Manirakiza v. Maine Department of Health and Human Services

• Court: Superior Court of Maine
• Decided: June 28, 2016
• Docket: KENap-16-07
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT KENNEBEC, ss. CIVIL ACTION DOCKET NO. AP-16-07

EUPHREM MANIRAKIZA and ) FATIMA NKEMBI, ) ) Petitioners, ) v. ) ORDER ON CLASS ) CERTIFICATION, MOTION TO MARY MAYHEW, COMMISSIONER ) DISMISS, AND PRELIMINARY MAINE DEPARTMENT OF HEAL TH ) INJUNCTION AND HUMAND SERVICES, et al., ) ) Respondent. )

I. Background

Petitioners Euphrem Manirakiza and Fatima Nkembi, were denied food

supplement benefits based upon their status as legal noncitizens. Mr. Manirakiza

is married to Francine Kanyange. Mr. Manirakiza and his wife both have

documentation allowing them to seek employment in the US as of August 2015.

Mr. Manirakiza is currently employed and Ms. Kanyange is currently

unemployed. They have three children, the youngest of whom was born in the

United States and has legal US citizenship . The youngest child currently receives

food supplement benefits. Mr. Manirakiza applied for food supplement benefits

for his household on August 26, 2015. On or before September 21, 2015, Mr.

Manirakiza's' application was denied because he was employed and because

there was no longer funding available for unemployed noncitizens with work - documentation pursuant to 22 M.R.S. § 3104-A(l)(D) and 10-144 C.M.R. ch. 301, §

FS-111-2. at 2c.

1 On September 21, 2015, Mr. Manirakiza filed for review of the DHHS

denial of his application for food supplement benefits. A hearing officer

reviewed a stipulated record and briefs as agreed to by the parties. On December

21, 2015, the Hearing officer issued a recommended decision denying Mr.

Manirakiza's appeal. Mr. Manirakiza filed a timely written response and

objections with the Division of Administrative Hearings. On January 6, 2016,

DHHS issued a final agency decision upholding the initial agency determination.

Ms. Nkembi applied for food supplement benefits for herself and her two

children on January 5, 2015. On August 11, 2015, Ms. Nkembi received work

authorization from USCIS. That same day, Ms. Nkembi was notified by DHHS

that her food supplement benefits had been reduced from $352 to $139. The

reduction represented a termination of food supplement benefits for Ms. Nkembi

and her oldest child. Ms. Nkembi's youngest child, a U.S. citizen, continued to

receive food supplement benefits.

On September 1, 2015, Ms. Nkembi timely filed an appeal of the DHHS

termination of her food supplement benefits. The matter was submitted to the

Hearing Officer on a stipulated record and briefs based upon an agreement

between Ms. Nkembi and DHHS. On December 21, 2015, the Hearing officer

issued a decision denying Ms. Nkembi' s appeal. Ms. Nkembi filed a written

response and objections with the Division of Administrative Hearings. On

January 6, 2016, DHHS issued a final agency decision affirming the

determination that Ms. Nkembi is not eligible for state food supplement benefits

due to lack of funding for benefits pursuant to DHHS interpretation of Section

3104-A(l)(D).

2 Before the Court are Petitioners' Motion for Class Certification,

Petitioners' Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Petitioners' Motion to Specify the

Future Course of Proceedings Pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 80C(i), and DHHS's

Motion to Dismiss.

Petitioners bring this action seeking judicial determination that DHHS'

current enforcement of the statute, denying food supplement benefits to

unemployed noncitizens with work documentation because that fund set aside

for this group through June 30, 2015 was exhausted, is not compliant with the

statute. Alternatively, Petitioners argue that they were wrongfully denied

benefits because the limitations set out by rule had expired.

II. Authority

The statute in question, 22 M.R.S. § 3104-A(l)(D), states:

"Anoncitizen legally admitted to the United States who is neither receiving assistance on July l, 2011 nor has an application pending for assistance on July 1, 2011 that is later approved is not eligible for food assistance through a state-funded program unless that noncitizen is:

D. Unemployed but has obtained proper work documentation, as defined by the department by rule. Rules adopted by the department under this paragraph are routine technical rules as defined by Title 5, chapter 37:i, subchapter 2-A.

