IN THE
Court of Appeals of Indiana Marco Antono Perez, II, FILED Apr 13 2026, 9:04 am Appellant-Defendant CLERK Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals and Tax Court v.
State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
April 13, 2026 Court of Appeals Case No. 25A-CR-2377 Appeal from the Vermillion Circuit Court The Honorable Chris A. Wrede, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 83C01-2304-F3-2
Opinion by Chief Judge Tavitas Judges Weissmann and Foley concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-2377 | April 13, 2026 Page 1 of 10 Tavitas, Chief Judge.
Case Summary [1] Marco Antono Perez, II, pleaded guilty to possession of a narcotic drug, a
Level 5 felony, and resisting law enforcement, a Level 6 felony. The trial court
sentenced Perez to an aggregate sentence of four years suspended to probation.
Perez violated the terms of his probation by failing to appear for two scheduled
probation appointments. The trial court revoked Perez’s probation and ordered
him to serve the entirety of his previously suspended sentence. Perez appeals
and argues that the trial court abused its discretion by imposing the entirety of
his previously suspended sentence because the circumstances did not warrant
the sanction imposed. We agree with Perez and, accordingly, reverse and
remand with instructions.
Issue [2] Perez raises one issue, which we restate as whether the trial court abused its
discretion by ordering Perez to serve the entirety of his previously suspended
sentence based on two technical violations.
Facts [3] On June 14, 2023, Perez entered into a plea agreement with the State pursuant
to which he pleaded guilty to possession of a narcotic drug, a Level 5 felony,
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-2377 | April 13, 2026 Page 2 of 10 and resisting law enforcement, a Level 6 felony. In exchange, the State agreed
to dismiss the remaining counts.1
[4] On March 13, 2024, the trial court accepted the plea agreement and sentenced
Perez to an aggregate term of four years, with 1,460 days suspended to
probation. Prior to sentencing, Perez served 105 actual days of incarceration,
for which the trial court awarded 105 actual days and thirty-five days of good-
time credit, for a total of 140 days of credit time. Accordingly, 1,320 days
remained suspended to probation. Perez’s conditions of probation included
that he refrain from committing new criminal offenses, report to the Probation
Department as directed, and refrain from consuming alcohol or controlled
substances. As a special condition of probation, Perez was “required to attend,
cooperate, and complete a drug and alcohol treatment program at [his] own
expense as approved by the Probation Officer.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 46.
[5] Perez voluntarily enrolled in an approved program named “Oxford House,”
which is a sober living program. Tr. Vol. II p. 10. Perez successfully finished
the program without any violations. Perez passed all drug screens administered
by the Vermillion County Probation Department and was on probation for 498
days without incident.
1 The dismissed counts were: Count I, dealing in a narcotic drug, a Level 3 felony; Count IV, possession of marijuana, a Class B misdemeanor; Count V, possession of a controlled substance, a Class A misdemeanor; and Count VI, reckless driving, a Class C misdemeanor.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-2377 | April 13, 2026 Page 3 of 10 [6] In July 2025, probation officer David Robinson scheduled two appointments
for July 11, 2025, and July 16, 2025, for Perez. The appointments were
scheduled “to transfer [Perez’s] supervision to Illinois,” where Perez resided.
Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 50. Robinson spoke with Perez by phone on two
occasions to schedule the appointments.2 Perez, however, failed to appear for
both appointments. On July 23, 2025, the Vermillion County Probation
Department filed a verified petition to revoke Perez’s probation.
[7] On September 3, 2025, the trial court held a hearing on the petition, and Perez
admitted to violating his probation as alleged. Perez testified that he missed the
two appointments because he was attending medical appointments related to
the imminent birth of his child and caring for two other children. Perez
accepted responsibility for missing the appointments, stated that he had called
to reschedule, and requested that the trial court return him to probation.
Alexandra Cardenas, Perez’s partner, testified that she and Perez had been in a
relationship for five years and that she relied on Perez financially and for
assistance caring for their children. The State noted that Perez had been
respectful throughout the proceedings and deserved “some credit” for accepting
responsibility. Tr. Vol. II p. 14.
2 It is unclear from the record who initiated the phone conversations, under what circumstances they occurred, or when they occurred.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-2377 | April 13, 2026 Page 4 of 10 [8] The trial court revoked Perez’s probation and ordered him to serve the entirety
of his previously suspended sentence in the Department of Correction. 3 The
trial court noted Perez’s history of probation violations as a juvenile, 4 the
benefit he received under the plea agreement, including the dismissal of a
charge of dealing in cocaine, a Level 3 felony, and that Perez had been given an
opportunity to appear prior to the filing of the petition but failed to do so. Perez
now appeals.
