Marcel D. Ford v. Kern Valley State Prison, et al.

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 10 11 MARCEL D. FORD, Case No. 1:23-cv-01603-FRS (BAM) (PC) 12 Plaintiff, ORDER DIRECTING CLERK OF COURT TO RANDOMLY ASSIGN DISTRICT JUDGE TO 13 v. ACTION 14 KERN VALLEY STATE PRISON, et al., FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO DISMISS ACTION, WITH PREJUDICE, FOR 15 Defendants. FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM, FAILURE TO OBEY COURT ORDER, AND FAILURE 17 (ECF No. 27) 18 FOURTEEN (14) DAY DEADLINE 19 20 I. Background 21 Plaintiff Marcel D. Ford (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma 22 pauperis in this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 23 On January 28, 2026, the Court screened the complaint and found that it failed to state a 24 cognizable claim for relief. (ECF No. 27.) The Court issued an order granting Plaintiff leave to 25 file a first amended complaint or a notice of voluntary dismissal within thirty (30) days. (Id.) 26 The Court expressly warned Plaintiff that the failure to comply with the Court’s order would 27 result in a recommendation for dismissal of this action, with prejudice, for failure to obey a court 28 order and for failure to state a claim. (Id.) Plaintiff failed to file an amended complaint or 1 otherwise communicate with the Court, and the deadline to do so has expired. 2 II. Failure to State a Claim 3 A. Screening Requirement 4 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 5 governmental entity and/or against an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. 6 § 1915A(a). Plaintiff’s complaint, or any portion thereof, is subject to dismissal if it is frivolous 7 or malicious, if it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or if it seeks monetary 8 relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b). 9 A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 10 pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not 11 required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 12 conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell 13 Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). While a plaintiff’s allegations are taken as 14 true, courts “are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 15 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 16 To survive screening, Plaintiff’s claims must be facially plausible, which requires 17 sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer that each named defendant is liable 18 for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation marks omitted); Moss v. U.S. Secret 19 Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The sheer possibility that a defendant acted unlawfully 20 is not sufficient, and mere consistency with liability falls short of satisfying the plausibility 21 standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation marks omitted); Moss, 572 F.3d at 969. 22 B. Plaintiff’s Allegations 23 Plaintiff is currently housed at the California Correctional Institution in Tehachapi, 24 California. The events in the complaint are alleged to have occurred while Plaintiff housed at 25 Kern Valley State Prison in Delano, California. Plaintiff names as defendants: (1) Kern Valley 26 State Prison (“KVSP”); and (2) Christian Pfieffer, Warden. 27 Plaintiff alleges that KVSP has a contract with the State of California and is jointly liable 28 and responsible for the breach of that contract when another inmate accessed Plaintiff’s personal 1 court trial criminal information on the computer at the KVSP law library. (ECF No. 1, p. 2.) 2 Plaintiff states that the contractual breach consists of: theft, slander, threats, intent, wanton, and 3 self admission. (Id. at 5.) 4 Plaintiff has attached several exhibits but does not explain how they are related to his 5 claims. 6 Plaintiff requests $35,000 in damages. 7 C. Discussion 8 Plaintiff’s complaint fails to comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 and fails to 9 state a cognizable claim for relief. 10 1. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 11 Pursuant to Rule 8, a complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim 12 showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Detailed factual allegations 13 are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 14 conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation omitted). Plaintiff must 15 set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on 16 its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). While factual allegations 17 are accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Id.; see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556–57; Moss, 18 572 F.3d at 969. 19 Here, Plaintiff’s complaint is short, but it is not a plain statement of his claims showing 20 that he is entitled to relief. Plaintiff’s allegations are conclusory and do not state what happened, 21 when it happened, who was involved, or how he was injured. 22 2. Linkage Requirement 23 The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides:

