Marco Antonio Mancilla Ruiz v. Christopher J. Larose, et al.

• Court: District Court, S.D. California
• Decided: November 18, 2025
• Docket: 3:25-cv-02714
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 MARCO ANTONIO MANCILLA RUIZ, Case No. 25-cv-02714-BAS-SBC

12 Petitioner, ORDER GRANTING PETITION 13 v. FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS (ECF No. 1) 14 CHRISTOPHER J. LAROSE, et al.,

15 Respondents. 16

18 19 Petitioner Marco Antonio Mancilla Ruiz filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 20 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, claiming he was improperly detained without bond pending 21 adjudication of his immigration matter. (ECF No. 1.) He requests an immediate bond 22 hearing. (Id.) The Government has responded, arguing: (1) this Court lacks jurisdiction to 23 adjudicate the Petition under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(g) and 1252(b)(9); and (2) Petitioner is 24 ineligible for bond and subject to mandatory detention as an “applicant for admission” 25 under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). (ECF No. 7.) For the reasons stated below, the Court 26 GRANTS the Petition and orders a bond hearing for an individual determination of danger 27 or risk of flight. 28 1 I. LEGAL STANDARD 2 A writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual detained within the United 3 States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004). “The traditional function of the 4 writ is to secure release from illegal custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 5 (1973). A court may grant a writ of habeas corpus to a petitioner who demonstrates he or 6 she is in custody in violation of the Constitution or federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). 7 The writ is available to non-citizens detained within the United States. Zadvydas v. Davis, 8 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001). 9 II. STATEMENT OF FACTS 10 Petitioner entered the United States in 2006. (Pet. ¶ 4.) He alleges he was mistakenly 11 detained by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) in Utah because “the officers 12 mistakenly believed Petitioner was someone else.” (Id. ¶ 28.) He was then transferred to 13 the Otay Mesa detention center in the Southern District of California. (Id. ¶ 29.) In light 14 of the recent Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision in Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 15 29 I. & N. Dec. 216, 216 (BIA 2025), Immigration Judges are instructing immigration 16 counsel not to request a bond hearing because Yajure Hurtado mandates detention without 17 bond. Petitioner argues he is being detained without bond in violation of the immigration 18 laws and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and requests an immediate 19 individualized bond determination. 20 III. ANALYSIS 21 A. Jurisdiction 22 Respondents argue that Petitioner’s action cannot proceed under 8 U.S.C. 23 §§ 1252(g) and 1252(b)(9). Section 1252(g) states that “no court shall have jurisdiction to 24 hear any cause or claim by or on behalf of any alien arising from the decision or action by 25 the Attorney General to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal 26 orders against any alien under this chapter.” 27 The general rule is to “‘resolve any ambiguities in a jurisdiction-stripping statute 28 [such as Section 1252(g)] in favor of the narrower interpretation,’ and by the ‘strong 1 presumption in favor of judicial review.’” Ibarra-Perez v. United States, 154 F.4th 989, 2 995 (9th Cir. 2025) (quoting Arce v. United States, 899 F.3d 796, 801 (9th Cir. 2018)). 3 Thus, the Supreme Court has ruled Section 1252(g) applies only to three discrete actions: 4 commencing proceedings, adjudicating cases, or executing removal orders. Reno v. Am.- 5 Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 482 (1999). “Instead of ‘sweep[ing] in 6 any claim that can technically be said to arise from the three listed actions,’ the provision 7 ‘refers to just those three specific actions themselves.’” Ibarra-Perez, 154 F.4th at 995 8 (alteration in original) (quoting Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 294 (2018)). “There 9 are of course many other decisions or actions that may be part of the deportation 10 process . . .” that are not one of these three. See Reno, 525 U.S. at 482 (listing possibilities). 11 Section 1252(g) “does not prohibit challenges to unlawful practices merely because they 12 are in some fashion connected to removal orders.” Ibarra-Perez, 154 F.4th at 997. 13 In this Petition, Petitioner is not contesting the commencement or adjudication of 14 removal proceedings against him, nor is he raising an issue with respect to the execution 15 of removal. His detention pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) may be during, but is 16 nonetheless independent of, the removal proceedings. Thus, this Court is not stripped of 17 jurisdiction by Section 1252(g). 18 Section 1252(b)(9) states, “[j]udicial review of all questions of law and fact, 19 including interpretation and application of constitutional and statutory provisions, arising 20 from any action taken or proceeding brought to remove an alien from the United 21 States . . . shall be available only in judicial review of a final order under this section.” 