NOTICE 2025 IL App (4th) 250188-U FILED This Order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is October 20, 2025 NO. 4-25-0188 Carla Bender not precedent except in the th limited circumstances allowed 4 District Appellate under Rule 23(e)(1). IN THE APPELLATE COURT Court, IL
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
CONNIE S. MAIN, ) Appeal from the Plaintiff-Appellant, ) Circuit Court of v. ) Knox County REBECCA LUNDEEN, ) No. 21L21 Defendant-Appellee. ) ) Honorable ) James G. Baber, ) Judge Presiding.
PRESIDING JUSTICE HARRIS delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Zenoff and Doherty concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The trial court did not err in granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff forfeited the remainder of her appellate claims by failing to comply with the requirements of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020).
¶2 Plaintiff, Connie S. Main, appeals the trial court’s judgment granting the motion
for summary judgment of defendant, Rebecca Lundeen, with respect to plaintiff’s amended
complaint. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 In August 2022, plaintiff filed an amended complaint alleging the following
causes of action against defendant: (1) malicious prosecution, (2) abuse of process, (3) false
imprisonment, and (4) defamation per se. Plaintiff’s allegations centered around an event that
occurred on May 27, 2020, and ultimately led to her being arrested on June 17, 2020, and
charged with the criminal offense of disorderly conduct in Knox County Case No. 20-CM-334. Specifically, plaintiff alleged the following occurred on May 27, 2020:
“Plaintiff—the passenger, and Plaintiff’s husband—the driver, were in
their 2010 white Honda checking their farmland crops all along the east side of
2800 Knox Road 1240E in Altona, Illinois. It is a rural country road wherein their
property starts at a ‘T’ corner approximately 1/2 mile north of Defendant’s rural
residence. Defendant’s rural residence sits on the west side directly across the
road from Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s field gate entry at the top of the hill. The road
continues south of Defendant’s house and Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s farmland for
another 1/4 mile approximately ***. This day, Plaintiff’s vehicle’s path was being
blocked and halted near the gate entry of Plaintiff’s husband’s farmland.
Defendant’s dog was illegally stray by Illinois law and Knox County statute, and
reported October 27, 2020, by the Sheriff’s Department answering Plaintiff’s
[Freedom of Information Act (5 ILCS 140/1 et seq. (West 2020))] request of June
17, 2020, non-registered, and non-inoculated—unbeknownst to Plaintiff and
Plaintiff’s husband, while running around their vehicle blocking and halting its
path, jumping, and barking.”
¶5 Plaintiff alleged that after driving around the dog, her “husband stopped at a stop
sign south of Defendant’s house *** and reported [the incident involving defendant’s dog] to
non-emergency 911 dispatch.” Plaintiff further alleged that: (1) defendant also reported the
incident “to non-emergency 911 dispatch,” (2) her “husband and Defendant both verbally
reported [the incident] to Sheriff’s Deputy Jacque Arthur-Dare,” and (3) they both also provided
Deputy Dare with a written statement of their respective version of the events. According to
plaintiff, defendant reported to authorities that she had seen a vehicle stopped in the road in front
-2- of her house and “ ‘someone in the front passenger seat with the windows down that appeared to
be using a hand held video recorder out the window towards the direction of a pig pen in [her]
yard and also towards the area that [her] children were playing.’ ” Plaintiff further alleged that
“[f]or the sole reasons reported by Defendant to non-emergency 911 dispatch *** to Sheriff’s
Deputy Dare, then supporting each with a *** sworn statement,” she was “ ‘Warrant’ arrested
[on] June 17, 2020,” and charged with the criminal offense of disorderly conduct in case No. 20-
CM-334, with the charge ultimately being “dismissed ‘Nolle Prosequi’ ” in April 2022.
¶6 With respect to plaintiff’s malicious prosecution claim, she alleged that defendant
“had no reasonable or probable cause to report [her] *** to law enforcement” but instead
“alleged Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s husband were photographing her children as malice and
retaliation for reporting her illegal dog and pursuing her husband’s arrest after he criminally
damaged Plaintiff’s rural residential property near midnight using his company truck [in] 2017.”
