Mangiapane v. Ford Motor Company

• Court: District Court, N.D. California
• Decided: October 16, 2019
• Docket: 4:19-cv-02014
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 BETH MANGIAPANE, Case No. 19-cv-02014-HSG

8 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO REMAND 9 v. Re: Dkt. No. 11 10 FORD MOTOR COMPANY, et al., 11 Defendants.

12 13 Pending before the Court is a motion to remand filed by Plaintiff Beth Mangiapane. See 14 Dkt. No. 11. The Court finds this matter appropriate for disposition without oral argument and the 15 matter is deemed submitted. See Civil L.R. 7-1(b). For the reasons discussed below, the Court 16 GRANTS the motion to remand. 17 I. BACKGROUND 18 Plaintiff filed this action in Santa Clara County Superior Court on March 12, 2019. See 19 Dkt. No. 1-1, Ex. A (“Compl.”). Plaintiff alleges that on January 30, 2011, she purchased a 20 vehicle manufactured by Defendant Ford Motor Company (“Ford”) from Defendant Tuttle-Click 21 Ford Lincoln Mercury, Inc. (“Tuttle-Click”), a Ford dealership. Id. at ¶¶ 8–9. The vehicle was 22 covered by an express 3-year/36,000-mile bumper-to-bumper warranty and a 5-year/60,000-mile 23 powertrain warranty from Ford. Id. at ¶ 9. Under the warranty, Ford undertook to maintain the 24 utility and performance of the vehicle or to provide compensation in the event of a failure in utility 25 or performance. Id. Accordingly, Plaintiff could deliver the vehicle to Ford’s representative for 26 repair in the event of a defect. Id. 27 Plaintiff identifies several defects that developed during the warranty period that impaired 1 did not cure these defects, replace the vehicle, or make other restitution, despite having several 2 opportunities to do so. Id. ¶¶ 11, 26. Based on these allegations, Plaintiff asserts several causes of 3 action, including for breach of express and implied warranties under the Song-Beverly Consumer 4 Warranty Act, Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1790 et seq. (“Song-Beverly”). See id. at ¶¶ 8–46. Plaintiff’s 5 only cause of action against Tuttle-Click is Count Five, for breach of the implied warranty of 6 merchantability. See id. ¶¶ 29–33. 7 Defendants removed this action on April 15, 2019, asserting diversity jurisdiction. See 8 Dkt. No. 1. Plaintiff now seeks to remand the action back to state court. See Dkt. No. 11. 9 II. LEGAL STANDARD 10 “Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil action brought in a 11 State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be 12 removed” to federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). District courts have original jurisdiction over 13 civil actions between citizens of different states in which the amount in controversy exceeds 14 $75,000. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). To properly invoke diversity jurisdiction, the defendant 15 bears the burden of proving that the parties in the action are completely diverse, meaning that 16 “each plaintiff [is] of a different citizenship from each defendant.” Grancare, LLC v. Thrower by 17 & through Mills, 889 F.3d 543, 548 (9th Cir. 2018). 18 If the district court lacks jurisdiction over an action, a plaintiff may seek remand to state 19 court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). There is a “strong presumption” in favor of remand, and 20 “[f]ederal jurisdiction must be rejected if there is any doubt as to the right of removal in the first 21 instance.” Guas v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992). Accordingly, “[t]he strong 22 presumption against removal jurisdiction means that the defendant always has the burden of 23 establishing that removal is proper . . . .” Hunter v. Philip Morris USA, 582 F.3d 1039, 1042 (9th 24 Cir. 2009). 25 III. DISCUSSION 26 Here, Defendants’ notice of removal states that there is complete diversity because 27 1 Plaintiff is a citizen of California1 and Ford is a citizen of Michigan and Delaware. See id. at 2 ¶¶ 19, 36. Defendants further assert that the only claim against Tuttle-Click, the non-diverse 3 Defendant, is barred by the statute of limitations. See id. at ¶ 2. As such, Defendants state that 4 Tuttle-Click was fraudulently joined, and its California citizenship should not defeat federal 5 diversity jurisdiction. Id. at ¶ 36. Alternatively, Defendants request that the Court exercise its 6 discretion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 21 to sever Tuttle-Click from this action. See id. 7 at ¶¶ 34–36. The Court addresses each argument in turn. 8 A. Fraudulent Joinder 9 Tuttle-Click, as a corporation organized under the laws of California, would ordinarily 10 defeat federal diversity jurisdiction because Plaintiff is also a citizen of California. See Compl. 