STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT YORK, SS. CIVIL ACTION DOCKET NO. RE-1~l1~
PATRICK MAIN, ) ufJN -'fOP-. .. ,LJ;5fD!~ ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) ORDER ) CHRISTINE MAIN, ) ) Defendant. )
I. Background
Plaintiff Patrick Main and Defendant Christine Main are parents to Brian George
Main, age16, and Nicole Ann Main, age 14. Mter litigation in 2011-2012, the Springvale
District Court ordered Defendant to pay child support in the amount of $14 7.50 and
arrearages in the amount of $5,179.27. Plaintiff has brought this action for fraud alleging
that Defendant overstated her weekly health insurance expense for the minor children in
her child support affidavit dated September 28, 2007. Furthermore, Plaintiff has brought
a claim for defamation alleging that Defendant has called him a "deadbeat dad" to others,
and caused others to repeat the moniker. The District Court retains jurisdiction of child
support determinations and review thereof. This Court reviews only Plaintiffs claims of
fraud and defamation.
II. Standard ofReview
When a defendant moves for summary judgment, "the plaintiff must establish a
prima facie case for each element of [the] cause of action that is properly challenged in
1 the defendant's motion." Flaherty v. Muther, 2011 ME 32, ~ 38, 171 A.3d 640. The
burden then shifts to the defendant to show that there is no genuine issue of material fact.
Summary judgment is appropriate where no genuine issue of material fact exists and the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Beal v. Allstate Ins. Co., 989 A.
2d 733,738 (Me. 2010); Dyerv. Department ofTransportation, 951 A.2d 821,825 (Me.
2008). When reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the court reviews the parties'
statements of material facts and the cited record evidence in the light most favorable to
the non-moving party. Id.
A genuine issue of material fact exists where the fact finder must make a
determination between differing versions of the truth. Reliance National Indemnity v.
Knowles Industrial Services Corp., 2005 Iv1E 29, ~7, 868 A.2d 220; citing Univ. of Me.
Found. V. Fleet Bank of Me., 2003 I\1E 20, ~20, 817 A.2d 871. Furthermore, "a fact is
material if it could potentially affect the outcome of the case." Id.
ill. Discussion
A. Res Judicata
Plaintiff claims that Defendant committed fraud when she submitted a child
support affidavit to the District Court at the December 13, 2007 child support hearing
stating that her weekly healthcare expense for the minor children was $90.50. Defendant
argues that Plaintiff's cause of action should be barred by the doctrine of res judicata.
"Under the doctrine of res judicata, a party and its privies are barred from relitigating
claims or issues that have already been decided." Godsoe v. Godsoe, 2010 ME 42, ~ 15,
995 A.2d 232; citing Portland Co. v. City of Portland, 2009 ME 98, ~ 22, 979 A.2d 1279.
2 In the litigation in 2011-2012, Plaintiff raised the claim of fraud concerning the health
insurance costs Defendant claimed on behalf of the minor children. Defendant had the
full and fair opportunity and incentive to litigate the issue before the District Court. 1
Plaintiff agreed to the stipulation that he owed back child support of $5,179 .26, an
amount that included the health insurance costs. Plaintiffs stipulated back child support
became part of a final judgment. This issue has already been litigated and determined.
Plaintiffs claim of fraud is therefore barred by the doctrine of res judicata.
B. Defamation
Plaintiff has brought a claim of defamation against Defendant for calling him a
"deadbeat dad" and similar terms, and for causing her friends to repeat these phrases. "To
prove defamation, a plaintiff must establish that a false statement published to a third
party harmed the plaintiffs reputation so as to lower her [or him] in the community's
estimation." Cookson v. Brewer Sch. Dep't, 2009 .ME 57, 974 A.2d 276; citing Ballard v.
Wagner, 2005 .ME 86, ~ 10, 877 A.2d 1083. Plaintiff has failed to show that Defendant's
statements harmed him. Because Plaintiff has not set out a prima facie case of
defamation, the Court grants ~ffs Motion for Summary Judgment on Pl~in11£fs 0~- ~~f~ claim of Defamation.
