Majak v. Starbucks Corporation

• Court: District Court, D. Arizona
• Decided: June 3, 2025
• Docket: 2:25-cv-01850
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 Abuk Majak, No. CV-25-01850-PHX-JAT

10 Plaintiff, ORDER

11 v.

12 Starbucks Corporation,

13 Defendant. 14 15 Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). 16 (Doc. 2). The Court will consider whether Plaintiff should be allowed to proceed in forma 17 pauperis. 18 I. Legal Standards 19 A. Ability to Pay 20 “There is no formula set forth by statute, regulation, or case law to determine when 21 someone is poor enough to earn IFP status.” Escobedo v. Applebees, 787 F.3d 1226, 1235 22 (9th Cir. 2015). “An affidavit in support of an IFP application is sufficient where it alleges 23 that the affiant cannot pay the court costs and still afford the necessities of life.” Id. at 1234 24 (citing Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 339 (1948)). 25 B. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)

26 Congress provided with respect to in forma pauperis cases that a district court “shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines” that 27 the “allegation of poverty is untrue” or that the “action or appeal” is “frivolous or malicious,” “fails to state a claim on which relief may be 28 granted,” or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). While much of section 1915 outlines 1 how prisoners can file proceedings in forma pauperis, section 1915(e) applies to all in forma pauperis proceedings, not just those filed by prisoners. Lopez 2 v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (“section 1915(e) applies to all in forma pauperis complaints”). “It is also clear that section 1915(e) not only 3 permits but requires a district court to dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint that fails to state a claim.” Id. Therefore, this court must dismiss an in forma 4 pauperis complaint if it fails to state a claim or if it is frivolous or malicious. 5 Kennedy v. Andrews, 2005 WL 3358205, *2 (D. Ariz. 2005). 6 “The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the 7 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012); see also 8 Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting that screening pursuant to § 1915A “incorporates the familiar standard applied in 9 the context of failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”). 10 11 Hairston v. Juarez, No. 22-CV-01801-BAS-WVG, 2023 WL 2468967, at *2 (S.D. Cal. 12 Mar. 10, 2023). 13 I. Screening 14 A. Ability to Pay 15 The Court has reviewed Plaintiff’s financial information (Doc. 2) and finds that he 16 does not have the ability to pay the filing fee and still afford life’s necessities. Accordingly, 17 the motion will be granted. 18 Also, the Court will direct the Clerk of the Court to seal exhibit 2-1 because it 19 includes personally identifiable information of Plaintiff. Plaintiff is advised that going 20 forward, for his own benefit, he should redact any personally identifiable information 21 consistent with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5.2. 22 B. Screening 23 Plaintiff is suing a former employer. (Doc. 1). Plaintiff brings four causes of action: 24 1) racial discrimination under Title VII (Doc. 1 at 7-8); 2) retaliation under Title VII (Doc. 25 1 at 8); 3) retaliation under the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”) (Doc. 1 at 8-9); 26 and 4) an alleged violation of the Family Medical Leave Act (Doc. 1 at 9-10). Having 27 reviewed the complaint, and accepting all allegations therein and reasonable inferences 28 drawn therefrom as true, the Court finds Plaintiff states a claim in Counts 1, 2 and 4. 1 Accordingly, the complaint may be served. 2 As to Count 3, the “NLRB’s jurisdiction is in general exclusive[, and] if a claim 3 falls within [its] purview, state and federal courts are preempted from hearing it.” Dist. No. 4 1, Pac. Coast Dist., Marine Engineers’ Beneficial Ass’n, AFL–CIO v. Liberty Maritime 5 Corp., 815 F.3d 834, 839 (D.C. Cir. 2016); Lance v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 6 3d 147, 159 (D.D.C. 2017) (dismissing a constructive discharge claim under 29 U.S.C. § 7 158(a)(3) for lack of jurisdiction). Similarly, under San Diego Bldg. Trades Council, 8 Millmen’s Union, Local 2020 v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959), known as the Garmon 9 doctrine, “both state and federal courts generally lack original jurisdiction to determine 10 disputes involving conduct actually or arguably prohibited or protected by the [National 11 Labor Relations Act].” United Ass’n of Journeymen & Apprentices of the Plumbing & Pipe 12 Fitting Indus., Local No. 57 v. Bechtel Power Corp., 834 F.2d 884, 886 (10th Cir. 1987). 13 For example, “Claims for retaliation due to protected union activity … constitute violations 14 of the NLRA, and the Garmon doctrine applies to vest exclusive jurisdiction with the 15 NLRB.” Elliott v. Tulsa Cement, LLC, 357 F. Supp. 3d 1141, 1153 (N.D. Okla. 2019). 16 Based on the record before the Court via the allegations in the complaint, it appears 17 that Plaintiff’s claim for a violation of the NLRA would fall within the exclusive 18 jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board. Plaintiff makes no legal argument for 19 an exception to this general rule. Accordingly, Count 3 will be dismissed, without 20 prejudice. 21 III. Conclusion 22 Based on the foregoing, 23 IT IS ORDERED that the motion to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. 2) is granted. 24 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Count 3 is dismissed, without prejudice. 25 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff must serve the summons, complaint 26 and a copy of this Order on Defendant within the time set by Federal Rule of Civil 27 Procedure 4(m). Plaintiff may either serve the complaint through his own means, or file a 28 motion asking for service by the U.S. Marshals. Any motion for Marshal service must be filed within 14 days of the date of this Order. 2 IT IS FINALLY ORDERED that exhibit 2-1 shall be sealed by the Clerk of the 3 || Court for the reasons stated above. 4 Dated this 3rd day of June, 2025. 5 6 '

g James A. C rg Senior United States District Judge 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

-4-