OPINION
COMPTON, Justice.
The principal issue presented in this appeal is whether and to what extent court ordered child support may be waived by the child’s custodian. The trial court concluded that despite a specific, intended waiver by the child’s custodian of the child support obligation, the waiver was inoperative as a matter of law.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
George Malekos (George) and Chloe Ann Yin (Chloe) were married in 1963. They lived together for only a brief period. On February 2, 1964, their son Richard Todd Malekos was born. George obtained a decree of divorce from Chloe at Reno, Nevada, on December 15,1964. The decree required George to pay Chloe the sum of $60.00 per month for the support of Richard.
George visited Chloe when she was still in the hospital with Richard. At that time, as well as on several other occasions, Chloe told George she wanted nothing to do with him and that she did not want support from him. In addition, Chloe had contact with members of George’s family on numerous occasions, and at no time did she express any interest in obtaining child support from George. George visited his child on only a few occasions in the years preceding this litigation.
George did not make the payments as ordered by the Nevada decree. Eventually he moved to Alaska, and at the time of trial he had lived in Alaska approximately thirteen years.
Richard apparently spent most of his first ten years with Chloe’s parents. There is no evidence that Chloe provided financial support for Richard during this period.
On September 15,1977, Chloe filed in the Superior Court for Santa Clara County, California, a complaint for support under the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act. Chloe sought monthly support in the amount of $150.00 and arrearages in the amount of $8,620.00 under the Nevada decree. The action was transferred to a superior court in Alaska on October 1, 1977.
George was served with process in the state. The case came on for trial in October 1980, at which time George raised the defenses of waiver, laches, estoppel and statute of limitations.
The superior court determined that Chloe’s statements and her course of conduct constituted a waiver of George’s decre-tory obligation to make child support payments. The court ruled, however, that a custodial parent’s waiver of support is inoperative as a matter of law. The court therefore held that George was obligated to pay all arrearages not barred by the appli[730]*730cable statute of limitations.1 The court did not award prejudgment interest on the amounts due.
Both parties appeal. George submits that the superior court improperly determined that a waiver of decretory child support is invalid as a matter of law. Chloe submits that the court improperly denied an award of prejudgment interest on any ar-rearages owed.
II. WAIVER OF DECRETORY CHILD SUPPORT
The principal issue presented on appeal is whether to give effect to a custodial parent’s waiver of decretory child support payments from the noncustodial parent. The custodial parent argues that to give effect to such a waiver is contrary to statutory and public policy concerns. The noncustodial parent, on the other hand, asserts that the waiver should permanently extinguish the support obligation. We conclude that a waiver freely executed by the custodial parent can be asserted by the noncustodial parent to bar recovery of child support arrearages, absent a finding that such a result would be deleterious to the child. However, the custodial parent may retract such a waiver at any time, and once withdrawn, the support obligation is renewed, subject to the court’s continuing authority to modify the support obligation in the light of changed circumstances.
A.
Whether a custodial parent who has waived decretory child support from a noncustodial parent may nonetheless recover support arrearages is a question of first impression in Alaska. Other courts that have addressed this issue have reached divergent views. See generally Annot., 5 A.L.R.4th 1015 (1981) (“Laches or Acquiescence as Defense, so as to Bar Recovery of Arrearages or Permanent Alimony or Child Support”); 100 A.L.R.3d 1129 (1980) (“Validity and Effect, as Between Former Spouses, of Agreement Releasing Parent from Payment of Child Support Provided for in an Earlier Divorce Decree”). The apparent majority rule is that a waiver precludes a custodial spouse from recovering support arrearages, providing that the result is not deleterious to the child. E.g., Kaminski v. Kaminski, 8 Cal.App.3d 563, 87 Cal.Rptr. 453 (1970); Anthony v. Anthony, 204 N.W.2d 829 (Iowa 1973); Wardle v. Wardle, 464 P.2d 854 (Wyo.1970). Courts adopting this view oftentimes focus on whether there was “consideration” for the waiver, or whether the noncustodial parent detrimentally relied upon the purported waiver. Other courts, however, refuse to give effect to a custodial parent’s waiver, arguing that child support payments are received by the custodial parent for the benefit of the child, and that as a consequence, the custodial parent has no authority to waive the child’s entitlement to future support from the noncustodial parent. E.g., Napoleon v. Napoleon, 59 Haw. 619, 585 P.2d 1270 (1978); Ditmar v. Ditmar, 48 Wash.2d 373, 293 P.2d 759 (1956).
