MARCOS GARIBALDO RAMIREZ v. GENERAL MOTORS LLC, a Delaware limited liability company, and DOES 1-10, inclusive

• Court: District Court, C.D. California
• Decided: March 27, 2026
• Docket: 2:25-cv-11430
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5

8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

10 MARCOS GARIBALDO RAMIREZ, ) NO. 2:25-cv-11430-KS 11 ) an individual, 12 ) Plaintiff, ) MEMORANDUM AND ORDER DENYING 13 ) v. PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO REMAND 14 ) ) 15 GENERAL MOTORS LLC, a )

16 Delaware limited liability company, ) ) 17 and DOES 1-10, inclusive, ) 18 Defendants. ) ) 19 _________________________________ 20 21 Before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand this matter to the California Superior 22 Court (“Motion”). For the reasons outlined below, the Motion is DENIED. 23 24 ALLEGATIONS OF THE COMPLAINT 25 26 Plaintiff filed his Complaint against Defendant General Motors LLC (“Defendant”) in 27 the Superior Court for the State of California on August 1, 2025. (Dkt. No. 1-1 (Complaint 28 (“Compl.”).) 1 Plaintiff is a “resident of Lakewood, California” and Defendant is “a limited liability 2 company organized under the laws of the State of Delaware.” (Compl. ¶¶ 2, 4.) In early 3 January 2019, Plaintiff purchased a 2019 Chevrolet Traverse manufactured and/or distributed 4 by Defendant (the “Vehicle”). (Id. ¶ 9.) Plaintiff alleges that when he purchased the Vehicle, 5 he “received express written warranties in which Defendant undertook to preserve or maintain 6 the utility or performance of [the Vehicle] or to provide compensation if there is a failure in 7 utility or performance for a specified period of time.” (Id. ¶ 11.) “During Plaintiff’s ownership 8 of the [Vehicle], the [Vehicle] manifested defects covered by Defendant’s express written 9 warranties” that “substantially impair the use, value, and/or safety of the [Vehicle].” (Id. ¶12.) 10 11 Plaintiff alleges that he delivered the Vehicle to Defendant and/or its authorized service 12 and repair facilities for diagnosis and repair of the defects, but “Defendant and/or its authorized 13 service and repair facilities failed to service or repair the [Vehicle] to conform to the applicable 14 express warranties after a reasonable number of opportunities to do so,” and “failed to 15 promptly replace the [Vehicle] or make restitution to Plaintiff as required by Civil Code 16 Section 1793.2(d).” (Id. ¶¶ 13-15.) Plaintiff asserts that he “has been damaged by Defendant’s 17 failure to promptly replace the [Vehicle] or make restitution as required by Civil Code section 18 1793.2(d).” (Id. ¶ 15.) 19 20 The Complaint presents causes of action against Defendant for violations of: (1) 21 California Civil Code section 1793(d); (2) California Civil Code section 1793.2(b); (3) 22 California Civil Code section 1793.2(a)(3); (4) breach of the implied warranty of 23 merchantability under California Civil Code sections 17691.1 and 1794; (5) violation of the 24 Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-12 (“MMWA”); and (6) violation of the 25 California Uniform Commercial Code. (Compl. ¶¶ 8-61.) Plaintiff seeks actual damages, 26 restitution, a civil penalty, consequential and incidental damages, remedies authorized under 27 California Commercial Code sections 2711, 2712, and/or 2713, as well as costs and expenses 28 of suit, reasonable attorneys’ fees pursuant to California Civil Code section 1794(d), 1 prejudgment interest, and “such other equitable or legal relief as the Court may deem proper.” 2 (Compl. at 8.) 3 4 PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 5 6 On September 4, 2025, Defendant filed an Answer to Plaintiff’s Complaint in the 7 Superior Court of the State of California for the County of Orange, asserting numerous 8 affirmative defenses. (Dkt. No. 1-2, filed as Ex. B to the Notice of Removal.) On December 9 1, 2025, Defendant filed a Notice of Removal, removing the case from the Orange County 10 Superior Court to this federal court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1446. (Dkt. No. 1.) 11 12 In the Notice of Removal, Defendant represents that “[i]n the last 30 days, GM, through 13 counsel, conducted a preliminary investigation and determined that plaintiff’s citizenship and 14 the reasonable, non-speculative estimation of the amount in controversy placed at issue 15 through Plaintiff’s allegations plausibly give rise to subject matter jurisdiction under both 16 federal question and diversity jurisdiction.” (Dkt. No. 1 at 2.) Defendant contends that “GM’s 17 duty to remove under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) has not been triggered” because the Complaint “is 18 ambiguous as to the amount in controversy and Plaintiff’s state of citizenship.” (Id.) 19 Defendant maintains that removal is proper, as this federal court has subject matter jurisdiction 20 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1332 because the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000 and the 21 lawsuit is between citizens of different states. (Id. at 3.) 