3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
4 DISTRICT OF NEVADA
5 MARCOS ALEJANDRO ROMERO Case No. 2:26-cv-00425-ART-NJK 6 ESTRADA, ORDER ON AMENDED PETITION 7 Plaintiff, FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS v. (ECF No. 8) 8 JOHN MATTOS, et al., 9 Defendants. 10 11 Petitioner Marcos Alejandro Romero Estrada is a Cuban citizen who was 12 paroled into the United States in April 2023. (ECF No. 8.) His parole expired two 13 years later, in April 2025. (Id. at 3.) On January 23, 2026, Romero Estrada was 14 taken into Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE) custody. (Id.) On March 15 25, 2026, Mr. Romero Estrada’s request for a bond hearing was denied. (ECF No. 16 19-5.) The immigration judge ruled that the court had no jurisdiction to consider 17 the merits of his bond request since Mr. Romero Estrada was mandatorily 18 detained under 8 U.S.C. 1225(b). (Id.) Mr. Romero Estrada argues that he is not 19 subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2), and that therefore 20 he is entitled to immediate release or a bond hearing on the merits under 8 U.S.C. 21 1226(a) (“Section 1226(a)”). Before the Court is Mr. Romero Estrada’s amended 22 petition for habeas corpus and a motion for temporary restraining order. (ECF 23 Nos. 8; 13.) The Court now grants the amended petition with respect to his 24 request for a bond hearing. 25 I. Legal Standard 26 The Constitution guarantees that the writ of habeas corpus is “available to 27 every individual detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 28 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S. Const., Art I, § 9, cl. 2). “The essence of habeas corpus 1 is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that custody, and . . . the 2 traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal custody.” Preiser 3 v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). A writ of habeas corpus may be granted 4 to a petitioner who demonstrates that he is in custody in violation of the 5 Constitution or federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). Historically, “the writ of 6 habeas corpus has served as a means of reviewing the legality of Executive 7 detention, and it is in that context that its protections have been strongest.” I.N.S. 8 v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001). Accordingly, a district court's habeas 9 jurisdiction includes challenges to immigration-related detention. Zadvydas v. 10 Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001); see also Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 517 11 (2003). 12 II. Analysis 13 A. Jurisdiction 14 The Court has jurisdiction over Mr. Romero Estrada’s case under 28 U.S.C. 15 § 2441, regardless of the jurisdiction-stripping provisions of 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(g) 16 and 1252(b)(9). Neither of those rules deprive district courts of jurisdiction to hear 17 challenges to confinement, as distinct from challenges to removal and actions 18 taken in furtherance of a removal proceeding. 19 First, the Supreme Court has limited the reach of § 1252(g). That section 20 deprives courts of jurisdiction to review “any cause or claim by or on behalf of an 21 alien arising from the decision or action by the Attorney General to [1] commence 22 proceedings, [2] adjudicate cases, or [3] execute removal orders against any alien 23 under this chapter.” The Supreme Court has named these factors the “three 24 discrete events along the road to deportation.” Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti- 25 Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 482 (1999). Petitioner challenges the 26 lawfulness of his detention only, and detention is not one of the three events. A 27 request for a bond hearing is “independent of, and collateral to, the removal 28 process.” Ozturk v. Hyde, 136 F.4th 382, 397 (2d Cir. 2025). 1 Second, the Supreme Court has rejected the argument that Section 2 1252(b)(9) is a jurisdictional bar to district court review of immigration detention. 3 That section provides that “judicial review of all questions of law . . . including 4 interpretation and application of statutory provisions . . . arising from any action 5 taken . . . to remove an alien from the United States” is only proper before the 6 appropriate federal court of appeals in the form of a petition for review of a final 7 removal order. Id. The Supreme Court has squarely held that Section 1252(b)(9) 8 does not deprive federal courts of jurisdiction to decide whether certain statutory 9 provisions require detention without a bond hearing. Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 10 U.S. 281, 292 (2018). Once again, “claims challenging the legality of detention 11 pursuant to an immigration detainer are independent of the removal process.” 12 Gonzalez v. U.S. Immig. and Cust. Enf't, 975 F.3d 788, 810 (9th Cir. 2020); see 13 Nielsen v. Preap, 586 U.S. 392, 402 (2019). 14 B. Mr. Romero Estrada is Not Subject to Mandatory Detention 15 Under Section 1225(b)(2) 16 Respondents argue that Mr. Romero Estrada is subject to mandatory 17 detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act 18 (“INA”) because he was present in the United States without being admitted or 19 paroled. (ECF No. 19 at 3.) Based on the statutory text as construed by numerous 20 courts that have addressed this issue, the Court concludes that Section 1225 21 does not apply to Mr. Romero Estrada, who has been in this country for three 22 years. 23 The first question is whether Section 1225 applies to all noncitizens in the 24 United States who entered without inspection, or if those who, like Mr. Romero 25 Estrada, have been present for many years, are exempt. The statute’s 26 construction depends on its ordinary meaning, its text read in conjunction with 27 Section 1226, and its interpretation by Article III courts, including the Ninth 28 Circuit and the Supreme Court. All these sources show that Section 1225 has a 1 “limited temporal focus” and mandates detention of those who are arriving or 2 have recently arrived in the United States. Maldonado Vazquez v. Feeley, No. 3 2:25-CV-01542-RFB-EJY, 2025 WL 2676082, at *11-16 (D. Nev. Sept. 17, 2025). 4 As the Supreme Court made clear in Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281 5 (2018), Section 1225 applies exclusively to recent arrivals at the border and 6 Section 1226 applies exclusively to those already present in the United States.
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3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
4 DISTRICT OF NEVADA
5 MARCOS ALEJANDRO ROMERO Case No. 2:26-cv-00425-ART-NJK 6 ESTRADA, ORDER ON AMENDED PETITION 7 Plaintiff, FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS v. (ECF No. 8) 8 JOHN MATTOS, et al., 9 Defendants. 10 11 Petitioner Marcos Alejandro Romero Estrada is a Cuban citizen who was 12 paroled into the United States in April 2023. (ECF No. 8.) His parole expired two 13 years later, in April 2025. (Id. at 3.) On January 23, 2026, Romero Estrada was 14 taken into Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE) custody. (Id.) On March 15 25, 2026, Mr. Romero Estrada’s request for a bond hearing was denied. (ECF No. 16 19-5.) The immigration judge ruled that the court had no jurisdiction to consider 17 the merits of his bond request since Mr. Romero Estrada was mandatorily 18 detained under 8 U.S.C. 1225(b). (Id.) Mr. Romero Estrada argues that he is not 19 subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2), and that therefore 20 he is entitled to immediate release or a bond hearing on the merits under 8 U.S.C. 21 1226(a) (“Section 1226(a)”). Before the Court is Mr. Romero Estrada’s amended 22 petition for habeas corpus and a motion for temporary restraining order. (ECF 23 Nos. 8; 13.) The Court now grants the amended petition with respect to his 24 request for a bond hearing. 25 I. Legal Standard 26 The Constitution guarantees that the writ of habeas corpus is “available to 27 every individual detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 28 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S. Const., Art I, § 9, cl. 2). “The essence of habeas corpus 1 is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that custody, and . . . the 2 traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal custody.” Preiser 3 v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). A writ of habeas corpus may be granted 4 to a petitioner who demonstrates that he is in custody in violation of the 5 Constitution or federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). Historically, “the writ of 6 habeas corpus has served as a means of reviewing the legality of Executive 7 detention, and it is in that context that its protections have been strongest.” I.N.S. 8 v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001). Accordingly, a district court's habeas 9 jurisdiction includes challenges to immigration-related detention. Zadvydas v. 10 Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001); see also Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 517 11 (2003). 12 II. Analysis 13 A. Jurisdiction 14 The Court has jurisdiction over Mr. Romero Estrada’s case under 28 U.S.C. 15 § 2441, regardless of the jurisdiction-stripping provisions of 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(g) 16 and 1252(b)(9). Neither of those rules deprive district courts of jurisdiction to hear 17 challenges to confinement, as distinct from challenges to removal and actions 18 taken in furtherance of a removal proceeding. 