . . possibly cure the deficiency.” Schreiber Distrib. 14 Co. v. Serv-Well Furniture Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1401 (9th Cir. 1986). 15 II. Analysis 16 Defendant seeks to dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint on four grounds: (1) quasi-judicial 17 immunity bars Plaintiff’s damages claims; (2) Section 1983 foreclosures injunctive relief 18 against judges and clerks; (3) Plaintiff lacks standing to obtain injunctive relief; and (4) the 19 Younger abstention precludes Plaintiff’s entire action.1 ECF No. 4-1 (“Mem.”) at 2. 20 A. Quasi-Judicial Immunity 21 Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s damages claims are barred since court clerks and 22 staff are immunized “from damages for civil rights violations when they perform tasks that 23 are an integral part of the judicial process” under the doctrine of quasi-judicial immunity. 24 Id. at 4 (quoting Mullis v. U.S. Bankr. Ct. for Dist. Of Nev., 828 F.2d 1385, 1390 (9th Cir. 25 26 1 Defendant requests judicial notice of Plaintiff’s cases in the Superior Court of California, County of San Diego, and the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One. See generally RJN. 27 Because the Court does not rely on information from Plaintiff’s Superior Court and Court of Appeal 28 proceedings in reaching its conclusion below, the Court DENIES AS MOOT Defendant’s Request for 1 1987)). Defendant argues that his alleged conduct—refusing to accept filings “without 2 valid reasons,” issuing “defective” orders “without judicial authority” and yelling at 3 Plaintiff when he attempted to file a document—are inarguably tasks “that are an integral 4 part of the judicial process” protected by the doctrine. Id. at 5–6. Plaintiff responds that 5 Defendant’s conduct is not immunized since quasi-judicial immunity “does not extend to 6 administrative or ministerial tasks, such as routine filing refusals or enforcement of non- 7 judicial directives.” Opp’n at 3 (citing Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 229 (1988)). 8 Instead, Defendant’s conduct is “subject only to qualified immunity, which Defendant has 9 not invoked or shown applies.” Id. at 4 (citing Mullis, 828 F.2d at 1390). 10 The Court finds that Defendant’s alleged conduct is protected by quasi-judicial 11 immunity. “Court clerks have absolute quasi-judicial immunity from damages for civil 12 rights violations when they perform tasks that are an integral part of the judicial process.” 13 Mullis, 828 F.2d at 1390 (citations omitted). The Ninth Circuit has “‘extended absolute 14 quasi-judicial immunity’ to ‘nonjudicial officers for purely administrative acts—acts 15 which taken out of context would appear ministerial, but when viewed in context are 16 actually a part of the judicial function.’” Fort v. Washington, 41 F.4th 1141, 1144 (9th Cir.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 MARIAN ANTHONY, Case No.: 25-CV-1551 JLS (AHG)
12 Plaintiff, ORDER (1) GRANTING MOTION 13 v. TO DISMISS COMPLAINT WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND 14 MICHAEL HUBBARD, AND (2) DENYING AS MOOT 15 Defendant. PROPOSED PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS 16
17 (ECF Nos. 4, 9) 18 19 Presently before the Court are Defendant Michael Hubbard’s Motion to Dismiss 20 Complaint (“Mot.,” ECF No. 4) and Request for Judicial Notice in Support of Motion to 21 Dismiss Complaint (“RJN,” ECF No. 4-2). Also before the Court are Plaintiff Marian 22 Anthony’s Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Complaint (“Opp’n,” ECF No. 5) 23 and Defendant’s Reply in support thereof (“Reply,” ECF No. 14). The Court has also 24 received Plaintiff’s Proposed Petition for Writ of Mandamus to Compel Disclosure of 25 Judicial Administrative Records (“Pet.,” ECF No. 9). For the reasons stated below, the 26 Court GRANTS WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF 27 No. 4) and DENIES AS MOOT Plaintiff’s Petition for Writ of Mandamus (ECF No. 9). 28 / / / 1 BACKGROUND 2 Plaintiff Marian Anthony filed this lawsuit against Defendant Michael Hubbard, a 3 Senior Deputy Clerk for the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division 4 One (“Court of Appeal”), for “behaving willfully repugnant to the professional duties and 5 conduct of a senior deputy clerk,” thus preventing Plaintiff from filing legal documents 6 and pursuing his appeal. Compl. ¶ 1. Plaintiff alleges that from January 16, 2025, to May 7 30, 2025, Defendant, “acting under color of state law, engaged in a pattern of illegal[,] 8 abusive, hostile, and obstructive conduct,” “including yelling, emotional embroilment, 9 refusing filings without valid lawful reasons, and denying motions as a judicial officer 10 without judicial authority.” Id. Plaintiff brings civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 11 and seeks monetary and injunctive relief, including punitive damages against Defendant. 