Maqsood Ali Haidari v. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Field Office Director

Opinion

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5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 8 AT SEATTLE 9 10 MAQSOOD ALI HAIDARI, CASE NO. 2:26-cv-00039-TL 11 Petitioner, ORDER ON PETITION FOR WRIT 12 v. OF HABEAS CORPUS 13 IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT FIELD OFFICE 14 DIRECTOR, 15 Respondent. 16

17 This matter is before the Court on Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. Dkt. 18 No. 4. Having reviewed the petition, Respondent’s Return (Dkt. No. 12), Petitioner’s Traverse 19 (Dkt. No. 17), and the relevant record, the Court DENIES Petitioner’s petition. 20 I. BACKGROUND1 21 Petitioner is Maqsood Ali Haidari, a 30-year-old citizen of Afghanistan. Dkt. No. 14-2 22 (Record of Deportable/Inadmissible Alien) at 2. Respondent is identified, but not specifically 23

1 Petitioner’s petition provided little factual information beyond the date and location of his detention. See Dkt. 24 No. 4 at 1. Consequently, the bulk of this recitation is drawn from Respondent’s briefing and exhibits. 1 named, as the Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) Field Office Director. Dkt. No. 4 2 at 1. 3 Petitioner was born and raised in Afghanistan. Dkt. No. 18 (Haidari Decl.) at 1. 4 Petitioner avers that his ethnic group is Hazara, and that Hazara people “face different types of

5 persecutions including Genocide.” Id. On or about September 2, 2024, Petitioner entered the 6 United States at the Calexico Port of Entry in Calexico, California, through a CBP One 7 appointment. Dkt. No. 14-2 at 2, 3. Petitioner applied for admission to the United States and 8 requested asylum. Dkt. No. 13 (Baz Decl.) ¶ 4. The United States Border Patrol placed Petitioner 9 in expedited-removal proceedings and referred Petitioner to the United States Citizenship and 10 Immigration Services (“USCIS”) for a credible-fear interview. Id. On September 17, 2024, 11 USCIS conducted a credible-fear interview. Id. ¶ 5. On September 24, 2024, Petitioner was 12 served with a Notice to Appear (“NTA”) (Dkt. No. 14-1), which charged Petitioner with a 13 violation of Section 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. 14 § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I). Id. at 2. This provision of the INA defines as inadmissible any immigrant

15 who, at the time of application for admission, 16 is not in possession of a valid unexpired immigrant visa, reentry permit, border crossing identification card, or other valid entry 17 document required by this chapter, and a valid unexpired passport, or other suitable travel document, or document of identity and 18 nationality if such document is required under the regulations issued by the Attorney General under section 1181(a) of this title. 19

20 The NTA noted that an asylum officer had found that Petitioner had demonstrated a credible fear 21 of persecution or torture. Dkt. No. 14-1 at 2. Petitioner was scheduled to appear before an 22 immigration judge (“IJ”) on October 10, 2024, in Calexico. Id. It is not clear from the record, 23 however, whether Petitioner appeared at his October 10, 2024, hearing before the IJ. 24 1 On October 6, 2024, ICE granted Petitioner parole and released him from custody. Dkt. 2 No. 13 ¶ 7; Dkt. No. 14-3 at 7 (Interim Notice Authorizing Parole). Petitioner’s parole was valid 3 for one year and was conditioned upon Petitioner’s compliance with the terms and conditions of 4 his release. Dkt. No. 14-3 at 7. Petitioner’s Notice Authorizing Parole advised him that “[p]arole

5 is entirely within the discretion of ICE and can be terminated at any time for any reason.” Id. 6 Parole “[was] not an admission in lawful status.” Id. 7 On January 27, 2025, Petitioner filed a Form I-589, an application for asylum and 8 withholding of removal. Dkt. No. 13 ¶ 8. On April 24, 2025, Petitioner amended his application. 9 Id. ¶ 9. On September 15, 2025, Petitioner appeared in San Diego Immigration Court for an 10 individual hearing on his I-589 application. After the hearing, an IJ ordered Petitioner removed 11 to Afghanistan. See Dkt. No. 14-4 at 2–3. The IJ denied Petitioner both asylum and withholding 12 of removal. Id. at 2. 13 After his hearing, Petitioner avers that he “was really suffering from depression” and that 14 he “decided to go to Canada without knowing the consequences.” Dkt. No. 18 at 1.2 On