19 First, the Supreme Court has limited the reach of § 1252(g). That section 20 deprives courts of jurisdiction to review “any cause or claim by or on behalf of an 21 alien arising from the decision or action by the Attorney General to [1] commence 22 proceedings, [2] adjudicate cases, or [3] execute removal orders against any alien 23 under this chapter.” The Supreme Court has named these factors the “three 24 discrete events along the road to deportation.” Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti- 25 Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 482 (1999). Petitioner challenges the 26 lawfulness of his detention only, and detention is not one of the three events. A 27 request for a bond hearing is “independent of, and collateral to, the removal 28 process.” Ozturk v. Hyde, 136 F.4th 382, 397 (2d Cir. 2025). 1 Second, the Supreme Court has rejected the argument that Section 2 1252(b)(9) is a jurisdictional bar to district court review of immigration detention. 3 That section provides that “judicial review of all questions of law . . . including 4 interpretation and application of statutory provisions . . . arising from any action 5 taken . . . to remove an alien from the United States” is only proper before the 6 appropriate federal court of appeals in the form of a petition for review of a final 7 removal order. Id. The Supreme Court has squarely held that Section 1252(b)(9) 8 does not deprive federal courts of jurisdiction to decide whether certain statutory 9 provisions require detention without a bond hearing. Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 10 U.S. 281, 292 (2018). Once again, “claims challenging the legality of detention 11 pursuant to an immigration detainer are independent of the removal process.” 12 Gonzalez v. U.S. Immig. and Cust. Enf't, 975 F.3d 788, 810 (9th Cir. 2020); see 13 Nielsen v. Preap, 586 U.S. 392, 402 (2019). 14 B. Mr. Romero Estrada is Not Subject to Mandatory Detention 15 Under Section 1225(b)(2) 16 Respondents argue that Mr. Romero Estrada is subject to mandatory 17 detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act 18 (“INA”) because he was present in the United States without being admitted or 19 paroled. (ECF No. 19 at 3.) Based on the statutory text as construed by numerous 20 courts that have addressed this issue, the Court concludes that Section 1225 21 does not apply to Mr. Romero Estrada, who has been in this country for three 22 years. 23 The first question is whether Section 1225 applies to all noncitizens in the 24 United States who entered without inspection, or if those who, like Mr. Romero 25 Estrada, have been present for many years, are exempt. The statute’s 26 construction depends on its ordinary meaning, its text read in conjunction with 27 Section 1226, and its interpretation by Article III courts, including the Ninth 28 Circuit and the Supreme Court. All these sources show that Section 1225 has a 1 “limited temporal focus” and mandates detention of those who are arriving or 2 have recently arrived in the United States. Maldonado Vazquez v. Feeley, No. 3 2:25-CV-01542-RFB-EJY, 2025 WL 2676082, at *11-16 (D. Nev. Sept. 17, 2025). 4 As the Supreme Court made clear in Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281 5 (2018), Section 1225 applies exclusively to recent arrivals at the border and 6 Section 1226 applies exclusively to those already present in the United States. 7 In Jennings, the Supreme Court explained that Section 1225’s mandatory 8 detention provision is part of the immigration process which “generally begins at 9 the Nation's borders and ports of entry, where the Government must determine 10 whether an alien seeking to enter the country is admissible,” and that the statute 11 “authorizes the Government to detain certain aliens seeking admission into the 12 country.” Id. at 287, 289. Section 1225 deals with the process of arrival in the 13 United States, including “inspection by immigration officers” of “applicants for 14 admission” and stowaways; “expedited removal of inadmissible arriving aliens;” 15 and “referral for hearing” of those individuals to whom the section otherwise 16 applies. 8 U.S.C. §1225. By contrast, Section 1226 deals with the “apprehension 17 and detention of aliens” who have passed through the border or a port of entry. 18 8 U.S.C. § 1226. The Court noted that Section 1226’s discretionary detention 19 provision “authorizes the Government to detain certain aliens already in the 20 country,” calling it a “default rule” that applies to those “already present in the 21 United States.