UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
PATRICK J. MAHONEY,
Plaintiff, v. Civil Action No. 22-760 (JEB)
UNITED STATES CAPITOL POLICE BOARD, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
There is no denying Plaintiff Patrick J. Mahoney’s persistence. Over the years, he has
brought lawsuits seeking Court authority to conduct various religious activities on restricted
federal grounds. This time around, he wishes to hold a large prayer vigil in an area of the U.S.
Capitol Grounds that is forbidden to groups of 20 or more unless sponsored by a Member of
Congress.
Just over a month ago, this Court granted in part and denied in part the Government’s
Motion to Dismiss a separate lawsuit he had filed. Mahoney, a clergyman, brought that action
after the Government denied his permit application to hold a large prayer vigil on the West Front
Lawn of the Capitol on September 11, 2021. Defendants in that case, the U.S. Capitol Police
Board and certain individuals associated with the Board, denied his application because the area
was still closed to demonstrations in the wake of the January 6, 2021, attack on the Capitol.
They later clarified that Plaintiff could go forward as long as his vigil attracted fewer than 20
people, or he could hold a larger vigil in an immediately adjacent area still on the Capitol
1 Grounds. In the Court’s prior Opinion, it dismissed four counts of the Amended Complaint and
allowed two to proceed to discovery.
Seeking to shore up potential shortcomings in his prior action, Mahoney has filed a new,
highly similar lawsuit — which relies on assorted constitutional provisions — in the hopes of
holding a similar prayer vigil on the West Front Lawn on Good Friday, which is April 15, 2022.
In winter 2022 he applied for a permit to hold such a vigil, which the Board denied because the
West Front Lawn remained off limits to demonstrations of 20 or more. He now moves for a
preliminary injunction requiring the Board to grant him the permit. Because he has not
established a likelihood of success on the merits, the Court will deny his Motion.
I. Background
As the Court recounted at length the relevant background in its previous Opinion in
Plaintiff’s other case, it provides here only a brief overview that relates to the current dispute.
See Mahoney v. U.S. Capitol Police Bd. (Mahoney I), No. 21-2314, 2022 WL 523009, at *1–3
(D.D.C. Feb. 22, 2022). In that case, Mahoney was seeking damages for being denied a permit
in September 2021, as well as declaratory and injunctive relief for future prayer vigils.
The Court’s Opinion granted the Government’s Motion to Dismiss four of the six claims
in the Amended Complaint. More specifically, it jettisoned Mahoney’s free-speech claim, which
encompassed both facial and as-applied causes of action, his claim under the Free Exercise
Clause, his challenge pursuant to the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, and his due-process
cause of action. Id. at *4–7, 10–14. The Court held, however, that Plaintiff had stated a
plausible claim for relief on his selective-enforcement claim brought pursuant to the Equal
Protection Clause, as well as on his freedom-of-association claim under the First Amendment.
2 Id. at *7–9. It also clarified that although Mahoney could not obtain damages on his remaining
constitutional counts, he could pursue declaratory and injunctive relief. Id. at *14.
While Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss was pending, Plaintiff applied for a permit to hold
a vigil this Good Friday on the West Front Lawn, to which he anticipated attracting
approximately 25 people. See ECF No. 1 (Complaint), ¶¶ 45–46. The Board denied his
application on February 3 because Area 1 of the Capitol Grounds, which encompasses the West
Front Lawn, “remain[s] temporarily restricted to demonstration groups of 20 or more.” ECF No.
11-1 (Declaration of Scott Grossi), ¶ 14. The relevant Board rules explain that “[n]o group of
twenty (20) persons or more shall engage in demonstration activity on Capitol Grounds except
pursuant to the terms of a permit issued by the Capitol Police Board,” ECF No. 2-3 (Traffic
Regulations for the U.S. Capitol Grounds), § 12.4.10, and the Board has made clear that it “can
only process permit requests for demonstrations or organized activity involving more than 19
people in non-restricted or non-prohibited areas.” Grossi Decl., ¶ 16. Mahoney attests that he
still wishes to hold a large prayer vigil on Good Friday. See Compl., ¶ 49; see ECF No. 2-2
(Declaration of Patrick J. Mahoney), ¶¶ 19–21. He thus filed a motion for preliminary injunction
in case no. 21-2314 asking the Court to require Defendants to grant him a permit. See Case No.
21-2314, ECF No. 20.