12 Id. ¶¶ 17–32. Now before the Court is Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. 13 MOTION TO DISMISS 14 I. Legal Standard 15 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) permits a party to raise by motion the 16 defense that the complaint “fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” To 17 survive a 12(b)(6) motion, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as 18 true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 19 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is 20 facially plausible when the facts pled “allow[] the court to draw the reasonable inference 21 that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. That is not to say that the claim 22 must be probable, but there must be “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has 23 acted unlawfully.” Id. Facts “‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability” fall short of 24 a plausible entitlement to relief. Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). 25 Though this plausibility standard “does not require ‘detailed factual 26 allegations,’ . . . it [does] demand[] more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully- 27 harmed-me accusation.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). In other words, a 28 complaint will not suffice “if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual 1 enhancement.’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). Put 2 differently, “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” 3 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. 4 Review under Rule 12(b)(6) requires a context-specific analysis involving the 5 Court’s “judicial experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. In performing 6 that analysis, “a district court must accept as true all facts alleged in the complaint, and 7 draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.” Wi-LAN Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 8 382 F. Supp. 3d 1012, 1020 (S.D. Cal. 2019). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not 9 permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has 10 alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. 11 at 679 (second alternation in original). If a complaint does not survive Rule 12(b)(6), a 12 court grants leave to amend unless it determines that no modified contention “consistent 13 with the challenged pleading could . . . possibly cure the deficiency.” Schreiber Distrib. 14 Co. v. Serv-Well Furniture Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1401 (9th Cir. 1986). 15 II. Analysis 16 Defendant seeks to dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint on four grounds: (1) quasi-judicial 17 immunity bars Plaintiff’s damages claims; (2) Section 1983 foreclosures injunctive relief 18 against judges and clerks; (3) Plaintiff lacks standing to obtain injunctive relief; and (4) the 19 Younger abstention precludes Plaintiff’s entire action.1 ECF No. 4-1 (“Mem.”) at 2. 20 A. Quasi-Judicial Immunity 21 Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s damages claims are barred since court clerks and 22 staff are immunized “from damages for civil rights violations when they perform tasks that 23 are an integral part of the judicial process” under the doctrine of quasi-judicial immunity. 24 Id. at 4 (quoting Mullis v. U.S. Bankr. Ct. for Dist. Of Nev., 828 F.2d 1385, 1390 (9th Cir. 25 26 1 Defendant requests judicial notice of Plaintiff’s cases in the Superior Court of California, County of San Diego, and the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One. See generally RJN. 27 Because the Court does not rely on information from Plaintiff’s Superior Court and Court of Appeal 28 proceedings in reaching its conclusion below, the Court DENIES AS MOOT Defendant’s Request for 1 1987)). Defendant argues that his alleged conduct—refusing to accept filings “without 2 valid reasons,” issuing “defective” orders “without judicial authority” and yelling at 3 Plaintiff when he attempted to file a document—are inarguably tasks “that are an integral 4 part of the judicial process” protected by the doctrine. Id. at 5–6. Plaintiff responds that 5 Defendant’s conduct is not immunized since quasi-judicial immunity “does not extend to 6 administrative or ministerial tasks, such as routine filing refusals or enforcement of non- 7 judicial directives.” Opp’n at 3 (citing Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 229 (1988)). 8 Instead, Defendant’s conduct is “subject only to qualified immunity, which Defendant has 9 not invoked or shown applies.” Id. at 4 (citing Mullis, 828 F.2d at 1390). 10 The Court finds that Defendant’s alleged conduct is protected by quasi-judicial 11 immunity. “Court clerks have absolute quasi-judicial immunity from damages for civil 12 rights violations when they perform tasks that are an integral part of the judicial process.” 