NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NOS. A-5088-17T1 A-5147-17T1
MARIA I. TIRPAK,1
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
BOROUGH OF POINT PLEASANT BEACH BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT, APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION
February 11, 2019 Defendant-Appellant, APPELLATE DIVISION
and
BOROUGH OF POINT PLEASANT BEACH,
Defendant. _______________________________
MARIA I. TIRPAK,
BOROUGH OF POINT PLEASANT
1 We have been advised that, while the appeal was pending, the property at issue was sold to Jack and Linda Whalen, and that plaintiff has assigned to the Whalens her interest in this case. BEACH BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT, and BOROUGH OF POINT PLEASANT BEACH,
Defendants-Appellants. ____________________________________
Argued January 28, 2019 – Decided February 11, 2019
Before Judges Sabatino, Haas and Sumners.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Ocean County, Docket No. L-2918-17.
Dennis M. Galvin argued the cause for appellant Borough of Point Pleasant Beach Board of Adjustment in A-5088-17 and A-5147-17 (Davison, Eastman, Muñoz, Lederman & Paone, PA, attorneys; Dennis M. Galvin, of counsel and on the briefs).
Kevin B. Riordan argued the cause for appellant Borough of Point Pleasant Beach in A-5147-17 (Kevin B. Riordan, Esq., LLC, attorney; Kevin B. Riordan, Gary P. McLean and Dina R. Khajezadeh, on the briefs).
John J. Jackson, III, argued the cause for respondent in A-5088-17 and A-5147-17 (King, Kitrick, Jackson & McWeeney, LLC, attorneys; John J. Jackson, III, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendants, the Borough of Point Pleasant Beach and the Borough's
Zoning Board of Adjustment, appeal the trial court's May 3, 2018 decision in
this land use case. The court declared invalid and unenforceable a variance
provision and associated deed restriction that requires one unit of the subject
A-5088-17T1 2 two-family dwelling to be occupied by the owner and not rented to a third-
party tenant.
These owner-occupancy limitations were imposed by the Board in 1999
as a condition of approving a variance allowing plaintiff Maria I. Tirpak and
her now-deceased husband to raze their then-existing dwelling and construct a
new two-family dwelling in a zone limited to single-family residences. The
Board also required the Tirpaks to memorialize the condition as a recorded
deed restriction.
The trial court concluded the variance condition and deed restriction
impermissibly discriminated against renters, and wrongfully predicated the
allowable use of the property upon the identities of its occupants.
On appeal, defendants argue the trial court should have dismissed
plaintiff's challenge to the restrictions as untimely. They further contend the
trial court misapplied the law and principles of equity in nullifying the
variance condition and deed restriction.
This appellate court rejects defendants' arguments, substantially for the
sound reasons expressed in Assignment Judge Marlene Lynch Ford's May 3,
2018 written decision, which is published in tandem with this opinion at ___
N.J. Super. ___ (Law Div. 2019).
A-5088-17T1 3 The trial court correctly enforced the fundamental, if not immutable,
principle that "zoning enabling acts authorize local regulation of 'land use' and
not regulation of the 'identity or status' of owners or persons who occupy the
land." 5 Edward H. Ziegler, Jr., Rathkopf's The Law of Zoning and Planning,
§ 81.7 (4th ed. 2005). The present situation does not fit any exceptions to that
principle, which has been long recognized under New Jersey law. In fact, this
court made clear more than thirty years ago – in an opinion coincidentally
involving this same municipality – that "a zoning board is charged with the
regulation of land uses and not with the person who owns or occupies the
land." DeFelice v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of Borough of Point Pleasant
Beach, 216 N.J. Super. 377, 381 (App. Div. 1987) (emphasis added).
In DeFelice, 216 N.J. Super. at 379, the owner of a residential lot had
two homes located on the property. After one of the homes burned down, the
owner applied for a variance to reconstruct the house. Ibid. As a condition of
variance approval, the owner agreed to grant the Zoning Board the right to
demolish any of the buildings on the lot in the event of the sale of the property
or owner's death. Id. at 380. This court ruled that the Zoning Board was
"powerless to attach [such] a condition restricting the future identity of the
owners" and deemed the condition invalid and ultra vires. Id. at 382-83. See
also Repair Master, Inc. v. Borough of Paulsboro, 352 N.J. Super. 1, 10 (App.
A-5088-17T1 4 Div. 2002) (upholding a finding of invalidity of a borough's moratorium on
rental licenses issued to single-family and non-owner-occupied duplex units,
because the moratorium was an improper "attempt to regulate the attributes of
ownership and the nature of the occupancy of property.").
Other jurisdictions have followed similar reasoning. See, e.g., City of
Wilmington v. Hill, 657 S.E.2d 670, 673 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000) (striking down
a city code provision requiring the owner of a house and a garage apartment to
reside either in the main residence or the apartment, because the city was
entitled only to regulate the use of the property and not the identity of the
owner or occupant); Kulak v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 563 A.2d 978, 980 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1989) (invalidating a condition that required the owner of a three -
unit apartment building to occupy one of the units). As the Pennsylvania court
rightly observed in Kulak, "the personal identity of an apartment occupant
obviously has no relationship to public health, safety, or the general welfare."
