Case: 18-12500 Date Filed: 06/18/2019 Page: 1 of 7
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ________________________
No. 18-12500 Non-Argument Calendar ________________________
D.C. Docket No. 1:14-cv-21855-MGC
MANUEL A. JUNES,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, FLORIDA ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondents-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida ________________________
(June 18, 2019)
Before ROSENBAUM, BRANCH, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: Case: 18-12500 Date Filed: 06/18/2019 Page: 2 of 7
Manuel Junes, a Florida prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals from the denial
of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition for a writ of habeas corpus. On appeal, we issued
him a certificate of appealability as to whether the district court erred in denying
his ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
Junes and his co-defendant, Wiley, went to trial on a charge of attempted
second degree murder. Junes was convicted and sentenced to twenty years. Wiley
was the actual shooter, but there was evidence that Junes had told Wiley to shoot
the victim.
In the district court and on appeal, Junes argued that his trial counsel was
ineffective for advising that he reject a ten-year plea offer offered to him just prior
to jury selection. He contends that counsel incorrectly advised him that the jury
could not convict him as the principal based on the testimony of a single witness.
On the day of the trial, before jury selection, and in open court, Junes’s
counsel told the court the prosecution had offered Junes, the alleged non-shooter,
an offer to plead guilty and receive ten years, while the prosecution offered the
alleged shooter, Wiley, five years for a plea deal. Acknowledging that witnesses
(plural) had allegedly accused Junes of telling Wiley to shoot the victim, counsel
expressed shock that the shooter would be offered five years while his client,
Junes, was only offered ten years. After ensuring that Junes’s counsel had
consulted with him about the plea offer, the court personally addressed Junes, who
2 Case: 18-12500 Date Filed: 06/18/2019 Page: 3 of 7
had been present during his counsel’s colloquy with the court about the plea offer.
Junes assured the court that he had talked with his counsel about the offer, that he
understood he could be found guilty and sentenced up to life imprisonment, that he
had made no counter-offers and did not want to do so, and that he wanted to go to
trial.1
When reviewing the district court’s denial of a habeas petition, we review
questions of law and mixed questions of law and fact de novo, and findings of fact
for clear error. Nyland v. Moore, 216 F.3d 1264, 1266 (11th Cir. 2000). We can
affirm on any basis supported by the record, regardless of whether the district court
decided the case on that basis. Lucas v. W.W. Grainger, Inc., 257 F.3d 1249, 1256
(11th Cir. 2001).
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”)
provides that, after a state court has adjudicated a claim on the merits, a federal
court may grant habeas relief only if the state court’s decision was (1) contrary to,
or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States, or (2) based on an
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented to the
state court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), (2). The AEDPA imposes a “highly
1 Co-defendant Wiley also rejected his plea offer and was tried with Junes. The jury found him not guilty. 3 Case: 18-12500 Date Filed: 06/18/2019 Page: 4 of 7
deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings and demands that state-court
decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.” Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 773
(2010) (quotation marks and citation omitted). The reviewing court applies a
“doubly” deferential standard that takes into account § 2254’s deference to state
courts and the deference to counsel, affirming if “there is any reasonable argument
that counsel” acted pursuant to prevailing professional standards. See Harrington
v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 105 (2011).
Where a state court does not explain its reasons in a post-conviction ruling, a
federal habeas court should “look through” the unexplained decision to the last
related state court decision that provides a relevant rationale and presume that the
unexplained decision adopted the same reasoning. Wilson v. Sellers, 138 S. Ct.
1188, 1192 (2018). The district court must consider the particular factual and legal
reasons that the state court rejected the prisoner’s federal claims. Id. at 1191-92.
