Maria Teresa Costantini Gomes v. Victor Maniglia

• Court: District Court of Appeal of Florida
• Decided: February 25, 2026
• Docket: 3D2025-2003
• Status: Published

Opinion

Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida

Opinion filed February 25, 2026. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

________________

No. 3D25-2003 Lower Tribunal No. 20-17447-CA-01 ________________

Maria Teresa Costantini Gomes, Petitioner,

vs.

Victor Maniglia, Respondents.

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Reemberto Diaz, Judge.

The Hink Law Firm, P.A., and Ronald R. Hink, for petitioner.

J. Muir & Associates, P.A., and Jane Whalley Muir, for respondents.

Before EMAS, GORDO and LOBREE, JJ.

PER CURIAM. Dismissed. See Bd. of Trs. of Internal Improvement Tr. Fund v. Am.

Educ. Enters., LLC, 99 So. 3d 450, 455 (Fla. 2012) (reaffirming that

irreparable harm is a condition precedent to invoking a district court’s

certiorari jurisdiction, and observing: “If the party seeking review does not

demonstrate that it will suffer material injury of an irreparable nature, then an

appellate court may not grant certiorari relief from a non-appealable non-final

order. Similarly, if the alleged harm can be remedied on appeal, the harm is

not considered irreparable, and thus certiorari relief is not merited.” (citations

omitted)); Landmark at Crescent Ridge LP v. Everest Fin., Inc., 219 So. 3d

218, 219 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017) (dismissing petition for writ of certiorari,

holding: “There is no showing that the order denying the motion to dissolve

the lis pendens at issue cannot be remedied on appeal of the final judgment.

Although the petition states generally that the property cannot be sold while

encumbered by the lis pendens, that Petitioner is in danger of defaulting on

mortgages connected with the property if it cannot sell, and that the lawsuit

might persist for a substantial time period, the petition fails “to clearly reflect

how the potential ‘harm is incurable’ by a final appeal.”) (quotations omitted);

id. at 220 (analyzing irreparable harm prong in analogous context of denial

of motion to dissolve temporary injunction, and noting: “Accordingly, the law

governing the irreparable harm required for injunctive relief is instructive;

2 ‘[t]here is no irreparable harm for the purpose of a temporary injunction

where the harm can be adequately compensated for by a monetary award.’”

(quoting City of Miami Springs v. Steffen, 423 So. 2d 930, 931 (Fla. 3d DCA

1982))).