Discussion and Decision [9] Perez argues that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering him to serve
the entirety of his previously suspended sentence. We acknowledge that
“‘[p]robation is a matter of grace left to trial court discretion, not a right to
which a criminal defendant is entitled.’” Heaton v. State, 984 N.E.2d 614, 616
(Ind. 2013) (quoting Prewitt v. State, 878 N.E.2d 184, 188 (Ind. 2007)). “It is
within the discretion of the trial court to determine probation conditions and to
revoke probation if the conditions are violated.” Id. “In appeals from trial
court probation violation determinations and sanctions, we review for abuse of
3 Perez argues that “the trial court found the appropriate sanction for this violation was to have Perez miss the birth and first three and one-half years of the child’s life by being in the Department of Correction.” Appellant’s Br. p. 8. This statement materially mischaracterizes the trial court’s findings and judgment. The trial court made no finding that requiring Perez to miss the birth or early years of his child’s life was the appropriate sanction. Rather, those consequences merely flow from the sanction imposed. The distinction is critical, and counsel’s argument improperly conflates the effects of the sanction with the trial court’s reasoning. We remind counsel of the duty of candor to the tribunal and that misstatements of the record may warrant corrective action. 4 Perez’s juvenile history, including prior probation violations, occurred in 2013 and 2014.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-2377 | April 13, 2026 Page 5 of 10 discretion.” Id. “An abuse of discretion occurs where the decision is clearly
against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances . . . or when the trial
court misinterprets the law.” Id. “We will consider all the evidence most
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IN THE
Court of Appeals of Indiana Marco Antono Perez, II, FILED Apr 13 2026, 9:04 am Appellant-Defendant CLERK Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals and Tax Court v.
State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
April 13, 2026 Court of Appeals Case No. 25A-CR-2377 Appeal from the Vermillion Circuit Court The Honorable Chris A. Wrede, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 83C01-2304-F3-2
Opinion by Chief Judge Tavitas Judges Weissmann and Foley concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-2377 | April 13, 2026 Page 1 of 10 Tavitas, Chief Judge.
Case Summary [1] Marco Antono Perez, II, pleaded guilty to possession of a narcotic drug, a
Level 5 felony, and resisting law enforcement, a Level 6 felony. The trial court
sentenced Perez to an aggregate sentence of four years suspended to probation.
Perez violated the terms of his probation by failing to appear for two scheduled
probation appointments. The trial court revoked Perez’s probation and ordered
him to serve the entirety of his previously suspended sentence. Perez appeals
and argues that the trial court abused its discretion by imposing the entirety of
his previously suspended sentence because the circumstances did not warrant
the sanction imposed. We agree with Perez and, accordingly, reverse and
remand with instructions.
Issue [2] Perez raises one issue, which we restate as whether the trial court abused its
discretion by ordering Perez to serve the entirety of his previously suspended
sentence based on two technical violations.
Facts [3] On June 14, 2023, Perez entered into a plea agreement with the State pursuant
to which he pleaded guilty to possession of a narcotic drug, a Level 5 felony,
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-2377 | April 13, 2026 Page 2 of 10 and resisting law enforcement, a Level 6 felony. In exchange, the State agreed
to dismiss the remaining counts.1
[4] On March 13, 2024, the trial court accepted the plea agreement and sentenced
Perez to an aggregate term of four years, with 1,460 days suspended to
probation. Prior to sentencing, Perez served 105 actual days of incarceration,
for which the trial court awarded 105 actual days and thirty-five days of good-
time credit, for a total of 140 days of credit time. Accordingly, 1,320 days
remained suspended to probation. Perez’s conditions of probation included
that he refrain from committing new criminal offenses, report to the Probation
Department as directed, and refrain from consuming alcohol or controlled
substances. As a special condition of probation, Perez was “required to attend,
cooperate, and complete a drug and alcohol treatment program at [his] own
expense as approved by the Probation Officer.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 46.
[5] Perez voluntarily enrolled in an approved program named “Oxford House,”
which is a sober living program. Tr. Vol. II p. 10. Perez successfully finished
the program without any violations. Perez passed all drug screens administered
by the Vermillion County Probation Department and was on probation for 498
days without incident.