On March 21, however — less than a month before Good Friday and on the day his reply
brief was due — Plaintiff withdrew his request for a preliminary injunction and instead filed a
new lawsuit and accompanying Motion for Preliminary Injunction. See Case No. 21-2314, ECF
No. 32 (Notice of Withdrawal of Motion); Case No. 22-760, ECF No. 2-1 (PI Motion). The new
lawsuit names the same Defendants as before, and his Motion seeks “a preliminary injunction
that prohibits the United States Capitol Police Board . . . from denying him a permit to hold a
3 prayer vigil attended by twenty-five people on the West Front Lawn on Good Friday of this
year.” PI Motion at 1. The Court assumes that this litigation strategy was meant to remedy
weaknesses pointed out by Defendants in their Opposition to the earlier PI Motion. See Case
No. 21-2314, ECF No. 30. (First Gov. Opp.).
In any event, the Government, with the Court’s permission, has now submitted an
Opposition in this case that “incorporate[s] by reference” its earlier filed Opposition. See ECF
No. 11 (Second Gov. Opp.) at 1; Minute Order of March 22, 2022. Defendants also attached to
each Opposition a declaration by Scott Grossi, the Special Events Section Commander for the
United States Capitol Police, which describes the permitting process that the USCP uses. See
Grossi Decl.
II. Legal Standard
“A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right.” Winter
v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008). “A plaintiff seeking a preliminary
injunction must establish [1] that he is likely to succeed on the merits, [2] that he is likely to
suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, [3] that the balance of equities tips in
his favor, and [4] that an injunction is in the public interest.” Sherley v. Sebelius, 644 F.3d 388,
392 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (alterations in original) (quoting Winter, 555 U.S. at 20). “The moving
party bears the burden of persuasion and must demonstrate, ‘by a clear showing,’ that the
requested relief is warranted.” Hospitality Staffing Solutions, LLC v. Reyes, 736 F. Supp. 2d
192, 197 (D.D.C. 2010) (quoting Chaplaincy of Full Gospel Churches v. England, 454 F.3d 290,
297 (D.C. Cir. 2006)).
Historically, these factors have “been evaluated on a ‘sliding scale.’” Davis v. Pension
Ben. Guar. Corp., 571 F.3d 1288, 1291 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (quoting Davenport v. Int’l Bhd. of
4 Teamsters, 166 F.3d 356, 361 (D.C. Cir. 1999)). In other words, if the movant makes an
“unusually strong showing on one of the factors, then it does not necessarily have to make as
strong a showing on another factor.” Id. at 1291–92. This Circuit has hinted, though not held,
that Winter — which overturned the Ninth Circuit’s “possibility of irreparable harm” standard —
establishes that “likelihood of irreparable harm” and “likelihood of success” are “‘independent,
free-standing requirement[s].’” Sherley, 644 F.3d at 392–93 (quoting Davis, 571 F.3d at 1296
(Kavanaugh, J., concurring)); see League of Women Voters v. Newby, 838 F.3d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir.
2016) (declining to address whether “sliding scale” approach is valid after Winter). At any rate,
our Circuit has held that a failure to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits alone is
sufficient to defeat a preliminary-injunction motion. See Ark. Dairy Co-op Ass’n, Inc. v. U.S.
Dep’t of Agric., 573 F.3d 815, 832 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
III. Analysis
In his initial lawsuit, Plaintiff claimed that Defendants’ denial of his September 11 permit
offended numerous constitutional provisions, as well as RFRA. See Mahoney I, 2022 WL
523009, at *4. As mentioned, however, the Court dismissed most of those counts in its earlier
Opinion, leaving only Fifth Amendment selective-enforcement and First Amendment freedom-
of-assembly counts. Mahoney’s new suit and Motion offload much that was dismissed and focus
on the Equal Protection Clause, although for some reason they still rely on a First Amendment
as-applied challenge as well. See PI Motion at 9. More specifically, he contends that the Traffic
Regulations are not narrowly tailored, that the Board did not apply the regulations in a neutral
manner, and that the denial of Plaintiff’s permit constituted impermissible selective enforcement
under the Equal Protection Clause. See PI Motion at 10, 15, 18. Plaintiff also adds in a footnote
5 that he is “likely to success [sic] on his claims for violation of his rights to association and
assembly.” Id. at 17 n.3.
