Manson v. Caron

CourtDistrict Court, D. Connecticut
DecidedJune 25, 2024
Docket3:24-cv-00876
StatusUnknown

This text of Manson v. Caron (Manson v. Caron) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Connecticut primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Manson v. Caron, (D. Conn. 2024).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

James Manson,

Plaintiff, Civil No. 3:24-cv-00876-MPS

v.

Caron et al,

Defendants. June 25, 2024

RECOMMENDED RULING ON PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS 1. Introduction The plaintiff, James Manson, is an inmate at the Enfield Correctional Institution in Enfield, Connecticut. He has sued several prison officials for violating his civil rights (Compl., ECF No. 1), and he also applied for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, or “IFP.” (ECF No. 2.) In other words, he asked for permission to begin his suit without pre-paying $405.00 in filing and administrative fees. The Clerk of the Court assigned Mr. Manson’s case to United States District Judge Michael P. Shea. In the District of Connecticut, however, motions for leave to proceed IFP are reviewed in the first instance by a United States Magistrate Judge. See United States District Court for the District of Connecticut, Guide for Self-Represented Litigants, at 6 (“[T]he motion to proceed in forma pauperis . . . will be reviewed by a Magistrate Judge.”). When the motion deserves to be granted, the Magistrate Judge will typically be the one to grant it. See, e.g., Ambrose v. Guadaramma, No. 3:24-cv-926 (VAB) (TOF), 2024 WL 2836228, at *2 (D. Conn. May 31, 2024). But when the IFP motion deserves to be denied, the Magistrate Judge will ordinarily only recommend denial to the District Judge, rather than deny it himself. This is because Magistrate Judges are not generally authorized to dismiss cases, and denying an IFP motion can sometimes be “the functional equivalent of an involuntary dismissal[.]” Woods v. Dahlberg, 894 F.2d 187 (6th Cir. 1990).

The undersigned Magistrate Judge has reviewed Mr. Manson’s application and supporting materials. For the reasons that follow, he recommends that Judge Shea deny the motion for leave to proceed IFP. 2. Governing Legal Principles A federal law allows inmates to commence civil actions without pre-paying the filing fee when, among other requirements, they submit affidavits showing that they are “unable to pay.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915. The Supreme Court has explained that an IFP affidavit “sufficient[ly]” demonstrates an inability to pay when it shows that the applicant “cannot because of his poverty pay or give security for the costs and still be able to provide himself and [his] dependents with the necessities of life.” Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 339 (1948). While

the applicant does not need to prove absolute destitution, Potnick v. E. State Hosp., 701 F.2d 243, 244 (2d Cir. 1983), he does need to show that pre-paying the fee would “constitute a serious hardship.” Fiebelkorn v. U.S., 77 Fed. Cl. 59, 62 (2007). When a prisoner’s inmate trust account balance is lower than the filing fee, courts often grant leave to proceed IFP. In Simmons v. Torres, for example, an inmate filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, which ordinarily requires a $5.00 filing fee. No. 3:07-cv-1409 (VLB), 2007 WL 3171356, at *1 (D. Conn. Oct. 26, 2007). Because he “provided a copy of his inmate account statement reflecting a spendable balance of $0.43,” Judge Bryant granted his motion to proceed IFP. Id. Yet courts typically deny IFP motions when the inmate’s low trust account balance is a result of his own voluntary spending decisions. As Judge Shea has previously explained, when “considering a prisoner’s affidavit of indigence, the district court may inquire whether, if a prisoner has no cash credit at the moment of filing, he had disabled himself by a recent drawing on his