15 September 22, 2025, Petitioner was encountered at the Pacific Highway Port of Entry in Blaine, 16 Washington. Dkt. No. 13 ¶ 11. Canadian Border Patrol returned Petitioner to the United States, 17 where he was taken into custody by the United States Border Patrol. Id. Petitioner was 18 subsequently detained at the Northwest ICE Processing Center (“NWIPC”) in Tacoma, 19 Washington. Id. Petitioner has been detained at NWIPC ever since. Dkt. No. 4 at 1. On October 20 10, 2025, Petitioner timely appealed his order of removal. Dkt. No. 13 ¶ 12. 21 22 23

2 Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 211.5(e)(1)(i), Petitioner’s parole would automatically terminate upon his departure from 24 the United States. 1 II. LEGAL STANDARD 2 “Writs of habeas corpus may be granted by . . . the district courts . . . within their 3 respective jurisdictions.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a). Habeas petitioners must prove by a preponderance 4 of the evidence that they are entitled to relief, Davis v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 628, 638 (9th Cir.

5 2004)—that is, that they are “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the 6 United States,” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c). 7 Under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, 8 no person shall be “deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .” U.S. 9 Const. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment guarantee of due process applies in deportation 10 proceedings. Torres-Aguilar v. I.N.S., 246 F.3d 1267, 1270 (9th Cir. 2001). In addition, the 11 Supreme Court has held that “the Due Process Clause protects [a noncitizen] subject to a final 12 order of deportation . . . .” Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693–94 (2001) (citing Wong Wing v. 13 United States, 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896)); see also Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 523 (2003) 14 (recognizing that Fifth Amendment due process protections extend to deportation proceedings,

15 but noting that “detention during deportation proceedings [is] a constitutionally valid aspect of 16 the deportation process.”). 17 III. DISCUSSION 18 A. Basis for Petitioner’s Detention 19 Respondent argues, and Petitioner does not rebut, that Petitioner is detained pursuant to 8 20 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), “pending resolution of his removal proceedings.” Dkt. No. 12 at 1. 21 Because Petitioner has appealed his order of removal, his removal is not administratively final. 22 See 8 C.F.R. § 1241.1. Petitioner does not take a definitive position on the authority that governs 23 his detention, asserting only that he “is not held under 8 USC 1226(c).” Dkt. No. 4 at 3. In his

24 Petition, Petitioner seems to suggest that he is detained under Section 1226(a) (see id. at 4), but 1 he does not definitively state as much, and he does not provide any opposition to Respondent’s 2 straightforward assertion (see Dkt. No. 12 at 1). Further, the Court sees no support in the record 3 demonstrating that Petitioner is detained under Section 1226. The Court therefore concludes that 4 Petitioner is detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2), which “mandates detention for an ‘applicant

5 for admission, if the examining immigration officer determines that a noncitizen seeking 6 admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted.’” Rodriguez Vazquez v. 7 Bostock, 779 F. Supp. 2d 1239, 1244 (W.D. Wash. 2025) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(a)). 8 B. The Banda Factors 9 Neither the Supreme Court nor the Ninth Circuit has settled on a test for assessing the 10 constitutionality of prolonged mandatory detention for noncitizens detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 11 § 1225. See Banda v. McAleenan, 385 F. Supp. 3d 1099, 1106 (W.D. Wash. 2019). However, 12 “nearly all district courts that have considered the issue agree that prolonged mandatory 13 detention pending removal proceedings, without a bond hearing, will—at some point—violate 14 the right to due process.” Maliwat v. Scott, No. C25-788, 2025 WL 2256711, at *3 (W.D. Wash.