Plaintiff further alleged: “If not for Defendant’s allegations, actions and behaviors, law
enforcement would not have ‘Warrant’ arrested Plaintiff ***. Instead, Plaintiff *** w[as]
prosecuted *** based upon information law enforcement gathered from Defendant. Law
enforcement’s decision was based upon Defendant’s reporting and sworn statement solely.” As
for plaintiff’s three other claims, she alleged as follows:
“Defendant acted maliciously, perversely and deliberately misused and
abused criminal court process without probable cause for improper purposes
initially [on] May 27, 2020, and for 2 years thereafter to protect her veterinarian
license, because her dog was in violation of [the] Animal Control Act [(510 ILCS
5/1 et seq. (West 2020))] another year, and as retaliation for Plaintiff reporting her
dog again to law enforcement as she had done in prior years and because Plaintiff
-3- caused the arrest of her husband [in] 2017 for criminally damaging Plaintiff’s
rural residential property using his company vehicle near midnight to do so, and
to keep Plaintiff and her husband from their farm property directly across the road
from their newly built rural residence.”
¶7 In September 2024, defendant filed a motion for summary judgment. Defendant
attached the following documents to her motion: (1) warrants issued for plaintiff’s arrest in Knox
County case Nos. 20-CM-312, 20-CM-333, and 20-CM-334; (2) a criminal complaint charging
plaintiff with disorderly conduct in case No. 20-CM-312, a criminal complaint charging plaintiff
with aggravated assault and disorderly conduct in case No. 20-CM-333, and a criminal complaint
charging plaintiff with disorderly conduct in case No. 20-CM-334; (3) an affidavit of Deputy
Dare; (4) an audio recording of both defendant’s and plaintiff’s husband’s nonemergency 911
calls made on May 27, 2020; (5) Deputy Dare’s written report of the May 27, 2020, incident;
(6) an affidavit of defendant; (7) transcripts of the sentencing hearings in case Nos. 20-CM-312
and 20-CM-333; (8) a statement of nolle prosequi in case No. 20-CM-334; and (9) an affidavit of
Knox County State’s Attorney Jeremy S. Karlin.
¶8 According to the allegations in the criminal complaint filed in case No.
20-CM-334, on May 27, 2020, plaintiff “knowingly yelled at, cursed at, and berated the dog
owned by [defendant] while in the presence of [defendant] and her three young children in such
an unreasonable manner as to alarm and disturb [defendant] and her three young children, and
provoke a breach of the peace.” Defendant attached to her sworn affidavit, “and by reference
incorporated,” her written statement to Deputy Dare concerning the incident on May 27, 2020, in
which defendant stated the following:
“Today at approximately 1:25 p.m. I was in my backyard playing with my
-4- 3 young children and our dog, a 12 year old female Golden Retriever. I walked
through the house and cut through the front yard to check the mailbox and pick up
mail. When walking back towards the house in our driveway I noticed a white car
stopped in the road just north of our house at the bottom of the hill. I started
walking through our yard closer to the vehicle to see if everything was okay and
saw someone in the front passenger seat with the windows down that appeared to
be using a hand held video recorder out the window towards the direction of a pig
pen in our yard and also towards the area that my children were playing. As I
came closer the car started moving very slowly southbound approaching our
house and idling in the road at the end of our driveway near our mailbox. At that
point my dog came through the north side of our yard to greet me when she saw
me walking back towards the house. She then noticed the car idling near our
mailbox and I heard the occupants of the car making noises in her direction. *** I
started calling to my dog but was carrying mail and trying to calm my 3 children
that had walked to the front yard to find me and was unable to get her before she
approached the car. Once my dog approached the vehicle I saw a woman then
hang out of the side of the passenger window with a hand held video camera
yelling at my dog and shouting expletives. I heard her shout ‘Get the F*** away!’
and I recognized the vehicle and occupants as [plaintiff’s husband] and [plaintiff].
As they drove past the house my dog quickly returned to me once they passed
through the area directly in front of our home. I then quickly contacted the
non-emergency line to report what had just happened. This was very upsetting to
both my 3 children that were present and myself.”
-5- ¶9 Knox County Sheriff’s Deputy Jaque Dare averred, in pertinent part, the
following in her sworn affidavit attached to defendant’s motion for summary judgment:
“4. The charge *** in Knox County Case No. 20-CM-312, arose out of an
encounter between David Benson and [plaintiff] that occurred *** on May 7,
2020.
***
6. The charges *** in Knox County Case No. 20-CM-33[3], resulted out
of an encounter that occurred between U.S. Postal employee, Jean McCann and
[plaintiff] that occurred *** on May 28, 2020.
7. On May 7, 2020, I originally issued a Disorderly Conduct citation to
[plaintiff], along with a Notice to Appear, and sent both to her by certified mail,
return receipt requested in regards to the charge *** that was ultimately filed in
Knox County Case No. 20-CM-312.