11 ¶¶ 2, 5. Although the removing party must establish complete diversity, “[i]n determining whether 12 there is complete diversity, district courts may disregard the citizenship of a non-diverse defendant 13 who has been fraudulently joined.” Grancare, 889 F.3d at 548. The Ninth Circuit has clarified 14 that there are two ways to establish fraudulent joinder: 15 (1) actual fraud in the pleading of jurisdictional facts, or (2) inability 16 of the plaintiff to establish a cause of action against the non-diverse party in state court. 17 18 Id. (quotation omitted). In the absence of actual fraud, therefore, a defendant must “show[] that an 19 individual joined in the action cannot be liable on any theory.” Id. “[I]f there is a possibility that a 20 state court would find that the complaint states a cause of action against any of the resident 21 defendants, the federal court must find that the joinder was proper and remand the case to the state 22 court.” Id. (emphasis added). In other words, joinder is only fraudulent if it is “obvious according 23 to the settled rules of the state that [the plaintiff] has failed to state a claim against [the resident 24 1 The Court is not persuaded by Plaintiff’s attempt to demur as to whether she is a citizen of 25 California. See Dkt. No. 11-1 at 2, n.2. Defendant’s notice of removal alleges that Plaintiff is a citizen of California, see Dkt. No. 1 at ¶ 18, and her complaint states that she “is a resident of 26 Orange County, California,” see Compl. ¶ 2. “[A]bsent evidence about domicile to the contrary,” Plaintiff’s California residence provides a factual basis for Defendants’ allegation that she is a 27 California citizen. See, e.g., Ervin v. Ballard Marine Constr., Inc., No. 16-CV-02931-WHO, 2016 1 defendant].” See Hunter, 582 F.3d at 1046 (quotation omitted). 2 Thus, courts have found fraudulent joinder “where a defendant presents extraordinarily 3 strong evidence or arguments that a plaintiff could not possibly prevail on her claims against the 4 allegedly fraudulently joined defendant,” including where “a plaintiff is barred by the statute of 5 limitations from bringing claims against that defendant.” Grancare, 889 F.3d at 548. However, in 6 contrast, it is not enough to sustain a finding of fraudulent joinder where “a defendant raises a 7 defense that requires a searching inquiry into the merits of the plaintiff’s case, even if that defense, 8 if successful, would prove fatal.” Id. at 548–49 (citing Hunter, 582 F.3d at 1046). 9 Here, Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s sole cause of action against Tuttle-Click for 10 breach of the implied warranty of merchantability is barred by the statute of limitations. See Dkt. 11 No. 1 at 5–8; Dkt. No. 14 at 3–11. Under California law, the applicable statute of limitations is 12 four years from the date the vehicle was delivered. See Cal. Com. Code § 2725(1)–(2); see also 13 Mexia v. Rinker Boat Co., 174 Cal. App. 4th 1297, 1305–06 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009). Because 14 Plaintiff took delivery of the vehicle on or about January 30, 2011, her cause of action for breach 15 of the implied warranty accrued on that date, and the statute of limitations expired on January 30, 16 2015. See Compl. ¶ 8. But Plaintiff did not file this action until March 12, 2019. 17 In response, Plaintiff cites several tolling doctrines—the future performance exception, the 18 repair doctrine, and fraudulent concealment—that she contends apply so as to make her claim 19 against Tuttle-Click viable. See Dkt. No. 11 at 7–11. 