22 M .R.S. § 3104-A(l). The applicable regulation is as follows:

Linu ted-Period Excep tion: for hardship pending work documentation and for asylum seekers who meet the criteria for hardship pending work documentation, if work documents have been received but the individual is unemployed state-funded benefits may continue (assuming all other eligibility factors such as income, assets, etc. are met), subject to the following conditions: 1. This limited-period exception is limited to $261,384 until June 30, 2015. If the funding limit is met prior to June 30, 2015, legal non-citizens with work documentation are no longer eligible for this exception. 2. The unemployed individual is required to report any changes in his or her eligibility status, including employment status

3 within 10 days of the change. Regarding employment status, the individual is required to report within 10 days of being hired. 3. State-funded eligibility will end when the unemployed individual becomes employed.

10-144 C.M.R. ch. 301, § FS-111-2. at 2c. DHHS has interpreted the rule to mean

that the availability of the exception to the general rule that noncitizens are

ineligible for food supplement benefits was both temporally and fiscally limited,

and that because the fund was exhausted on January 17, 2014, "eligibility for this

provision of the food supplement program for legal non-citizens that had

received [work documentation] and remained unemployed ended when the

funding limit was met on or before January 17, 2014." Decision on Informal

Appeal of Denial of Food Supplement Benefits, p. 20, Dec. 21, 2015.

III. Discussion

Petitioners ultimately seek a permanent injunction requiring DHHS to

comply with the statute by administering food supplement benefits to

unemployed noncitizens with work documentation without reference to any

funds set aside for this purpose.

A. Specification of Future Course and Motion to Dismiss

Petitioners seek an order of the Court specifying the future course of

proceedings pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 80C(i). Where independent claims are ·

brought, a plaintiff must file a motion to specify the course of future proceedings

within 10 days of filing. M.R. Civ. P. 80C(i). DHHS moves the Court to dismiss

the independent claims as duplicative of the 80C administrative appeal. "If a

claim for review of governmental action under [80C] is joined with a claim

alleging an independent basis for. relief from governmental action, the petition

shall contain a separate count for each claim for relief asserted, setting forth the

4 facts relied upon, the legal basis of the claim, and the relief requested." M.R. Civ.

P. 80C(i). "When a claim joined with an SOC or B Petition is duplicative of the

Petition, the Law Court has affirmed the Superior Court's dismissal on that

ground." Breton v. Mayhew, 2015 Me. Super. LEXIS 186, *3, (citing Kane v. Comm'r

of the Dep't of Health and Human Services, 2008 ME 185, 9[9[ 30-32, 960 A.2d 1196).

Petitioners have brought two claims independent of the SOC

administrative appeal. Petitioners have brought a claim seeking review of the

rule pursuant to 5 M.R.S. § 8058, which permits judicial review of the validity of

an agency rule and the agency'$ rule making authority in accordance with an

action for declaratory judgment. See 5 M.R.S. § 8058. Petitioners contend that the

rule is in.violation of statute. Petitioners also seek declaration by the Court of the

parties' rights and legal relations with respect to food supplement benefits.

All three counts are based upon the same legal arguments and seek the

same remedy from the Court. Because the Court is able to evaluate the agency's

rulemaking and declare the rights of the parties through the SOC action, the other

claims are duplicative. Therefore, the Court dismisses Count II and III of

Petitioners' Complaint. Because no independent claims remain, the Court need

not specify the future course of proceedings.

B. Class Certification

Petitioners seek certification of the class pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 23.

According to the Maine Rules of Civil Procedure, a class may be certified if:

(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the represen tative parties are. typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.

5 M .R. Civ. P. 23(a). Petitioners claim that the class is made up of approximately

100 people, making joinder of all members impracticable, that the questions of

law concerning eligibility and payment of food supplement benefits are common

between all members of the class, that the claims of the representative party are

typical of the claims of the class, and that the representative party will fairly and

adequately protect the interests of the class. See Id.

DHHS argues that class certification is inappropriate in an SOC action.