The Court GRANTS Defendant's Motiofror Summary Judgment. I -:;:,_d. C( ,........ .&-.._r- ~/L ork-oct.--r. 1 The issue of child support is often a contentiously litigated issue in the District Court. Full and fair opportunity exists to obtain financial discovery and to litigate the basis for child support. Because of these opportunities, the court concludes that relitigation of these issues, even for claims of fraud, should be confined to circumstances where discovery would not have been able to root out inaccuracies in the claim's basis for child support. Since independent verification for health insurance issues could have occurred, there was a fair opportunity to investigate and litigate this issue.
3 DATE: John O'Neil, Jr. Justice, Superior Court
4 ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF; GREGORY MCCULLOUGH MCCULLOUGH LAW OFFICES PO BOX 910 SANFORD ME 04073-0910
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT: BRADLEY C MORIN BOURQUE & CLEGG PO BOX 1068 SANFORD ME 04073 STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT YORK, SS. CIVIL ACTION GJ DOCKET NO. ~-12;210 PATRICK MAIN, ) ) Uo/11-Yoli'. y;if.ol'/ Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) ORDER ) CHRISTINE MAIN, ) ) Defendant. )
Plaintiff moves the court to reconsider its October 3, 2013 Order granting Defendant's
Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiffs motion is based on the court's decision not to address
similarities between the present case and Sargent v. Sargent, as cited in Plaintiff's Memorandum
ofLaw in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.
In Sargent v. Sargent, a husband and wife had signed a separation agreement that afforded
the wife $1,000,000 upon separation. Sargent v. Sargent, 622 A.2d 721, 722 (Me. 1993) The
wife signed the agreement after her husband led her to believe that the marital estate was worth
$2,000,000. Id. The parties divorced and the wife received the $1,000,000 according to the
agreement. Id. Three years after the separation, the wife learned that the marital estate was
actually worth $17,000,000, and brought an action seeking $8,500,000, one-half of the marital
estate. Id. The Law Court found that the issue of whether a party had been fraudulently induced
to accept a separation agreement was not precluded by the doctrine of res judicata. Id. at 723.
Issues of fraud are not precluded in cases where the plaintiff did not know of the fraud at the
time of the first action. Id. The Court found that the wife could have justifiably relied on her
husband's representations of the worth of the marital estate. Therefore, the Court found that the
Superior Court's dismissal ofthe case was in error.
1 The court recognizes that both Sargent and the case at hand are family law matters in which
the doctrine of res judicata is raised with reference to a claim of fraud. The court distinguishes
the current case from Sargent on two grounds. First, the court finds that Plaintiff's claim of fraud
does not fall into the exception to res judicata described in Sargent. The issue of fraud is
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STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT YORK, SS. CIVIL ACTION DOCKET NO. RE-1~l1~
PATRICK MAIN, ) ufJN -'fOP-. .. ,LJ;5fD!~ ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) ORDER ) CHRISTINE MAIN, ) ) Defendant. )
I. Background
Plaintiff Patrick Main and Defendant Christine Main are parents to Brian George
Main, age16, and Nicole Ann Main, age 14. Mter litigation in 2011-2012, the Springvale
District Court ordered Defendant to pay child support in the amount of $14 7.50 and
arrearages in the amount of $5,179.27. Plaintiff has brought this action for fraud alleging
that Defendant overstated her weekly health insurance expense for the minor children in
her child support affidavit dated September 28, 2007. Furthermore, Plaintiff has brought
a claim for defamation alleging that Defendant has called him a "deadbeat dad" to others,
and caused others to repeat the moniker. The District Court retains jurisdiction of child
support determinations and review thereof. This Court reviews only Plaintiffs claims of
fraud and defamation.