15 Aug. 7, 2025) (citation modified) (quoting Banda, 385 F. Supp. 3d at 1116); see also Toktosunov 16 v. Wamsley, No. C25-1724, 2025 WL 3492858, at *3 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 5, 2025) (collecting 17 cases). 18 In assessing the constitutionality of prolonged mandatory detention, the court in Banda 19 declined to apply the test established in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976), because 20 balancing the Mathews factors does “not resolve the more fundamental issue of whether any 21 procedure—such as a bond hearing—must be provided” and was “not particularly probative of 22 whether prolonged mandatory detention has become unreasonable in a particular case.” Banda, 23 385 F. Supp. 3d at 1106–07 (citation modified). Rather, the Court in Banda conducted a case-

24 specific analysis considering the following factors: 1 (1) the total length of detention to date; (2) the likely duration of future detention; (3) the conditions of detention; (4) delays in the 2 removal proceedings caused by the detainee; (5) delays in the removal proceedings caused by the government; and (6) the 3 likelihood that the removal proceedings will result in a final order of removal. 4

5 Id. at 1117 (quoting Jamal A. v. Whitaker, 358 F. Supp. 3d 853, 858–59 (D. Minn. 2019)). 6 Courts in this District have now adopted the “Banda test” to assess when detention without a 7 bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) has become unjustifiably prolonged and thus violative of 8 due process. See, e.g., Maliwat, 2025 WL 2256711, at *3–4; Belqasim v. Bostock, No. C25-1282, 9 2025 WL 3466971 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 28, 2025), report and recommendation adopted sub nom 10 Belqasim v. Hermosillo, 2025 WL 3170929 (Nov. 13, 2025); Hong v. Mayorkas, 11 No. C20-01784, 2022 WL 1078627, at *4–5 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 11, 2022). 12 Here, Petitioner does not discuss the Banda test, and Respondent provides a perfunctory 13 application of it. See Dkt. No. 12 at 8. In line with prevailing practice in this District, the Court 14 will apply the Banda test in determining whether Petitioner’s detention without a bond hearing 15 violates the Constitution. 16 1. Total Length of Detention 17 The length of detention is “the most important factor.” Banda, 385 F. Supp. 3d at 1118. 18 Here, when Petitioner first filed his petition for habeas relief, he had been detained for 19 approximately three months. Dkt. No. 4 at 6. As of the date of this Order, he has been detained 20 for almost six months. Respondent asserts that the length of detention “is well within 21 constitutional bounds.” Dkt. No. 12 at 8. 22 Petitioner’s detention has not yet reached “the rough six-month threshold at which 23 detentions become less and less reasonable.” L.B.O.M. v. Hermosillo, No. C25-2695, 2026 WL 24 266068, at *3 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 2, 2026) (quoting Perez v. Decker, No. C18-5279, 2018 WL 1 3991497, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 20, 2018)) (citation modified); see Odimara v. Bostock, No. C24- 2 572, 2024 WL 3862256, at *6 (W.D. Wash. July 12, 2024) (“Petitioner was detained for four 3 months at the time he filed his Petition, and his detention has now extended to approximately six 4 months. . . . [T]his first factor is neutral or, at most, weighs slightly in favor of [petitioner].”); cf.

5 Bojorge-Sequeira v. Geo Group Inc., No. C25-1807, 2026 WL 288378, at *5 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 6 15, 2026), report and recommendation adopted 2026 WL 285657 (Feb. 3, 2026) (finding first 7 Banda factor “weighs slightly in favor of Respondents” where Petitioner had been detained for 8 “approximately five months.”). 9 Therefore, the Court finds that this factor weighs slightly in favor of Respondent. 10 2. Likely Duration of Future Detention 11 The second factor for the Court to consider is the likely duration of future detention. 12 Banda, 385 F. Supp. 3d at 1118. Petitioner maintains that the pending appeal of his removal 13 creates “the absence of a foreseeable removal date . . . .” Dkt. No. 17 at 4. Respondent argues 14 that “[t]here is no indication of indefinite detention; BIA appeals typically resolve within

