1 • \ laW library ORIG'iNAL Te itona 2
3 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF GUAM 4 ) 5 JOSEPH GOKITA MANIBUSAN, Pro Se, ) Special Proceeding Case No. SP 0107-09 ) 6 Petitioner, ) 7 ) DECISION AND ORDER ON PETITION vs. ) FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 8 ) 9 SUPERIOR COURT OF GUAM, ) DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, and ) 10 GUAM PAROLE BOARD ) ) 11 Respondents. ) 12 ----------------------------) 13 INTRODUCTION 14 This matter came before the Honorable Alberto C. Lamorena III, on November 28,2011 15 on Joseph G. Manibusan's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. Petitioner appeared in court 16 acting pro se. Assistant Attorney General Marianne Woloschuck represented the Respondents 17 Department of Corrections and the Guam Parole Board. Having given due consideration to th 18 parties' arguments, the Court now issues its Decision and Order. 19 FACTUAL BACKGROUND 20 On May 19, 1989, Petitioner pleaded guilty to charges of murder and guilt by complicit 21 under title 9, sections l6.40(a)(l), l6.40(b) and 4.60 of the Guam Code in Guam Superior Cou 22 Criminal Case Nos. CF0137-89 and CF0126-89. On August 29, 1991, this Court sentence 23 petitioner to a term of life imprisonment, with parole eligibility after fifteen years. Petitioner wa 24 given credit for time served since 1989. The Judgment stated that Petitioner's sentence woul 25 run concurrent to and simultaneously with Petitioner's federal sentence in Federal District Cou 26 of Guam Case No. 89-00035. Following issuance of the Judgment, Guam Department 0 27 Corrections ("DOC') transferred custody of Petitioner to the Federal Bureau of Prisons an 28 Petitioner served his sentence on the federal charges in federal prison. Following his release fro
-1- ORIGtNAL federal prison, Petitioner returned to Guam and submitted to the custody of DOC. Petitioner i 2 currently confined and continues to serve out his life sentence pursuant to the Judgment issue
3 by this Court. 4 Despite the fact that Petitioner became eligible for parole in 2004, he did not receive hi 5 first parole hearing until May of 2009, at which time Petitioner's request for parole was denied. 6 Petitioner filed the present Petition for Habeas Corpus arguing that the denial of his right to 7 parole hearing for five consecutive years amounts to a due process violation justifying habea 8 relief. Notwithstanding various potential defects in the petition itself, I in addressing the merits 0 9 the petition this Court finds no legal basis on which it may grant habeas relief. 10 DISCUSSION 11
12 A convicted individual has "no constitutional or inherent right ... to be conditionall
13 released before the expiration of a valid sentence," Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Pena
14 Correcitonal Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7, 99 S. Ct. 2100, 60 L.Ed.2d 668 (1979). However, unde
15 certain circumstances a prisoner may be able to show that he has been wrongfully detained and i
16 entitled to habeas relief. Title 8, section 135.38 of the Guam Code establishes the circumstance
17 under which a convicted individual is entitled to habeas relief:
18 § 135.38. When Defendant May be Discharged if Held under Process From Gua 19 Courts. 20 If it appears on the return of the writ that the prisoner is in custody by virtue 0 process form any court of this Territory, or judge or officer thereof, such prisoner may b 21 discharged in any of the following case, subject to the restrictions of 135.36: 22
24 I First, there is some question as to whether Petitioner properly served the petition for writ 0 habeas corpus on the Attorney General as required by Title 8 G.C.A. § 135.14. Second 25 Petitioner states within his petition that he has not exhausted all available administrativ 26 remedies as is typically required before the writ may issue. Finally, the Petitioner fails t properly name the party "by whom he is so confined or restrained" as required by Title 8 G.C.A 27 § 135.12. But see 8 G.C.A. § 135.54 (stating that "[n]o writ of habeas corpus can be disobeye for defect of form, if it sufficiently appear [sic] therefrom in whose custody or under whos 28 restraint the party imprisoned or restrained is, the officer or person detaining him, and the cou before whom he is to be brought.").
