J-A04006-20
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
THOMAS M. MANIDIS : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA Appellant : : : v. : : : RENEE K. MANIDIS : No. 1023 EDA 2019
Appeal from the Order Dated February 28, 2019 In the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County Civil Division at No(s): No. 2018-08943-DI
BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., STRASSBURGER, J.*, and COLINS, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.: FILED APRIL 24, 2020
Thomas Manidis (“Husband”) appeals from the order entered in the
Chester County Court of Common Pleas dismissing his request for equitable
distribution of marital property for lack of personal jurisdiction over Renee
Manidis (“Wife”). On appeal, Husband argues Wife submitted to the in
personam jurisdiction of the trial court because she failed to raise an objection
to the court’s jurisdiction in her preliminary objections. After careful review,
we affirm.
Husband and Wife were married in Palm Beach County, Florida and lived
together in Florida until their separation. Shortly after separating, Husband
moved to Chester County, Pennsylvania, where he found work as a
chiropractor. Wife, however, remained in Florida.
____________________________________________
* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. J-A04006-20
Husband filed a divorce complaint in Pennsylvania seeking a no fault
divorce and equitable distribution of martial assets. In response to Husband’s
complaint, Wife filed preliminary objections challenging the subject matter
jurisdiction and in personam jurisdiction of the trial court.
After a hearing, the trial court sustained in part and overruled in part
Wife’s preliminary objections. Specifically, the court overruled Wife’s objection
to subject matter jurisdiction because husband satisfied the requirements for
residency in Pennsylvania. By contrast, the court granted the objection to in
personam jurisdiction finding that it lacked jurisdiction over Wife to adjudicate
equitable distribution claims. As a result, the court dismissed Husband’s
economic claims. This timely appeal followed.
In his only issue, Husband contends Wife waived her challenge to in
personam jurisdiction by failing to assert such claim in her preliminary
objections. See Appellant’s Brief, at 13. Therefore, Husband claims that Wife
submitted to the in personam jurisdiction of the Commonwealth.
In reviewing an order granting preliminary objections challenging in
personam jurisdiction, our standard of review is as follows:
When preliminary objections, if sustained, would result in the dismissal of an action, such objections should be sustained only in cases which are clear and free from doubt. . . . Moreover, when deciding a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction [,] the court must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.
Gaboury v. Gaboury, 988 A.2d 672, 675 (Pa. Super. 2009).
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“[T]his court will reverse the trial court’s decision regarding preliminary
objections only where there has been an error of law or an abuse of
discretion.” Rambo v. Greene, 906 A.2d 1232, 1235 (Pa. Super. 2006).
“Once the moving party supports its objections to personal jurisdiction, the
burden of proving personal jurisdiction is upon the party asserting it.” Barr v.
Barr, 749 A.2d 992, 994 (Pa. Super. 2000) (citation omitted).
As an initial matter, we must determine whether Husband’s appeal is
from a final order. This Court may review such issue sua sponte because it
concerns our jurisdiction over the appeal. See Kensey v. Kensey, 877 A.2d
1284, 1286-1287 (Pa. Super. 2005).
Under Pennsylvania law, a party may only appeal from a final order
unless otherwise permitted by rule or statute. See McCutcheon v.
Philadelphia Electric Company, 788 A.2d 345, 349-350 (Pa. 2002). A final
order is an order that “disposes of all claims and of all parties[.]” Pa.R.A.P.
341(b)(1). In other words, a final order ends the litigation as to all claims and
all parties. See McCutcheon, 788 A.2d at 350.
Here, the trial court, after reviewing Wife’s preliminary objections,
issued an order dismissing Husband’s request for equitable distribution. See
Trial Court Order, 02/28/19. In a memorandum opinion, the court explained
that it had jurisdiction to dissolve the bonds of matrimony, but it did not have
personal jurisdiction over Wife to decide any economic claims. See Trial Court
Opinion, 02/28/19, at 5, 12. The court’s decision put into operation a “divisible
divorce.” See Gaboury, 988 A.2d at 676.
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A divisible divorce exists where a court has subject matter jurisdiction
to dissolve the parties’ marriage, but lacks in personam jurisdiction to decide
economic issues. See Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541 (1948). The court under
these circumstances must dismiss all claims for economic relief due to its
jurisdictional limits. As a result, this order is considered a final order because
it disposes of all economic claims arising under the divorce complaint. See
Scoggins v. Scoggins, 555 A.2d 1314, 1317 n.3 (Pa. Super. 1989).