Although the Government spent much time on selective enforcement in its PI Opposition
in the original case, it makes a somewhat odd tactical choice in the newly filed case. More
specifically, it spills much ink on reiterating that the denial of Mahoney’s permit application
reflects a narrowly tailored restriction under the First Amendment — a position nearly identical
to one the Court already agreed with in its prior Opinion. See Second Gov. Opp. at 6–10;
Mahoney I, 2022 WL 523009, at *4–6. That issue is thus no longer live. Defendants,
meanwhile, neglect entirely to address the selective-enforcement claim. See Second Gov. Opp.
at 5–12. Because they did discuss that issue in their first Opposition, however, and expressly
incorporated that brief here, their arguments concerning selective enforcement are properly
presented. Id. at 1; see First Gov. Opp. at 9–14.
In the analysis that follows, the Court will primarily address Mahoney’s selective-
enforcement claim before briefly taking up his freedom-of-assembly challenge and irreparable
harm. As just mentioned, and despite Plaintiff’s focus in his Reply, the Court will not relitigate
his First Amendment arguments that the Traffic Regulations are not narrowly tailored and that
the Board inconsistently enforced them, given that it already discussed at length and dismissed
essentially identical arguments in its prior Opinion. See Mahoney I, 2022 WL 523009, at *4–7.
With respect to narrow tailoring, the Court rejected the same argument in the context of
Plaintiff’s facial First Amendment challenge, and he does not provide any compelling reason
why the analysis should be different here. Id. at *4–6. Indeed, nowhere does Mahoney even
acknowledge the existence of the earlier Opinion, much less attempt to distinguish it. As for his
argument that the Government did not enforce the regulations in a uniform manner, the Court
6 previously explained why such a claim is better analyzed as a selective-enforcement claim under
the Equal Protection Clause, in which context it will examine the issue here. See Mahoney I,
2022 WL 523009, at *7 (citing Frederick Douglass Found., Inc. v. D.C., No. 20-3346, 2021 WL
3912119, at *4–10 (D.D.C. Sept. 1, 2021)). It will otherwise rest on its prior Opinion to
conclude that Plaintiff has not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of his First
Amendment claims. To the extent that Mahoney wishes the Court to reconsider that prior
decision, the proper vehicle for raising such arguments is a Motion for Reconsideration, which
he has separately filed and the Court will analyze in due course. See Case No. 21-2314, ECF
No. 26.
A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits
Selective Enforcement
Mahoney’s selective-enforcement claim boils down to this: it was unconstitutional for the
Board to deny his permit application to host a demonstration with 20 or more people on the West
Front Lawn while refusing to enforce the same restrictions against Members of Congress. See PI
Motion at 18–21. The Government counters that he was not similarly situated to those allowed
to host such demonstrations, that he was treated the same as those who were similarly situated,
and that his permit denial was not improperly motivated. See First Gov. Opp. at 9–14. The
Court concurs.
“When determining whether the [Equal Protection] Clause has been violated because of
selective enforcement or prosecution, plaintiffs must establish two factors: ‘that (1) [they were]
singled out for prosecution from among others similarly situated and (2) that [the] prosecution
was improperly motivated, i.e., based on race, religion or another arbitrary classification.’”
Frederick Douglass Found., Inc., 2021 WL 3912119, at *7 (quoting Branch Ministries v.
7 Rossotti, 211 F.3d 137, 144 (D.C. Cir. 2000)); see also Wandering Dago, Inc. v. Destito, 879
F.3d 20, 40 (2d Cir. 2018) (applying similar test in selective-enforcement claim based on
viewpoint discrimination); Mahoney I, 2022 WL 523009, at *8. The Court addresses the two
requirements in order.
Parties are “‘similarly situated’ for purposes of a selective enforcement claim ‘when their
circumstances present no distinguishable legitimate prosecutorial factors that might justify
making different prosecutorial decisions with respect to them.’” United States v. AT&T Inc.,
290 F. Supp. 3d 1, 4 (D.D.C. 2018) (quoting Branch Ministries, 211 F.3d at 145); see Frederick
Douglass Found., Inc., 2021 WL 3912119, at *7. In its prior Opinion — at the motion-to-
dismiss stage — the Court held that Mahoney had “plausibly alleged that the Board enforced the
Traffic Regulations against him differently than against others similarly situated.” Mahoney I,
2022 WL 523009, at *8. In denying the Government’s Motion as to selective enforcement, it
reasoned that, taking the Amended Complaint as true and not looking to outside materials,
Plaintiff had sufficiently alleged that “the Board allowed three large demonstrations to go
forward in late summer 2021 on or around the West Front Lawn, while it denied Mahoney’s
application to do the same.” Id. Critical to that conclusion, however, was the Court’s declining
to take judicial notice of the Government’s proffered reason for approving the three large
demonstrations — i.e., “[t]hose demonstrations were not subject to the Traffic Regulations
because they were sponsored or requested by Members of Congress.” Id. Such rationale could
not be considered because it was “premised on facts not alleged in the Amended Complaint.” Id.