8. On May 27, 2020, I consulted with Assistant Knox County State’s
Attorney [(ASA)] Ashley Worby about how to proceed relative to the incident
involving [defendant] and [plaintiff]. I advised ASA Worby of the information I
had obtained from [defendant] and [plaintiff’s husband] and ASA Worby advised
me to proceed with charges against [plaintiff] for Disorderly Conduct ***.
9. On that same date, May 27, 2020, I also spoke with the Altona Post
Office and learned that the certified letter I had sent to [plaintiff] regarding the
May 7, 2020, event had not been received or signed for by [plaintiff]. I then
advised ASA Worby of that fact and it was then determined that since it had been
almost 3 weeks since the letter was mailed and [plaintiff] had not claimed the
-6- certified letter, a warrant for the arrest of [plaintiff] would be sought on both the
May 7, 2020, incident *** and the May 27, 2020, incident ***.
10. Subsequently, on the following day ***, in the course of my
investigation of the incident involving U.S. Postal employee, Jean McCann and
[plaintiff], I sent my report to the Knox County State’s Attorney’s Office
requesting an arrest warrant for [plaintiff] on the charges of aggravated assault of
a government official, intimidation and disorderly conduct.
11. On June 1, 2020, I met with ASA Worby and together we appeared
before Judge Curtis Lane. I advised Judge Lane of the information I had learned
in each of my investigations ***.
12. On June 1, 2020, after hearing the information presented, Judge Lane
simultaneously issued warrants for the arrest of [plaintiff in all three cases. ***
13. On June 17, 2020, [plaintiff] was simultaneously arrested on all three
warrants.
14. At no time throughout my investigation of the three above listed
incidents did [defendant] ever ask for [plaintiff] to be arrested for the offense of
Disorderly Conduct for the May 27, 2020 event.
15. At no time throughout my investigation of the three above listed
incidents did [defendant] ever ask for [plaintiff] to be prosecuted for the offense
of Disorderly Conduct for the May 27, 2020 event.”
¶ 10 Knox County State’s Attorney Jeremy Karlin averred, in pertinent part, the
following in his sworn affidavit attached to defendant’s motion for summary judgment:
“7. Knox County Case No. 20-CM-312 proceeded to a jury trial ***. ***
-7- [T]he jury returned a guilty verdict against [plaintiff] on the offense of Disorderly
Conduct. *** At the sentencing hearing I recommended to the Court that part of
[plaintiff’s] sentence should include a mental health evaluation and compliance
with any recommended follow up treatment. The sentencing judge did not accept
my recommendation that [plaintiff] undergo a mental health evaluation. ***
8. Knox County Case No. 20-CM-333 proceeded to a jury trial ***. ***
[T]he jury returned a guilty verdict against [plaintiff] on the offense of Disorderly
Conduct. *** At the sentencing hearing [ASA] Arman recommended to the Court
that part of [plaintiff’s] sentence should include a mental health evaluation and
compliance with any recommended follow up treatment. The sentencing judge did
not accept the State’s recommendation that [plaintiff] undergo a mental health
evaluation. ***
9. In Knox County Case No. 20-CM-334, as Knox County State’s
Attorney, I nolle prosequi the charge of Disorderly Conduct against [plaintiff] on
April 25, 2022. In doing so I stated my reasons for the filing of the
Nolle Prosequi, those being:
‘The Office of the State’s Attorney of Knox County, having considered the
nature of the offenses, the evidence herein, finds the best interests of
justice would be served by a nolle prosequi.’
‘Other: Believes best outcome upon finding of guilt is for defendant to
receive mental health evaluation. Assigned judge unwilling to do this.’
10. My decision to nolle prosequi the charge of Disorderly Conduct that
had been filed against [plaintiff] was not motivated by any belief that [plaintiff]
-8- was innocent of the charge. Nor was it motivated by my assessment that the State
could not prove [plaintiff’s] guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Rather my decision
was based solely upon the consideration that [the] State did not wish to further
consume State and County resources in bringing [plaintiff] to trial and secure a
conviction, only to have the sentencing court not impose the remedial aspect of
ordering a mental health evaluation of [plaintiff]. (Emphasis in original.)”
¶ 11 Plaintiff filed a response to defendant’s motion for summary judgment, but she
did not attach any affidavits thereto. Following a hearing, the trial court granted defendant’s
motion for summary judgment.
¶ 12 This appeal followed.