20 i. Future Performance 21 Plaintiff first contends that the statute of limitations should not begin to run until the 22 discovery of the breach. See Dkt. No. 11 at 8. In support of this theory, Plaintiff cites to an 23 exception in California Commercial Code § 2725, which states that “where a warranty explicitly 24 extends to future performance of the goods and discovery of the breach must await the time of 25 such performance the cause of action accrues when the breach is or should have been discovered.” 26 See id. (citing Cal. Com. Code § 2725(2)). Plaintiff suggests that because Ford’s express 5- 27 year/60,000-mile powertrain warranty extends to future performance, somehow the implied 1 The California Court of Appeal has emphasized that the future performance exception 2 “must be narrowly construed,” as it “applies only when the seller has expressly agreed to warrant 3 its product for a specific and defined period of time.” See Cardinal Health 301, Inc. v. Tyco Elecs. 4 Corp., 169 Cal. App. 4th 116, 130, 134 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (emphasis added). “Because an 5 implied warranty is one that arises by operation of law rather than by an express agreement of the 6 parties, courts have consistently held it is not a warranty that explicitly extends to future 7 performance of the goods . . . .” Id. at 134 (collecting cases). 8 Plaintiff relies on Krieger v. Nick Alexander Imports, Inc., 234 Cal. App. 3d 205, 211 (Cal. 9 Ct. App. 1991), but Krieger does not hold that the four-year statute of limitations for implied 10 warranties can be tolled for the duration of an express warranty. Id.; accord Covarrubias, 2019 11 WL 2866046 at *3; Philips v. Ford Motor Co., No. 14-CV-02989-LHK, 2016 WL 1745948, at 12 *12–13 (N.D. Cal. May 3, 2016). Because Plaintiff’s cause of action against Tuttle-Click is for 13 breach of an implied warranty, the future performance exception is inapplicable to her claim. 14 ii. Repair Doctrine 15 Next, Plaintiff suggests that the four-year statute of limitations was tolled under the “repair 16 doctrine.” See Dkt. No. 11 at 10–11. California Civil Code § 1795.6 states that: 17 Notwithstanding the date or conditions set for the expiration of the 18 warranty period, such warranty period shall not be deemed expired if . . . the warranty repairs or service performed upon the 19 nonconforming goods did not remedy the nonconformity for which such repairs or service was performed and the buyer notified the 20 manufacturer or seller of this failure within 60 days after the repairs or service was completed. When the warranty repairs or service has 21 been performed so as to remedy the nonconformity, the warranty period shall expire in accordance with its terms, including any 22 extension to the warranty period for warranty repairs or service. 23 24 Cal. Civ. Code § 1795.6(b). However, as the plain language of the provision makes clear, Section 25 1795.6 addresses extending the “warranty period,” not tolling the statute of limitations, during the 26 time of repair. Id.; cf. Judicial Council of California Civil Jury Instructions Nos. 3212, 3231. 27 The one-year implied warranty duration can be lengthened by the number of days that the vehicle 1 implied warranty under the repair doctrine would concomitantly extend the statute of limitations, 2 Plaintiff did not file this action until eight years after she purchased the vehicle, see Compl. ¶ 8, 3 and seven years after the implied warranty ordinarily would have expired. Thus, for the repair 4 doctrine to somehow preserve Plaintiff’s implied warranty claim, the vehicle would have had to be 5 under repair for seven of the eight years that Plaintiff owned the vehicle. The Court finds it 6 entirely implausible that Plaintiff could toll the statute of limitations under the repair doctrine. 7 iii. Fraudulent Concealment 8 Lastly, Plaintiff contends that Defendants’ fraudulent concealment tolls her implied 9 warranty claim against Tuttle-Click. See Dkt. No. 11 at 8, 11. The California Supreme Court has 10 explained that “[t]he doctrine of fraudulent concealment tolls the statute of limitations where a 11 defendant, through deceptive conduct, has caused a claim to grow stale.” Aryeh v. Canon Bus. 12 Sols., Inc., 55 Cal. 4th 1185, 1192 (Cal. 2013). The underlying purpose of the doctrine is “that the 13 defendant, having by fraud or deceit concealed material facts and by misrepresentations hindered 14 the plaintiff from bringing an action within the statutory period, is estopped from taking advantage 15 of his own wrong.” Inv’rs Equity Life Holding Co. v. Schmidt, 195 Cal. App. 4th 1519, 1532 16 (2011), as modified (Cal. Ct. App. June 15, 2011); Regents of Univ. of California v. Superior 17 Court, 20 Cal. 4th 509, 533 (Cal. 1999) (“In articulating the doctrine, the courts have had as their 18 purpose to disarm a defendant who, by his own deception, has caused a claim to become stale and 19 a plaintiff dilatory.”). 