-2- (a) When the jurisdiction of such courts or officer has been exceeded; 2
3 (b) When the imprisonment was at first lawful, yet by some act, omission, or event which has taken place afterwards, the party has become 4 entitled to a discharge; 5 (c) When the process is defective in some matter of substance 6 required by law, rendering such process void;
7 (d) When the process, though proper in form, has been issued in a case not allowed by law; 8 (e) When the person having the custody of the prisoner is not the 9 person allowed by law to detain him; 10 (f) Where the process is not authorized by any order, judgment, or 11 decree of any court, nor by any provision of law; 12 (g) Where a party has been committed on criminal charge without 13 reasonable or probable cause.
14 8 G.C.A. § 135.38(a)-(g). Though Petitioner does not explicitly state which of the abov
15 provisions he believes entitles him to relief, this Court fairly presumes that the Petitioner'
16 argument that his due process rights were violated by the Parole Board's five-year delay i
17 holding the initial parole hearing relates to subsection (b). This Court also presumes tha
18 subsection (e) serves as the basis for Petitioner's argument that DOC is not authorized to detai
19 him. Each of these bases is discussed below.
20 I. The Five Year Delay 21 Petitioner argues that the five-year delay between his parole eligibility date and the dat 22 on which he received his hearing violated his constitutional right to due process. Court 23 addressing this very issue have determined that habeas relief is not available to a convicte 24 individual who has been wrongfully denied a parole hearing, either on initial release or upo 25 revocation of parole, unless the petitioner can show he was prejudiced by the delay. See Taisi i 26 v. Marion 1996 Guam 9, ~ 42; Clifton v. Attorney General of State of California, 997 F.2d 66 27 (9th Cir. 1993); Jones v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 903 F.2d 1178,1181 (8th Cir. 1990); Po ner v. 28 U.S. Parole Comm'n, 878 F.2d 275, 276 (9th Cir. 1989); Heath v. U.S. Parole Comm'n, 78
-3- F.2d 85 (2nd Cir. 1986); Sacasas v. Rison, 755 F.2d 1533, 1535 (lIth Cir. 1985); Sutherland v 2 McCall, 709 F.2d 730, 732 (D.C. Cir. 1983); United States ex reI. Pullia v. Luther, 635 F.2d 612 3 616-17 (7th Cir. 1980); Beck v. Wilkes, 589 F.2d 901 (5th Cir. 1979). 4 In Jones v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 903 F.2d 1178, 1181 (8 th Cir. 1990), Jones w 5 incarcerated and serving concurrent state and federal sentences. Jones was eligible for parole i 6 1981 in relating to his federal sentence, but was not granted a parole hearing until 1987. Id.
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1 • \ laW library ORIG'iNAL Te itona 2
3 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF GUAM 4 ) 5 JOSEPH GOKITA MANIBUSAN, Pro Se, ) Special Proceeding Case No. SP 0107-09 ) 6 Petitioner, ) 7 ) DECISION AND ORDER ON PETITION vs. ) FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 8 ) 9 SUPERIOR COURT OF GUAM, ) DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, and ) 10 GUAM PAROLE BOARD ) ) 11 Respondents. ) 12 ----------------------------) 13 INTRODUCTION 14 This matter came before the Honorable Alberto C. Lamorena III, on November 28,2011 15 on Joseph G. Manibusan's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. Petitioner appeared in court 16 acting pro se. Assistant Attorney General Marianne Woloschuck represented the Respondents 17 Department of Corrections and the Guam Parole Board. Having given due consideration to th 18 parties' arguments, the Court now issues its Decision and Order. 19 FACTUAL BACKGROUND 20 On May 19, 1989, Petitioner pleaded guilty to charges of murder and guilt by complicit 21 under title 9, sections l6.40(a)(l), l6.40(b) and 4.60 of the Guam Code in Guam Superior Cou 22 Criminal Case Nos. CF0137-89 and CF0126-89. On August 29, 1991, this Court sentence 23 petitioner to a term of life imprisonment, with parole eligibility after fifteen years. Petitioner wa 24 given credit for time served since 1989. The Judgment stated that Petitioner's sentence woul 25 run concurrent to and simultaneously with Petitioner's federal sentence in Federal District Cou 26 of Guam Case No. 89-00035. Following issuance of the Judgment, Guam Department 0 27 Corrections ("DOC') transferred custody of Petitioner to the Federal Bureau of Prisons an 28 Petitioner served his sentence on the federal charges in federal prison. Following his release fro