Ibid.2
2 None of the out-of-state authorities cited by defendants in their supplemental letter-briefs filed after we called their attention to Hill and Kulak are persuasive. Several of those cases involve "accessory" buildings, whereas the duplex in this case consists of two identical top-and-bottom units, neither of which is primary. Cf. Soucheim v. City of San Dimas, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d 290, 292-93 (Ct. App. 1996); Kasper v. Town of Brookhaven, 535 N.Y.S.2d 621, 624 (App. Div. 1988); Anderson v. Provo City Corp., 108 P.3d 701,706-08 (Utah 2005).
A-5088-17T1 5 Defendants argue that the trial court's decision fails to appreciate that
property owners who live on the premises are more likely than absentee
owners to assure that their tenants – particularly seasonal renters living in this
shore town during the summer – will obey noise, parking, and other local
ordinances. Whether or not that premise is true, a deed restriction or variance
condition cannot, in effect, functionally delegate to a private landlord a portion
of the municipality's police powers and its own exclusive responsibility to
enforce the local laws and keep the peace. See Kirsch Holding Co. v. Borough
of Manasquan, 59 N.J. 241, 253-54 (1971); see also Urban v. Planning Bd. of
Borough of Manasquan, 124 N.J. 651, 662 (1991) (citing Kirsch); State v.
Baker, 81 N.J. 99, 111 (1979) (citing Kirsch).
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NOS. A-5088-17T1 A-5147-17T1
MARIA I. TIRPAK,1
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
BOROUGH OF POINT PLEASANT BEACH BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT, APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION
February 11, 2019 Defendant-Appellant, APPELLATE DIVISION
and
BOROUGH OF POINT PLEASANT BEACH,
Defendant. _______________________________
MARIA I. TIRPAK,
BOROUGH OF POINT PLEASANT
1 We have been advised that, while the appeal was pending, the property at issue was sold to Jack and Linda Whalen, and that plaintiff has assigned to the Whalens her interest in this case. BEACH BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT, and BOROUGH OF POINT PLEASANT BEACH,
Defendants-Appellants. ____________________________________
Argued January 28, 2019 – Decided February 11, 2019
Before Judges Sabatino, Haas and Sumners.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Ocean County, Docket No. L-2918-17.
Dennis M. Galvin argued the cause for appellant Borough of Point Pleasant Beach Board of Adjustment in A-5088-17 and A-5147-17 (Davison, Eastman, Muñoz, Lederman & Paone, PA, attorneys; Dennis M. Galvin, of counsel and on the briefs).
Kevin B. Riordan argued the cause for appellant Borough of Point Pleasant Beach in A-5147-17 (Kevin B. Riordan, Esq., LLC, attorney; Kevin B. Riordan, Gary P. McLean and Dina R. Khajezadeh, on the briefs).
John J. Jackson, III, argued the cause for respondent in A-5088-17 and A-5147-17 (King, Kitrick, Jackson & McWeeney, LLC, attorneys; John J. Jackson, III, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendants, the Borough of Point Pleasant Beach and the Borough's
Zoning Board of Adjustment, appeal the trial court's May 3, 2018 decision in
this land use case. The court declared invalid and unenforceable a variance
provision and associated deed restriction that requires one unit of the subject
A-5088-17T1 2 two-family dwelling to be occupied by the owner and not rented to a third-
party tenant.
These owner-occupancy limitations were imposed by the Board in 1999
as a condition of approving a variance allowing plaintiff Maria I. Tirpak and
her now-deceased husband to raze their then-existing dwelling and construct a
new two-family dwelling in a zone limited to single-family residences. The
Board also required the Tirpaks to memorialize the condition as a recorded
deed restriction.
The trial court concluded the variance condition and deed restriction
impermissibly discriminated against renters, and wrongfully predicated the
allowable use of the property upon the identities of its occupants.
On appeal, defendants argue the trial court should have dismissed
plaintiff's challenge to the restrictions as untimely. They further contend the
trial court misapplied the law and principles of equity in nullifying the
variance condition and deed restriction.
This appellate court rejects defendants' arguments, substantially for the
sound reasons expressed in Assignment Judge Marlene Lynch Ford's May 3,
2018 written decision, which is published in tandem with this opinion at ___
N.J. Super. ___ (Law Div. 2019).
A-5088-17T1 3 The trial court correctly enforced the fundamental, if not immutable,
principle that "zoning enabling acts authorize local regulation of 'land use' and
not regulation of the 'identity or status' of owners or persons who occupy the
land." 5 Edward H. Ziegler, Jr., Rathkopf's The Law of Zoning and Planning,
§ 81.7 (4th ed. 2005). The present situation does not fit any exceptions to that
principle, which has been long recognized under New Jersey law. In fact, this
court made clear more than thirty years ago – in an opinion coincidentally
involving this same municipality – that "a zoning board is charged with the
regulation of land uses and not with the person who owns or occupies the
land." DeFelice v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of Borough of Point Pleasant
Beach, 216 N.J. Super. 377, 381 (App. Div. 1987) (emphasis added).