1 The dismissed counts were: Count I, dealing in a narcotic drug, a Level 3 felony; Count IV, possession of marijuana, a Class B misdemeanor; Count V, possession of a controlled substance, a Class A misdemeanor; and Count VI, reckless driving, a Class C misdemeanor.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-2377 | April 13, 2026 Page 3 of 10 [6] In July 2025, probation officer David Robinson scheduled two appointments
for July 11, 2025, and July 16, 2025, for Perez. The appointments were
scheduled “to transfer [Perez’s] supervision to Illinois,” where Perez resided.
Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 50. Robinson spoke with Perez by phone on two
occasions to schedule the appointments.2 Perez, however, failed to appear for
both appointments. On July 23, 2025, the Vermillion County Probation
Department filed a verified petition to revoke Perez’s probation.
[7] On September 3, 2025, the trial court held a hearing on the petition, and Perez
admitted to violating his probation as alleged. Perez testified that he missed the
two appointments because he was attending medical appointments related to
the imminent birth of his child and caring for two other children. Perez
accepted responsibility for missing the appointments, stated that he had called
to reschedule, and requested that the trial court return him to probation.
Alexandra Cardenas, Perez’s partner, testified that she and Perez had been in a
relationship for five years and that she relied on Perez financially and for
assistance caring for their children. The State noted that Perez had been
respectful throughout the proceedings and deserved “some credit” for accepting
responsibility. Tr. Vol. II p. 14.
2 It is unclear from the record who initiated the phone conversations, under what circumstances they occurred, or when they occurred.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-2377 | April 13, 2026 Page 4 of 10 [8] The trial court revoked Perez’s probation and ordered him to serve the entirety
of his previously suspended sentence in the Department of Correction. 3 The
trial court noted Perez’s history of probation violations as a juvenile, 4 the
benefit he received under the plea agreement, including the dismissal of a
charge of dealing in cocaine, a Level 3 felony, and that Perez had been given an
opportunity to appear prior to the filing of the petition but failed to do so. Perez
now appeals.
Discussion and Decision [9] Perez argues that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering him to serve
the entirety of his previously suspended sentence. We acknowledge that
“‘[p]robation is a matter of grace left to trial court discretion, not a right to
which a criminal defendant is entitled.’” Heaton v. State, 984 N.E.2d 614, 616
(Ind. 2013) (quoting Prewitt v. State, 878 N.E.2d 184, 188 (Ind. 2007)). “It is
within the discretion of the trial court to determine probation conditions and to
revoke probation if the conditions are violated.” Id. “In appeals from trial
court probation violation determinations and sanctions, we review for abuse of
3 Perez argues that “the trial court found the appropriate sanction for this violation was to have Perez miss the birth and first three and one-half years of the child’s life by being in the Department of Correction.” Appellant’s Br. p. 8. This statement materially mischaracterizes the trial court’s findings and judgment. The trial court made no finding that requiring Perez to miss the birth or early years of his child’s life was the appropriate sanction. Rather, those consequences merely flow from the sanction imposed. The distinction is critical, and counsel’s argument improperly conflates the effects of the sanction with the trial court’s reasoning. We remind counsel of the duty of candor to the tribunal and that misstatements of the record may warrant corrective action. 4 Perez’s juvenile history, including prior probation violations, occurred in 2013 and 2014.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-2377 | April 13, 2026 Page 5 of 10 discretion.” Id. “An abuse of discretion occurs where the decision is clearly
against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances . . . or when the trial
court misinterprets the law.” Id. “We will consider all the evidence most
favorable to supporting the judgment of the trial court without reweighing that
evidence or judging the credibility of the witnesses.” Holmes v. State, 923
N.E.2d 479, 483 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (quoting Monroe v. State, 899 N.E.2d 688,
691 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009)).
[10] “Probation revocation is a two-step process. First, the trial court must make a
factual determination that a violation of a condition of probation actually
occurred.” Heaton, 984 N.E.2d at 616 (citing Woods v. State, 892 N.E.2d 637,
640 (Ind. 2008)). “Second, if a violation is found, then the trial court must
determine the appropriate sanctions for the violation.” Id.
[If the trial court] finds that the person has violated a condition at any time before termination of the period, and the petition to revoke is filed within the probationary period, the court may . . . [o]rder execution of all or part of the sentence that was suspended at the time of initial sentencing.
Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(h)(3).
[11] “[E]ven a probationer who admits the allegations against him must still be
given an opportunity to offer mitigating evidence suggesting that the violation
does not warrant revocation.” Woods, 892 N.E.2d at 640. That said, the trial
court is not obliged to balance aggravating and mitigating factors when deciding
whether to revoke probation and when imposing a sentence. Porter v. State, 117
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-2377 | April 13, 2026 Page 6 of 10 N.E.3d 673, 675 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018). Moreover, it is well settled that a single
violation of a condition of probation is sufficient to permit the trial court
to revoke probation. Pierce v. State, 44 N.E.3d 752, 755 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015).