22 23 THE PARTIES’ POSITIONS 24 25 Plaintiff argues that Defendant’s removal was improper and remand is required because 26 removability was evident on the face of the Complaint, that is, it was clear that Plaintiff was 27 asserting a separate federal cause of action under the MMWA. (Mot. at 5-6.) Plaintiff further 28 contends that in April 2025, as part of pre-litigation efforts to resolve this action, Plaintiff 1 provided Defendant and defense counsel with a copy of the Vehicle Sales Agreement and all 2 the relevant repair orders. (Id. at 1.) Plaintiff also represents that after commencing this 3 lawsuit, on October 6, 2025, Plaintiff produced a copy of the Vehicle Sales Agreement that 4 identified the total sales price of the Vehicle. (Id. at 2.) Thus, Plaintiff maintains that 5 Defendant’s Notice of Removal, filed on December 1, 2025, was 88 days after the 30-day 6 removal period prescribed by 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1). (Id.) 7 8 Plaintiff acknowledges that the Complaint “does not allege a specific dollar amount in 9 controversy,” but contends that Plaintiff nevertheless provided Defendant sufficient 10 information to “plausibly allege satisfaction of the jurisdictional threshold.” (Id. at 6.) 11 Specifically, Plaintiff contends that because the Complaint states that the damages Plaintiff 12 seeks include: “restitution of the purchase of the Vehicle,” “incidental and consequential 13 damages,” “civil penalties of two times the actual damages,” and “attorneys’ fees,” these 14 allegations were sufficient to alert Defendant that the jurisdictional threshold was met and 15 therefore trigger the 30-day removal clock. (Id.) Plaintiff emphasizes that no particular 16 “evidentiary submission concerning the amount in controversy” or corroborating evidence was 17 needed because the amount in controversy was evident on the face of the Complaint. (Id. at 7 18 (citing Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co., LLC v. Owens, 574 U.S. 81 (2014)).) 19 20 Plaintiff also points out that the caption page and Civil Case Cover Sheet filed in the 21 California Superior Court expressly indicated that the case is “brought under the state court’s 22 unlimited jurisdiction (seeking damages above $35,000.00).” (Id. at 8.) Plaintiff argues that 23 even if Defendant could not ascertain the jurisdictional amount upon service of the Complaint 24 itself, any doubt about the amount in controversy was resolved on October 6, 2025, when 25 Defendant received Plaintiff’s initial disclosures, which identified the Vehicle’s total sales 26 price. (Id. at 9.) Thus, Plaintiff argues that Defendant’s Notice of Removal was untimely and 27 remand to the California Superior Court is required. (Id.) 28 1 In the Opposition, Defendant maintains that removal was timely and the exercise of 2 federal subject matter jurisdiction here is proper. Defendant argues that while a defendant has 3 the burden to establish subject matter jurisdiction, Ninth Circuit precedent establishes that the 4 “measure of that burden” is a preponderance of the evidence, and a removing party need only 5 show that it is “more likely than not” that subject matter jurisdiction exists. (Opp’n at 2 (citing 6 Sanchez v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 102 F.3d 398, 403 (9th Cir. 1996)).) Defendant also 7 points to settled circuit precedent holding that a defendant can sufficiently establish proof of 8 the amount in controversy even when “it could not be certain that plaintiff[] would recover any 9 attorneys’ fees or punitive damages.” (Id. (citing Guglielmino v. McKee Foods Corp., 506 F.3d 10 696, 698 (9th Cir. 2007)).) Defendant emphasizes that, here, the Complaint was deliberately 11 ambiguous and, therefore, did not trigger the 30-day deadline for removal under 28 U.S.C. § 12 1446(b)(1). (Id. at 6 (citing Harris v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 425 F.3d 689 (9th Cir. 2005) 13 and Kuxhausen v. BMW Fin. Servs. NA LLC, 707 F.3d 1136 (9th Cir. 1979)).) 