We adopt the rule that a custodial parent may waive child support payments established by a prior decree, and that such a waiver precludes the recovery of arrearages absent a finding of detriment to the child.2 Parents bear both a statutory and moral obligation to support their child until emancipation or majority. AS 25.20.030. See Young v. Williams, 583 P.2d 201, 204 (Alaska 1978). This obligation is not extinguished by divorce. Viewed in this light, child support obligations imposed by a divorce decree allocate the burden of the parents’ joint responsibility to provide their child with adequate support. While parents may not by waiver or otherwise eviscerate their child’s right to adequate parental sup[731]*731port, we see no compelling policy considerations to refuse to enforce a custodial parent’s waiver of child support from a noncustodial parent, providing that such agreements are executed without fraud or duress, and providing that enforcement is not deleterious to the child.
Chloe offers several countervailing arguments. She first argues that allowing a custodial parent’s waiver of decretory child support to bar the recovery of arrear-ages contravenes AS 47.23.0603 or, absent a statutory prohibition, public policy. The premise underlying either argument is that child support payments established by decree are for the benefit of the child, and that the custodial parent, who receives such payments as a trustee for the child, has no authority to waive the child’s right to future support from the noncustodial parent.
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OPINION
COMPTON, Justice.
The principal issue presented in this appeal is whether and to what extent court ordered child support may be waived by the child’s custodian. The trial court concluded that despite a specific, intended waiver by the child’s custodian of the child support obligation, the waiver was inoperative as a matter of law.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
George Malekos (George) and Chloe Ann Yin (Chloe) were married in 1963. They lived together for only a brief period. On February 2, 1964, their son Richard Todd Malekos was born. George obtained a decree of divorce from Chloe at Reno, Nevada, on December 15,1964. The decree required George to pay Chloe the sum of $60.00 per month for the support of Richard.
George visited Chloe when she was still in the hospital with Richard. At that time, as well as on several other occasions, Chloe told George she wanted nothing to do with him and that she did not want support from him. In addition, Chloe had contact with members of George’s family on numerous occasions, and at no time did she express any interest in obtaining child support from George. George visited his child on only a few occasions in the years preceding this litigation.
George did not make the payments as ordered by the Nevada decree. Eventually he moved to Alaska, and at the time of trial he had lived in Alaska approximately thirteen years.
Richard apparently spent most of his first ten years with Chloe’s parents. There is no evidence that Chloe provided financial support for Richard during this period.
On September 15,1977, Chloe filed in the Superior Court for Santa Clara County, California, a complaint for support under the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act. Chloe sought monthly support in the amount of $150.00 and arrearages in the amount of $8,620.00 under the Nevada decree. The action was transferred to a superior court in Alaska on October 1, 1977.
George was served with process in the state. The case came on for trial in October 1980, at which time George raised the defenses of waiver, laches, estoppel and statute of limitations.
The superior court determined that Chloe’s statements and her course of conduct constituted a waiver of George’s decre-tory obligation to make child support payments. The court ruled, however, that a custodial parent’s waiver of support is inoperative as a matter of law. The court therefore held that George was obligated to pay all arrearages not barred by the appli[730]*730cable statute of limitations.1 The court did not award prejudgment interest on the amounts due.
Both parties appeal. George submits that the superior court improperly determined that a waiver of decretory child support is invalid as a matter of law. Chloe submits that the court improperly denied an award of prejudgment interest on any ar-rearages owed.
II. WAIVER OF DECRETORY CHILD SUPPORT
The principal issue presented on appeal is whether to give effect to a custodial parent’s waiver of decretory child support payments from the noncustodial parent. The custodial parent argues that to give effect to such a waiver is contrary to statutory and public policy concerns. The noncustodial parent, on the other hand, asserts that the waiver should permanently extinguish the support obligation. We conclude that a waiver freely executed by the custodial parent can be asserted by the noncustodial parent to bar recovery of child support arrearages, absent a finding that such a result would be deleterious to the child. However, the custodial parent may retract such a waiver at any time, and once withdrawn, the support obligation is renewed, subject to the court’s continuing authority to modify the support obligation in the light of changed circumstances.
A.