In the present case, the order issued by the trial court disposed of all
Husband’s economic claims. See Trial Court Order, 02/28/19; see also
Pa.R.A.P. 341(b)(1). Therefore, we conclude that the court’s order is a final,
appealable order. See Scoggins, 555 A.2d 1317 n.3.
Next, we must address Wife’s argument that Husband failed to preserve
his claim on appeal. Wife contends that Husband is raising his claim for the
first time on appeal and is therefore barred from doing so under our rules of
appellate procedure. See Appellee’s Brief, at 7.
Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) provides that “issues not raised in the lower court are
waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.” Furthermore, Rule
2117(c) and Rule 2119(e) require appellants to identify, in both the statement
of the case and in the argument, where in the record the issue presented on
appeal has been raised or preserved. See Young v. S.B. Conrad, Inc., 216
A.3d 267, 274 (Pa. Super. 2019).
Here, Husband’s brief does not comply with Rule 2117(c), which
requires an appellant to pinpoint where in the record the issue was preserved.
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In his statement of the case, his first allegation of raising this objection is the
“[o]n appeal, Husband raised the issue … that Wife waived her right to object
to personal jurisdiction.” Appellant’s Brief, at 9 (emphasis supplied). However,
Husband does comply with Rule 2119(e), as he notes in his argument that he
argued to the trial court that Wife had “availed herself already” of
Pennsylvania jurisdiction. Id., at 14. Under these circumstances, we conclude
Husband properly preserved this argument for appellate review.
Nonetheless, Husband’s argument merits no relief. Contrary to
Husband’s assertion, Wife objected to the court’s exercise of in personam
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J-A04006-20
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
THOMAS M. MANIDIS : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA Appellant : : : v. : : : RENEE K. MANIDIS : No. 1023 EDA 2019
Appeal from the Order Dated February 28, 2019 In the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County Civil Division at No(s): No. 2018-08943-DI
BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., STRASSBURGER, J.*, and COLINS, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.: FILED APRIL 24, 2020
Thomas Manidis (“Husband”) appeals from the order entered in the
Chester County Court of Common Pleas dismissing his request for equitable
distribution of marital property for lack of personal jurisdiction over Renee
Manidis (“Wife”). On appeal, Husband argues Wife submitted to the in
personam jurisdiction of the trial court because she failed to raise an objection
to the court’s jurisdiction in her preliminary objections. After careful review,
we affirm.
Husband and Wife were married in Palm Beach County, Florida and lived
together in Florida until their separation. Shortly after separating, Husband
moved to Chester County, Pennsylvania, where he found work as a
chiropractor. Wife, however, remained in Florida.
____________________________________________
* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. J-A04006-20
Husband filed a divorce complaint in Pennsylvania seeking a no fault
divorce and equitable distribution of martial assets. In response to Husband’s
complaint, Wife filed preliminary objections challenging the subject matter
jurisdiction and in personam jurisdiction of the trial court.
After a hearing, the trial court sustained in part and overruled in part
Wife’s preliminary objections. Specifically, the court overruled Wife’s objection
to subject matter jurisdiction because husband satisfied the requirements for
residency in Pennsylvania. By contrast, the court granted the objection to in
personam jurisdiction finding that it lacked jurisdiction over Wife to adjudicate
equitable distribution claims. As a result, the court dismissed Husband’s
economic claims. This timely appeal followed.
In his only issue, Husband contends Wife waived her challenge to in
personam jurisdiction by failing to assert such claim in her preliminary
objections. See Appellant’s Brief, at 13. Therefore, Husband claims that Wife
submitted to the in personam jurisdiction of the Commonwealth.
In reviewing an order granting preliminary objections challenging in
personam jurisdiction, our standard of review is as follows:
When preliminary objections, if sustained, would result in the dismissal of an action, such objections should be sustained only in cases which are clear and free from doubt. . . . Moreover, when deciding a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction [,] the court must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.
Gaboury v. Gaboury, 988 A.2d 672, 675 (Pa. Super. 2009).
-2- J-A04006-20
“[T]his court will reverse the trial court’s decision regarding preliminary
objections only where there has been an error of law or an abuse of
discretion.” Rambo v. Greene, 906 A.2d 1232, 1235 (Pa. Super. 2006).
“Once the moving party supports its objections to personal jurisdiction, the
burden of proving personal jurisdiction is upon the party asserting it.” Barr v.