II. Standard ofReview
When a defendant moves for summary judgment, "the plaintiff must establish a
prima facie case for each element of [the] cause of action that is properly challenged in
1 the defendant's motion." Flaherty v. Muther, 2011 ME 32, ~ 38, 171 A.3d 640. The
burden then shifts to the defendant to show that there is no genuine issue of material fact.
Summary judgment is appropriate where no genuine issue of material fact exists and the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Beal v. Allstate Ins. Co., 989 A.
2d 733,738 (Me. 2010); Dyerv. Department ofTransportation, 951 A.2d 821,825 (Me.
2008). When reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the court reviews the parties'
statements of material facts and the cited record evidence in the light most favorable to
the non-moving party. Id.
A genuine issue of material fact exists where the fact finder must make a
determination between differing versions of the truth. Reliance National Indemnity v.
Knowles Industrial Services Corp., 2005 Iv1E 29, ~7, 868 A.2d 220; citing Univ. of Me.
Found. V. Fleet Bank of Me., 2003 I\1E 20, ~20, 817 A.2d 871. Furthermore, "a fact is
material if it could potentially affect the outcome of the case." Id.
ill. Discussion
A. Res Judicata
Plaintiff claims that Defendant committed fraud when she submitted a child
support affidavit to the District Court at the December 13, 2007 child support hearing
stating that her weekly healthcare expense for the minor children was $90.50. Defendant
argues that Plaintiff's cause of action should be barred by the doctrine of res judicata.
"Under the doctrine of res judicata, a party and its privies are barred from relitigating
claims or issues that have already been decided." Godsoe v. Godsoe, 2010 ME 42, ~ 15,
995 A.2d 232; citing Portland Co. v. City of Portland, 2009 ME 98, ~ 22, 979 A.2d 1279.
2 In the litigation in 2011-2012, Plaintiff raised the claim of fraud concerning the health
insurance costs Defendant claimed on behalf of the minor children. Defendant had the
full and fair opportunity and incentive to litigate the issue before the District Court. 1
Plaintiff agreed to the stipulation that he owed back child support of $5,179 .26, an
amount that included the health insurance costs. Plaintiffs stipulated back child support
became part of a final judgment. This issue has already been litigated and determined.
Plaintiffs claim of fraud is therefore barred by the doctrine of res judicata.
B. Defamation
Plaintiff has brought a claim of defamation against Defendant for calling him a
"deadbeat dad" and similar terms, and for causing her friends to repeat these phrases. "To
prove defamation, a plaintiff must establish that a false statement published to a third
party harmed the plaintiffs reputation so as to lower her [or him] in the community's
estimation." Cookson v. Brewer Sch. Dep't, 2009 .ME 57, 974 A.2d 276; citing Ballard v.
Wagner, 2005 .ME 86, ~ 10, 877 A.2d 1083. Plaintiff has failed to show that Defendant's
statements harmed him. Because Plaintiff has not set out a prima facie case of
defamation, the Court grants ~ffs Motion for Summary Judgment on Pl~in11£fs 0~- ~~f~ claim of Defamation.
The Court GRANTS Defendant's Motiofror Summary Judgment. I -:;:,_d. C( ,........ .&-.._r- ~/L ork-oct.--r. 1 The issue of child support is often a contentiously litigated issue in the District Court. Full and fair opportunity exists to obtain financial discovery and to litigate the basis for child support. Because of these opportunities, the court concludes that relitigation of these issues, even for claims of fraud, should be confined to circumstances where discovery would not have been able to root out inaccuracies in the claim's basis for child support. Since independent verification for health insurance issues could have occurred, there was a fair opportunity to investigate and litigate this issue.