¶ 13 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 14 On appeal, plaintiff raises the following arguments: (1) the trial court erred in
granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment “based on counterfactual interpretations of
material facts that are against sound legal principles and facts of the case, which rendered [the]
order unsound [and] biased”; (2) the court further erred in granting defendant’s motion for
summary judgment by “failing to consider statutory factors (Animal Control Act and County
Ordinances) [and] standards—preponderance of the evidence, which story is more likely true
[and] failed to consider crucial factual material evidence of the case *** [and] instead
disregarded obvious misrepresented material facts”; (3) the court erred in “dismissing [her] last
filed Motion for Summary Judgment based on counterfactual decisions and interpretations,
which violated [her] Constitutional Rights to fairness, justice [and] due process”; and (4) the
court “violat[ed] Judicial Precedent (horizontal stare decisis) when Judge Baber changed a
Motion to Compel to a Motion for Reconsideration—planted by opposing counsel—[and] denied
-9- discovery previously ordered by Judge Rasmussen.”
¶ 15 A. Plaintiff’s Failure to Comply
With Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020)
¶ 16 Initially, we note plaintiff has forfeited each of the arguments raised in her pro se
appellant’s brief by failing to comply with the citation requirements of Illinois Supreme Court
Rule 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020). Rule 341(h)(7) provides that the argument section of an
appellant’s brief “shall contain the contentions of the appellant and the reasons therefor, with
citation of the authorities and the pages of the record relied on.” Id. The “failure to assert a well-
reasoned argument supported by legal authority is a violation of Rule 341(h)(7) resulting in
forfeiture.” People v. Ivanchuk, 2025 IL App (4th) 241230, ¶ 43. “[T]he procedural rules
governing the content and form of appellate briefs are mandatory and not suggestions.” Litwin v.
County of La Salle, 2021 IL App (3d) 200410, ¶ 3. “Pro se litigants are not excused from
following rules that dictate the form and content of appellate briefs.” Lewis v. Heartland Food
Corp., 2014 IL App (1st) 123303, ¶ 5.
¶ 17 Here, in arguing the trial court erred in granting defendant’s motion for summary
judgment, plaintiff does not include a single citation to authority or even identify the elements of
the causes of action alleged in her amended complaint. Further, plaintiff’s entire argument that
the court erred in denying her third motion for summary judgment consists of the following two
sentences:
“The trial court dismissed [plaintiff’s] Motion for Summary Judgment last
filed 3/15/24 (C416-C499 V2); heard 7/26/24—4-1/2 months later (C711-C712
V2), yet granted [defendant’s] filed 9/19/24 (C728-C1000 V3); heard 12/4/24
(R328[ ]-R363)—approximately 2 months later with the Judge’s Order based off
- 10 - counterfactual decisions and interpretations. (C1029-C1044 V3)[.] This violated
[plaintiff’s] Constitutional Rights to fairness, justice and due process.”
With respect to plaintiff’s final argument, that the court erred in “chang[ing] a Motion to Compel
to a Motion for Reconsideration,” plaintiff does not even include a citation to the record
identifying the relevant “Motion to Compel” or the court’s order that allegedly “changed” the
motion to a motion to reconsider. Given that plaintiff filed numerous motions to compel
discovery, we decline to sift through the record only to speculate as to which motion and order
she is now challenging on appeal. See, e.g., Alms v. Peoria County Election Comm’n, 2022 IL
App (4th) 220976, ¶ 28 (“Reviewing courts are not depositories where litigants may dump the
burden of argument and research.”). Accordingly, we find plaintiff has forfeited each of the
arguments raised in her pro se appellant’s brief. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020);
Ivanchuk, 2025 IL App (4th) 241230, ¶ 43.
¶ 18 Despite plaintiff’s clear violation of Rule 341(h)(7) and the resulting forfeiture of
her appellate claims, we will nonetheless address the issue of whether the trial court erred in
granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment, as defendant has provided citations to the
relevant portions of the record and to relevant authority in her appellee’s brief. See, e.g., In re
Marriage of Debra N., 2013 IL App (1st) 122145, ¶ 44 (“Although a party’s failure to comply
with Rule 341 is grounds for disregarding the arguments raised on appeal, it is not a limitation on
this court’s jurisdiction to consider the matter.”).
¶ 19 B. The Trial Court’s Grant of
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment
¶ 20 As stated, plaintiff argues the trial court erred in granting defendant’s motion for
summary judgment. Defendant, on the other hand, contends the court was correct in granting her
- 11 - motion because “on at least one element of each cause of action alleged by plaintiff, [she] has
established that there is an absence of evidence to support the necessary elements to prove the
causes of actions alleged.” We review de novo the question of whether defendant was entitled to
a judgment in her favor as a matter of law. See, e.g., National Tractor Parts Inc. v. Caterpillar
Logistics Inc., 2020 IL App (2d) 181056, ¶ 38 (“In reviewing the circuit court’s grant of
summary judgment, we review the judgment de novo, and we may affirm on any grounds found
present in the record.”).