account and if so, for what purposes.” Hinton v. Pearson, No. 3:21-cv-863 (MPS), 2021 WL 3036921, at *2 (D. Conn. July 19, 2021) (quoting Miller v. Brown, No. CV 112-166, 2013 WL 1346826, at *2 (S.D. Ga. Feb. 21, 2013)) (quotation marks omitted). In Hinton, the plaintiff had only $132.91 in his trust account at the time he filed his suit. Id. at *1. But his account statement revealed that he had received over $3,500.00 in the preceding six months, money that he “chose to spend . . . in the commissary or send . . . out of the facility.” Id. at *2. Because “[t]he plaintiff had sufficient funds to pay the filing fee . . . but chose to spend those funds on other things to render himself eligible for [IFP] status,” the Court denied his IFP motion. Id.; see also Clark v. Pappoosha, No. 3:21-cv-1690 (CSH), 2022 WL 960296, at *2 (D. Conn. Mar. 30, 2022) (denying IFP motion in part because inmate “received a total of $1,645.00 in deposits during a six-month

period prior to filing [his] action,” yet “made numerous personal withdrawals”); Brown v. Ruiz, No. 3:20-cv-1202 (KAD), 2020 WL 6395480, at *1 (D. Conn. Nov. 2, 2020) (denying IFP motion because inmate “had deposits exceeding $3,850.00 in the seven months prior to filing [his] action,” but “made purchases at the commissary and regularly sent money out of the facility”). Before denying an IFP motion on account of an inmate’s spending, however, courts must consider whether the inmate’s expenditures were necessary or optional. As noted above, the Supreme Court has held that a litigant is entitled to proceed IFP if he shows that he cannot simultaneously pay the filing fee and afford “the necessities of life.” Adkins, 335 U.S. at 339. And while the Second Circuit has observed that “what constitutes the ‘necessities of life’ . . . is obviously different for prisoners, most of whose necessities are paid for by the jurisdiction that incarcerates them[,]” In re Epps, 888 F.2d 964, 967 (2d Cir. 1989), it has also observed that inmates sometimes have “financial obligations” such as “medical debts, court fees, student loans[,]” and family support orders. Rosa v. Doe, 86 F.4th 1001, 1009 (2d Cir. 2023). These

obligations “warrant consideration” in the IFP analysis, and they can support IFP status even when the inmate’s account balance exceeds the filing fee by a meaningful amount. Id. The plaintiff in Rosa, for example, claimed to “support[] his mother and son with monthly payments totaling $86.66,” and he was therefore entitled to IFP status even though his account balance exceeded the filing fee by $174.98. Id. at 1005-06, 1009-10. To help prisoners demonstrate the necessity of their expenses, the District of Connecticut has prepared a standard IFP application form. (ECF No. 2.) The form prompts the applicant to disclose “[h]ow much money” he “contribute[s] each month to the support of family members or other individuals,” and it gives him space to state the name of the person he supports and his relationship to him or her. (Id. at 3.) The form also prompts the applicant to state the amount he

“spend[s] each month on necessities of life that are not provided for [him] by the Department of Correction,” and it gives him space to identify the items he purchases and the amounts he spends on each one. (Id.) Finally, the form invites him to attach additional pages if he needs more space in which to explain his necessary expenses. (Id.) A copy of the form is attached as Exhibit A. 3. Application to Mr. Manson’s Case In this case, Mr. Manson filled out the form, and he provided a certified copy of his inmate trust account statement as required by 28 U.S.C. §

Related

Adkins v. E. I. DuPont De Nemours & Co.
335 U.S. 331 (Supreme Court, 1948)
Robert Lumbert v. Illinois Department of Corrections
827 F.2d 257 (Seventh Circuit, 1987)
In Re Lawrence Epps
888 F.2d 964 (Second Circuit, 1989)
Fridman v. City of New York
195 F. Supp. 2d 534 (S.D. New York, 2002)
Impala v. United States Department of Justice
670 F. App'x 32 (Second Circuit, 2016)
Fiebelkorn v. United States
77 Fed. Cl. 59 (Federal Claims, 2007)
Rosa v. Doe
86 F.4th 1001 (Second Circuit, 2023)

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Bluebook (online)
Manson v. Caron, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/manson-v-caron-ctd-2024.