Mangosoft v. Oracle

2003 DNH 061

• Court: District Court, D. New Hampshire
• Decided: April 9, 2003
• Docket: CV-02-545-M
• Status: Published

Opinion

Mangosoft v . Oracle CV-02-545-M 04/09/03 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Mangosoft, Inc. and Mangosoft Corporation, Plaintiffs

v. Civil N o . 02-545-M Opinion N o . 2003 DNH 061 Oracle Corporation, Defendants

O R D E R

Mangosoft, Inc. and its wholly owned subsidiary, Mangosoft

Corporation, (collectively “Mangosoft”) have sued Oracle

Corporation (“Oracle”) in two counts, asserting two claims of

patent infringement. Oracle has counterclaimed for a declaratory

judgement that the two patents-in-suit are invalid,

unenforceable, and not infringed. Before the court is Oracle’s

Motion to Transfer Action (document n o . 7 ) to which Mangosoft

objects. For the reasons given below, Oracle’s motion to

transfer is denied.

Both Mangosoft entities are foreign corporations with their

principal place of business in Nashua, New Hampshire. Oracle is

also a foreign corporation. It has a regular and established place of business in New Hampshire, but its principal place of

business is in Redwood Shores, California. Oracle moves to

transfer this case to the Northern District of California, on

grounds that Redwood Shores is the “center of gravity” of the

events giving rise to this action and that Mangosoft has at best

a tenuous connection to New Hampshire. Oracle further argues

that patent infringement actions are particularly appropriate for

transfer to the home district of the alleged infringer, owing to

the concentration of witnesses and documents in the alleged

infringer’s home district as well as the general paucity of such

sources of proof in the home district of the plaintiff.

Mangosoft objects, on grounds that Oracle’s focus on “center of

gravity” distorts the appropriate multi-factor analysis, which

favors litigation in this district. The court agrees.

“[A] district court may transfer any civil action to any

other district or division where it might have been brought,” in

the interests of justice, and if a transfer would prove more

convenient for parties and witnesses. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). But,

“[t]he burden of proof rests with the party seeking transfer;

there is a strong presumption in favor of the plaintiff’s choice

2 of forum.” Coady v . Ashcraft & Gerel, 223 F.3d 1 , 11 (1st Cir.

2000) (citing Gulf Oil Corp. v . Gilbert, 330 U.S. 5 0 1 , 508

(1947)). Finally, whether to transfer an action for convenience

is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court.

Coady, 223 F.3d at 11 (citing Cianbro Corp. v . Curran-Lavoie,

Inc., 814 F.2d 7 , 11 (1st Cir. 1987)).

There is no doubt that Mangosoft could have brought this

suit in the Northern District of California. However, Oracle has

not met its heavy burden to show that a transfer to that district

is warranted.

Transfers are for “the convenience of parties and

witnesses.” 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). While that standard has

remained relatively undeveloped in the First Circuit, other

courts and commentators have clarified i t . When discussing the

doctrine of forum non conveniens, the common law precursor of

§ 1404(a), see Albion v . YMCA Camp Letts, 171 F.3d 1 , 1 (1st Cir.

1999) (citing Pedzewick v . Foe, 963 F. Supp. 4 8 , 50 n.1 (D. Mass.

1997)), the Supreme Court explained that

3 [i]mportant considerations [in deciding whether to transfer a case to another district] are the relative ease of access to sources of proof; availability of compulsory process for attendance of unwilling, and the cost of obtaining attendance of willing, witnesses; possibility of view of premises, if view would be appropriate to the action; and all other practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive.

Gulf Oil, 330 U . S . at 508; see also 17 JAMES W M . MOORE ET A L . , MOORE’S

FEDERAL PRACTICE § 111.13[1] (3d ed. 2000) (listing fourteen

factors that courts should consider when deciding whether to

grant convenience transfer). As the Supreme Court summarized,

“[t]he court will weigh relative advantages and obstacles to fair

trial.” Gulf Oil, 330 U . S . at 508.

Here, there are factors that weigh in favor of each

possible forum. On balance, however, and in light of the weight

that must be accorded to plaintiff’s choice of forum, the court

declines to transfer this case. While there may well be

important witnesses in California, Mangosoft has identified a

number of plausible potential witnesses subject to the subpoena

power of this court. Thus, the factor of witness convenience

does not weigh all that strongly in favor of Oracle.

Furthermore, Oracle is a large company with a substantial

4 presence in New Hampshire. Even if that presence is not directly

related to the design or manufacture of the accused devices, the

fact remains that Oracle’s presence in New Hampshire will make it

easier for Oracle to litigate in New Hampshire than it would be

for Mangosoft to litigate in the Northern District of California,

given Mangosoft’s small size and complete lack of presence in

that district. The interests of justice would not be served by

upsetting Mangosoft’s choice of forum under the circumstances

presented.

Accordingly, Oracle’s Motion to Transfer Action (document

n o . 7 ) is denied.

SO ORDERED.

Steven J. McAuliffe United States District Judge

April 9, 2003

cc: Alexander J. Walker, Esq. Paul J. Hayes, Esq. Martha Van Oot, Esq. Dorian Daley, Esq. Matthew D. Powers, Esq.