Whether a custodial parent who has waived decretory child support from a noncustodial parent may nonetheless recover support arrearages is a question of first impression in Alaska. Other courts that have addressed this issue have reached divergent views. See generally Annot., 5 A.L.R.4th 1015 (1981) (“Laches or Acquiescence as Defense, so as to Bar Recovery of Arrearages or Permanent Alimony or Child Support”); 100 A.L.R.3d 1129 (1980) (“Validity and Effect, as Between Former Spouses, of Agreement Releasing Parent from Payment of Child Support Provided for in an Earlier Divorce Decree”). The apparent majority rule is that a waiver precludes a custodial spouse from recovering support arrearages, providing that the result is not deleterious to the child. E.g., Kaminski v. Kaminski, 8 Cal.App.3d 563, 87 Cal.Rptr. 453 (1970); Anthony v. Anthony, 204 N.W.2d 829 (Iowa 1973); Wardle v. Wardle, 464 P.2d 854 (Wyo.1970). Courts adopting this view oftentimes focus on whether there was “consideration” for the waiver, or whether the noncustodial parent detrimentally relied upon the purported waiver. Other courts, however, refuse to give effect to a custodial parent’s waiver, arguing that child support payments are received by the custodial parent for the benefit of the child, and that as a consequence, the custodial parent has no authority to waive the child’s entitlement to future support from the noncustodial parent. E.g., Napoleon v. Napoleon, 59 Haw. 619, 585 P.2d 1270 (1978); Ditmar v. Ditmar, 48 Wash.2d 373, 293 P.2d 759 (1956).
We adopt the rule that a custodial parent may waive child support payments established by a prior decree, and that such a waiver precludes the recovery of arrearages absent a finding of detriment to the child.2 Parents bear both a statutory and moral obligation to support their child until emancipation or majority. AS 25.20.030. See Young v. Williams, 583 P.2d 201, 204 (Alaska 1978). This obligation is not extinguished by divorce. Viewed in this light, child support obligations imposed by a divorce decree allocate the burden of the parents’ joint responsibility to provide their child with adequate support. While parents may not by waiver or otherwise eviscerate their child’s right to adequate parental sup[731]*731port, we see no compelling policy considerations to refuse to enforce a custodial parent’s waiver of child support from a noncustodial parent, providing that such agreements are executed without fraud or duress, and providing that enforcement is not deleterious to the child.
Chloe offers several countervailing arguments. She first argues that allowing a custodial parent’s waiver of decretory child support to bar the recovery of arrear-ages contravenes AS 47.23.0603 or, absent a statutory prohibition, public policy. The premise underlying either argument is that child support payments established by decree are for the benefit of the child, and that the custodial parent, who receives such payments as a trustee for the child, has no authority to waive the child’s right to future support from the noncustodial parent. The conclusory distinction drawn between whether the custodial parent or the child “possesses” the right to receive support from the noncustodial parent interjects an unduly formalistic characterization of familial relationships that finds no support in either statute or public policy. The statutory argument advanced by Chloe relies upon the following portion of AS 47.23.060(a): “An order of support establishes a relationship by which the custodian of the child is the administrator for the purposes of administering child support on behalf of the child.” Read in proper context, we think it plain that the legislature did not intend by enacting AS 47.23.060 to impose on a custodial parent receiving child support the fiduciary responsibilities and attendant legal liabilities of a trustee whose expenditures of such payments would thus be subject to extensive judicial scrutiny. Nor is such a result counseled by sound public policy considerations. Our concern is to assure that children receive from their parents adequate care and maintenance. A child’s right to adequate parental support cannot be impaired by the custodial parent’s waiver of decretory support. However, how parents choose to discharge their parental responsibilities is a matter particularly ill-suited for judicial supervision. As we stated in Young v. Williams, “the manner in which child support payments are used to meet the children’s basic needs is left to the discretion of the parent or guardian with custody.” 583 P.2d at 203 (footnote omitted). Without a more explicit source of authority or a more compelling public policy basis, we decline to hold that a custodial parent has no authority to waive decretory child support payments.
Chloe also argues that enforcing a waiver to bar the recovery of arrearages is necessarily deleterious to the child. We disagree. A custodial parent’s waiver of decretory child support shifts that portion of the financial onus borne by the noncustodial parent to the custodial parent or to another private source. Chloe suggests that the practical consequence of such a reallocation of the burden of support is to diminish the monies available for the benefit of the child. Whether or not we share this view of practical realities is irrelevant, however, because we reject the concomitant notion that the quality of a child’s home environment is directly linked to the extent of the financial resources available to provide support. A more troublesome concern is that a custodial parent’s waiver of support may be tied to the noncustodial parent’s relinquishment of visitation privileges. As an abstract proposition, questions of support and visitation are best viewed as separate considerations. See AS 47.23.080(c).4 We are [732]*732not blind, however, to the fact that parties embroiled in the difficult emotional turmoil of a divorce may view support and visitation as related concerns. Without placing our judicial imprimatur on agreements that link the two, we conclude that agreements between parents concerning the proper rearing and maintenance of their child are entitled to judicial respect and enforcement absent any evidence of detriment to the child. Families must be accorded sufficient latitude to arrange their own relationships in a manner that in their view best accommodates their divergent needs.