14 15 In his Reply, Plaintiff reiterates that Defendant failed to comply with the bright line 16 removal deadlines in 28 U.S.C § 1446(b) and argues that Defendant attempts to “convert” the 17 statutory deadline into a “license to remove at any point so long as Defendant can claim the 18 Complaint was not ‘determinate.’” (Reply at 1.) Plaintiff insists that he produced the purchase 19 agreement for the Vehicle on or about October 7, 2025, and payoff documents in early 20 November 2025. (Id.) Plaintiff argues that these documents constituted “other paper[s]” 21 sufficient for Defendant to ascertain the amount in controversy and trigger removal under 22 1446(b)(3). (Id.) 23 24 Plaintiff further argues that Defendant has failed to meet its burden to establish the 25 amount in controversy by a preponderance of the evidence because “once statutory offsets are 26 applied, the case does not exceed $75,000[.]) (Id.) Plaintiff contends that Defendant’s reliance 27 on amounts based on “future loan amortization assumptions, maximum civil penalties, and 28 unsupported fee estimates” is entirely speculative and is not sufficient to meet the $75,000 1 |}amount in controversy threshold. According to Plaintiff, Defendant’s figures merely “stack 2 ||speculation on top of speculation” and, thus, remand is required. (/d.) 3 4 LEGAL STANDARDS 5 6 “Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, defined (within constitutional bounds) 7 || by federal statute.” McNeil v. Gittere, 150 F.4th 1205, 1207 (9th Cir. 2025) (citing Badgerow 8 || v. Walters, 596 U.S. 1, 7 (2022)). Furthermore, “[s]ubject matter jurisdiction can never be 9 || forfeited or waived, and federal courts have a continuing, independent obligation to determine 10 || whether subject matter jurisdiction exists.” Mashiri v. Department of Educ., 724 F.3d 1028, 11 |} 1031 (9th Cir. 2013). “District courts have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under 12 || the Constitution laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Removal is proper 13 || when federal courts have original jurisdiction over an action filed in state court. 28 U.S.C. § 14 || 1441(a). 15 16 Removal statutes are strictly construed against removal jurisdiction, and removal must 17 || be rejected where there is any doubt as to the right of removal. See Gaus v. Miles, 980 F.2d 18 ||564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992). The party seeking removal has the burden of establishing federal 19 jurisdiction. Even where the jurisdictional standard is satisfied, federal law requires that the 20 ||removal be effectuated timely. Remand is proper when the federal court either lacks subject 21 || matter jurisdiction or there is a defect in the removal procedure. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). 22 23 As relevant here, 28 U.S.C. § 1446 provides alternate pathways to remove an action 24 state court depending on when the basis for removal becomes ascertainable by the 25 || defendant: 26 27 e “The notice of removal of a civil action or proceeding shall be filed within 30 28 days after receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of

l the initial pleading setting for the claim of relief upon which such action or 2 proceeding 1s based, or within 30 days after the service of summons upon the 3 defendant if such initial pleading has then been filed in court and is not 4 required to be served upon the defendant, whichever period is shorter.” 5 6 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1). The statute also provides that: 7 8 e “Ifthe case stated by the initial pleading is not removable, a notice of removal 9 may be filed within 30 days after receipt by the defendant .. . of a copy of an 10 amended pleading, motion, order or other paper from which it may first be 11 ascertained that the case is one which is or has become removable. 12 13 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(3) (emphasis added). When a case is removed based on diversity of 14 || citizenship, the statute states: 15 16 e removal of the action is proper on the basis of an amount in controversy 17 asserted under subparagraph (A) if the district court finds, by the 18 preponderance of the evidence, that the amount in controversy exceeds the 19 amount specified in section 1332(a). 20 21 U.S.C. § 1446(c)(2)(b). 22 23 DISCUSSION 24 25 Here, the Motion and subsequent briefing raise two essential questions: (1) whether 26 Defendant’s Notice of Removal was timely; and (2) even if removal was timely, whether 27 ||Defendant has met its burden to demonstrate that the exercise of federal subject matter 28

