Marcos Arredondo v. Warden FPC Yankton

CourtDistrict Court, D. South Dakota
DecidedJanuary 27, 2026
Docket4:25-cv-04038
StatusUnknown

This text of Marcos Arredondo v. Warden FPC Yankton (Marcos Arredondo v. Warden FPC Yankton) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. South Dakota primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Marcos Arredondo v. Warden FPC Yankton, (D.S.D. 2026).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF SOUTH DAKOTA SOUTHERN DIVISION

MARCOS ARREDONDO, 4:25-CV-04038-KES

Petitioner, ORDER GRANTING RESPONDENT’S vs. MOTION TO DISMISS AND ADOPTING THE MAGISTRATE WARDEN FPC YANKTON, JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION IN FULL Respondent.

Petitioner, Marcos Arredondo, filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Docket 1. Arredondo seeks an order directing the Warden at FPC Yankton to apply the appropriate First Step Act (FSA) earned time credits to his sentence. See id.; Docket 5; Docket 12. The petition was assigned to a United States Magistrate Judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and D.S.D. Civ. LR 72.1. Respondent, Warden FPC Yankton, moves to dismiss Arredondo’s petition for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, and failure to state a claim. Docket 8. Magistrate Judge Veronica L. Duffy filed a report and recommended Arredondo’s petition be dismissed as a matter of law. See Docket 22 at 10. Arredondo filed a response to the magistrate judge’s report, Docket 23, which this court construes as an objection, see Solomon v. Petray, 795 F.3d 777, 787 (8th Cir. 2015) (stating that pro se filings are to be construed liberally). The court issues the following order. FACTS Because Arredondo did not file objections to the facts, see Docket 23, the court adopts the facts as set forth in the report and recommendation, see

Docket 22 at 1-4. STANDARD OF REVIEW The court’s review of the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 636 and Rule 72 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The court reviews de novo any objections to a magistrate judge’s recommendations with respect to dispositive matters that are timely made and specific. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). In conducting its de novo review, this court may then “accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the

findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); United States v. Craft, 30 F.3d 1044, 1045 (8th Cir. 1994). DISCUSSION Although Arredondo filed an objection to the magistrate judge’s report, he does not identify any particular findings or conclusions in the report with which he takes issue. See Docket 23. Arredondo’s objection essentially echoes the arguments in his § 2241 petition—that BOP staff at FPC Yankton are wrongly denying him FSA earned time credits for prerelease custody, despite

clear statutory and agency guidance allowing such credits for inmates without a term of supervised release. Compare Docket 23 at 2 (objection), with Docket 1 (petition). After reviewing de novo the magistrate judge’s report, the court adopts the report and recommendation in full. Magistrate Judge Duffy provided a thoughtful and well-reasoned analysis, concluding that under the FSA, a

prisoner without a term of supervised release—like Arredondo—may earn FSA credits and apply them toward prerelease custody. Docket 22 at 9. Prerelease custody may consist of a residential re-entry center or home confinement. See 18 U.S.C. § 3624(g)(1)-(3). Because Arredondo’s sentence does not include supervised release conditions, his FSA credits cannot be applied to his supervised release conditions. As such, Arredondo’s objection is overruled. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY “[A] state prisoner seeking a writ of habeas corpus has no absolute entitlement to appeal a district court’s denial of his petition.” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 335 (2003) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2253). “Before an appeal

may be entertained, a prisoner who was denied habeas relief in the district court must first seek and obtain a [certificate of appealability] from a circuit justice or judge.” Id. at 335-36. A certificate may be issued “only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). A “substantial showing” is one that demonstrates “reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). The court finds that Arredondo has failed to make a substantial showing that his constitutional rights were denied. Consequently, a certificate of appealability is denied.

CONCLUSION Based on the foregoing, it is ORDERED: 1. That respondent’s motion to dismiss (Docket 8) is granted. Arredondo’s petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (Docket 1) is dismissed. 2. That the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation (Docket 22) is adopted in full.

3. That Arredondo’s objection (Docket 23) is overruled. Dated January 27, 2026. BY THE COURT:

/s/ Karen E. Schreier KAREN E. SCHREIER UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Related

Slack v. McDaniel
529 U.S. 473 (Supreme Court, 2000)
Miller-El v. Cockrell
537 U.S. 322 (Supreme Court, 2003)
United States v. Kareem Sekou Craft
30 F.3d 1044 (Eighth Circuit, 1994)
James Solomon v. Deputy U.S. Marshal Thomas
795 F.3d 777 (Eighth Circuit, 2015)

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Bluebook (online)
Marcos Arredondo v. Warden FPC Yankton, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/marcos-arredondo-v-warden-fpc-yankton-sdd-2026.