15 months, and removal can proceed promptly thereafter if affirmed.” Dkt. No. 12 at 8. 16 Petitioner’s position is more in line with prevailing law, not least because Respondent 17 presumes that Petitioner is only entitled to an administrative appeal of his removal order. Courts 18 in this District have construed the second Banda factor as a consideration of “how long the 19 detention is likely to continue absent judicial intervention; in other words, the anticipated 20 duration of all removal proceedings including administrative and judicial appeals.” Hong v. 21 Mayorkas, No. C20-1784, 2022 WL 1078627, at *6 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 11, 2022) (quoting 22 Martinez v. Clark, No. C18-1669, 2019 WL 5968089, at *9 (W.D. Wash. May 23, 2019)). In 23 finding that this factor weighed in favor of the petitioner, the Banda court noted that in that case,

24 “Petitioner only recently filed his appeal of the IJ’s removal order with the BIA. If the BIA 1 affirms, petitioner will have the opportunity to seek review in the Ninth Circuit. This process 2 may take up to two years or longer.” Banda, 385 F. Supp. 3d at 1119. 3 Petitioner appealed his removal order on October 10, 2025. See Dkt. No. 12 at 8. In 4 Bojorge-Sequeira, the court noted that the petitioner had appealed their removal order on

5 October 27, 2025. Bojorge-Sequeira, 2026 WL 288378, at *5. On January 15, 2026, “[g]iven the 6 length of time the appeals process can take, the [c]ourt f[ound] that the second Banda factor 7 weigh[ed] in favor of [petitioner].” Id. Similarly here, “[i]t thus appears that Petitioner could 8 potentially be facing two years or more of additional time in custody.” Murillo-Chavez v. 9 Garland, No. C22-303, 2022 WL 16555997, at *5 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 30, 2022). 10 Therefore, this factor weighs in favor of Petitioner. 11 3. Conditions of Detention 12 Next, the Court considers the third Banda factor—the conditions of detention. 385 F. 13 Supp. 3d at 1118. “The more that the conditions under which the noncitizen is being held 14 resemble penal confinement, the stronger the argument that he or she is entitled to a bond

15 hearing.” Diaz Reyes v. Wolf, No. C20-0377, 2020 WL 6820903, at *6 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 7, 16 2020) (citation modified) (quoting Jamal A., 358 F. Supp. 3d at 860), report and 17 recommendation adopted as modified, No. C20-0377, 2020 WL 6820822 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 20, 18 2020), aff’d sub nom. Diaz Reyes v. Mayorkas, No. 21-35142, 2021 WL 3082403 (9th Cir. July 19 21, 2021). Petitioner asserts that his conditions of detention are poor and prison-like: 20 We are not allowed to have recreation; we go to the recreation Yard may be once a week. In addition to, the food is not properly 21 cooked and it is not enough to sustain. . . . In addition to that; we are not given a proper treatment if you are sick. 22

23 Dkt. No. 18 at 2. Petitioner’s description is in line with other characterizations of detention at 24 NWIPC. See, e.g., Toktosunov v. Wamsley, No. C25-1724, 2025 WL 3492858, at *5 (W.D. 1 Wash. Dec. 5, 2025) (“Petitioner demonstrates that the conditions at NWIPC [are] that of a 2 prison,” including “problems with food, medical neglect, and cleanliness”). 3 Therefore, this factor weighs in favor of Petitioner. 4 4. Delays in Removal Proceedings Caused by Petitioner

5 The fourth factor considers delays in the removal proceedings caused by the Petitioner. 6 See Banda, 385 F. Supp. 3d at 1118. Petitioner does not present any argument on this factor one 7 way or the other. Respondents assert that “[a]ny delay should be attributed to Petitioner’s appeal 8 to the BIA . . . , not government misconduct.” Dkt. No. 12 at 8. A “delay” caused by an appeal is 9 not generally considered dilatory conduct; a noncitizen has a right to an appeal. See, e.g., Gao v. 10 LaRose, 805 F. Supp. 3d 1106, 1111 (S.D. Cal. 2025); Nguyen v. Scott, No. C25-1988, 2026 WL 11 194232, at *4 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 26, 2026). 12 Therefore, this factor is neutral. 13 5. Delays in Removal Proceedings Caused by Respondents 14 The fifth factor considers delays attributable to the Government. See Banda, 385 F. Supp.