1 jurisdiction is appropriate. For the reasons outlined below, the Court concludes that the answer 2 to both of these questions is yes. 3 4 “[T]he burden is on the party removing the case from state court to show the exercise of 5 federal jurisdiction is appropriate.” Lewis v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., 627 F.3d 395, 399 (9th 6 Cir. 2010). Plaintiff argues that Defendant has failed to meet its burden. Plaintiff emphasizes 7 that the face of the Complaint alleges that Plaintiff is a “resident” of California. (See Compl. 8 ¶ 2.) But, Defendant responds that the Complaint does not specify that he is a “citizen” such 9 as to make diversity jurisdiction plain on the face of the Complaint. (Mot. at 4.) The Court 10 agrees. In response to a similar argument made in another Lemon Law action in this district, 11 Judge Hernan D. Vera rejected this very argument, noting that “citizenship” and “residence” 12 are not synonymous for purposes of establishing federal jurisdiction and “the bare allegation 13 of Plaintiff’s California residency was not enough to allege domicile or citizenship for diversity 14 purposes.” Chavarin v. General Motors, No. 2:25-cv-06852-HDV-MBK, 2025 WL 3030875, 15 at *1 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 29, 2025). Thus, Judge Vera concluded that diversity of citizenship of 16 the parties was not “unequivocally clear and certain” on the face of the Complaint. Id. at *5. 17 This Court reaches the same conclusion here; Plaintiff’s ambiguous assertion of “residency” 18 did not trigger the 30-day removal period. 19 20 A. The Indeterminate Allegations in the Complaint re: Damages Did Not Trigger 21 the 30-Day Removal Period under § 1446(b)(1) 22 23 Plaintiff urges that remand is required here because Defendant’s removal was untimely. 24 Plaintiff maintains that the Complaint as initially filed: (1) plainly asserted a federal cause of 25 action under the MMWA; and (2) stated that Plaintiff was “at all relevant times a resident of 26 California,” and that Plaintiff’s production of documents evidencing the Vehicle sales contract 27 adequately established that the amount in controversy exceeded $75,000, thus meeting the 28 requirements for federal subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1332. (Mot. 1 at 2.) Plaintiff contends this information was sufficient to trigger the 30-day removal clock 2 under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1) when the Complaint was served. (Id.) This argument, however, 3 is unavailing because the Complaint was entirely indeterminate as to the amount in controversy. 4 The Complaint, as filed, contains no information about the purchase price of the Vehicle or the 5 cost of any alleged repairs and did not articulate any specific measure of damages that Plaintiff 6 seeks to recover. (Dkt. No. 1-1.) 7 8 Plaintiff concedes (as he must) that the Complaint did not specify a quantum of damages 9 sought, but next argues that despite the Complaint being indeterminate as to the amount in 10 controversy, when on October 6, 2025, pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure § 11 871.26, Plaintiff produced to Defendant a copy of the Vehicle Sales Agreement that identified 12 the total sales price for the Vehicle, this document constituted an “other paper” sufficient to 13 trigger the 30-day removal period under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(3), which also rendered 14 Defendant’s December 1, 2025 Notice of Removal untimely. Plaintiff, relying on the Supreme 15 Court’s analysis in Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co., LLC, 573 U.S. 81, argues that remand 16 to California state court is required because “Defendant had sufficient information to plausibly 17 allege satisfaction of the jurisdictional threshold, . . . .” (Mot. at 2.) On that basis, Plaintiff 18 argues that Defendant was required to seek removal of the action within the statutory 30-day 19 window under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(2), making Defendant’s December 1, 2025 Notice of 20 Removal untimely by 88 days. (Id.) Here, too, Plaintiff’s argument misses the mark because 21 the amount in controversy was not expressly stated in the Complaint and Plaintiff’s production 22 of the sales contract by itself also was not sufficient to trigger the section 1446 removal clock. 23 24 Here, where the Complaint is indeterminate as to the amount in controversy, Defendant 25 looks to the remedies available under MMWA to determine whether the amount in controversy 26 is sufficient to satisfy the federal jurisdictional threshold. (Opp’n at 16.) Defendant notes that 27 on his state law claims, “Plaintiff seeks actual damages, a civil penalty of up to two times actual 28 damages, and attorney’s fees,” and is entitled to additional statutory offsets based on 1 amendments to the Song-Beverly Act enacted by California Assembly Bill 1755. (Id.)1 2 Because actual damages are indeterminate, the maximum amount of any civil penalties is 3 similarly indeterminate. (Id. at 17.) 