Barr, 749 A.2d 992, 994 (Pa. Super. 2000) (citation omitted).
As an initial matter, we must determine whether Husband’s appeal is
from a final order. This Court may review such issue sua sponte because it
concerns our jurisdiction over the appeal. See Kensey v. Kensey, 877 A.2d
1284, 1286-1287 (Pa. Super. 2005).
Under Pennsylvania law, a party may only appeal from a final order
unless otherwise permitted by rule or statute. See McCutcheon v.
Philadelphia Electric Company, 788 A.2d 345, 349-350 (Pa. 2002). A final
order is an order that “disposes of all claims and of all parties[.]” Pa.R.A.P.
341(b)(1). In other words, a final order ends the litigation as to all claims and
all parties. See McCutcheon, 788 A.2d at 350.
Here, the trial court, after reviewing Wife’s preliminary objections,
issued an order dismissing Husband’s request for equitable distribution. See
Trial Court Order, 02/28/19. In a memorandum opinion, the court explained
that it had jurisdiction to dissolve the bonds of matrimony, but it did not have
personal jurisdiction over Wife to decide any economic claims. See Trial Court
Opinion, 02/28/19, at 5, 12. The court’s decision put into operation a “divisible
divorce.” See Gaboury, 988 A.2d at 676.
-3- J-A04006-20
A divisible divorce exists where a court has subject matter jurisdiction
to dissolve the parties’ marriage, but lacks in personam jurisdiction to decide
economic issues. See Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541 (1948). The court under
these circumstances must dismiss all claims for economic relief due to its
jurisdictional limits. As a result, this order is considered a final order because
it disposes of all economic claims arising under the divorce complaint. See
Scoggins v. Scoggins, 555 A.2d 1314, 1317 n.3 (Pa. Super. 1989).
In the present case, the order issued by the trial court disposed of all
Husband’s economic claims. See Trial Court Order, 02/28/19; see also
Pa.R.A.P. 341(b)(1). Therefore, we conclude that the court’s order is a final,
appealable order. See Scoggins, 555 A.2d 1317 n.3.
Next, we must address Wife’s argument that Husband failed to preserve
his claim on appeal. Wife contends that Husband is raising his claim for the
first time on appeal and is therefore barred from doing so under our rules of
appellate procedure. See Appellee’s Brief, at 7.
Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) provides that “issues not raised in the lower court are
waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.” Furthermore, Rule
2117(c) and Rule 2119(e) require appellants to identify, in both the statement
of the case and in the argument, where in the record the issue presented on
appeal has been raised or preserved. See Young v. S.B. Conrad, Inc., 216
A.3d 267, 274 (Pa. Super. 2019).
Here, Husband’s brief does not comply with Rule 2117(c), which
requires an appellant to pinpoint where in the record the issue was preserved.
-4- J-A04006-20
In his statement of the case, his first allegation of raising this objection is the
“[o]n appeal, Husband raised the issue … that Wife waived her right to object
to personal jurisdiction.” Appellant’s Brief, at 9 (emphasis supplied). However,
Husband does comply with Rule 2119(e), as he notes in his argument that he
argued to the trial court that Wife had “availed herself already” of
Pennsylvania jurisdiction. Id., at 14. Under these circumstances, we conclude
Husband properly preserved this argument for appellate review.
Nonetheless, Husband’s argument merits no relief. Contrary to
Husband’s assertion, Wife objected to the court’s exercise of in personam
jurisdiction in her preliminary objections. See Appellee’s Preliminary
Objections, filed 9/27/18, at ¶ 15 (“[Husband] has not established any indicia
of residency that would grant Pennsylvania subject matter jurisdiction or an
in personam jurisdiction over [Wife]”).
Husband does not challenge the trial court’s conclusion that it lacked
personal jurisdiction over Wife. His only argument is that paragraph 15 of
Wife’s preliminary objection was too vague to place him on notice that she
was challenging personal jurisdiction. He contends that since Wife only
mentioned personal jurisdiction in conjunction with a challenge to the court’s
subject matter jurisdiction to grant divorce, he was not on notice that personal
jurisdiction was being challenged.
We disagree. While Wife’s preliminary objection was not perfectly
drafted, paragraph 15 provided sufficient notice, under the circumstances,
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that personal jurisdiction was at issue. Husband’s sole issue on appeal merits
no relief.
Order affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Judge Colins joins the Memorandum.
Judge Strassburger files a Concurring Memorandum.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary
Date: 4/24/20
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