¶ 21 “The purpose of summary judgment is not to try a question of fact, but to
determine whether any genuine issues of triable fact exist.” Watkins v. Schmitt, 172 Ill. 2d 193,
203 (1996). Summary judgment is appropriate where “the pleadings, depositions, and admissions
on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” 735 ILCS
5/2-1005(c) (West 2024). However, “where reasonable persons could draw divergent inferences
from the undisputed material facts or where there is a dispute as to a material fact, summary
judgment should be denied and the issue decided by the trier of fact.” Espinoza v. Elgin, Joliet &
Eastern Ry. Co., 165 Ill. 2d 107, 114 (1995). “If a plaintiff fails to establish one element of the
cause of action, summary judgment in favor of the defendant is appropriate.” National Tractor
Parts Inc., 2020 IL App (2d) 181056, ¶ 38.
¶ 22 “[A] defendant moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of
production,” which may be satisfied “(1) by affirmatively showing that some element of the case
must be resolved in [the movant’s] favor [citation] or (2) by establishing that there is an absence
of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Nedzvekas v. Fung, 374 Ill. App. 3d 618, 624 (2007). If the moving party meets its initial burden
- 12 - of production by providing sworn facts demonstrating it is entitled to a judgment in its favor,
“the burden then shift[s] to the plaintiff to present a factual basis which would arguably entitle
her to a favorable judgment.” Id. “If the party seeking summary judgment supplies facts via
affidavit, which, when left uncontradicted, would warrant judgment in its favor as a matter of
law, the opponent may not sit idly by and rely on his pleadings to create a genuine material
factual issue.” Cano v. Village of Dolton, 250 Ill. App. 3d 130, 139 (1993). “Failure to oppose a
summary judgment motion supported by affidavits or stipulations by filing counteraffidavits in
response is fatal.” Fitzpatrick v. Human Rights Comm’n, 267 Ill. App. 3d 386, 391 (1994).
¶ 23 1. Malicious Prosecution
¶ 24 In her amended complaint, plaintiff first alleged that defendant was liable for the
tort of malicious prosecution. In part, she alleged: “Defendant had no reasonable or probable
cause to report Plaintiff *** to law enforcement, nor to act as [a] witness by providing a sworn
statement for the State to prosecute Plaintiff initially or for nearly 2 years thereafter, because no
criminal act occurred.”
¶ 25 The tort of malicious prosecution is comprised of five elements: “(1) the
commencement or continuance of an original criminal or civil judicial proceeding by the
defendant; (2) the termination of the proceeding in favor of the plaintiff; (3) the absence of
probable cause for such proceeding; (4) the presence of malice; and (5) damages resulting to the
plaintiff.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Swick v. Liautaud, 169 Ill. 2d 504, 512 (1996).
“The absence of any of these elements bars a plaintiff’s malicious prosecution claim.” Beaman v.
Freesmeyer, 2019 IL 122654, ¶ 26. “In regard to the second element, a malicious prosecution
action cannot be predicated on underlying criminal proceedings which were terminated in a
manner not indicative of the innocence of the accused.” Swick, 169 Ill. 2d at 512. “Public policy
- 13 - favors the exposure of crime, and courts should encourage and protect citizen cooperation by
‘narrowly circumscribing’ the circumstances in which malicious prosecution actions may be
brought.” Vincent v. Williams, 279 Ill. App. 3d 1, 5 (1996) (quoting Misselhorn v. Doyle, 257 Ill.
App. 3d 983, 986 (1994)).
¶ 26 In Swick, the supreme court addressed for the first time the question of “[w]hether
the [nolle prosequi] of a criminal charge constitutes a favorable termination in a malicious
prosecution action.” Swick, 169 Ill. 2d at 512. The Swick court resolved this question of first
impression as follows:
“In a criminal context, a nolle prosequi is not a final disposition of a case but ***
is a procedure which reverts the matter to the same condition which existed before
the commencement of the prosecution. [Citation.] In the civil malicious
prosecution context, the majority rule is that a criminal proceeding has been
terminated in favor of the accused when a prosecutor formally abandons the
proceeding via a nolle prosequi, unless the abandonment is for reasons not
indicative of the innocence of the accused. [Citations.] The abandonment of the
proceedings is not indicative of the innocence of the accused when the
nolle prosequi is the result of an agreement or compromise with the accused,
misconduct on the part of the accused for the purpose of preventing trial, mercy
requested or accepted by the accused, the institution of new criminal proceedings,
or the impossibility or impracticability of bringing the accused to trial. [Citation.]