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 289, 303; see also Nielsen, 586 U.S. at 396– 22 97 (holding that Section 1226(a) applies to most people who are “present in this 23 country” and removable); Fifty-Six Hope Rd. Music, Ltd. v. A.V.E.L.A., Inc., 778 24 F.3d 1059, 1081 (9th Cir. 2015) (“[P]ermissive and mandatory detention are in 25 harmony, as they apply to different situations”). 26 Section 1225 detains a subset of noncitizens who meet the definition of an 27 “applicant for admission.” Focusing more narrowly on that statutory term, 28 controlling and persuasive authorities have held that those who have been in the 1 United States for many years are not applicants for admission. The Ninth Circuit 2 has held that “an immigrant submits an ‘application for admission’ at a distinct 3 point in time” and “stretching the phrase” to continue “potentially for years or 4 decades” “would push the statutory text beyond its breaking point.” U.S. v. 5 Gambino-Ruiz, 91 F.4th 981, 988-89 (9th Cir. 2024) (citing Torres v. Barr, 976 6 F.3d 918, 922-26 (9th Cir. 2020) (en banc)). Numerous district courts have taken 7 the same approach. Lopez Benitez v. Francis, 795 F. Supp. 3d 475, 489 (S.D.N.Y. 8 2025); Escobar Salgado v. Mattos, No. 2:25-CV-01872-RFB-EJY, 2025 WL 9 3205356, at *15 (D. Nev. Nov. 17, 2025); Maldonado Vazquez, 2025 WL 2676082, 10 at *13; Rusu v. Noem, No. 25 C 13819, 2025 WL 3240911, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 20, 11 2025) (seeking admission “would most logically occur at the border upon 12 inspection”); Bautista v. Santacruz, No. 5:25-CV-01873-SSS-BFM, 2025 WL 13 3289861, at *9 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2025) (“Individuals who are present in the 14 United States and have not been inspected and authorized by an immigration 15 officers are merely part of the broadly defined term ‘[noncitizen]’” and are not 16 “applicants for admission”). 17 Respondents’ reading of Section 1225 would render superfluous much of 18 Section 1226, including Section 1226(c) (“Laken Riley Act”). See Hasan v. 19 Crawford, 800 F. Supp. 3d 641, 656 (E.D. Va. 2025) (“A statute should be 20 construed so that effect is given to all its provisions,” and “no part will be 21 inoperative or superfluous, void, or insignificant.”) (citing Corley v. United States, 22 556 U.S. 303, 314 (2009)). Construing Section 1225 so expansively would eclipse 23 the discretionary detention available under Section 1226(a). See, e.g. Lopez 24 Benitez, 795 F. Supp. 3d at 490; Bautista, 2025 WL 3289861, at *11 25 (“Respondents unacceptably collapse § 1226 into nonexistence under a wide- 26 reaching interpretation of ‘applicants for admission’”); Rusu, 2025 WL 3240911, 27 at *5; Helbrum v. Williams Olson, No. 4:25-CV-00349-SHL-SBJ, 2025 WL 28 2840273, at *4 (S.D. Iowa Sept. 30, 2025); Maldonado Vazquez, 2025 WL 1 2676082, at *14. If all noncitizens present in the United States without admission 2 were already subject to mandatory detention under Section 1225, discretionary 3 detention under 1226(a) would be limited and there would be no need for 4 mandatory detention under the Laken Riley Act. See Romero v. Hyde, 795 F. 5 Supp. 3d 271, 286 (D. Mass. 2025) (“‘[T]he canon against surplusage is strongest 6 when an interpretation would render superfluous another part of the same 7 statutory scheme.’”) (quoting Marx v. Gen. Revenue Corp., 568 U.S. 371, 386 8 (2013)). 9 In contrast to the above-recited points and authorities, Respondents argue 10 that Section 1225 subjects all noncitizens who are inadmissible for entry without 11 inspection to mandatory detention, regardless of how long they have been in the 12 United States. The vast majority of courts confronting this question have rejected 13 Respondents’ interpretation of Section 1225, including its reliance on the Board 14 of Immigration Appeals decision in Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216, 15 217 (BIA 2025), as contradictory to the plain text of the statute. See, e.g., 16 Hernandez-Luna v. Noem, No. 2:25-CV-01818-GMN-EJY, 2025 WL 3102039, at 17 *4 (D. Nev. Nov. 6, 2025): Veletanga v. Noem, No. 25-CV-9211 (NSR), 2025 WL 18 3751865, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 26, 2025) (noting that “[a]n abundance of district 19 courts around the country have disagreed with Matter of Yajure Hurtado” and 20 granted relief to persons improperly detained under § 1225(b)(2)”); Vazquez v. 21 Feeley, No. 2:25-cv-01542-RFB-EJY, 2025 WL 2676082, at *16 (D. Nev. Sept. 17, 22 2025); Rodriguez v. Bostock, 779 F. Supp. 3d 1239, 1261 (W.D. Wash. 2025); 23 Patel v. Almodovar, No. 25-cv-15345, 2025 WL 3012323 at *3 (D.N.J. Oct. 28, 24 2025) (collecting cases). 