-1- ORIGtNAL federal prison, Petitioner returned to Guam and submitted to the custody of DOC. Petitioner i 2 currently confined and continues to serve out his life sentence pursuant to the Judgment issue
3 by this Court. 4 Despite the fact that Petitioner became eligible for parole in 2004, he did not receive hi 5 first parole hearing until May of 2009, at which time Petitioner's request for parole was denied. 6 Petitioner filed the present Petition for Habeas Corpus arguing that the denial of his right to 7 parole hearing for five consecutive years amounts to a due process violation justifying habea 8 relief. Notwithstanding various potential defects in the petition itself, I in addressing the merits 0 9 the petition this Court finds no legal basis on which it may grant habeas relief. 10 DISCUSSION 11
12 A convicted individual has "no constitutional or inherent right ... to be conditionall
13 released before the expiration of a valid sentence," Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Pena
14 Correcitonal Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7, 99 S. Ct. 2100, 60 L.Ed.2d 668 (1979). However, unde
15 certain circumstances a prisoner may be able to show that he has been wrongfully detained and i
16 entitled to habeas relief. Title 8, section 135.38 of the Guam Code establishes the circumstance
17 under which a convicted individual is entitled to habeas relief:
18 § 135.38. When Defendant May be Discharged if Held under Process From Gua 19 Courts. 20 If it appears on the return of the writ that the prisoner is in custody by virtue 0 process form any court of this Territory, or judge or officer thereof, such prisoner may b 21 discharged in any of the following case, subject to the restrictions of 135.36: 22
24 I First, there is some question as to whether Petitioner properly served the petition for writ 0 habeas corpus on the Attorney General as required by Title 8 G.C.A. § 135.14. Second 25 Petitioner states within his petition that he has not exhausted all available administrativ 26 remedies as is typically required before the writ may issue. Finally, the Petitioner fails t properly name the party "by whom he is so confined or restrained" as required by Title 8 G.C.A 27 § 135.12. But see 8 G.C.A. § 135.54 (stating that "[n]o writ of habeas corpus can be disobeye for defect of form, if it sufficiently appear [sic] therefrom in whose custody or under whos 28 restraint the party imprisoned or restrained is, the officer or person detaining him, and the cou before whom he is to be brought.").
-2- (a) When the jurisdiction of such courts or officer has been exceeded; 2
3 (b) When the imprisonment was at first lawful, yet by some act, omission, or event which has taken place afterwards, the party has become 4 entitled to a discharge; 5 (c) When the process is defective in some matter of substance 6 required by law, rendering such process void;
7 (d) When the process, though proper in form, has been issued in a case not allowed by law; 8 (e) When the person having the custody of the prisoner is not the 9 person allowed by law to detain him; 10 (f) Where the process is not authorized by any order, judgment, or 11 decree of any court, nor by any provision of law; 12 (g) Where a party has been committed on criminal charge without 13 reasonable or probable cause.
14 8 G.C.A. § 135.38(a)-(g). Though Petitioner does not explicitly state which of the abov
15 provisions he believes entitles him to relief, this Court fairly presumes that the Petitioner'
16 argument that his due process rights were violated by the Parole Board's five-year delay i
17 holding the initial parole hearing relates to subsection (b). This Court also presumes tha
18 subsection (e) serves as the basis for Petitioner's argument that DOC is not authorized to detai
19 him. Each of these bases is discussed below.