24 Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, 25 privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution . . . shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for 26 redress. 27 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute plainly requires that there be an actual connection or link between 28 the actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by Plaintiff. See 1 Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). The 2 Ninth Circuit has held that “[a] person ‘subjects another to the deprivation of a constitutional 3 right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another’s 4 affirmative acts or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the 5 deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). 6 Here, Plaintiff’s complaint fails to link Defendant Pfieffer to any wrongful conduct. 7 Plaintiff must like each individual Defendant to a specific act or omission that violated Plaintiff’s 8 rights. 9 Insofar as Plaintiff is attempting to sue Defendant Pfeiffer based on his supervisory role, 10 he may not do so. Liability may not be imposed on supervisory personnel for the actions or 11 omissions of their subordinates under the theory of respondeat superior. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676– 12 77; Simmons v. Navajo Cty., Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011, 1020–21 (9th Cir. 2010); Ewing v. City of 13 Stockton, 588 F.3d 1218, 1235 (9th Cir.2009); Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 14 2002). 15 Supervisors may be held liable only if they “participated in or directed the violations, or 16 knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them.” Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th 17 Cir. 1989); accord Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1205–06 (9th Cir. 2011); Corales v. Bennett, 18 567 F.3d 554, 570 (9th Cir. 2009). Supervisory liability may also exist without any personal 19 participation if the official implemented “a policy so deficient that the policy itself is a 20 repudiation of the constitutional rights and is the moving force of the constitutional violation.” 21 Redman v. County of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1446 (9th Cir. 1991) (citations and quotations 22 marks omitted), abrogated on other grounds by Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1970). 23 Here, Plaintiff has failed to establish that Defendant Pfieffer participated in or directed 24 any constitutional violation or that he implemented a policy so deficient that it was the moving 25 force of any constitutional violation. 26 3. Eleventh Amendment Immunity 27 “The Eleventh Amendment bars suits for money damages in federal court against a state, 28 its agencies, and state officials acting in their official capacities.” Aholelei v. Dep’t of Public 1 Safety, 488 F.3d 1144, 1147 (9th Cir. 2007). Indeed, the Eleventh Amendment prohibits federal 2 courts from hearing a Section 1983 lawsuit in which damages or injunctive relief is sought against 3 a state, its agencies (such as CDCR) or individual prisons, absent “a waiver by the state or a valid 4 congressional override. . . .” Dittman v. California, 191 F.3d 1020, 1025 (9th Cir. 1999). “The 5 Eleventh Amendment bars suits which seek either damages or injunctive relief against a state, ‘an 6 arm of the state,’ its instrumentalities, or its agencies.” See Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. City of 7 Lodi, Cal., 302 F.3d 928, 957 n.28 (9th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation and citations omitted), cert. 8 denied, 538 U.S. 961 (2003). “The State of California has not waived its Eleventh Amendment 9 immunity with respect to claims brought under § 1983 in federal court. . . .” Dittman, 191 F.3d at 10 1025–26 (citing Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 241 (1985)); see also Brown v. 11 Cal. Dep’t. of Corrs., 554 F.3d 747, 752 (9th Cir. 2009) (finding California Department of 12 Corrections and California Board of Prison Terms entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity). 13 Therefore, Plaintiff cannot pursue claims for damages against KVSP in this action. Any 14 claim for monetary damages against Defendant Pfieffer in his official capacity is also barred by 15 the Eleventh Amendment. 16 4. Eighth Amendment – Failure to Protect 17 Plaintiff alleges that he was injured when another inmate accessed Plaintiff’s criminal 18 court history from the KVSP law library computer. Plaintiff may be attempting to bring a failure 19 to protect claim under the Eighth Amendment. 20 The Eighth Amendment protects prisoners from inhumane methods of punishment and 21 from inhumane conditions of confinement. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994); Morgan v. 22 Morgensen, 465 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2006). Thus, no matter where they are housed, prison 23 officials have a duty to ensure that prisoners are provided adequate shelter, food, clothing, 24 sanitation, medical care, and personal safety. Johnson v. Lewis, 217 F.3d 726, 731 (9th Cir. 25 2000) (quotation marks and citations omitted). To establish a violation of the Eighth 26 Amendment, the prisoner must “show that the officials acted with deliberate indifference . . .” 