15 3d at 1120. Here, “Petitioner does not point to any delays in his case occasioned by Respondents, 16 and the record does not evince any. There is no basis for treating the absence of government- 17 caused delay differently than the absence of petitioner-caused delay.” Nguyen, 2026 WL 194232, 18 at *4. 19 Therefore, this factor is neutral. 20 6. Likelihood Removal Proceedings Will Result in Final Order of Removal 21 The sixth factor considers the ultimate disposition of Petitioner’s removal proceedings. 22 See Banda, 385 F. Supp. 3d at 1120. In Toktosunov, the court, in applying the sixth Banda factor, 23 gave particular consideration to the fact that petitioner there “ha[d] prevailed before an

24 immigration judge on a prior occasion.” Toktosunov, 2025 WL 3492858, at *5. Here, even 1 though it is Respondent who has previously prevailed before an immigration judge (see Dkt. 2 No. 14-4), the principle is the same. “Although the appeal adds some uncertainty, the fact 3 remains” that Respondent has successfully argued for Petitioner’s removal in immigration court. 4 Toktosunov, 2025 WL 3492858.

5 Therefore, this factor weighs in favor of Respondent. 6 7. Weighing the Factors 7 Having considered the Banda factors, the Court has found that two are neutral, two weigh 8 in favor of Petitioner, and two—including the most important factor—weigh in favor of 9 Respondent. Under such circumstances, the Court finds that the Banda factors point toward a 10 finding that Petitioner’s detention is not unlawful, and that he is therefore not entitled to habeas 11 relief. 12 C. Petitioner’s Application for Court-Appointed Counsel 13 Petitioner has also filed an application for court-appointed counsel. Dkt. No. 8. 14 Petitioner’s motion is cursory, asserting only: “I am not well conversant with the legal matters

15 and I don’t have knowledge to do research in the law library. In addition to lack of clear 16 understanding well about the laws.” Dkt. No. 8 at 1. Given the disposition of Petitioner’s 17 petition, the request for counsel is moot. However, even if the Court were inclined to grant the 18 habeas petition, the Court would still deny the request for counsel on its merits. 19 “There is no constitutional right to counsel in federal habeas proceedings.” Paz- 20 Valenzuela v. Warden of the Golden State Annex Detention Facility, No. C25-1834, 2025 WL 21 3633540, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 15, 2025). But “[c]ourts may appoint an attorney for an 22 ‘impoverished habeas petitioner’ when ‘the interests of justice so require.’” Avila-Hebra v. 23 Noem, No. C25-3140, 2025 WL 3190608, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 14, 2025) (quoting Bashor v.

24 Risley, 730 F.2d 1228, 1234 (9th Cir. 1984)). “In this assessment, courts evaluate a petitioner’s 1 || (a) ‘likelihood of success on the merits’ and (b) ‘ability . . . to articulate [their] claims pro se in 2 || light of the complexity of the legal issues involved.” Jd. (quoting Wilborn v. Escalderon, 789 3 || F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir. 1986)). Here, Petitioner has not prevailed on the merits of his petition. 4 || Further, “Petitioner’s proffered difficulties in presenting this case without the assistance of 5 || counsel and arising from his status as a detained immigrant are shared with many other habeas 6 || petitioners.” Paz-Valenzuela, 2025 WL 3633540, at *1. Therefore, Petitioner has not 7 || demonstrated that he is entitled to Court-appointed counsel. 8 IV. CONCLUSION 9 Accordingly, Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Dkt. No. 4) and 10 || Application for Court-Appointed Counsel (Dkt. No. 8) are DENIED. 1] 12 Dated this 18th day of March, 2026.

14 ana Lin 15 United States District Judge

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ORDER ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CorPUus — 11