DHHS argues that it is inappropriate to join new parties to an administrative

appeal as the Court's review is limited to the facts included in the record. A class

action would necessarily require the Court to look outside of the record .

Additionally, DHHS argues that there is no need for a class action because

DHHS concedes that if the Court finds that DHHS has improperly interpreted

the rule, DHHS will notify all affected parties and the Court's interpretation will

be uniformly applied.

The Court finds that in this case, Petitioners have not shown that "a class

action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient

adjudication of the controversy." M.R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). Considering the facts and

procedural posture of the current case, the Court finds that class certification is

unnecessary for the award of relief sought by Petitioners. Therefore, the Court

denies Petitioners' Motion for Class Certification.

C. Motion for Preliminary Injunction

Petitioners move the Court to grant a preliminary injunction enjoining

Mary Mayhew, DHHS, and all agents and employees thereof from denying the

named Petitioners and all members of the proposed class food supplement

benefits.

6 "The party seeking a preliminary or permanent injunction generally has

the burden of demonstrating to the Court that the following four criteria are met:

(1) that plaintiff will suffer irreparable injury if the injunction is not granted, (2)

that such injury outweighs any harm which granting the injunctive relief would

inflict on the defendant, (3) that that has exhibited a likelihood of success on the

merits (at most, a probability; at least, a substantial possibility), and (4) that the

public interest will not be adversely affected by granting the

injunction." Ingraham v. University of Maine at Orono, 441 A.2d 691, 693 (Me.

1982); Bangor Historic Track, Inc. v. Department of Agriculture, 2003 ME 140, 9[ 9,

837 A.2d 129, 132. Failure to demonstrate that any one of these criteria is met

requires that injunctive relief be denied. Town of Charleston v. Sch. Admin. Dist.

No. 68, 2002 ME 95, PP6-7, 798 A.2d 1102, 1104. The Ingraham criteria are not to

be applied in isolation from each other; rather, the court should weigh all of these

factors together in determining whether injunctive relief is proper in the specific

circumstances of each case. See Developments in the Law -- Injunctions, 78 Harv. L.

Rev. 994, 1056 (1965) ("Clear evidence of irreparable injury should result in a less

stringent requirement of certainty of victory; greater certainty of victory should

result in a less stringent requirement of proof of irreparable injury") (footnote

omitted). Emerson, 563 A.2d 762.

DHHS argues that Petitioners are unlikely to succeed on the merits and

therefore the preliminary injunction should not issue. DHHS alleges that the

language of the statute clearly limits the eligibility of unemployed individuals

with work authorization to either the amount budgeted or to an end date of July

15, 2015. Petitioners argue that the statute itself does not limit the food

supplement benefit eligibility of unemployed individuals with work

7 authorization, and even if it did, any limitation ends on June 30, 2015.

Furthermore, Petitioners argue that the rule go.e s beyond the rulemaking

authority of DHHS.

On an 80C administrative appeal, the Court's review is "deferential and

limited." Watts v. Bd. of Envtl. Prat., 2014 ME 91,

reviews adjudicatory decisions "for abuse of discretion, errors of law, or findings

not supported by the substantial evidence in the record." Wyman v. Town of

Phippsburg, 2009 ME 77,

decision unless it: violates the Constitution or statutes; exceeds the agency's

authority; is procedurally unlawful; is arbitrary or capricious; constitutes an

abuse of discretion; is affected by bias or an error of law; or is unsupported by

the evidence in the record." Kroeger v. Dep't of Envtl. Prat., 2005 ME 50,

A.2d 566.

The Court reviews issues of statutory and constitutional interpretation de

novo. Munjoy Sporting & Ath. Club v. Dow, 2000 ME 141,

party attempting to vacate the agency's decision bears the burden of persuasion.