4 5 Defendant argues that “once actual damages are calculated, the maximum resulting civil 6 penalties should be included in the amount in controversy,” but Defendant concedes that civil 7 penalties are, at this juncture, equally indeterminate because courts in this district have taken 8 divergent views on the treatment of civil penalties under the Song-Beverly Act. (Id. at 18.) 9 Finally, Defendant notes that while attorney’s fees may be included in the amount in 10 controversy, the Complaint is silent on any specific amount because Plaintiff “does not allege 11 value for such fees.” (Id.) 12 13 Defendant points to decisions in this District where judges concluded that later-served 14 sales contracts are not “unequivocally clear and certain” enough to trigger the 30-day removal 15 clock when various statutory deductions could not be determined with certainty. See e.g., 16 Rosita M. Stewart, et al., v. General Motors LLC, No. 2:25-cv-07153-SPG-MAA, 2025 WL 17 284991, at *3-4 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 7, 2025); Alejandra Arambul Watanable et al. v. General 18 Motors, LLC, No. 2:25-07006-SPG-E, 2025 WL 2848993 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 7, 2025); Marcial Y. 19 Cruz Lopez v. General Motors, LLC, No. CV 25-06549-MFF (MAAx), 2025 WL 2629545, at 20 *3 (C.D. Cal. Sep. 11, 2025) (concluding amount in controversy could not be determined 21 without accounting for unpaid financing offset absent loan payment history.”). 22 23 24

25 1 Defendant acknowledges that district courts are split on whether to consider Song-Beverly offsets 26 when calculating damages, but urges that Song-Beverly mileage offsets should be considered as part of the damages formula in this case, rather than as a defense, because “this case falls under the new 27 Song-Beverly scheme” and the Complaint affirmatively “seeks ‘actual damages’ under the Song Beverly Act, meaning the paid and payable minus offsets.” (Id. at 17 (emphasis in original; internal 28 citation omitted).) 1 MMWA has a threshold amount in controversy of $50,000. Kelly v. Fleetwood Enters., 2 377 F.3d 1034, 12037 (9th Cir. 2004). Defendant notes that while district courts in this Circuit 3 differ in how they assess the amount in controversy in MMWA cases, the majority of courts 4 strictly interpret the statute and do not include in the amount in controversy analysis amounts 5 available under California’s Song-Beverly Act, such as civil penalties. (Opp’n at 12 (citing 6 Critney v. Nat’l City Ford, Inc., 255 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 1148 (S.D. Cal. 2003)).) Defendant 7 also argues that Plaintiff “specifically delineates two different approaches to damages: one 8 applicable solely to his Song-Beverly claims and one applicable solely to his MMWA claims.” 9 (Id. at 13.) Defendant highlights that while Plaintiff alleges he pursues cancellation of the 10 contract and a civil penalty based on his Song-Beverly claim, the Complaint is not clear as to 11 under what sections of the MMWA he wishes to recover. (Id. at 13-14.) Thus, Defendant 12 urges, because the Complaint alleges no specific dollar amounts that Plaintiff seeks to recover 13 on his MMWA claim, “the measure of Plaintiff’s damages for federal claims is indeterminate 14 from the Complaint” and the Complaint on its face did not trigger the 30-day removal deadline 15 under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1). (Id. at 14.) 16 17 The Court readily concludes that, given the indeterminate nature of the Complaint as to 18 the amount of damages Plaintiff seeks, the deadline for Defendant to remove under 28 U.S.C. 19 § 1446(b)(1) was not triggered and Defendant’s Notice of Removal was not procedurally 20 defective/untimely. 21 22 B. Defendant Establishes by a Preponderance of the Evidence that the Amount in 23 Controversy Meets the $75,000 Jurisdictional Threshold 24 25 Defendant contends that Plaintiff’s Motion incorrectly equates the standard for 26 evaluating when the thirty-day removal period begins to run under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) with 27 the standard to establish the existence of federal jurisdiction. (Opp’n at 8.) Indeed, a 28 defendant’s burden to establish the proper timing of removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) is 1 analytically distinct from the standard of proof to support the exercise of federal subject matter 2 jurisdiction. 