1 2 JS-6 3 4 5 6 7
8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
11 MARIA ALLAHVERDIAN, Case No. 2:25-cv-03988-CV (RAOx) 12 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S 13 MOTION TO REMAND [20] AND v. DENYING DEFENDANT’S 14 MOTION TO DISMISS [22] ESTES EXPRESS LINES CORP., et 15 al.
16 Defendants.
17 18 On June 4, 2025, Plaintiff Maria Allahverdian filed a Motion to Remand (“Motion 19 to Remand”), and on June 12, 2025, Defendant Estes Express Line Corporation filed a 20 Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint (“Motion to Dismiss”). Doc. # 20 (“Mot. to 21 Remand”); Doc. # 22 (“Mot. to Dismiss”). Having reviewed and considered all briefing 22 filed with respect to the Motions, the Court finds that oral argument is not necessary, see 23 Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b); Local Rule 7-15; Willis v. Pac. Mar. Ass’n, 244 F.3d 675, 684 n.2 24 (9th Cir. 2001), and concludes as follows. 25 I. INTRODUCTION 26 On March 24, 2025, Plaintiff filed a Complaint in the Los Angeles County Superior 27 Court against Defendant , asserting claims for (1) conversion, (2) negligence, (3) breach of 28 contract, (4) breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, (5) unfair business 1 practices, (6) fraudulent deceit, (7) fraud/intentional misrepresentation, and (8) negligent 2 misrepresentation. Doc. # 1-2 (“Compl.”) ¶¶ 34–94. 3 On May 5, 2025, Defendant removed the case to federal court based on federal 4 question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1441. Doc. # 1 (“Notice of 5 Removal”) ¶ 2. 6 II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 7 On September 10, 2024, Plaintiff and Defendant entered into an agreement for 8 Defendant to deliver a chandelier purchased by Plaintiff to Plaintiff’s private residence. 9 Compl. ¶ 7, Ex. A. Plaintiff alleges that the Chandlier was delivered in damaged condition, 10 and Plaintiff informed Defendant about the alleged damage through email communications 11 with Defendant’s representative as well as through a claims form. Id. ¶¶ 19–26. Defendant 12 rejected Plaintiff’s reimbursement claims, first based on the claim being “too vague” and 13 not allowing an accurate measure of damages, and later based on failure to notify within 14 the agreed upon time frame. Id. ¶¶ 27–31. 15 III. LEGAL STANDARD 16 In general, “any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of 17 the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the 18 defendants, to the district court.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). “The right of removal is entirely a 19 creature of statute and a suit commenced in a state court must remain there until cause is 20 shown for its transfer under some act of Congress.” Syngenta Crop. Protection, Inc. v. 21 Henson, 537 U.S. 28, 32 (2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). Where Congress has 22 passed a statute providing a right of removal, the statute, unless otherwise stated, is to be 23 strictly construed against removal. Id. “The strong presumption against removal 24 jurisdiction means that the defendant always has the burden of establishing that removal is 25 proper.” Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992) (internal quotation marks 26 omitted); Abrego Abrego v. The Dow Chem. Co., 443 F.3d 676, 684 (9th Cir. 2006) (per 27 curiam) (noting the “longstanding, near-canonical rule that the burden on removal rests 28 with the removing defendant”). Moreover, any doubts regarding the existence of subject 1 matter jurisdiction must be resolved in favor of remanding the action to state court. See 2 Gaus, 980 F.2d at 566 (“Federal jurisdiction must be rejected if there is any doubt as to the 3 right of removal in the first instance.”). 4 IV. DISCUSSION 5 Defendant contends that removal was proper here under federal question jurisdiction 6 because Plaintiff’s claims are preempted by the Federal Aviation Administration 7 Authorization Act of 1994 (“FAAAA”). Notice of Removal ¶ 3 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1331). 8 Generally, under the well-pleaded complaint rule, “a civil action arises under federal 9 law for purposes of § 1331 when a federal question appears on the face of the complaint.” 10 City of Oakland v. BP PLC, 969 F.3d 895, 903 (9th Cir. 2020). Thus, the existence of a 11 federal defense, including preemption, is not enough to justify removal to federal court. 12 See Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 393 (1987) (“it is now settled law that a 13 case may not be removed to federal court on the basis of a federal defense, including the 14 defense of pre-emption, even if the defense is anticipated in the plaintiff’s complaint”). 15 However, “[c]omplete preemption is an exception to the well-pleaded complaint 16 rule.” Saldana v. Glenhaven Healthcare LLC, 27 F.4th 679, 686 (9th Cir. 2022). Complete 17 preemption applies if a well-pleaded complaint establishes a state-law cause of action but 18 “requires resolution of a substantial question of federal law in dispute between the parties.” 19 Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Tr. for S. Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 20 13 (1983) 21 Here, all of Plaintiff’s claims are state law claims, and no federal question appears 22 on the face of Plaintiff’s complaint. Therefore, the sole question is whether the FAAAA 23 completely preempts Plaintiff’s claims. See Gorom v. Old Dominion Freight Line Inc., No. 24 CV 12-763-GW (AJWx), 2012 WL 12887687, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 12, 2012). 25 Complete preemption “arises only in ‘extraordinary’ situations,” and the test is 26 “whether Congress clearly manifested an intent to convert state law claims into federal- 27 question claims.” Ansley v. Ameriquest Mortg. Co., 340 F.3d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 2003). The 28 1 Supreme Court has identified only three statutes that provide for complete preemption. Id. 2 (citing Beneficial Nat’l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 8 (2003)). 3 In support of its claim of federal question jurisdiction, Defendant argues that the 4 FAAAA completely preempts state law causes of action in the Complaint. Notice of 5 Removal ¶ 4. Similarly, Defendant’s opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand presumes 6 that the complete preemption exception applies to FAAAA in this case. Doc. # 28 at 3. 7 However, Defendant has directed the Court to no case, and the Court has found none in its 8 own research, indicating that the FAAAA satisfies the requirement of complete preemption 9 exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule. See also Gorom, 2012 WL 12887687, at *2. 10 Instead, Defendant has directed the Court only to two cases—Aspen Am. Ins. Co. v.
