Mansell v. Bodiford

• Court: District Court, D. South Carolina
• Decided: July 8, 2025
• Docket: 9:25-cv-02480
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA

Kyrkland Mansell, ) C/A No. 9:25-cv-02480-BHH-MHC ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ) Director Scotty Bodiford, ) ) Defendant. ) )

This a civil action filed by Plaintiff Kyrkland Mansell, a state prisoner who is proceeding pro se. Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.), pretrial proceedings in this action have been referred to the assigned United States Magistrate Judge. In an Order dated May 29, 2025, Plaintiff was directed to bring his case into proper form by providing the specified documents. Plaintiff was also notified of pleading deficiencies and given the opportunity to amend his Complaint. See ECF No. 3. The time for Plaintiff to bring his case into proper form has passed, Plaintiff has failed to bring his case into proper form, and he has not filed an amended complaint. I. BACKGROUND Plaintiff is a pretrial detainee at the Greenville County Detention Center (GCDC). Defendant Scott Bodiford is the Director of the GCDC. Plaintiff states that the events giving rise to his claim arose on June 26, 2024, when he was “Arrested on White horse RD. Once place in handcuffs you are consider a prisoner.” ECF No. 1 at 5 (errors in original). In response to the question on the Complaint form asking Plaintiff to state the facts underlying his Complaint, he wrote: I was arrested and Brung to jail. The law states I can file this suit and coming to jail means I am a Government agency worker upon entry into building. ECF No. 1 at 5-6 (errors in original). In the “Relief” section of the Complaint, Plaintiff wrote: The law claims that even if guilty or not you can receive $100,000,000 x 5 = $5,000,000,00 million dollars no matter if you know Your worth if even the case is older than a Year. I SEEK $500,000,000 Million Dollars.

ECF No. 1 at 6 (errors in original). II. STANDARD OF REVIEW A pro se Complaint is reviewed pursuant to the procedural provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104–134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996), and in light of the following precedents: Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25 (1992), Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989), Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972), and Todd v. Baskerville, 712 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1983). Pro se complaints are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys, and a court is charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); King v. Rubenstein, 825 F.3d 206, 214 (4th Cir. 2016). However, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that this Court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim currently cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009) (outlining pleading requirements under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for “all civil actions”). III. DISCUSSION It is recommended that this action be summarily dismissed for the reasons discussed below. A. Lack of Jurisdiction Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, see Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994), and a district court is charged with ensuring that all cases before it are properly subject to such jurisdiction. In re Bulldog Trucking, Inc., 147 F.3d 347, 352 (4th Cir. 1998). The Complaint filed in this case is subject to summary dismissal without service of process because it fails to state a claim which this court may consider under its federal question jurisdiction, see 28 U.S.C. § 1331, or its diversity jurisdiction, see 28 U.S.C. § 1332.1 Plaintiff appears to be attempting to assert federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983

(§ 1983), which “‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,’ but merely provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.’” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n. 3 (1979)). A civil action under § 1983 “creates a private right of action to vindicate violations of ‘rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws’ of the United States,” Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 361 (2012). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). Plaintiff checked boxes on the complaint form indicating he is bringing claims in his Complaint under § 1983. ECF No. 1 at 4. However, in response to the question asking him what

federal constitutional or statutory rights are being violated, he wrote what appears to be a random sequence of numbers (“500-18-2516181211”). Id. Thus, Plaintiff fails to establish federal question jurisdiction as he has not identified any federal constitutional or statutory right he alleges has been violated.

1 A district court may also have jurisdiction of a civil action “where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000...and is between – (1) citizens of different States....” 28 U.S.C. § 1332. However, Plaintiff has not asserted diversity jurisdiction and has not alleged complete diversity of the parties. See Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 372-374 (1978) (Complete diversity of parties means that no party on one side may be a citizen of the same State as any party on the other side). B. Failure to State a Claim Even if Plaintiff can establish federal court jurisdiction, this action should be summarily dismissed because Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable claim against Defendant. Much of the Complaint is fairly characterized as being composed of what some courts have described as “buzz