25 Because Respondents do not argue in their briefing that Mr. Romero 26 Estrada is detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) for any other reasons, the Court 27 grants Mr. Romero Estrada’s writ and orders Respondents to provide Mr. Romero 28 Estrada with an individualized bond hearing, under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), by April 1 20, 2026. 2 C. The Government Bears the Burden of Proving that Mr. Romero 3 Estrada’s Detention is Warranted 4 Respondents argue that Mr. Romero Estrada bears the burden of 5 establishing that release is warranted, in a bond hearing before an immigration 6 judge. However, numerous courts have held that the burden is on the 7 Government to establish whether detention is justified. See e.g., LUIS ENRIQUE 8 ANDRADE, Petitioner, v. JOHN MATTOS, et al., Respondents., No. 2:26-CV-00156- 9 RFB-MDC, 2026 WL 969289, at *3 (D. Nev. Apr. 9, 2026) (“[T]he Court orders 10 Respondents to conduct a bond hearing for Petitioner under § 1226(a), and its 11 implementing regulations, wherein the government must prove, by clear and 12 convincing evidence, that Petitioner's civil detention is justified by an 13 individualized, constitutionally recognized interest—e.g., that his detention is 14 necessary to prevent danger to the community or to ensure his future appearance 15 at removal proceedings.”); JUAN CARLOS NAVA MEZA, Petitioner, v. JOHN 16 MATTOS, et al., Respondents., No. 2:26-CV-00957-RFB-BNW, 2026 WL 969307, 17 at *3 (D. Nev. Apr. 9, 2026); Lima v. Wofford, No. 1:25-CV-01390-SKO (HC), 2025 18 WL 3535009, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 10, 2025); Arostegui-Maldonado v. Baltazar, 19 794 F. Supp. 3d 926, 944 (D. Colo. 2025) (“[T]he Supreme Court has long held 20 that the clear and convincing evidence standard applies to civil detention . . . . 21 The Court sees no compelling reason why a lesser standard should apply in [the 22 immigration detention] context.” (internal citation omitted)). 23 Additionally, while the Ninth Circuit ruled that the Government does not 24 bear the burden in a second bond hearing held under Section 1226(a), the Ninth 25 Circuit subsequently endorsed requiring the Government to prove by clear and 26 convincing evidence that noncitizens are a danger to the community or a flight 27 risk, in an initial bond hearing. Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland, 53 F.4th 1189, 1203 28 (9th Cir. 2022); Martinez v. Clark, 124 F.4th 775, 785 (9th Cir. 2024) (“[T]he BIA 1 properly noted that the government bore the burden to establish by clear and 2 convincing evidence that [a detained noncitizen] is a danger to the community” 3 in the context of prolonged detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)). 4 Accordingly, Respondents are required to provide Mr. Romero Estrada with 5 an individualized bond hearing, under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), by April 20, 2026, 6 wherein Respondents must establish by clear and convincing evidence that Mr. 7 Romero Estrada is a flight risk or a danger to the public, or otherwise release him 8 from custody. 9 III. Conclusion 10 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Petitioner’s writ of habeas corpus (ECF No. 11 8) is GRANTED with respect to his request for a bond hearing. 12 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Respondents shall provide Petitioner with an 13 individualized bond hearing before an immigration judge pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 14 1226(a) by April 20, 2026, wherein the Government must establish by clear and 15 convincing evidence that Petitioner is a flight risk or danger to the public. If a 16 bond hearing is not provided by April 20, 2026, Petitioner is to be released from 17 custody, and upon release, should Respondent seek to re-detain Petitioner, it 18 must provide no less than seven (7) days’ notice to Petitioner and must hold a 19 pre-deprivation bond hearing before a neutral arbiter wherein the Government 20 must establish by clear and convincing evidence that Petitioner is a flight risk or 21 danger to the public and at which Petitioner's eligibility for bond must be 22 considered. 23 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Respondents must file a Notice of Compliance 24 within ten (10) days of providing Petitioner with a bond determination hearing. 25 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Petitioner’s motion for a temporary restraining 26 order (ECF No. 13) is DENIED AS MOOT. 27 28 1 Dated this 13th day of April 2026. 2
4 ANNER.TRAUM 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28