3 DATE: John O'Neil, Jr. Justice, Superior Court
4 ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF; GREGORY MCCULLOUGH MCCULLOUGH LAW OFFICES PO BOX 910 SANFORD ME 04073-0910
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT: BRADLEY C MORIN BOURQUE & CLEGG PO BOX 1068 SANFORD ME 04073 STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT YORK, SS. CIVIL ACTION GJ DOCKET NO. ~-12;210 PATRICK MAIN, ) ) Uo/11-Yoli'. y;if.ol'/ Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) ORDER ) CHRISTINE MAIN, ) ) Defendant. )
Plaintiff moves the court to reconsider its October 3, 2013 Order granting Defendant's
Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiffs motion is based on the court's decision not to address
similarities between the present case and Sargent v. Sargent, as cited in Plaintiff's Memorandum
ofLaw in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.
In Sargent v. Sargent, a husband and wife had signed a separation agreement that afforded
the wife $1,000,000 upon separation. Sargent v. Sargent, 622 A.2d 721, 722 (Me. 1993) The
wife signed the agreement after her husband led her to believe that the marital estate was worth
$2,000,000. Id. The parties divorced and the wife received the $1,000,000 according to the
agreement. Id. Three years after the separation, the wife learned that the marital estate was
actually worth $17,000,000, and brought an action seeking $8,500,000, one-half of the marital
estate. Id. The Law Court found that the issue of whether a party had been fraudulently induced
to accept a separation agreement was not precluded by the doctrine of res judicata. Id. at 723.
Issues of fraud are not precluded in cases where the plaintiff did not know of the fraud at the
time of the first action. Id. The Court found that the wife could have justifiably relied on her
husband's representations of the worth of the marital estate. Therefore, the Court found that the
Superior Court's dismissal ofthe case was in error.
1 The court recognizes that both Sargent and the case at hand are family law matters in which
the doctrine of res judicata is raised with reference to a claim of fraud. The court distinguishes
the current case from Sargent on two grounds. First, the court finds that Plaintiff's claim of fraud
does not fall into the exception to res judicata described in Sargent. The issue of fraud is
precluded where Plaintiff had the opportunity to litigate the claim in the earlier action. In
Sargent, the wife did not know of the fraud until well after the initial action, therefore her claim
of fraud was not precluded. In the current case, Plaintiff not only knew of the alleged fraud at the
time of the District Court proceeding, he raised the issue of fraud in that action. Because the
issue of fraud was raised, between the same two parties, and a final judgment was issued, the
issue of fraud is precluded.
Additionally, in Sargent, the Law Court found that the case was dismissed in error because
Plaintiff could have justifiably relied upon the statements made by her husband. There is no such
potential for justifiable reliance in the current action. As a matter of law, in order to prove an
action for fraud or negligent misrepresentation Plaintiff must show that through Defendant's
failure of reasonable care Defendant provided false information to Plaintiff, on which Plaintiff
relied, causing Plaintiff damages. See Langevin v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2013 :ME 55,~ 11, 66 A.3d
585, 590, citing St. Louis v. Wilkinson Law Offices, P.C., 2012 :ME 116, ~18, 55 A.3d 443.
Defendant has not provided any evidence beyond mere opinion and allegation that Plaintiff
did not in fact have a healthcare expense of $90.50 a week at the time she submitted the child
support affidavit to the District Court in December 2007. Defendant has submitted an affidavit
stating that his attorney obtained one of Plaintiffs 2011 paystubs.Attomey McCullough has also
submitted an affidavit that Defendant's 2011 paystub did not comport with the number supplied
to the court in 2007. Plaintiff has not provided any evidence that Defendant provided false
2 information to Plaintiff in 2007. Furthermore, Plaintiff has not provided evidence that if there
was any misinformation submitted by Defendant that it was a result of failure of reasonable care.
Plaintiff has provided no evidence to support a contention of justifiable reliance.
For these reason, the court finds that Sargent is distinguishable from the case at hand. The
Court denies Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration.
DATE: Q
3 ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF; GREGORY MCCULLOUGH MCCULLOUGH LAW OFFICES 1074 MAIN STREET PO BOX 910 SANFORD ME 04073-0910
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT : BRADLEY C MORIN BOURQUE & CLEGG 949 MAIN STREET PO BOX 1068 SANFORD ME 04073