27 Labatad v. Corrs. Corp. of Amer., 714 F.3d 1155, 1160 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing Gibson v. Cty. of 28 Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175, 1187 (9th Cir. 2002)). 1 Prison officials have a duty under the Eighth Amendment to protect prisoners from 2 violence at the hands of other prisoners or others because being violently assaulted in prison is 3 simply not part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society. 4 Farmer, 511 U.S. at 833; Clem v. Lomeli, 566 F.3d 1177, 1181 (9th Cir.2009); Hearns v. 5 Terhune, 413 F.3d 1036, 1040 (9th Cir. 2005). However, prison officials are liable under the 6 Eighth Amendment only if they demonstrate deliberate indifference to conditions posing a 7 substantial risk of serious harm to an inmate; and it is well settled that deliberate indifference 8 occurs when an official acted or failed to act despite his knowledge of a substantial risk of serious 9 harm. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834, 841; Clem, 566 F.3d at 1181; Hearns, 413 F.3d at 1040. 10 As currently pled, Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable claim under the Eighth Amendment 11 for failure to protect. Plaintiff has failed to allege how he was injured and how any defendant was 12 responsible for Plaintiff’s injuries. 13 5. State Law Claims 14 Plaintiff alleges a claim for breach of contract. “[A] breach of contract is not a violation 15 of the Constitution or any other federal law, as is required to state a claim under § 1983. . . . 16 Breach of contract is a matter of state law and may be raised in state court.” Garafolo v. Walker, 17 No. C 03-4941 MMC (PR), 2004 WL 834698, at *2 (N.D. Cal., April 13, 2004). 18 The Court notes that while Plaintiff has submitted a form complaint for Small Claims 19 Court used in California state court, he has filed the complaint with the federal court. 20 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), in any civil action in which the district court has original 21 jurisdiction, the district court “shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims in the 22 action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under 23 Article III,” except as provided in subsections (b) and (c). “The district court may decline to 24 exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim under subsection (a) if . . . the district court has 25 dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). The 26 Supreme Court has cautioned that “if the federal claims are dismissed before trial, . . . the state 27 claims should be dismissed as well.” United Mine Workers of Amer. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 28 (1966). Here, Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state any cognizable federal claims. It is therefore 1 recommended that the Court decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state 2 law claims. 3 Furthermore, Plaintiff has failed to allege compliance with the claim presentation 4 requirement of the Government Claims Act. California’s Government Claims Act1 requires that a 5 claim against the State2 or its employees “relating to a cause of action for death or for injury to 6 person” be presented to the Department of General Services’ Government Claims Program no 7 more than six months after the cause of action accrues. Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 905.2, 910, 911.2, 8 945.4, 950–950.2. Presentation of a written claim, and action on or rejection of the claim, are 9 conditions precedent to suit. State v. Super. Ct. of Kings Cty. (Bodde), 32 Cal. 4th 1234, 1245 10 (Cal. 2004); Mangold v. Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 67 F.3d 1470, 1477 (9th Cir. 1995). To state a 11 tort claim against a public entity or employee, a plaintiff must allege compliance with the 12 Government Claims Act. Bodde, 32 Cal. 4th at 1245; Mangold, 67 F.3d at 1477; Karim-Panahi 13 v. Los Angeles Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 627 (9th Cir. 1988). 14 III. Failure to Prosecute and Failure to Obey a Court Order 15 A. Legal Standard 16 Local Rule 110 provides that “[f]ailure . . . of a party to comply with these Rules or with 17 any order of the Court may be grounds for imposition by the Court of any and all sanctions . . . 18 within the inherent power of the Court.” District courts have the inherent power to control their 19 dockets and “[i]n the exercise of that power they may impose sanctions including, where 20 appropriate, . . . dismissal.” Thompson v. Hous. Auth., 782 F.2d 829, 831 (9th Cir. 1986). A 21 court may dismiss an action, with prejudice, based on a party’s failure to prosecute an action, 22 failure to obey a court order, or failure to comply with local rules. See, e.g., Ghazali v. Moran, 46 23 F.3d 52, 53–54 (9th Cir. 1995) (dismissal for noncompliance with local rule); Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 24 963 F.2d 1258, 1260–61 (9th Cir. 1992) (dismissal for failure to comply with an order requiring 25