As the issue now arrives clothed in different legal raiment — viz., a PI motion, rather
than a motion to dismiss — the Court may look outside the Amended Complaint, particularly at
the Grossi Declaration. There, Grossi acknowledges that several large demonstrations went
8 forward on the West Front Lawn and on the Eastern Steps of the Capitol, but explains that they
were allowed only because they were sponsored or organized by Members of Congress. See
Grossi Decl., ¶¶ 24–29. He points out: “[E]vents sponsored or organized by Members of
Congress are not subject to the rules regarding demonstrations on Capitol Grounds.” Id., ¶ 26.
Plaintiff, meanwhile, does not seriously dispute the veracity of this proffered rationale. See PI
Motion at 18–20. Instead, he argues that this practice is repugnant to the Constitution because
Members and Plaintiff should be regarded as similarly situated. Id. The Court disagrees.
Members of Congress sponsoring or organizing demonstrations on the Capitol Grounds
present “distinguishable legitimate prosecutorial factors that might justify making different
prosecutorial decisions with respect to them.” AT&T Inc., 290 F. Supp. 3d at 4 (quoting Branch
Ministries, 211 F.3d at 145). Consider the numerous ways in which Members are different from
non-Members while on the Capitol Grounds. In such a setting, for instance, the Member is at her
workplace, she enjoys private access to many areas that are otherwise restricted, and she is
carrying out her unique constitutional duties as a legislator and representative of her constituents.
Numerous legal principles recognize this reality and accord Members unique status while on the
Capitol Grounds.
For instance, a statute governing unlawful activities on the Capitol Grounds — which
prohibits, for example, engaging in disruptive or disorderly conduct and carrying firearms on the
Grounds — explicitly exempts Members of Congress from its coverage. See 40 U.S.C.
§ 5104(e)(3). With regard to the Traffic Regulations, the D.C. Circuit held that it was reasonable
for the Capitol Police to believe that the regulations simply do not apply to Members. See Kroll
v. U.S. Capitol Police, 847 F.2d 899, 902–03 (D.C. Cir. 1988). While Kroll addressed the issue
in the context of ruling on whether Capitol Police officers were entitled to qualified immunity
9 and therefore had no occasion to definitively resolve whether Members are in fact exempt from
the regulations, the Court of Appeals did not question the constitutionality of such a regime. Id.
On the contrary, the panel reached its conclusion after observing “the oddity of having the
United States Senate ‘apply’ for a permit from its own Police Board.” Id. at 902. The D.C.
Circuit further observed that the Capitol Police Board’s permit system “by its nature applies to
those outside the Capitol Hill community of Members of Congress (and their staffs).” Id. at 903
(emphasis added). Slightly further afield from the Traffic Regulations, the Speech or Debate
Clause of the Constitution, which the Supreme Court has read “broadly,” Eastland v. U.S.
Servicemen’s Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 501 (1975), insulates Members from liability involving all
“legislative acts,” which “are those ‘generally done in a session of the House by one of its
members in relation to the business before it.’” McCarthy v. Pelosi, 5 F.4th 34, 39 (D.C. Cir.
2021), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 897 (2022) (quoting Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 204
(1880)).
To be sure, the above authorities do not squarely hold that it is permissible for the Board
to deny permits to non-Members seeking to hold large demonstrations on the West Front Lawn
while declining to enforce the same rules against Members of Congress. They do fortify,
however, the intuitive notion that there are legitimate reasons to view Members as different in
relevant ways when enforcing the regulations concerning demonstrations at the Capitol. In
addition to being responsible at some level for the Board and its regulations, Members of
Congress are routinely and uncontroversially treated differently from the general public while
they are present on the Capitol Grounds. That is not to say that Members are above the law at
the Capitol or that they enjoy a similar legal status away from the shelter of the dome, but those
issues are not presented here. Rather, the Court concludes merely that, while on the Capitol
10 Grounds, there are “legitimate prosecutorial factors that might justify making different
prosecutorial decisions with respect to” Members of Congress. AT&T Inc., 290 F. Supp. 3d at 4
(quoting Branch Ministries, 211 F.3d at 145).