words” or “legalistic gibberish.” See, e.g., Rochester v. McKie, No. 8:11-CV-0797-JMC-JDA, 2011 WL 2671306 (D.S.C. Apr. 13, 2011), report and recommendation adopted, No. 8:11-CV- 0797-JMC, 2011 WL 2671228 (D.S.C. July 8, 2011). As such, a substantial portion of Plaintiff’s allegations are so generally incomprehensible or filled with what could only be considered by a reasonable person as unconnected, conclusory, and unsupported comments or “gibberish,” that it is unclear what is to be made of them. See Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536-537 (1974) (noting that federal courts lack power to entertain claims that are “so attenuated and unsubstantial as to be absolutely devoid of merit”); see also Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434 (2nd Cir. 1998); Adams v. Rice, 40 F.3d 72 (4th Cir. 1994) (affirming dismissal of Plaintiff’s suit as frivolous where allegations were conclusory and nonsensical on their face).

Although Plaintiff lists Defendant’s name in the caption of his complaint and in the “Defendant” section of his Complaint, his pleadings fail to provide any specific facts to support a claim that Defendant violated any of his federal constitutional or statutory rights. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (requiring, to avoid dismissal, “‘a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests’” (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2))). Although the “liberal pleading requirements” of Rule 8(a) only require a “short and plain” statement of the claim, a plaintiff must “offer more detail ... than the bald statement that he has a valid claim of some type against the defendant.” Trulock v. Freeh, 275 F.3d 391, 405 (4th Cir. 2001) (internal citations omitted); see also White v. White, 886 F.2d 721, 723 (4th Cir. 1989) (district court did not abuse discretion by dismissing plaintiff’s complaint which “failed to contain any factual allegations tending to support his bare assertion”). Additionally, to the extent Plaintiff may be attempting to bring a claim against Defendant

based on a theory of supervisory liability, such a claim is subject to summary dismissal. To state a § 1983 claim for supervisory liability, a plaintiff must allege: (1) that the supervisor had actual or constructive knowledge that [his or her] subordinate was engaged in conduct that posed “a pervasive and unreasonable risk” of constitutional injury to citizens like the plaintiff; (2) that the supervisor’s response to that knowledge was so inadequate as to show “deliberate indifference to or tacit authorization of the alleged offensive practices”; and (3) that there was an “affirmative causal link” between the supervisor’s inaction and the particular constitutional injury suffered by the plaintiff.

Wilkins v. Montgomery, 751 F.3d 214, 226 (4th Cir. 2014) (quoting Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 799 (4th Cir. 1994)). Here, Plaintiff has not alleged any facts to establish supervisory liability as to Defendant. C. Failure to Bring Case Into Proper Form As noted above, Plaintiff has also failed to bring this case into proper form. In the Court’s Proper Form Order dated May 29, 2025, Plaintiff was given the opportunity to bring his case into proper form by paying the filing fee or submitting an Application to Proceed Without Prepayment of Fees and Affidavit (Form AO-240), submitting a summons for Defendant, and submitting a completed and signed Form USM-285 for Defendant. Plaintiff was warned that failure to provide the necessary information within the timetable set forth in the Order would subject the case to dismissal. See ECF No. 3. The time to bring this case into proper form has now lapsed, and Plaintiff has failed to provide the required items to bring his case into proper form or respond to the Proper Form Order in any way. Thus, in the alternative, it is recommended that this action be dismissed in accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 41. See Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626 (1962); Ballard v. Carlson, 882 F.2d 93, 95-96 (4th Cir. 1989) (holding that district court’s dismissal following an explicit and reasonable warning was not an abuse of discretion). IV. RECOMMENDATION Based on the foregoing, it 1s recommended that the Court dismiss this action without prejudice, without leave to amend,’ and without issuance and service of process. Plaintiff’s attention is directed to the important notice on the following page.

fl H. Aha United States Magistrate Judge

July 8, 2025 Charleston, South Carolina

* See Britt v. DeJoy, 45 F.4th 790 (4th Cir. 2022) (noting that “when a district court dismisses a complaint or all claims without providing leave to amend ... the order dismissing the complaint is final and appealable”). Here, any attempt to cure the deficiencies in the complaint would be futile for the reasons discussed above.

Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation

The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.’” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee’s note).

Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:

Robin L. Blume, Clerk United States District Court Post Office Box 835 Charleston, South Carolina 29402

Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).