1 This Act was formerly known as the California Tort Claims Act. City of Stockton v. Superior Court, 42 Cal. 4th 26 730, 741–42 (Cal. 2007) (adopting the practice of using Government Claims Act rather than California Tort Claims Act). 27

2 “ ‘State’ means the State and any office, officer, department, division, bureau, board, commission or agency of the 28 State claims against which are paid by warrants drawn by the Controller.” Cal. Gov’t Code § 900.6. 1 amendment of complaint); Malone v. U.S. Postal Serv., 833 F.2d 128, 130–33 (9th Cir. 1987) 2 (dismissal for failure to comply with court order). 3 In determining whether to dismiss an action, the Court must consider several factors: 4 (1) the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the Court’s need to manage its 5 docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of 6 cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic sanctions. Henderson v. Duncan, 779 7 F.2d 1421, 1423 (9th Cir. 1986); Carey v. King, 856 F.2d 1439, 1440 (9th Cir. 1988). 8 B. Discussion 9 Here, Plaintiff’s first amended complaint is overdue, and he has failed to comply with the 10 Court’s order. The Court cannot effectively manage its docket if Plaintiff ceases litigating his 11 case. Thus, the Court finds that both the first and second factors weigh in favor of dismissal. 12 The third factor, risk of prejudice to defendant, also weighs in favor of dismissal, since a 13 presumption of injury arises from the occurrence of unreasonable delay in prosecuting an action. 14 Anderson v. Air W., 542 F.2d 522, 524 (9th Cir. 1976). The fourth factor usually weighs against 15 dismissal because public policy favors disposition on the merits. Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 16 639, 643 (9th Cir. 2002). However, “this factor lends little support to a party whose 17 responsibility it is to move a case toward disposition on the merits but whose conduct impedes 18 progress in that direction,” which is the case here. In re Phenylpropanolamine (PPA) Products 19 Liability Litigation, 460 F.3d 1217, 1228 (9th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). 20 Finally, the Court’s warning to a party that failure to obey the court’s order will result in 21 dismissal satisfies the “considerations of the alternatives” requirement. Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 1262; 22 Malone, 833 at 132–33; Henderson, 779 F.2d at 1424. The Court’s January 28, 2026 screening 23 order expressly warned Plaintiff that his failure to file an amended complaint would result in a 24 recommendation of dismissal of this action, with prejudice, for failure to obey a court order and 25 for failure to state a claim. (ECF No. 27.) Thus, Plaintiff had adequate warning that dismissal 26 could result from his noncompliance. 27 Additionally, at this stage in the proceedings there is little available to the Court that 28 would constitute a satisfactory lesser sanction while protecting the Court from further 1 unnecessary expenditure of its scarce resources. As Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis in 2 this action, it appears that monetary sanctions will be of little use and the preclusion of evidence 3 or witnesses is likely to have no effect given that Plaintiff has ceased litigating his case. 4 IV. Conclusion and Recommendation 5 Accordingly, the Court HEREBY ORDERS the Clerk of the Court to randomly assign a 6 District Judge to this action. 7 Furthermore, the Court finds that dismissal is the appropriate sanction and HEREBY 8 RECOMMENDS that this action be dismissed, with prejudice, for failure to state a claim 9 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, for failure to obey a court order, and for Plaintiff’s failure to 10 prosecute this action. 11 These Findings and Recommendation will be submitted to the United States District Judge 12 assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen 13 (14) days after being served with these Findings and Recommendation, the parties may file 14 written objections with the Court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate 15 Judge’s Findings and Recommendation.” Objections, if any, shall not exceed fifteen (15) pages 16 or include exhibits. Exhibits may be referenced by document and page number if already in 17 the record before the Court. Any pages filed in excess of the 15-page limit may not be 18 considered. The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may 19 result in the waiver of the “right to challenge the magistrate’s factual findings” on 20 appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 838–39 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 21 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)). 22 IT IS SO ORDERED. 23

24 Dated: March 16, 2026 /s/ Barbara A. McAuliffe _ UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 25

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