We find that the majority rule best reflects the need to balance an individual’s
right to be free from unreasonable criminal prosecutions with the public policy
which favors the exposure of crime. [Citation.] Accordingly, we adopt this rule.”
- 14 - Id. at 512-13.
In adopting the majority rule, the supreme court went on to note that the burden of proving a
favorable termination remains with the plaintiff and “[o]nly when a plaintiff establishes that the
nolle prosequi was entered for reasons consistent with his innocence does the plaintiff meet his
burden of proof.” Id. at 513. The Swick court stressed that the “circumstances surrounding the
abandonment of the criminal proceedings must compel an inference that there existed a lack of
reasonable grounds to pursue the criminal prosecution.” Id. at 513-14.
¶ 27 Here, although plaintiff is unable to establish multiple elements of her claim for
malicious prosecution, we only find it necessary to address her inability to establish the second
element of her claim. Specifically, defendant attached to her motion for summary judgment the
affidavit of Knox County State’s Attorney Karlin. Karlin averred that his “decision to
nolle prosequi the charge of disorderly conduct *** was not motivated by any belief that
[plaintiff] was innocent of the charge.” Instead, Karlin averred that his “decision was based
solely upon the consideration that [the] State did not wish to further consume State and County
resources in brining [plaintiff] to trial and secure a conviction, only to have the sentencing court
not impose the remedial aspect of ordering a mental health evaluation of [plaintiff].” Plaintiff did
not file any counteraffidavits in response to defendant’s motion contradicting Karlin’s assertion
that the abandonment of the charges was for a reason not at all indicative of her innocence. See
Fitzpatrick, 267 Ill. App. 3d at 391 (“Failure to oppose a summary judgment motion supported
by affidavits or stipulations by filing counteraffidavits in response is fatal.”); Swick, 169 Ill. 2d at
512-13. Accordingly, because plaintiff cannot demonstrate the charge was abandoned for a
reason indicative of her innocence, we find defendant was entitled to a judgment in her favor as a
matter of law on the malicious prosecution claim. See, e.g., Beaman, 2019 IL 122654, ¶ 26 (“The
- 15 - absence of any [one] element[ ] bars a plaintiff’s malicious prosecution claim.”); National
Tractor Parts Inc., 2020 IL App (2d) 181056, ¶ 38 (“If a plaintiff fails to establish one element
of the cause of action, summary judgment in favor of the defendant is appropriate.”).
¶ 28 2. Abuse of Process
¶ 29 Next, plaintiff alleged defendant was liable for the tort of abuse of process. In
relevant part, she alleged: “Defendant, maliciously, perversely and deliberately misused and
abused criminal court process without probable cause for improper purposes initially [on]
May 27, 2020, and for 2 years thereafter to protect her veterinarian license *** and as retaliation
for Plaintiff reporting her dog again to law enforcement.”
¶ 30 The tort of abuse of process has been defined as “the misuse of legal process to
accomplish some purpose outside the scope of the process itself.” Neurosurgery & Spine
Surgery, S.C. v. Goldman, 339 Ill. App. 3d 177, 182 (2003) (citing Bonney v. King, 201 Ill. 47,
50-51 (1903)). In this context, “process” refers to “any means used by the court to acquire or to
exercise its jurisdiction over a person or over specific property.” Holiday Magic, Inc. v. Scott, 4
Ill. App. 3d 962, 968 (1972). To recover on a claim of abuse of process, a plaintiff must prove
two elements: “(1) the existence of an ulterior purpose or motive and (2) some act in the use of
process that is not proper in the regular course of proceedings.” Neurosurgery, 339 Ill. App. 3d
at 183. Concerning the second element, a plaintiff must prove “the process has been used to
accomplish some result which is beyond the purview of the process, or which compels the party
against whom it is used to do some collateral thing which he could not legally be compelled to
do.” Community National Bank in Monmouth v. McCrery, 156 Ill. App. 3d 580, 583 (1987).
“The usual case of abuse of process is one of some form of extortion, using the process to put
pressure on someone to compel him to pay a different debt or to take or refrain from taking some
- 16 - other action.” Id. (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 682 (1977)). “An actionable tort [for
abuse of process] does not exist unless there is some improper use of the process of the court.”
Holiday Magic, Inc., 4 Ill. App. 3d at 967. “Because the tort of abuse of process is not favored
under Illinois law, the elements must be strictly construed.” Neurosurgery, 339 Ill. App. 3d
at 183.