22 “[C]laims that are independent of or collateral to the removal process do not fall 23 within the scope of § 1252(b)(9).” J.E.F.M. v. Lynch, 837 F.3d 1026, 1032 (9th Cir. 2016). 24 Thus, in Nielsen v. Preap, 586 U.S. 392 (2019), the Supreme Court held Section 1252(b)(9) 25 inapplicable when the petitioners were not asking for review of an order of removal, were 26 not challenging the decision to detain them in the first place or to seek removal, and were 27 not challenging any part of the process by which removability would be determined. Id. at 28 402 (citing Jennings, 583 U.S. at 294). 1 Here, Petitioner does not challenge the Government’s authority to remove him from 2 the United States in this Petition. Instead, he challenges his classification under Section 3 1225(b)(2) instead of Section 1226(a) and the BIA’s decision that Immigration Judges lack 4 authority to provide a bond under Section 1225(b)(2). Thus, Section 1252(b)(9) does not 5 provide a jurisdictional bar. 6 B. Applicability of Section 1225(b)(2) Versus Section 1226(a) 7 The primary disagreement between the parties is whether Petitioner is now, after 8 nineteen years of residency in the United States, subject to discretionary release as ordered 9 by the Immigration Judge pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) or, as the BIA has ruled in Yajure 10 Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216, subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 11 1225(b)(2)(A). This Court agrees with the multitude of cases that have concluded that 12 applying Section 1225 in this situation “(1) disregards the plain meaning of section 13 1225(b)(2)(A); (2) disregards the relationship between sections 1225 and 1226; (3) would 14 render a recent amendment to section 1226(c) superfluous; and (4) is inconsistent with 15 decades of prior statutory interpretation and practice.” Lepe v. Andrews, __F. Supp. 3d__, 16 2025 WL 2716910, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2025) (citing cases). 17 “We begin, as always, with the text.” Esquivel-Quintana v. Sessions, 581 U.S. 385, 18 391 (2017). Section 1225(b)(2)(A) applies to an applicant “seeking admission” to the 19 United States, whereas Section 1226(a) applies to individuals who have been arrested “on 20 a warrant issued by the Attorney General.” 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b)(2)(A), 1226(a). 21 “Seeking,” as noted by other courts, “means ‘asking for’ or ‘trying to acquire or gain.’” 22 Lepe, 2025 WL 2716910, at *5 (citing Merriam-Webster Dictionary, 23 https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/seeking). “And the use of a present 24 participle, ‘seeking,’ necessarily implies some sort of present-tense action.” Id. (citation 25 modified). As noted by the Southern District of New York: 26 [S]omeone who enters a movie theater without purchasing a ticket and then proceeds to sit through the first few minutes of a film would not ordinarily 27 then be described as “seeking admission” to the theater . . . . Even if that 28 1 person, after being detected, offered to pay for a ticket, one would not ordinarily describe them as “seeking admission.” 2 3 Lopez Benitez v. Francis, __F. Supp. 3d__, 2025 WL 2371588, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 4 2025). Respondents point to Section 1225(a)(1), which states, “[a noncitizen] present in 5 the United States who has not been admitted or who arrives in the United States . . . shall 6 be deemed for purposes of this chapter an applicant for admission.” However, if Section 7 1225 was intended to apply to all applicants for admission, “there would be no need to 8 include the phrase ‘seeking admission’ in the statute.” Lopez Benitez, 2025 WL 2371588, 9 at *6; see also Vasquez-Garcia v. Noem, No. 25-cv-2180-DMS-MMP, 2025 WL 2549431, 10 at *6 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2025) (“Only those who take affirmative acts, like submitting an 11 application for admission, are those who can be said to be ‘seeking admission’ within 12 § 1225(b)(2)(A).”). 13 Furthermore, Respondents’ interpretation ignores the statutory scheme. “It is a 14 fundamental canon of statutory construction that the words of a statute must be read in their 15 context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme.” Lepe, 2025 WL 16 2716910, at *6 (quoting Davis v. Mich. Dep’t of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 809 (1989)). 17 “Section 1225 ‘authorizes the Government to detain certain aliens seeking admission into 18 the country,’ whereas section 1226 ‘authorizes the Government to detain certain aliens 19 already in the country pending the outcome of removal proceedings.’” Id. (quoting 20 Jennings, 583 U.S. at 287). This is reinforced by the title of Section 1225: “Inspection by 21 immigration officers; expedited removal of inadmissible arriving aliens; referral for 22 hearing.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225. “‘Inspection’ is a process that occurs at the border or other 23 ports of entry.” Lepe, 2025 WL 2716910, at *6 (citing Posos-Sanchez v. Garland, 3 F.4th 24 1176, 1183 (9th Cir. 2021)). 