Mallgren v. United States

• Court: District Court, District of Columbia
• Decided: June 1, 2026
• Docket: Civil Action No. 2026-1125
• Status: Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

ANTHONY BRIAN MALLGREN, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Civil Action No. 1:26-cv-01125 (UNA) ) ) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) ) Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, has filed a Complaint (“Compl.”), ECF No. 1, and an

Application for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), ECF No. 2. The Court grants

Plaintiff’s IFP Application, and for the reasons discussed below, it dismisses this matter without

prejudice.

Plaintiff, a resident of New York, sues the United States. See Compl. at 1. The Complaint

is vague and sparse. Plaintiff alleges only that the “United States Patent and Trademark Office

have reported that they are unable to find a patent application that was filed in or around 2007.”

Id. at 1. No other supporting facts or context is provided. Plaintiff demands “[s]pecific

performance in the government implementing a public blockchain system that provides more

integrity in the patenting process.” See id. at 2.

First, pro se litigants must comply with the Federal and Local Rules of Civil Procedure.

See Jarrell v. Tisch, 656 F. Supp. 237, 239–40 (D.D.C. 1987). Federal Rule 8(a) requires a

complaint to contain “(1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction

[and] (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a); see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678–79 (2009); Ciralsky v. CIA, 355 F.3d 661, 668-71 (D.C. Cir. 2004). The Rule 8 standard ensures that respondents receive fair notice of

the claim being asserted so that they can prepare a responsive answer and an adequate defense and

determine whether the doctrine of res judicata applies. Brown v. Califano, 75 F.R.D. 497, 498

(D.D.C. 1977). Here, Plaintiff’s bare and ambiguous allegations fall well short of providing

sufficient notice of any claim.

Second, Plaintiff does not cite to any authority to establish this Court’s subject matter

jurisdiction, nor is it clear what legal obligation, if any, the United States bears with regarding to

his claims. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). Moreover, this Court is without jurisdiction to, as

requested by plaintiff, see Compl. at 13–14, direct Defendant to take specific actions. “It is one

thing to seek to compel an agency to respond to an administrative complaint within a reasonable

time. It is entirely another to seek to control what that response says.” SAI v. Homeland Security,

149 F. Supp. 3d 99, 109 (D.D.C. 2015). Put differently, “[u]nder Section 706(1) of the APA

[Administrative Procedure Act], a court may at times compel an agency ‘to take a discrete agency

action that is it is required to take,’ but may not direct ‘how it shall act.’” Id. (quoting Norton v. S.

Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55, 64 (2004) (emphases in original) (internal quotation marks

omitted)). Simply put, Plaintiff has failed to establish that Defendant is statutorily required to take

any action, and the Court is without authority to award him the relief he demands.

Accordingly, the Court dismisses the Complaint, and this matter, without prejudice. An

Order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion is issued separately.

DATE: June 1, 2026 /s/ CHRISTOPHER R. COOPER United States District Judge