Maher v. Harris Trust & Savings Bank

75 F.3d 1182, 1996 WL 44387
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
DecidedFebruary 5, 1996
DocketNo. 95-1103
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 75 F.3d 1182 (Maher v. Harris Trust & Savings Bank) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Maher v. Harris Trust & Savings Bank, 75 F.3d 1182, 1996 WL 44387 (7th Cir. 1996).

Opinion

CUMMINGS, Circuit Judge.

The issue in this case is whether the creation of trusts established to provide deferred compensation to a bank’s top execufives, and bonuses paid to those executives, violated 12 C.F.R. §§ 563.89 and 563.39-1 (1987). Those sections prohibit thrift institutions from establishing pension plans and entering employment contracts that “could lead to material financial loss or damage” to the bank. Because we agree that the trusts and bonuses violated those sections, we affirm the district court’s decision.

Background

On May 19,1987, the Board of Directors of Horizon Federal Savings Bank, F.S.B. (“Horizon”), a mutual savings institution in Wilmette, Illinois, approved the establishment of trusts to fund benefits under deferred compensation agreements with plaintiffs John R. Gravee, Horizon’s President and Chief Executive Officer, and Jerome A. Maher, Horizon’s Vice Chairman. Under the terms of the deferred compensation agreements, Gravee and Maher became entitled, upon termination or death, to an amount of trust proceeds at a rate of twenty percent per year, dating from 1985. However, under the terms of the ' trusts, commonly known as “rabbi trusts,” Horizon continued to own the trust property for tax purposes and the property remained subject to the claims of Horizon’s creditors. Thus plaintiffs’ interests in the rabbi trusts were essentially those of unsecured general creditors.

In May of 1988, Horizon’s Board of Directors approved the conversion of the rabbi trusts to “secular trusts.” Under the secular trusts, Gravee and Maher constructively received the trust funds. In other words, the trust property was no longer a part of Horizon’s general assets and thus was not available to Horizon’s creditors. In establishing the secular trusts, and paying $340,387 in withholding for income taxes owed by Gravee and Maher as a result of the transaction, Horizon removed $1,114,024 of its capital from creditors’ reach in 1988.

At the time Horizon created the secular trusts, its balance sheet and income projections were positive. However, Horizon’s [1186]*1186profitability was illusory; in reality, it was experiencing significant capital difficulties as a result of a number of factors. First, Horizon was nearing the end of the positive effects it experienced as a result of “purchase accounting.” Horizon was formed in 1982 when three troubled thrifts were merged into First Federal Savings and Loan Association of Wilmette, then becoming Horizon. Under accounting methods allowed for this transaction, known as “purchase accounting,” the assets of the acquired thrifts were given a balance sheet value that reflected the price the assets would receive if sold in the market at that time. This resulted in a “purchase accounting discount” on Horizon’s interest-earning assets of about $80 million, which yielded “discounting income” to Horizon as the value was reduced at an accelerated pace in the following years. Because Horizon’s merged liabilities exceeded the fair market value of its merged assets, purchase accounting provided that Horizon had a “goodwill” asset on its balance sheet to equate its assets and liabilities. Horizon chose to amortize that goodwill over a 40-year period, producing a yearly expense of about $2.9 million. In the years directly following the merger, the income resulting from “discounting income” substantially exceeded the goodwill expense, creating a positive effect on Horizon’s financial statements. However, as the purchase accounting discount was depleted, the discounting income dropped below the value of the goodwill expense, resulting in a negative impact. The district court found that “it should have been clear from the time of the merger to anyone who looked into the matter, that the net effect would become irreversibly negative during fiscal year 1989.” [Opinion and Order dated January 14, 1993, p. 8].

Additionally, much of Horizon’s profits in the few profitable years following the merger were the result of non-recurring sales of mortgage-backed assets. From 1985 through 1987, interest rates in' the United States declined significantly. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 1994, p. 525 (indicating that the effective rate on Federal funds fell from 10.23% in 1984 to 6.66% in 1987). This allowed Horizon to sell a large amount of its mortgage-backed securities at substantial profits. These sales depleted much of the potential benefits of the purchase accounting methods described above: When Horizon sold interest-earning assets carrying a purchase accounting discount, the discount associated with those assets was removed from the books and Horizon lost the future discount accretion income that would have been derived from those assets. These sales accelerated the date when the purchase accounting effect would turn from positive to negative.

Horizon’s income projections during this time were also overly optimistic. In April 1988, at the same time Horizon published a four-year Strategic Plan that reflected a healthy .5 percent return on assets, the Board approved Horizon’s actual budget for the fiscal 1988-1989 year, which predicted a return of only .36 percent. The substantially lower anticipated return on the actual budget existed because of a new accounting rule that would soon come into effect. The Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987 (“CEBA”) required the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (“FHLBB”) to establish uniform accounting standards to be used by thrift institutions in determining compliance with FHLBB capitalization regulations. CEBA § 402(a), 101 Stat. 606. In January 1988, the FHLBB announced that it would require insured thrifts to account for all loan origination and commitment fees incurred after the first day of fiscal year 1989 in accordance with the Financial Accounting Standards Board Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 91 (“FASB 91”).1 Under FASB 91, Horizon would be required to defer $1.5 million in loan fee income during the first two quarters of fiscal 1989. When the defendants’ expert witness, John Thoms, a certified public accountant, changed the operating plan to take into account FASB 91, it was apparent that the .5 percent return on assets would be unattainable.

By June 30, 1989, Horizon had become deficient in its capital by over $8 million. On [1187]*1187July 8, 1989, Horizon’s Board concluded that “unless economic conditions were such that Horizon had extraordinarily good earning during the next few years, the probability was that Horizon would not remain an independent mutual financial institution.” Nonetheless, in August 1989 Horizon’s Board approved bonuses for Gravee and Maher in the amounts of $50,000 and $42,000, respectively.

The final straw for Horizon came when Congress enacted the Financial Institution Reform Recovery and Enforcement Act (“FIRREA”) in August of 1989. Under accounting principles prescribed under FIR-REA, Horizon was no longer permitted to include the remaining goodwill asset from the 1982 merger in calculating its regulatory capital requirements. Primarily as a result, the Office of Thrift Supervision (“OTS”) determined that Horizon had insufficient capital to meet the new FIRREA guidelines and an inadequate plan for overcoming that deficiency. On January 11, 1990, Horizon was placed in receivership by the OTS and the Resolution Trust Company (“RTC”) was appointed as receiver.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
75 F.3d 1182, 1996 WL 44387, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/maher-v-harris-trust-savings-bank-ca7-1996.