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1 2 JS-6 3 4 5 6 7
8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
11 MARIA ALLAHVERDIAN, Case No. 2:25-cv-03988-CV (RAOx) 12 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S 13 MOTION TO REMAND [20] AND v. DENYING DEFENDANT’S 14 MOTION TO DISMISS [22] ESTES EXPRESS LINES CORP., et 15 al.
16 Defendants.
17 18 On June 4, 2025, Plaintiff Maria Allahverdian filed a Motion to Remand (“Motion 19 to Remand”), and on June 12, 2025, Defendant Estes Express Line Corporation filed a 20 Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint (“Motion to Dismiss”). Doc. # 20 (“Mot. to 21 Remand”); Doc. # 22 (“Mot. to Dismiss”). Having reviewed and considered all briefing 22 filed with respect to the Motions, the Court finds that oral argument is not necessary, see 23 Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b); Local Rule 7-15; Willis v. Pac. Mar. Ass’n, 244 F.3d 675, 684 n.2 24 (9th Cir. 2001), and concludes as follows. 25 I. INTRODUCTION 26 On March 24, 2025, Plaintiff filed a Complaint in the Los Angeles County Superior 27 Court against Defendant , asserting claims for (1) conversion, (2) negligence, (3) breach of 28 contract, (4) breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, (5) unfair business 1 practices, (6) fraudulent deceit, (7) fraud/intentional misrepresentation, and (8) negligent 2 misrepresentation. Doc. # 1-2 (“Compl.”) ¶¶ 34–94. 3 On May 5, 2025, Defendant removed the case to federal court based on federal 4 question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1441. Doc. # 1 (“Notice of 5 Removal”) ¶ 2. 6 II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 7 On September 10, 2024, Plaintiff and Defendant entered into an agreement for 8 Defendant to deliver a chandelier purchased by Plaintiff to Plaintiff’s private residence. 9 Compl. ¶ 7, Ex. A. Plaintiff alleges that the Chandlier was delivered in damaged condition, 10 and Plaintiff informed Defendant about the alleged damage through email communications 11 with Defendant’s representative as well as through a claims form. Id. ¶¶ 19–26. Defendant 12 rejected Plaintiff’s reimbursement claims, first based on the claim being “too vague” and 13 not allowing an accurate measure of damages, and later based on failure to notify within 14 the agreed upon time frame. Id. ¶¶ 27–31. 15 III. LEGAL STANDARD 16 In general, “any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of 17 the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the 18 defendants, to the district court.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). “The right of removal is entirely a 19 creature of statute and a suit commenced in a state court must remain there until cause is 20 shown for its transfer under some act of Congress.” Syngenta Crop. Protection, Inc. v. 21 Henson, 537 U.S. 28, 32 (2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). Where Congress has 22 passed a statute providing a right of removal, the statute, unless otherwise stated, is to be 23 strictly construed against removal. Id. “The strong presumption against removal 24 jurisdiction means that the defendant always has the burden of establishing that removal is 25 proper.” Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992) (internal quotation marks 26 omitted); Abrego Abrego v. The Dow Chem. Co., 443 F.3d 676, 684 (9th Cir. 2006) (per 27 curiam) (noting the “longstanding, near-canonical rule that the burden on removal rests 28 with the removing defendant”). Moreover, any doubts regarding the existence of subject 1 matter jurisdiction must be resolved in favor of remanding the action to state court. See 2 Gaus, 980 F.2d at 566 (“Federal jurisdiction must be rejected if there is any doubt as to the 3 right of removal in the first instance.”). 4 IV. DISCUSSION 5 Defendant contends that removal was proper here under federal question jurisdiction 6 because Plaintiff’s claims are preempted by the Federal Aviation Administration 7 Authorization Act of 1994 (“FAAAA”). Notice of Removal ¶ 3 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1331). 8 Generally, under the well-pleaded complaint rule, “a civil action arises under federal 9 law for purposes of § 1331 when a federal question appears on the face of the complaint.” 10 City of Oakland v. BP PLC, 969 F.3d 895, 903 (9th Cir. 2020). Thus, the existence of a 11 federal defense, including preemption, is not enough to justify removal to federal court. 