In determining whether a state court made an “unreasonable determination
of facts,” a reviewing court must remember that the “AEDPA establishes a
presumption that the state court’s findings of fact are correct, and only clear and
convincing evidence can rebut that presumption.” Rodriguez v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t
of Corr., 756 F.3d 1277, 1301-02 (11th Cir. 2014); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1)
(in a § 2254 proceeding, “a determination of a factual issue made by a State court
shall be presumed to be correct. The applicant shall have the burden of rebutting
4 Case: 18-12500 Date Filed: 06/18/2019 Page: 5 of 7
the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence.”). We will only
overturn a state court decision on factual grounds if the decision is objectively
unreasonable. Barnes v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 888 F.3d 1148, 1156 (2018). A
state court decision is “contrary to” clearly established federal law only if the state
court arrives at a legal conclusion opposite to that reached by the Supreme Court or
if it issues a different decision than the Supreme Court in a case involving
materially indistinguishable facts. Borden v. Allen, 646 F.3d 785, 817 (11th Cir.
2011).
The Sixth Amendment gives criminal defendants the right to effective
assistance of counsel. U.S. Const., amend. VI. To succeed on an ineffective
assistance claim, a movant must show that (1) his attorney’s performance was
deficient, and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced his defense. Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). Counsel’s performance is deficient if it
falls below the wide range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases,
and there is a “strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide
range of reasonable professional assistance.” Id. at 688-89.
As to the prejudice prong of an ineffective assistance claim, in the context of
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Case: 18-12500 Date Filed: 06/18/2019 Page: 1 of 7
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ________________________
No. 18-12500 Non-Argument Calendar ________________________
D.C. Docket No. 1:14-cv-21855-MGC
MANUEL A. JUNES,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, FLORIDA ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondents-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida ________________________
(June 18, 2019)
Before ROSENBAUM, BRANCH, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: Case: 18-12500 Date Filed: 06/18/2019 Page: 2 of 7
Manuel Junes, a Florida prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals from the denial
of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition for a writ of habeas corpus. On appeal, we issued
him a certificate of appealability as to whether the district court erred in denying
his ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
Junes and his co-defendant, Wiley, went to trial on a charge of attempted
second degree murder. Junes was convicted and sentenced to twenty years. Wiley
was the actual shooter, but there was evidence that Junes had told Wiley to shoot
the victim.
In the district court and on appeal, Junes argued that his trial counsel was
ineffective for advising that he reject a ten-year plea offer offered to him just prior
to jury selection. He contends that counsel incorrectly advised him that the jury
could not convict him as the principal based on the testimony of a single witness.
On the day of the trial, before jury selection, and in open court, Junes’s
counsel told the court the prosecution had offered Junes, the alleged non-shooter,
an offer to plead guilty and receive ten years, while the prosecution offered the
alleged shooter, Wiley, five years for a plea deal. Acknowledging that witnesses
(plural) had allegedly accused Junes of telling Wiley to shoot the victim, counsel
expressed shock that the shooter would be offered five years while his client,
Junes, was only offered ten years. After ensuring that Junes’s counsel had
consulted with him about the plea offer, the court personally addressed Junes, who
2 Case: 18-12500 Date Filed: 06/18/2019 Page: 3 of 7
had been present during his counsel’s colloquy with the court about the plea offer.
Junes assured the court that he had talked with his counsel about the offer, that he
understood he could be found guilty and sentenced up to life imprisonment, that he
had made no counter-offers and did not want to do so, and that he wanted to go to
trial.1
When reviewing the district court’s denial of a habeas petition, we review
questions of law and mixed questions of law and fact de novo, and findings of fact
for clear error. Nyland v. Moore, 216 F.3d 1264, 1266 (11th Cir. 2000). We can
affirm on any basis supported by the record, regardless of whether the district court
decided the case on that basis. Lucas v. W.W. Grainger, Inc., 257 F.3d 1249, 1256
(11th Cir. 2001).
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”)
provides that, after a state court has adjudicated a claim on the merits, a federal
court may grant habeas relief only if the state court’s decision was (1) contrary to,
or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States, or (2) based on an
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented to the
state court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), (2). The AEDPA imposes a “highly
1 Co-defendant Wiley also rejected his plea offer and was tried with Junes. The jury found him not guilty. 3 Case: 18-12500 Date Filed: 06/18/2019 Page: 4 of 7
deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings and demands that state-court
decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.” Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 773
(2010) (quotation marks and citation omitted). The reviewing court applies a
“doubly” deferential standard that takes into account § 2254’s deference to state
courts and the deference to counsel, affirming if “there is any reasonable argument
that counsel” acted pursuant to prevailing professional standards. See Harrington
v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 105 (2011).