Plaintiff resists this conclusion, contending that “[e]vents that are sponsored or requested
by Members of Congress are no different with respect to the Government’s asserted interest
under the Traffic Regulations — security — than events sponsored or requested by other
ordinary Americans.” PI Motion at 18. While the argument has some superficial appeal, it does
not withstand scrutiny. Mahoney himself admits that “the Board may reasonably assume that
Members of Congress themselves are unlikely to present a security threat to the Capitol
Grounds.” Id. (emphasis omitted). And while he questions whether a similar assumption is
warranted with regard to attendees of a demonstration organized or sponsored by Members, it is
reasonable to think that Members have approved the parameters of an event they sponsor and
implicitly invite the attendees. Indeed, bolstering that notion, Grossi explained that at one of the
permitted demonstrations, which was held on the East Steps of the Capitol and sponsored by
Congresswoman Cori Bush and attended by other Members, once “the attendance of these
Members ceased, the remaining demonstrators were told they were in violation of the
demonstration rules and given appropriate warnings.” Grossi Decl., ¶¶ 28–29.
Having concluded that Plaintiff is not similarly situated to the Members of Congress who
organize or sponsor large demonstrations on the West Front Lawn, the Court could end its
analysis. It will nonetheless briefly explain why he has also not established a likelihood of
success on the second prong of a selective-enforcement claim: showing that the “prosecution was
improperly motivated, i.e., based on race, religion or another arbitrary classification.” Frederick
Douglass Found., Inc., 2021 WL 3912119, at *7 (quoting Branch Ministries, 211 F.3d at 144).
11 Insofar as Plaintiff argues that any alleged improper motivation stems from an arbitrary
distinction between Members and non-Members, the above analysis applies with equal force —
viz., the distinction is not arbitrary because exempting Members from the restriction on large
demonstrations in certain areas of the Capitol Grounds is solidly based. And aside from that
legitimate differentiation, Mahoney has not established that the Board’s denial of his permit
application discriminated on an otherwise impermissible basis.
The Government’s treatment of other would-be demonstrators confirms that its
application of the regulations to Mahoney was not improperly motivated. There is no genuine
dispute that, in summer 2021, all applicants not sponsored by Members of Congress seeking to
hold demonstrations with more than 19 people on the West Front Lawn were not granted a
permit. See Case No. 21-2314, ECF No. 30-1 (Grossi Decl. of March 16, 2022), ¶ 17. These
unsuccessful applicants represented a range of political groups hoping to speak on a number of
different topics, yet none of them was allowed to hold a large demonstration because they were
not organized or sponsored by a Member. Id. Any lingering doubt about whether the Board’s
decision was based on anything other than Mahoney’s status as a non-Member is further allayed
by Grossi’s explanation that the Board began enforcing the regulations as to Congresswoman
Bush’s demonstration on the Eastern Steps as soon as the Members were no longer present. See
Grossi Decl., ¶¶ 28–29.
In short, Plaintiff has not established that he is likely to succeed on the merits of his claim
that Defendants violated the Equal Protection Clause by selectively enforcing the Traffic
Regulations against him.
12 Freedom of Assembly
Mahoney’s sole remaining claim is that Defendants violated his constitutional right to
assembly. See PI Motion at 17 n.3. In its prior Opinion, the Court noted that “[t]he precise
contours of the claim are not terribly clear, as both parties treat it as a corollary of the [selective-
enforcement] claim previously discussed and address the issue only in a footnote.” Mahoney I,
2022 WL 523009, at *9. It declined to dismiss the claim, however, on the ground that the parties
agreed that the claim “should rise and fall” with Mahoney’s selective-enforcement count. Id.
Here, the Court is left in the same position as before: Plaintiff addresses the count only in
a footnote and concurs that its fate should be dictated by that of his other claim. See PI Motion
at 17 n.3. As they rose together in the last round, so do they fall together in this one. That
conclusion is fortified by the reality that while the Court previously noted “the Government’s
lack of a showing [why] the claim should be dismissed,” Mahoney I, 2022 WL 523009, at *9,
here Mahoney is the movant and he “must establish . . . that he is likely to succeed on the
merits.” Sherley, 644 F.3d at 392 (quoting Winter, 555 U.S. at 20). By neglecting to address the
claim in any detail, he has not carried that burden. See Fresno Cmty. Hosp. & Med. Ctr. v.