In DeFelice, 216 N.J. Super. at 379, the owner of a residential lot had
two homes located on the property. After one of the homes burned down, the
owner applied for a variance to reconstruct the house. Ibid. As a condition of
variance approval, the owner agreed to grant the Zoning Board the right to
demolish any of the buildings on the lot in the event of the sale of the property
or owner's death. Id. at 380. This court ruled that the Zoning Board was
"powerless to attach [such] a condition restricting the future identity of the
owners" and deemed the condition invalid and ultra vires. Id. at 382-83. See
also Repair Master, Inc. v. Borough of Paulsboro, 352 N.J. Super. 1, 10 (App.
A-5088-17T1 4 Div. 2002) (upholding a finding of invalidity of a borough's moratorium on
rental licenses issued to single-family and non-owner-occupied duplex units,
because the moratorium was an improper "attempt to regulate the attributes of
ownership and the nature of the occupancy of property.").
Other jurisdictions have followed similar reasoning. See, e.g., City of
Wilmington v. Hill, 657 S.E.2d 670, 673 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000) (striking down
a city code provision requiring the owner of a house and a garage apartment to
reside either in the main residence or the apartment, because the city was
entitled only to regulate the use of the property and not the identity of the
owner or occupant); Kulak v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 563 A.2d 978, 980 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1989) (invalidating a condition that required the owner of a three -
unit apartment building to occupy one of the units). As the Pennsylvania court
rightly observed in Kulak, "the personal identity of an apartment occupant
obviously has no relationship to public health, safety, or the general welfare."
Ibid.2
2 None of the out-of-state authorities cited by defendants in their supplemental letter-briefs filed after we called their attention to Hill and Kulak are persuasive. Several of those cases involve "accessory" buildings, whereas the duplex in this case consists of two identical top-and-bottom units, neither of which is primary. Cf. Soucheim v. City of San Dimas, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d 290, 292-93 (Ct. App. 1996); Kasper v. Town of Brookhaven, 535 N.Y.S.2d 621, 624 (App. Div. 1988); Anderson v. Provo City Corp., 108 P.3d 701,706-08 (Utah 2005).
A-5088-17T1 5 Defendants argue that the trial court's decision fails to appreciate that
property owners who live on the premises are more likely than absentee
owners to assure that their tenants – particularly seasonal renters living in this
shore town during the summer – will obey noise, parking, and other local
ordinances. Whether or not that premise is true, a deed restriction or variance
condition cannot, in effect, functionally delegate to a private landlord a portion
of the municipality's police powers and its own exclusive responsibility to
enforce the local laws and keep the peace. See Kirsch Holding Co. v. Borough
of Manasquan, 59 N.J. 241, 253-54 (1971); see also Urban v. Planning Bd. of
Borough of Manasquan, 124 N.J. 651, 662 (1991) (citing Kirsch); State v.
Baker, 81 N.J. 99, 111 (1979) (citing Kirsch). Moreover, the status of a
house's occupant as a property-owner rather than as a tenant is no guarantee
that he or she will be a law-abiding and considerate neighbor.
In sum, although we understand defendants' desire to maintain a quiet
and peaceful environment in this single-family zone, they cannot accomplish
that objective by imposing land use restrictions that discriminate against
renters. If the Board wanted to preserve the single-family character of the
zone, it never should have approved a variance for this two-family dwelling in
the first place. It is now too late to rescind the variance itself; instead we
agree with Judge Ford the appropriate solution is to excise the illegal
A-5088-17T1 6 condition. See, e.g., DeFelice, 216 N.J. Super. at 383 (invalidating the
variance condition but upholding the underlying variance); Orloski v. Planning
Bd. of Borough of Ship Bottom, 234 N.J. Super. 1, 2 (App. Div. 1989) (citing
DeFelice and noting that "an unreasonable condition, under proper
circumstances, may be stricken or removed even if the variance benefit has
been accepted."); Aldrich v. Schwartz, 258 N.J. Super. 300, 311 (App. Div.
1992) (same). The associated deed restriction tied to the illegal variance
condition must also be nullified. Am. Dream at Marlboro v. Planning Bd. of
the Twp. of Marlboro, 209 N.J. 161, 169 (2012).
We reject defense counsel's suggestion that the Tirpaks have been
unjustly enriched. For nearly three decades they abided by the restrictions
mandated by the local government when they could otherwise have obtained
rental income from both units of the duplex. We perceive no inequity in the
trial court's remedy.
Finally, because this lawsuit implicates important public values and
involves a perpetual restriction on the identity of the premises' occupants, we
endorse the trial court's election to adjudicate the merits of this case under the
"interests of justice" exception to the forty-five-day time bar in Rule 4:69-6(c).
See Hopewell Valley Citizens Grp., Inc. v. Berwind Prop. Grp. Dev. Co., 204
N.J. 569, 577-78 (2011).
A-5088-17T1 7 The trial court's decision is therefore affirmed. The stay pending appeal
previously issued by this court shall expire in thirty days, without further
extension.
A-5088-17T1 8