Manhattan Book Casing Mach. Co. v. E. C. Fuller Co.

274 F. 964, 1912 U.S. App. LEXIS 1127
CourtU.S. Circuit Court for the District of Southern New York
DecidedJanuary 3, 1912
StatusPublished
Cited by12 cases

This text of 274 F. 964 (Manhattan Book Casing Mach. Co. v. E. C. Fuller Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Southern New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Manhattan Book Casing Mach. Co. v. E. C. Fuller Co., 274 F. 964, 1912 U.S. App. LEXIS 1127 (circtsdny 1912).

Opinion

LEARNED HAND, District Judge

(after stating the facts as above). [1] There can be no question that the patent was the first that purported to disclose a machine by which books could be coated with paste and take up the “case,” or cover, in position to be registered and sent [966]*966to the press. As such it might fairly be within the definition of a pioneer patent, and its claims receive the scope in interpretation accorded to such patents, provided it disclosed one way in which this function could in fact be performed. However, even a pioneer patent must be accompanied with a disclosure, which will show the art how the idea stated in the claim may be realized in an operable structure. It is, of course, not enough merely to conceive abstractly of a combination of elements which will together do something new. Invention requires the added element of showing how the idea may be actually incorporated, and without such a disclosure as would enable a skilled artisan to embody the idea it remains sterile, and makes no advance in the art, from which the man conceiving the idea should be entitled to a monopoly. While, therefore, in the case at bar the court ought not to ask for a perfected or finally developed machine, still it is a condition that the patentee must show at least in one practicable form how his idea may be used, else he is at best only an ingenious theorist, and not an inventor at all.

[2] Now, it is here in evidence with no contradiction at all, as I shall show later, that the machine actually disclosed by the patent was inoperable. If the faults were merely in the diagrammatic representations, that would not be a defense, for diagrams or descriptions are not meant for working drawings. Crown Cork & Seal Co. v. Aluminum Stopper Co., 108 Fed. 845, 48 C. C. A . 72. But such drawings must at least show enough for the ordinary skilled mechanic to build the machine, correcting the discrepancies and the difficulties appearing in the drawings, by means of that store of expert information which such men will bring to the task in a bona fide effort to make the machine' work. Some of the difficulties raised by the defendant are of this correctible character, but several are not.

[3] The defendant raises in his brief nine objections to the disclosure, all of which are unanswered by any technical witness. I will take up separately Nos. 1, 4, 6, and 7, which I think to be radical difficulties, going to the very root of the structure.

No. 1: That the pawl and ratchet mechanism is inoperative. This depends upon the fact that the arms k 5 and k 0 cannot rise high enough, nor drop low enough, to make the pawl take more than two teeth on the ratchet, and pull down more than two, so producing less than a quarter circle of revolution. No one shows how this can be remedied. Moreover, the lever, e B, is forced into the notch G of the back of the paste plate by a spring, e 8, without which it would never lock the plate, since its heavier end is on the far side of the pivot, e 4. The temporary release of the plate by the contact of the end, e8, with the cam, e7, will not answer, because on the return movement the spring, e 8, will 'at once cause the lever again to lock the plate as soon as the cam, e7, ceases to contact. That will be before the pawl has begun to pull upon the ratchet, for the cam will lose contact as soon as the L,piece, b s, has descended the length of the slot, b 9, and the large number B must descend still further than that before the arm, k 6, begins to pull down the lever, f i, which operates the pawl, if it could do so at all. Moreover, at that period in the operation of the machine, when the [967]*967pawl could so operate, the plates are already in contact with the book. The experts say they can see no way to remedy this, and no way is suggested.

No. 4: That the machine can never unlock the plates. This is really another form of the objection No. 7. It also depends in part upon the fact that the bent ends of the treadle N cannot operate to raise up the arms, d, d, high enough, because the bent ends strike on the sides of the frame.

No. 6: The slotted connection between b 8 and 0 is; inoperative. This is said to be an unworkable device mechanically; it will jam if one tries to operate it, and it is fundamentally vicious. No one suggests that it could be changed. Obviously there must be a portion of the rise in the book, represented by the slot, b 9, during which the plates so remain in contact with the sheets that a solid piece at that point would not serve. How to remedy this does not appear.

No. 7: The ends, D, D, of the arms, d, d, must enter the paste tank to give the slides d7, their necessary movement. This is obviously true from the diagram. It is answered that the pot might be divided; but, if so, the paste plates could not close on the book. No other suggestion is made as to how this could be remedied.

[4] It must therefore be conceded, and indeed it is not denied, except as I shall show later, that the machine as disclosed was an inoperable mechanism. However, the defendant must go further, and show that it could not be made operable by a skilled mechanic. This it does by the testimony of its two experts, who say that they do not see how it could be made to operate. Now, it was made to operate when the principle was put into the second machine patented by the inventor here, 677,040. This machine was without question an entirely workable machine, and I do not attach any importance to the fact that in the operation of it, as seen by the defendant’s witnesses, the leaves were not properly covered with paste. The testimony of the two mechanics who operated it for a period of over a year satisfies me beyond doubt that it was an entirely operable device, and had it been disclosed in the first patent I should not have hesitated to overrule the defence. When, however, one comes to examine the second machine, one sees that, although the principle of the first, as set forth in claim 6, is undoubtedly there, the disclosure is very radically different.

As these two machines are the only ones, besides the defendant’s, which have ever appeared in which the claim has been embodied, and as the evidence nowhere suggests that there is another way in which it could be embodied and the unworkable features of the first eliminated, I think the question must resolve itself into this: Whether a skilled mechanic could have devised the second machine from what he saw of the first. A judge is entirely unadapted to decide such a question as an original question, and must rely upon the testimony of skilled artisans or of experts in mechanics.

Here the only evidence is that a skilled artisan could not have done so. I cannot accept Gunz’s testimony in rebuttal as raising an issue in this respect. The codefendant’s witnesses at great length pointed out the difficulties, and showed that the machine as disclosed was thorough[968]*968ly unworkable. It was not enough for Gunz to say merely that he disagreed with them in their subsequent conclusion that it could not be made workable. I agree that the burden of proof on the issue is on the defendant; but the defendant had made out a case, and the complainant had the burden of going forward with the proof to show how a skilled artisan could change it over.

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Bluebook (online)
274 F. 964, 1912 U.S. App. LEXIS 1127, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/manhattan-book-casing-mach-co-v-e-c-fuller-co-circtsdny-1912.