12 See Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 393 (1987) (“it is now settled law that a 13 case may not be removed to federal court on the basis of a federal defense, including the 14 defense of pre-emption, even if the defense is anticipated in the plaintiff’s complaint”). 15 However, “[c]omplete preemption is an exception to the well-pleaded complaint 16 rule.” Saldana v. Glenhaven Healthcare LLC, 27 F.4th 679, 686 (9th Cir. 2022). Complete 17 preemption applies if a well-pleaded complaint establishes a state-law cause of action but 18 “requires resolution of a substantial question of federal law in dispute between the parties.” 19 Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Tr. for S. Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 20 13 (1983) 21 Here, all of Plaintiff’s claims are state law claims, and no federal question appears 22 on the face of Plaintiff’s complaint. Therefore, the sole question is whether the FAAAA 23 completely preempts Plaintiff’s claims. See Gorom v. Old Dominion Freight Line Inc., No. 24 CV 12-763-GW (AJWx), 2012 WL 12887687, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 12, 2012). 25 Complete preemption “arises only in ‘extraordinary’ situations,” and the test is 26 “whether Congress clearly manifested an intent to convert state law claims into federal- 27 question claims.” Ansley v. Ameriquest Mortg. Co., 340 F.3d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 2003). The 28 1 Supreme Court has identified only three statutes that provide for complete preemption. Id. 2 (citing Beneficial Nat’l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 8 (2003)). 3 In support of its claim of federal question jurisdiction, Defendant argues that the 4 FAAAA completely preempts state law causes of action in the Complaint. Notice of 5 Removal ¶ 4. Similarly, Defendant’s opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand presumes 6 that the complete preemption exception applies to FAAAA in this case. Doc. # 28 at 3. 7 However, Defendant has directed the Court to no case, and the Court has found none in its 8 own research, indicating that the FAAAA satisfies the requirement of complete preemption 9 exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule. See also Gorom, 2012 WL 12887687, at *2. 10 Instead, Defendant has directed the Court only to two cases—Aspen Am. Ins. Co. v. 11 Landstar Ranger, Inc., 65 F.4th 1261 (11th Cir. 2023) and Rowe v. New Hampshire Motor 12 Transp. Ass’n, 552 U.S. 364 (2008)—which analyze “ordinary” preemption without 13 considering any jurisdictional effect of the preemption issue. See Moore-Thomas, 553 F.3d 14 at 1244 (explaining difference between “ordinary” and “complete” preemption and the 15 distinct jurisdictional consequences of the two). Cases that discuss the FAAAA often reject 16 the argument that the FAAAA has a jurisdictional effect through complete preemption 17 exception. See, e.g., Indep. Serv. Provider, LLC v. Aponte, No. 6:21-cv-558-GAP-GJK, 18 2021 WL 2828323, at *2 (M.D. Fla. May 24, 2021) (finding that the FAAAA does not 19 completely preempt state law negligence claims or contract actions”); Fehr v. Unicorn 20 Freight, LLC, No. 3:23-CV-00271-DCG, 2025 WL 2253730, at *3 (W.D. Tex. July 21, 21 2025) (“the plain language of the FAAAA fails to satisfy any of the three required 22 conditions for complete preemption”). 23 Because the FAAAA does not have complete preemption over state law claims, 24 Defendant’s FAAAA preemption defense is insufficient to establish federal jurisdiction. 25 Accordingly, the Court does not have federal question jurisdiction over this action, and 26 therefore finds that remand is proper. 27 As a result, the Court need not address what preemptive effect, if any, FAAAA 28 regulations would have on Plaintiff’s claims, and the Court therefore does not address the 1 arguments raised by Plaintiff's Motion to Remand. Further, without jurisdiction, the Court 2 || declines to rule on the merits of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. 3 CONCLUSION 4 For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff's Motion to Remand, and 5 || DENIES Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss as moot. The Court REMANDS this action to the 6 || Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles, Case No. 25NNCV01985. The clerk 7 || shall send a certified copy of this Order to the state court. 8 9 10 IT IS SO ORDERED. 11 12 ||Dated: 3/17/26 Cynthia Valenzuela 13 HON. CYNTHIA VALENZUELA 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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