13 Mullis, 828 F.2d at 1390 (citations omitted). The Ninth Circuit has “‘extended absolute 14 quasi-judicial immunity’ to ‘nonjudicial officers for purely administrative acts—acts 15 which taken out of context would appear ministerial, but when viewed in context are 16 actually a part of the judicial function.’” Fort v. Washington, 41 F.4th 1141, 1144 (9th Cir. 17 2022) (quoting In re Castillo, 297 F.3d 940, 952 (9th Cir. 2002)). Here, Defendant’s 18 alleged conduct is “an integral part of the judicial process.” Mullis, 828 F.2d at 1390 19 (finding that clerk’s failure to give proper advice and refusal to accept filing were “all 20 properly characterized as integral parts of the judicial process”); see also Coulter v. 21 Murrell, No. 10CV102-IEG(NLS), 2011 WL 13208995, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 1, 22 2011), aff’d sub nom., Coulter v. Roddy, 463 F. App’x 610 (9th Cir. 2011) (“The 23 processing of documents submitted to the Clerk for filing is an integral part of the judicial 24 process.”) (collecting cases). Therefore, quasi-judicial immunity bars Plaintiff’s damages 25 claims. 26 / / / 27 / / / 28 / / / 1 B. Injunctive Relief 2 Defendant argues that § 1983 expressly forbids injunctive relief, and that Plaintiff 3 otherwise lacks standing to obtain injunctive relief. Mem. at 7–8. Plaintiff responds that 4 § 1983’s bar to injunctive relief “applies only to acts in a ‘judicial capacity,’ not 5 administrative ones,” and Defendant’s “clerical refusals and unprofessional conduct were 6 not judicial . . . .” Opp’n at 4 (quoting Moore v. Urquhart, 899 F.3d 1094, 1104 (9th Cir. 7 2018)). 8 The Court finds that § 1983 bars Plaintiff’s request to “enjoin[] [Defendant] from 9 refusing Plaintiff’s filings without valid reasons, engaging in hostile conduct, or interfering 10 with Plaintiff’s appeal . . . .” Compl. ¶ 32. Judicial immunity does not preclude a court 11 from granting declaratory or injunctive relief. Steinmeyer v. Lab’y Corp. of Am. Holdings, 12 676 F. Supp. 3d 851, 866 (S.D. Cal. 2023). However, § 1983 provides that “in any action 13 brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial 14 capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or 15 declaratory relief was unavailable”—“effectively ‘immuniz[ing] judicial officers against 16 suits for injunctive relief.’” Steinmeyer, 676 F. Supp. 3d at 866 (quoting Roth v. King, 449 17 F.3d 1272, 1286 (D.C. Cir. 2006)). Here, Plaintiff does not allege that “a declaratory decree 18 was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.”2 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court 19 otherwise rejects Plaintiff’s argument that Defendant’s conduct is not judicial in nature. 20 See supra Section A. Injunctive relief is therefore unavailable to Plaintiff. 21 / / / 22 23 24 2 Plaintiff does not seek declaratory relief in his Complaint. See generally Compl. However, in his Opposition, he states that he “seeks declaratory relief that Defendant’s actions violate the First 25 Amendment,” and thus, injunctive relief remains available under § 1983. Opp’n at 5. The Court cannot consider claims not alleged in the Complaint. See Kim v. Wilmington Tr. Co., No. 17-CV-0528-WQH- 26 AGS, 2018 WL 11649245, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 13, 2018). Regardless, Plaintiff could not seek a declaration that Defendant’s conduct violated his constitutional rights, as “declaratory relief is 27 inappropriate where the alleged constitutional injury has already occurred.” See Sterner v. San Diego 28 Police Dep’t, No. 08CV1407-IEG-JMA, 2009 WL 160921, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 2009) (citation 1 Because the Court finds that Plaintiff's damages claims and request for injunctive 2 ||relief are barred by quasi-judicial immunity and § 1983, the Court need not reach 3 || Defendant’s arguments as to standing and the Younger abstention. Accordingly, the Court 4 || GRANTS Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Complaint WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND. 5 Schreiber Distrib. Co., 806 F.2d at 1401 (a court may deny leave to amend if it 6 || “determines that the allegation of other facts consistent with the challenged pleading could 7 ||not possibly cure the deficiency’). 8 CONCLUSION 9 In light of the foregoing, the Court (1) GRANTS WITHOUT LEAVE TO 10 || AMEND Defendant Michael Hubbard’s Motion to Dismiss Complaint (“Mot.,” ECF 11 || No. 4) and (2) DENIES AS MOOT Plaintiff's Proposed Petition for Writ of Mandamus 12 ||to Compel Disclosure of Judicial Administrative Records (“Pet.,” ECF No. 9).° As this 13 || concludes the litigation in the matter, the Clerk of Court SHALL close the file. 14 IT IS SO ORDERED. 15 || Dated: January 26, 2026 . tt 16 pen Janis L. Sammartino 7 United States District Judge 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 3g ||° Because the Court DISMISSES the Complaint (ECF No. 1), Plaintiff’s request to compel production of judicial administrative records, including security camera footage, is moot. See generally Pet.