20 I. The Five Year Delay 21 Petitioner argues that the five-year delay between his parole eligibility date and the dat 22 on which he received his hearing violated his constitutional right to due process. Court 23 addressing this very issue have determined that habeas relief is not available to a convicte 24 individual who has been wrongfully denied a parole hearing, either on initial release or upo 25 revocation of parole, unless the petitioner can show he was prejudiced by the delay. See Taisi i 26 v. Marion 1996 Guam 9, ~ 42; Clifton v. Attorney General of State of California, 997 F.2d 66 27 (9th Cir. 1993); Jones v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 903 F.2d 1178,1181 (8th Cir. 1990); Po ner v. 28 U.S. Parole Comm'n, 878 F.2d 275, 276 (9th Cir. 1989); Heath v. U.S. Parole Comm'n, 78
-3- F.2d 85 (2nd Cir. 1986); Sacasas v. Rison, 755 F.2d 1533, 1535 (lIth Cir. 1985); Sutherland v 2 McCall, 709 F.2d 730, 732 (D.C. Cir. 1983); United States ex reI. Pullia v. Luther, 635 F.2d 612 3 616-17 (7th Cir. 1980); Beck v. Wilkes, 589 F.2d 901 (5th Cir. 1979). 4 In Jones v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 903 F.2d 1178, 1181 (8 th Cir. 1990), Jones w 5 incarcerated and serving concurrent state and federal sentences. Jones was eligible for parole i 6 1981 in relating to his federal sentence, but was not granted a parole hearing until 1987. Id. Th 7 Eighth Circuit noted that neither it nor the trial court could correct the mistake by ordering Jones' 8 release: because Jones had not shown any actual prejudice, the most the courts could do was t 9 order the parole board to hold a fair hearing. Id. Thus, because the parole board had grante 10 Jones a hearing, albeit nearly six years too late, the court held that petitioner had received all th 11 relief to which he was entitled. Id. at 1181. In Taisipic v. Marion, 1996 Guam 9 ~ 42, the Gu 12 Supreme Court similarly held that "the appropriate remedy for denial or delay of a parole hearin 13 is an order directing that the hearing be given." 14 In the present case, although Petitioner did not receive his first parole hearing until 200 15 - five years after his date of eligibility - habeas relief is not available in the absence of an 16 actual prejudice to Petitioner. Petitioner offers no proof that the delay adversely influenced hi 17 chances of parole or that he was otherwise prejudiced by the delay. The remedy available t 18 petitioner during the delay was a writ of mandamus by which the court could have compelled 19 meeting of the Parole Board to discuss Petitioner's case. As Petitioner has since received prope 20 hearings, this Court cannot grant any additional relief. 21
22 II. DOC's Custody Over Petitioner 23 In his Reply, Petitioner asserts additional arguments not raised in his Petition for Writ 0 24 Habeas Corpus. Petitioner apparently argues that because DOC did not communicate with th 25 Bureau of Prisons to take immediate custody of Petitioner following his release from federa 26 prison, DOC "waived any argument that [Petitioner] should not be released." (Pet'r's Response 27 1) Petitioner also argues that DOC cannot exercise "local jurisdiction" to confine Petitioner. Thi 28 Court finds no merit in these claims.
-4- ORIGiNAL
This Court issued a valid Judgment relating to Petitioner's violation of Guam law an 2 Petitioner received a sentence of life in prison with the possibility of parole. That Judgmen 3 directed DOC to take custody of Petitioner. DOC did initially take custody of Petitioner an 4 subsequently transferred custody to the Bureau of Prisons. Thereafter, Petitioner served time i 5 federal prison on his related federal sentence. Petitioner's release from federal prison had n 6 effect on the Judgment of this Court and DOC acted properly by taking action to ensure tha 7 Petitioner serves the sentence imposed by this Court. Cf. Hall v. Looney, 256 F.2d 59, 60 (lOt 8 Cir. 1958) (" [A] person ... lawfully in the custody of one sovereign ... remains exclusively i 9 the jurisdiction of that sovereign until its jurisdiction has been exhausted."); Strand v. 10 Schmittroth. 21 F .2d 590, 606 (9th Cir. 1957) ("The sovereign who lacks possession of the bod 11 'permits' another to proceed against the accused .... "). DOC did not, and could not, "waive" it 12 custody of petitioner, which was authorized pursuant to an order by this Court. DOC was, in fact 13 compelled to take custody of Petitioner once DOC determined that Petitioner had completed hi
14 federal sentence. 15
16 CONCLUSION 17 Based on the foregoing, the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is hereby DISMISSE 18 without prejudice. 19
20 It is SO ORDERED, this 13 th day of March, 2012. 21
ORIGtNAL -5-