3 4 A timely Notice of Removal does not, by itself, establish that the exercise of federal 5 subject matter jurisdiction is appropriate and a removing party’s notice of removal does not 6 need to include affirmative proof of its amount-in-controversy allegation. See Dart Cherokee 7 Basin Operating Co., LLC, 574 U.S. at 89. In Dart, the High Court held that because “§ 1446(a) 8 tracks the general pleading requirement stated in Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil 9 Procedure, a defendant’s notice of removal need include only a plausible allegation that the 10 amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional threshold,” and the notice of removal need 11 not include supporting evidentiary submissions. Id. Defendant must simply demonstrate by a 12 preponderance of the evidence that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. 28 U.S.C. § 13 1332(a). 14 15 Here, although the Complaint is indeterminate as to the amount of alleged damages 16 Plaintiff seeks, the pleading clearly states that Plaintiff seeks three categories of damages for 17 the state law claim: (1) actual damages; (2) a civil penalty; and (3) reasonable attorneys’ fees 18 pursuant to California Civil Code section 1794(d). (Compl. at 8.) The Ninth Circuit has 19 emphasized that “in assessing the amount in controversy, a removing defendant is permitted to 20 rely on ‘a chain of reasoning that includes assumptions.’” Ibarra v. Manheim Investments, Inc., 21 775 F.3d 1193, 1199 (9th Cir. 2015); and see Arias v. Residence Inn., 936 F.3d 920, 927 (9th 22 Cir. 2019) (defendant need only show “reasonable grounds” for estimated damages). 23 24 Here, in determining the potential quantum of damages, Defendant points to the 25 purchase contract, service records, and Plaintiff’s payment record. (Opp’n at 19-20.) As to 26 “actual damages,” Defendant notes that the purchase price of the Vehicle with 5 miles on the 27 odometer was $62,476.84. (Id. at 19 (citing Declaration of Aubrey Kramer (“Kramer Decl.”), 28 Ex. A).) After considering the 8,911 miles on the odometer when the Vehicle was first 1 presented to a dealership for repair of alleged defects, Defendant calculated an “estimated 2 mileage offset of $3,047.04.” (Kramer Decl. ¶ 2, Ex. A.) Defendant then calculates $4,840.00 3 in “other offsets for optional third-party contracts” and as of December 3, 2021, Plaintiff had 4 made all scheduled payments. Taking these amounts together, Defendant represents that “by a 5 preponderance of the evidence, the ‘actual damages’ at issue here is $54,489.80.” (Opp’n at 6 19.) 7 8 Civil penalties may be determined after an award of actual damages. Defendant argues 9 that because the Complaint seeks civil penalties and Plaintiff has alleged willfulness on the part 10 of Defendant, the availability of civil penalties in addition to actual damages, are “non- 11 speculative.” (Id.) Defendant maintains that the amount of civil penalties is also non- 12 speculative, and applies the 2x times maximum civil penalties available under the law, which 13 “brings the total damages to $166,469,40.” (Id. at 20.) Here, the Court finds that Defendant’s 14 “chain of reasoning” with respect to the amount in controversy is sound. Therefore, even before 15 including any potential award of attorneys’ fees, Defendant has established by a preponderance 16 of the evidence that the potential recovery could exceed the $75,000 jurisdictional threshold. 17 18 The MMWA also provides that a consumer who prevails in an action under the statute 19 may recover reasonable attorney’s fees. 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(2). Based on prior litigation 20 against Plaintiff’s counsel, Defendant maintains that Plaintiff’s counsel charges a billable rate 21 of $450/hour “for even routine litigation work” and “has billed nearly $3000” for motions 22 nearly identical to the instant Motion. (Opp’n at 20.) Citing prior experience with Plaintiff’s 23 counsel in similar actions, Defendant represents that “it is reasonable to assume . . . that Plaintiff 24 will demand at least $15,000 in attorneys fees, even if this case resolves before trial.” (Id. 25 (internal citation omitted).) This figure, combined with the estimated actual damages and civil 26 penalties, well exceeds the $75,000 amount in controversy threshold to support federal subject 27 matter jurisdiction. The Court, therefore, concludes that Defendant has established by a 28 1 || preponderance of the evidence that the amount in controversy here satisfies the jurisdictional 2 || threshold to support removal to this Federal Court. 3 4 CONCLUSION 5 6 For the reasons outlined above, the Court finds Defendant’s removal of this action was 7 ||timely and Defendant has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence a reasonable 8 || probability that the amount in controversy exceeds the $75 ,000 requirement to support federal 9 || subject matter jurisdiction. 10 11 Accordingly, the Motion to Remand is DENIED. 12 13 14 || DATED: March 27, 2026 15

M KAREN L. STEVENSON 18 CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 14