[12] Perez admitted that he violated the terms of his probation by failing to appear
for two appointments with his probation officer. Perez, however, argues that he
missed the probation appointments because he was attending medical
appointments related to the imminent birth of his child and caring for two other
children. Given the “technical nature” of the violations, Perez contends that
the trial court abused its discretion by ordering him to serve the entirety of his
previously suspended sentence. Appellant’s Br. p. 12. We agree with Perez
that the trial court abused its discretion under these circumstances.
[13] In Brown v. State, this Court explained that “[w]hile it is correct that probation
may be revoked on evidence of violation of a single condition, the selection of
an appropriate sanction will depend upon the severity of the defendant’s
probation violation . . . . Given that the remaining . . . violations are technical
in nature, the trial court, in its discretion, may decide to continue the
probationer on probation without modification. In any event, such
determination is better exercised by the trial court [on remand].” 162 N.E.3d
1179, 1184 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (quoting Heaton, 984 N.E.2d at 618 (citation
omitted)).
[14] Similarly, in Johnson v. State, the defendant committed several technical
violations, including traveling to unauthorized locations, sitting outside his
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-2377 | April 13, 2026 Page 7 of 10 residence while on community corrections, arriving at an approved destination
earlier than permitted, and moving his GPS monitoring device within his
residence. 62 N.E.3d 1224 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). The trial court ordered the
defendant to serve the entirety of his previously suspended sentence based on
those violations. This Court held that the trial court abused its discretion in
ordering the sanction of revoking the entirety of his probation and reversed and
remanded with instructions.
[15] Here, Perez failed to appear for the first appointment because he was
accompanying his partner to a medical appointment related to the imminent
birth of his child. Perez contacted the probation officer to reschedule and was
given a second opportunity to report. Perez then failed to appear for the second
appointment because he was caring for two other children. During this period,
the probation officer testified that Perez maintained communication with his
probation officer. Perez did not commit any new criminal offenses or violate
other conditions of his probation, and he passed all drug and alcohol screens.
Prior to the violations, Perez voluntarily enrolled in and successfully completed
a sober living program without incident. After the State filed the petition to
revoke probation, Perez did not prolong the proceedings; he admitted the
violations and accepted responsibility. Importantly, the State also
acknowledged at the hearing that Perez deserved “some credit” for doing so.
Tr. Vol. II p. 14.
[16] Moreover, the trial court did not account for the remoteness of Perez’s prior
probation violations, which occurred more than ten years earlier when Perez
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-2377 | April 13, 2026 Page 8 of 10 was a juvenile. The record also indicates that Perez had distanced himself from
the circumstances and associations that led to his prior offenses by relocating to
Illinois and focusing on supporting and raising his family.
[17] Our courts have long recognized the importance of individualized assessments
in determining appropriate sanctions in both sentencing and probation
revocation contexts. See Woods, 892 N.E.2d at 641 (noting that automatic
revocation “no matter the reason is constitutionally suspect”); Heaton, 984
N.E.2d at 618 (explaining that the appropriate sanction depends upon the
severity of the violation). We acknowledge that, even in the case of “technical”
violations, the trial court has the discretion to determine the appropriate
sanction based upon the seriousness of the offense.
[18] Here, though, given the less serious nature of the violations, the lack of
additional misconduct, Perez’s acceptance of responsibility, and the State’s
acknowledgment that the trial court should give Perez “some credit,” we
conclude that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering Perez to serve the
entirety of his previously suspended sentence. Tr. Vol. II p. 14. Lesser
sanctions were available that would have allowed Perez to continue working
and supporting his family and may have been more appropriate within the
range of sanctions available to the trial court. We, therefore, reverse and
remand for the trial court to determine an appropriate sanction consistent with
this opinion, including consideration of alternatives that would permit Perez to
maintain employment while serving his sentence.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-2377 | April 13, 2026 Page 9 of 10 Conclusion [19] The trial court abused its discretion by ordering Perez to serve the entirety of his
previously suspended sentence. We, therefore, reverse and remand for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
[20] Reversed and remanded.
Weissmann, J. and Foley, J., concur.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Aaron J. Spolarich Bennett Boehning & Clary LLP Lafayette, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theordore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana
Courtney Staton Supervising Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-2377 | April 13, 2026 Page 10 of 10