25 Petitioner, under the plain meaning of the statute, is not seeking admission to the 26 United States. He has lived in the United States for nineteen years and has not filed an 27 application for admission to the United States. He was not arrested at the border or a port 28 1 of entry where he was subject to inspection. Instead, he was arrested on a warrant while 2 already in the United States, and, thus, is subject to Section 1226(a). 3 To the extent the addition of Section 1225(a) renders the two statutes ambiguous or 4 unclear as to which section applies, the Court turns to principles of statutory construction. 5 See Rodriguez v. Bostock, 779 F. Supp. 3d 1239, 1256 (W.D. Wash. 2025) (“[E]ven when 6 a statute is ambiguous or internally contradictory, courts must ‘use every tool at their 7 disposal to determine the best reading of the statute.’” (quoting Loper Bright Enters. v. 8 Raimundo, 603 U.S. 369, 400 (2024))). “[A] statute should be construed so that effect is 9 given to all its provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous, void or 10 insignificant.” Rodriguez, 779 F. Supp. 3d at 1258 (quoting Corley v. United States, 556 11 U.S. 303, 314 (2009)). 12 Section 1226 carves out a statutory category of non-citizens who, despite being 13 arrested while already in the country, may not be released because of their criminal or 14 terrorist activities. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). If, as Respondents argue, all non-citizens arrested 15 while already in this country are subject to mandatory detention under § 1225, there would 16 be no need to carve out an exception for those who had committed criminal or terrorist 17 activities. See Rosado v. Figueroa, No. CV 25-2157-DHX-DLR (CDB), 2025 WL 18 2337099, at *9 (D. Ariz. Aug. 11, 2025) (reasoning that if Section 1225’s “mandatory 19 detention provisions apply to all noncitizens present in the United States who have not been 20 admitted, it would render superfluous provisions of § 1226 that apply to certain categories 21 of inadmissible noncitizens”); Rodriguez, 779 F. Supp. 3d at 1258 (noting that if the court 22 were to adopt a reading of Section 1225 advanced by the BIA, it would render significant 23 portions of Section 1226(c) meaningless). To avoid rendering Section 1226(c) completely 24 meaningless, the Court finds non-citizens arrested on a warrant in the interior of the United 25 States are subject to discretionary release on bond under Section 1226(a), not mandatory 26 detention under Section 1225(b)(2)(A). 27 In addition, “the longstanding practice of the government—like any other 28 interpretive aid—can inform a court’s determination of what the law is.” Rosado, 2025 1 WL 2337099, at *10 (citation modified) (quoting Loper Bright, 603 U.S. at 386). “Until 2 this year, DHS has applied section 1226(a) and its regime of discretionary release and 3 review of detention to the vast majority of noncitizens allegedly in this country without 4 valid documentation—a practice codified by regulation.” Valencia Zapata v. Kaiser, __F. 5 Supp. 3d __, 2025 WL 2741654, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2025) (citation modified); see 6 also Inspection & Expedited Removal of Aliens, 62 Fed. Reg. 10312, 10323 (Mar. 6, 7 1997). 8 Against this backdrop, Congress adopted the Laken Riley Act, adding Section 9 1226(c)(1)(E), which mandates detention for additional categories of criminal aliens. 10 “When Congress acts to amend a statute, we presume it intends its amendment to have real 11 and substantial effect.” Rodriguez, 779 F. Supp. 3d at 1259 (quoting Stone v. I.N.S., 514 12 U.S. 386, 397 (1995), abrogated on other grounds by Riley v. Bondi, 606 U.S. 259, 261 13 (2025)). “When Congress adopts a new law against the backdrop of a ‘longstanding 14 administrative construction,’ courts ‘generally presume the new provision should be 15 understood to work in harmony with what has come before.’” Id. (quoting Monsalvo 16 Velazquez v. Bondi, 604 U.S. 712, 725 (2025)). 17 The longstanding practice of DHS applying Section 1226 to those arrested in the 18 interior of the United States supports the finding that this practice was the best reading of 19 the statute. This conclusion is particularly true because adopting Respondents’ 20 interpretation would result in the recently enacted Laken Riley Act being completely 21 meaningless and unnecessary. 22 Statutory interpretation supports that Section 1226(a), not Section 1225(b)(2)(A), 23 applies to Petitioner’s immigration detention. Because the BIA’s decision binding 24 Immigration Judges incorrectly provides that Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention 25 with no individualized bond determination, Petitioner is being held in violation of Federal 26 Law. Hence, his Petition is GRANTED. 27 28 1 |}IV. CONCLUSION 2 For the reasons stated above, Petitioner Marco Antonio Mancilla Ruiz’s Petition for 3 || Writ of Habeas Corpus is GRANTED. The Court issues the following writ: 4 The Court ORDERS Respondents to arrange an individualized bond hearing 5 before an Immigration Judge under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) for Marco Antonio 6 Mancilla Ruiz, A221-454-310, no later than November 24, 2025. 7 || Finally, the Clerk of Court shall close the case. 8 IT IS SO ORDERED. ? ~ 10 || DATED: November 18, 2025 ilu (Diyharb 11 Hon. Cynthia Bashant, Chief Judge United States District Court 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 _Q_