¶ 31 Here, contrary to plaintiff’s allegation that defendant “maliciously, perversely and
deliberately misused and abused criminal court process,” the undisputed facts demonstrate that
defendant never used the process of the court. Rather, she merely reported plaintiff’s alleged
conduct to a nonemergency 911 line and subsequently provided a written statement to the police.
It was the State, not defendant, who used the process of the court to arrest plaintiff for the
offense of disorderly conduct. Moreover, Deputy Dare made it clear in her affidavit that
defendant never asked her to arrest plaintiff for the offense of disorderly conduct. Accordingly,
because there was no improper use of the process of the court by defendant, plaintiff’s claim
necessarily fails. See Holiday Magic, Inc., 4 Ill. App. 3d at 967 (“An actionable tort does not
exist unless there is some improper use of the process of the court.”).
¶ 32 3. False Imprisonment
¶ 33 Next, plaintiff alleged defendant was liable for the tort of false imprisonment.
Specifically, she alleged as follows: “If not for Defendant’s allegations, actions and behaviors,
law enforcement would not have ‘Warrant’ arrested Plaintiff ***. *** Law enforcement’s
decision was based upon Defendant’s reporting and sworn statement solely.”
¶ 34 “False imprisonment is an unreasonable restraint of an individual’s liberty,
against his will, caused or procured by the defendant.” Meerbrey v. Marshall Field & Co., 139
Ill. 2d 455, 474 (1990). “The elements of a cause of action for false imprisonment are: (1) that
- 17 - the plaintiff was restrained or arrested by the defendant; and (2) that the defendant acted without
reasonable grounds (i.e., without probable cause) to believe that an offense was committed by
the plaintiff.” Grainger v. Harrah’s Casino, 2014 IL App (3d) 130029, ¶ 38. A private-citizen
defendant who supplied information to the arresting officer may be subject to liability for false
imprisonment. See, e.g., Randall v. Lemke, 311 Ill. App. 3d 848, 852 (2000). “However, the
private defendant is subject to liability only if he either (1) directed the officer to arrest the
plaintiff; or (2) procured the arrest by giving information that was the sole basis for the arrest.”
Id. (citing Odorizzi v. A.O. Smith Corp., 452 F.2d 229, 231 (7th Cir. 1971)).
¶ 35 Here, plaintiff cannot establish a claim of false imprisonment for multiple
reasons. First, the undisputed facts demonstrate defendant never directed police officers to arrest
plaintiff. See id. Deputy Dare averred in her affidavit attached to defendant’s motion for
summary judgment that “[a]t no time throughout my investigation *** did [defendant] ever ask
for [plaintiff] to be arrested for the offense of Disorderly Conduct for the May 27, 2020 event.”
Plaintiff did not file any counteraffidavits to contradict Deputy Dare’s affidavit. See Fitzpatrick,
267 Ill. App. 3d at 391. Second, the undisputed facts demonstrate the information defendant
provided to law enforcement officials was not the sole basis for plaintiff’s arrest. See Randall,
311 Ill. App. 3d at 852. Deputy Dare averred that she and Knox County ASA Worby appeared
before a judge on June 1, 2020, and secured warrants for plaintiff’s arrest in case Nos.
20-CM-312, 20-CM-333, and 20-CM-334; defendant also attached each arrest warrant to her
summary judgment motion. Deputy Dare further averred that on June 17, 2020, plaintiff “was
simultaneously arrested on all three warrants.” Because plaintiff was also arrested on charges
unrelated to the charge predicated on the information provided by defendant, plaintiff cannot
establish that defendant’s accusation was the sole basis for her arrest. See id. (“However,
- 18 - because plaintiff was arrested on charges unrelated to the one of which defendant accused him,
defendant’s accusation could not have been the sole basis for the arrest.” (Emphasis in
original.)). Lastly, we note plaintiff’s claim also fails because she was arrested pursuant to a
judicially issued arrest warrant. See Weimann v. Kane County, 150 Ill. App. 3d 962, 968 (1986)
(“Where an arrest is made under a judicially issued arrest warrant, the arrest itself cannot give
rise to a false imprisonment claim.”). Accordingly, we find defendant was entitled to a judgment
in her favor as a matter of law on the false-imprisonment claim. See National Tractor Parts Inc.,
2020 IL App (2d) 181056, ¶ 38.
¶ 36 4. Defamation Per Se
¶ 37 Lastly, plaintiff alleged a cause of action for defamation per se due to defendant
baselessly accusing her of committing a criminal offense as retaliation for plaintiff having
reported defendant’s dog to law enforcement.
¶ 38 “To state a defamation claim, a plaintiff must present facts showing that the
defendant made a false statement about the plaintiff, that the defendant made an unprivileged
publication of that statement to a third party, and that this publication caused damages.” Green v.