Where a state court does not explain its reasons in a post-conviction ruling, a
federal habeas court should “look through” the unexplained decision to the last
related state court decision that provides a relevant rationale and presume that the
unexplained decision adopted the same reasoning. Wilson v. Sellers, 138 S. Ct.
1188, 1192 (2018). The district court must consider the particular factual and legal
reasons that the state court rejected the prisoner’s federal claims. Id. at 1191-92.
In determining whether a state court made an “unreasonable determination
of facts,” a reviewing court must remember that the “AEDPA establishes a
presumption that the state court’s findings of fact are correct, and only clear and
convincing evidence can rebut that presumption.” Rodriguez v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t
of Corr., 756 F.3d 1277, 1301-02 (11th Cir. 2014); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1)
(in a § 2254 proceeding, “a determination of a factual issue made by a State court
shall be presumed to be correct. The applicant shall have the burden of rebutting
4 Case: 18-12500 Date Filed: 06/18/2019 Page: 5 of 7
the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence.”). We will only
overturn a state court decision on factual grounds if the decision is objectively
unreasonable. Barnes v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 888 F.3d 1148, 1156 (2018). A
state court decision is “contrary to” clearly established federal law only if the state
court arrives at a legal conclusion opposite to that reached by the Supreme Court or
if it issues a different decision than the Supreme Court in a case involving
materially indistinguishable facts. Borden v. Allen, 646 F.3d 785, 817 (11th Cir.
2011).
The Sixth Amendment gives criminal defendants the right to effective
assistance of counsel. U.S. Const., amend. VI. To succeed on an ineffective
assistance claim, a movant must show that (1) his attorney’s performance was
deficient, and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced his defense. Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). Counsel’s performance is deficient if it
falls below the wide range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases,
and there is a “strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide
range of reasonable professional assistance.” Id. at 688-89.
As to the prejudice prong of an ineffective assistance claim, in the context of
pleas, the defendant must show that the outcome of the plea process would have
been different if he had received competent counsel. Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S.
156, 163 (2012). The Supreme Court stated in Lafler that, when the prejudice
5 Case: 18-12500 Date Filed: 06/18/2019 Page: 6 of 7
alleged is the defendant proceeding to trial instead of pleading guilty, he must
show a reasonable probability that, but for his counsel’s errors: (1) an offer would
have been presented to the court; (2) the court would have accepted it; and (3) his
conviction, sentence, or both would have been less severe under the offer’s terms
than it was under the judgment and sentence that he actually received. Id. at 164;
see also Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 149-50 (2012) (stating that a defendant
whose counsel failed to communicate a plea offer to him “must show not only a
reasonable probability that he would have accepted the lapsed plea but also a
reasonable probability that the prosecution would have adhered to the agreement
and that it would have been accepted by the trial court”).
Here, even if we assume, arguendo, that the district court erred in its
analysis of Junes’s ineffective assistance claim, we conclude that the denial of the
petition was still proper. The magistrate judge failed to look through the Florida
appeals court’s decision to review the reasons that the Florida circuit court denied
Junes’s claim on the merits in April 2016. However, Junes has not pointed to clear
and convincing evidence to rebut the presumption that the state court’s factual
findings were correct. Likewise, he has not shown that its decision was contrary
to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law.
The state court found, and the record supported, that the outcome of the plea
process would not have been different even if his attorney had not made the
6 Case: 18-12500 Date Filed: 06/18/2019 Page: 7 of 7
alleged errors. The state court found that Junes was made aware that multiple
witnesses would testify against him and that he could be convicted as the principal
to the crime simply by telling the shooter to shoot the victim. Notwithstanding
this knowledge, the state court found that he did not accept the prosecution’s plea
offer or seek to negotiate by counter-offer. Thus, the state court found that Junes
had failed to show that he would have accepted the plea offer but for the bad
advice of counsel. We cannot conclude that Junes has proved by clear and
convincing evidence that these state court findings are erroneous. Thus, we cannot
conclude that Junes has satisfied the prejudice prong of the ineffective assistance
of counsel standard in the context of alleged ineffectiveness in the plea context.
AFFIRMED.