We also reject Chloe’s argument that a waiver of decretory support payments is ineffective if executed without judicial scrutiny. Contemporaneous judicial scrutiny is not needed, in our view, for a court to assess whether a waiver precludes recovery of support arrearages. When waiver is asserted as a defense to a petition to recover arrearages, courts must determine that the waiver was not tainted by fraud or duress, and that the waiver was not deleterious to the child. The question, indeed, is not whether judicial scrutiny is a prerequisite to enforcement, but whether a court abdicates its responsibility to the parties and to the child by exercising such scrutiny at a later point in time.
The last issue with respect to the effect of a waiver is whether such a waiver is ineffective if not supported by consideration. When the waiver at issue concerns the obligation to pay future support payments, as in the present case, we share Professor Clark’s observation that “the insistence upon observance of contract principles ... seems unnecessary and undesirable.” H. Clark, The Law of Domestic Relations in the United States § 15.3, at 512 (1968). Indeed, support obligations are by statute susceptible to judicial modification, and, therefore, consideration can always be inferred by the noncustodial parent’s failure to pursue the opportunity to obtain judicial modification of the support obligation.
B.
We hold that a waiver of decretory support may be asserted to bar the recovery of arrearages without any formalities such as consideration or contemporaneous judicial scrutiny. We further hold that the custodial parent may retract the waiver at any time by initiating proceedings to enforce the support obligation. Once the waiver is withdrawn, the support obligation set forth in the decree is renewed. Of course, the noncustodial parent may petition the court to modify the support obligation upon a showing of changed circumstances. See Headlough v. Headlough, 639 P.2d 1010, 1013 (Alaska 1982); Curley v. Curley, 588 P.2d 289, 291 (Alaska 1979).
Our holding that the parties may freely rescind an informal agreement with respect to the child support obligation imposed by a decree is consonant with the court’s continuing authority to modify the support obligation. AS 09.55.205 provides that a court may modify a divorce decree as it relates to the child support obligation “at any time ... during the minority of any child of the marriage.” An agreement between the parties cannot limit or abridge the court’s continuing authority to modify a divorce decree to safeguard the best interests of the child. Deivert v. Oseira, 628 P.2d 575, 579 (Alaska 1981).5
We conclude that George’s claim, that a custodial parent’s waiver of decretory support permanently precludes the renewal of the support obligation, has no merit. We note in this regard that the superior court should carefully consider the effect of the waiver on the various parties in assessing the extent of the noncustodial parent’s support obligation once a prior waiver is withdrawn, subject of course to the proviso that the best interests of the child is the court’s paramount concern.
[733]*733C.
The superior court’s finding that Chloe waived child support for the period preceeding October 1977, the date when this action was filed in Alaska, is amply supported by the evidence. The only evidence that the waiver was deleterious to the child was hearsay statements that for several years Chloe’s parents assisted in the raising of the child, allegedly because Chloe did not have sufficient funds to raise the child by herself. In the context of the present case, we conclude that such evidence is insufficient to establish that the waiver was deleterious to the child. Accordingly, we hold that the waiver bars recovery of all arrear-ages which accrued before October 1977.
The superior court ordered George to pay arrearages for the period between when the waiver was withdrawn and when the superior court order was entered, October 1977 through November 1980. In addition, the court ordered George to continue to pay support in the amount of $60.00 per month until the child reaches eighteen. While this award may well be proper, we believe that the superior court’s determination of George’s child support obligation after the waiver was withdrawn may have been prejudiced by the erroneous view that a custodian’s waiver of decretory child support is inoperative as a matter of law. We therefore think it advisable to allow the superior court an opportunity to reconsider these aspects of its decision. We add that if the superior court affirms its decision that George pay child support during the period after the waiver was withdrawn, prejudgment interest should be awarded on such arrearages.6
REVERSED and REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
RABINOWITZ, J., dissenting, joined by MATTHEWS, J.
CONNOR, J., not participating on rehearing.