Rogers, 234 Ill. 2d 478, 491 (2009); see Schivarelli v. CBS, Inc., 333 Ill. App. 3d 755, 759
(2002) (“A statement is defamatory if it impeaches a person’s reputation and thereby lowers that
person in the estimation of the community or deters third parties from associating with that
person.”). There are five categories of statements deemed defamatory per se. When a statement
falls into one of these categories, “the plaintiff need not plead or prove actual damage to her
reputation to recover. [Citation.] Rather, statements that fall within these actionable per se
categories are thought to be so obviously and materially harmful to the plaintiff that injury to her
reputation may be presumed.” Bryson v. News America Publications, Inc., 174 Ill. 2d 77, 87
- 19 - (1996).
¶ 39 Statements “that impute the commission of a criminal offense” fall within one of
the categories of per se defamatory statements. Id. at 88. “To constitute defamation per se based
on imputing the commission of a crime, the crime must be an indictable one, involving moral
turpitude and punishable by death or imprisonment rather than by fine.” Jacobson v. Gimbel,
2013 IL App (2d) 120478, ¶ 27. “Defamatory statements that would otherwise be actionable will
escape liability when the conduct is to further an interest of social importance such as the
investigation of an alleged crime.” Morris v. Harvey Cycle & Camper, Inc., 392 Ill. App. 3d 399,
404 (2009). “It has long been held that statements made to law enforcement officials, for the
purpose of instituting legal proceedings, are granted absolute privilege.” Vincent, 279 Ill. App.
3d at 7. “When absolute privilege attaches, no action for defamation lies, even where malice is
alleged.” Id.
¶ 40 In Starnes v. International Harvester Co., 184 Ill. App. 3d 199, 203 (1989),
abrogated on other grounds by Bryson, 174 Ill. 2d at 108, the First District addressed the
question of whether statements made to law enforcement officials with a malicious intent were
afforded a conditional or absolute privilege. The trial court in Starnes dismissed the plaintiff’s
complaint on the basis the statements at issue—allegations of judicial impropriety made to
federal law enforcement officials—were absolutely privileged. Id. at 201. On appeal, the plaintiff
argued the trial court had erred because when “communications [to law enforcement officials]
are made with malice,” they should be afforded only a conditional, as opposed to absolute,
privilege. Id. at 203. The plaintiff reasoned that applying an absolute privilege to such statements
“condones and even encourages malicious harassment through police investigations.” Id. The
Starnes court rejected the plaintiff’s argument, citing in support of its decision a number of
- 20 - Illinois cases holding that “communications made to prosecuting authorities concerning alleged
criminal activities” are absolutely privileged. Id. at 204 (compiling cases). We note that Illinois
courts have consistently reaffirmed the holding in Starnes. See, e.g., Layne v. Builders Plumbing
Supply Co., 210 Ill. App. 3d 966, 969-73 (1991) (holding allegedly false statements to the police
that the plaintiff had harassed, assaulted, and threatened a coworker were protected by absolute
privilege despite the allegation of malice); Vincent, 279 Ill. App. 3d at 7-8 (holding allegedly
false statements to the police that the plaintiff had threatened the defendant with a knife were
protected by absolute privilege); Morris, 392 Ill. App. 3d at 405-06 (holding allegedly false
statements to the police that the plaintiff had stolen a vehicle were absolutely privileged despite
the allegation the statements were made for the improper purpose of recovering the vehicle
without refunding a down payment).
¶ 41 Here, it is undisputed that defendant made the allegedly defamatory statements to
law enforcement officials. Thus, even accepting as true plaintiff’s allegation that defendant
maliciously reported her to the police as “retaliation for [plaintiff] reporting her illegal dog and
pursuing her husband’s arrest after he criminally damaged plaintiff’s rural residential property,”
plaintiff’s defamation claim still fails as a matter of law because defendant’s statements were
made to law enforcement officials, and they are therefore “cloaked with absolute privilege.”
Vincent, 279 Ill. App. 3d at 8; see Starnes, 184 Ill. App. 3d at 203 (“An absolute privilege
provides complete immunity from civil action, even though the statements are made with malice,
because public policy favors the free and unhindered flow of such information.”). Accordingly,
we find defendant was entitled to a judgment in her favor as a matter of law on the defamation
claim. See National Tractor Parts Inc., 2020 IL App (2d) 181056, ¶ 38.
¶ 42 III. CONCLUSION
- 21 - ¶ 43 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
¶ 44 Affirmed.
- 22 -