Town ofJay v. Androscoggin Energy, LLC, 2003 ME 64,

agency's decision was committed to the reasonable discretion of the agency, the

party appealing has the burden of demonstrating that the agency abused its

discretion in reaching the decision. See Sager v. Town of Bowdoinham, 2004 ME 40,

demonstrates that the decision maker exceeded the bounds of the reasonable

choices available to it, considering the facts and circumstances of the particular

case and the governing law." Id. Ultimately, the petitioner must prove that "no

competent evidence" supports the agency's decision. Seider v. Bd. of Examiners of

8 Psychologists, 2000 ME 206, 'IT 9, 762 A.2d 551 (citing Bisclwff v. Bd. of Trustees, 661

A.2d 167, 170 (Me. 1995)). The mere fact that there is "[i]nconsistent evidence will

not render an agency decision unsupported." Id.

Petitioners argue that, interpreting the only language of the statute, there

is no limitation to the food supplement benefit eligibility of unemployed

noncitizens with work authorization. DHHS argues that the intent of statue and

accompanying regulation is clear and limits eligibility. The regulation, rather

than the statute, provides the language of limitation.

Review of DHHS' s interpretation of statute is performed in the following

manner:

First, the court decides de novo whether the statute is ambiguous or unambiguous.

Second, if the statute is unambiguous, the statute is construed directly, without deference to the agency's interpretation on the question of law. An agency cannot, by regulation, create an ambiguity in interpretation of a statute that does not otherwise exist.

Third, if the statute is viewed as ambiguous, the agency's interpretation, although not conclusive, is reviewed with great deference and will be upheld unless contrary to the plain meaning of the statute.

Donald G. Alexander, Maine Appellate Practice§ 8(b)(3) (4th ed. 2013); citations

omitted, citing City of Bangor v. Penobscot County, 2005 ME 35,

Whitney v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 2006 ME 37, 'IT'IT 22-23, 895 A.2d 309; Dep't of

Corrections v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 2009 ME 40, 'IT 8, 968 A.2d 1047; S.D. Warren Co.

v. Bd. Of Envrionmental Prat., 2005 ME 27, 'IT'IT 4-5, 868 A.2d 210, aff'd, 547 U.D. 370,

126 S. Ct. 1843 (2006); Kane v. Commissioner of Dep't of Health and Human Servs,

2008 ME 185, 'IT 12, 960 A.2d 1196.

9 The parties have addressed in briefing and at oral argument whether they

believed the statute was ambiguous. Petitioners claimed both in briefing and at

oral argument that it was not, while the Respondent conceded at oral argument

that it was not. However, neither party addressed the related but different issues

of whether the statute is silent on the points of temporal and fiscal limitations,

whether the statute is presumed to be in effect unless and until repealed or

amended by the legislature, and how these determinations might affect the

Court's analysis and standard of review when comparing the statute to the

regulation. See Goodrich v. Me. Pub. Eml.s Ret. Sys., 2002 ME 95,

("When a statute administered by an agency is silent or ambiguous on a

particular point, we will review whether the agency's interpretation of the statute

is reasonable and uphold its interpretation unless the statute plainly compels a

contrary result. II)

The Court seeks further argument from the parties on three matters. The first

is whether the statute is silent, as opposed to ambiguous, on temporal and fiscal

limitations. Second, if the issue is silence as opposed to ambiguity, the parties

should address whether this creates a conflict between the statute and the

regulation or whether this regulation as promulgated falls within the agency's

broad rulemaking authority. See Coulombe v. Anthem Blue Cross/Blue Shield ofMe.,

2002 ME 163,

statute should be presumed to be in effect unless and until repealed or amended

by the legislature.

The Court sets out a briefing schedule below.

IV. Conclusion

The Court Denies Petitioner's Motion to Certify the Class.

10 The Court Grants Respondent's Motion to Dismiss the Claims as

Duplicative.

The Court Denies Petitioner's Motion to Specify the Future Proceedings

The Court Seeks Memoranda of Law by the Parties concerning the law of

statutory interpretation as described above according to the following schedule:

• Petitioners shall file a memorandum of law on August 12, 2016

• Respondents shall file a memorandum of law on September 9, 2016

After the memoranda have been filed, the Court will either take the matter un_d er

advisement on the papers or set a date for oral argument.

The Clerk is directed to incorporate this Order into the docket by reference

in accordance with M.R. Civ. P. 79(a).

0 ~ · DATE: Michaela Murphy Justice, Superior Court