Cochran, 987 F.3d 158, 163 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (quoting CTS Corp. v. EPA, 759 F.3d 52, 64 (D.C.
Cir. 2014)) (“Footnotes, of course, are ‘no place to make a substantive legal argument.’”).
Likely failure on each of his counts dooms this Motion. See Ark. Dairy Co-op, 573 F.3d
at 832 (because appellants “have shown no likelihood of success on the merits,” “this court need
not proceed to review the other three preliminary injunction factors”); Frederick Douglass
Found., Inc. v. D.C., 531 F. Supp. 3d 316, 345 (D.D.C. 2021) (“As Plaintiffs have not
established a likelihood of success on any of their claims, the Court need not address the
remaining preliminary-injunction factors.”); Adams v. District of Columbia, 285 F. Supp. 3d
13 381, 397 (D.D.C. 2018). That said, the Court believes it also worthwhile to address the
irreparable-harm factor, on which the parties also focus. See Second Gov. Opp. at 12; ECF No.
13 (Reply) at 11–14.
B. Irreparable Harm
Mahoney contends that “because he will be forced to forgo holding his proposed Good
Friday prayer vigil before the Court can fully resolve his claims, he has established irreparable
harm.” PI Motion at 21. What that assertion neglects to engage with, however, is that even
without obtaining an injunction, Plaintiff remains free to hold a prayer vigil on Good Friday on
the Capitol Grounds, either on the West Front Lawn with 19 or fewer people, or a stone’s throw
away with more attendees. See Grossi Decl., ¶¶ 18–21. Indeed, the Board reiterated to Mahoney
that it “would be happy to work with [him] on selecting an alternate location from the available
areas on U.S. Capitol Grounds,” id., ¶ 21, and it offered him “the opportunity to relocate his
group to Area 15 for the same day, informing him that Area 15, like Area 1, offers west front
views of the U.S. Capitol.” Id., ¶ 19. There is no dispute, moreover, that even if an injunction is
not entered, Mahoney can proceed with a prayer vigil in his desired location on the West Front
Lawn (in Area 1) with 19 or fewer people. Id., ¶ 14.
In light of that reality — as well as Plaintiff’s vague and conclusory allegations of harm
from being forced to trim his vigil or relocate nearby — the Court has doubts that he has
established irreparable harm in the absence of an injunction. Mahoney’s declaration, for
example, makes no concrete reference to precisely how he will be irreparably harmed. See
Mahoney Decl., ¶¶ 19–21. As the Court previously explained in the context of discussing why
the Traffic Regulations leave open ample alternative channels of communication, “Plaintiff
remain[s] free to demonstrate with fewer than 20 people in his desired location, and with 20 or
14 more in most of the numbered areas on the Capitol Grounds. In fact, some of those areas are
across the street from Capitol Square and, like the West Front Lawn, also have prominent views
of the Capitol, and Plaintiff offers no substantive reason why they are not of essentially
equivalent utility.” Mahoney I, 2022 WL 523009, at *6 (citations omitted). “Because Plaintiff[]
remain[s] ‘free to engage in a rich variety of expressive activities’ and retain[s] ‘a multitude of
possibilities for meaningful protest,’ it matters not that the [Government] curbed but a single
form of such potential expression.” Frederick Douglass Found., Inc., 531 F. Supp. 3d at 338
(quoting White House Vigil for ERA Comm. v. Clark, 746 F.2d 1518, 1528 (D.C. Cir. 1984));
cf. Lederman v. United States, 291 F.3d 36, 46 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (explaining that it likely would
be constitutional for the Board to “require permits for demonstrations on the sidewalk [at the foot
of the steps on the East Front of the Capitol], limit the duration of such demonstrations, restrict
the number of individuals who may demonstrate simultaneously, require that demonstrators
present bags and other personal possessions to police officers for screening, or prohibit activities
likely to attract large crowds”).
Of course, the prior Opinion’s analysis focused on whether Mahoney had alleged a
plausible First Amendment violation on the merits. The reasoning nonetheless may well apply
with similar force here, as Plaintiff has likely not established how he would be irreparably
harmed by holding a vigil in his desired location with 19 people, or at an adjacent site with a
larger group. Ultimately, the Court need not decide this question as he has not demonstrated a
likelihood of success on the merits. See Ark. Dairy Co-op, 573 F.3d at 832.
15 IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will deny Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary
Injunction. A separate Order so stating will issue this day.
/s/ James E. Boasberg JAMES E. BOASBERG United States District Judge Date: April 5, 2022