20 As an initial matter, the Court notes that Plaintiff’s complaint and motion to remand suffer 21 from significant drafting errors, including intermittently referring to “Defendants,” plural, and 22 “Defendant,” singular. See, e.g., Compl. ¶ 33 (“Plaintiff has been damaged by Defendant’s failure 23 to comply with its obligations under the implied warranty” (emphasis added)); Dkt. No. 11-1 at 11 24 (“Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that Defendant failed to disclose and actively concealed 25 material facts from Plaintiff” (emphasis added)). Nevertheless, Plaintiff alleges in the complaint 26 that “Ford was well aware and knew that the Sync system installed on the subject vehicle was 27 defective but failed to disclose this fact to Plaintiff at the time of sale and thereafter,” and that 1 Plaintiff further explains that Ford acquired this knowledge, at least in part, through “Ford’s 2 network of dealers.” See id. at ¶ 39. Although such inartfully pleaded allegations may well fail to 3 survive a motion to dismiss, the standard for demonstrating fraudulent joinder is a high one. The 4 Court thus cannot conclude that it would be impossible for Plaintiff to allege fraudulent 5 concealment tolling sufficient to state a claim against Tuttle-Click were she given leave to amend. 6 See Grancare, 889 F.3d at 548; see also Heslop v. Ford Motor Co., No. 19-CV-01422-LHK, 2019 7 WL 3026954, at *3 (N.D. Cal. July 11, 2019) (finding that “it is not impossible for Plaintiffs to 8 state a viable implied warranty claim against [the dealership]” because “fraudulent concealment 9 tolling applies to claims brought under the Song-Beverly Act”); Cavale v. Ford Motor Co., No. 10 118CV00680LJOBAM, 2018 WL 3811727, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 2018) (same). The Court 11 therefore finds that Defendants have not met the high bar of establishing that Tuttle-Click was 12 fraudulently joined. See Hunter, 582 F.3d at 1042 (“The strong presumption against removal 13 jurisdiction means that the defendant always has the burden of establishing that removal is 14 proper . . . .”). 15 B. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 21 16 Alternatively, Defendants request that the Court sever Tuttle-Click from the action under 17 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 21. See Dkt. No. 14 at 10–11. Rule 21 provides that a court may 18 sua sponte “at any time, on just terms, add or drop a party.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 21; Sams v. Beech 19 Aircraft, 625 F.2d 273, 277 (9th Cir. 1980) (holding that Rule 21 “grants a federal district or 20 appellate court the discretionary power to perfect its diversity jurisdiction by dropping a 21 nondiverse party provided the nondiverse party is not indispensable to the action under Rule 19”). 22 However, the Court declines to exercise its discretion to sever Tuttle-Click as it would run counter 23 to judicial efficiency, and it would create an end-run around the Ninth Circuit’s admonition that 24 “[f]ederal jurisdiction must be rejected if there is any doubt as to the right of removal in the first 25 instance.” Guas, 980 F.2d at 566. Plaintiff’s claims against both Ford and Tuttle-Click involve 26 the same vehicle and the same alleged defects, and Plaintiff brings its implied warranty of 27 merchantability claim against both Defendants. See Compl. at ¶¶ 29–33. 1 IV. CONCLUSION 2 Accordingly, the Court GRANTS the motion to remand and REMANDS the case to Santa 3 || Clara County Superior Court. The clerk is directed to close the case. 4 IT ISSO ORDERED. 5 || Dated: 10/16/2019 ° aon S. GILLIAM, JR. / 2 7 United States District Judge 8 9 10 11 a 12

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