Maher-App & Co. v. The United States

418 F.2d 922, 57 C.C.P.A. 31, 1969 CCPA LEXIS 231
CourtCourt of Customs and Patent Appeals
DecidedDecember 4, 1969
DocketCustoms Appeal 5324
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 418 F.2d 922 (Maher-App & Co. v. The United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Customs and Patent Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Maher-App & Co. v. The United States, 418 F.2d 922, 57 C.C.P.A. 31, 1969 CCPA LEXIS 231 (ccpa 1969).

Opinions

ALMOND, Judge.

Maher-App & Co., et al., importers, appeal from the decision and judgment of the United States Customs Court1 overruling the eight consolidated protests against classification of the imported merchandise by the Collector of Customs for the Port of New Orleans,

[923]*923Louisiana. Involved in the protest are five and eight pound balls- of henequen or sisal twine, described on the invoices as “binder twine,” and assessed with duty at the rate of 15 per centum ad valorem under the provisions for cords and twines in paragraph 1005(b) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as modified by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, T.D. 51802. Appellants contend that the merchandise is entitled to entry free of duty as binding twine under the provisions of paragraph 1622 of said Act, as modified by Public Law 82-219, 65 Stat. 655 (1951).

The relevant statutory provisions are:

Paragraph 1005, supra:

Cords and twines (whether or not composed of three or more strands, each strand composed of two or more yarns), tarred or untarred, single or plied, wholly or in chief value of manila (abaca), sisal, henequen, or other hard fiber........ 15% ad val.

Paragraph 1622, supra:

All binding twine, and twine chiefly used for baling hay, straw, and other fodder and bedding materials, manufactured from New Zealand hemp, henequen, manila, istle or Tampico fiber, sisal grass, or sunn, or a mixture of any two or more of them, of single ply and measuring not exceeding seven hundred and fifty feet to the pound............ Free

The issue calling for resolution here is whether the instant importation constitutes such twine as falls within the description “binding twine” within the purview of said paragraph 1622 or, aided by the attendant presumption, constitutes a commodity as classified under paragraph 1005(b) by the Collector of Customs.

As noted by the court below, the question posed is by no means novel in the area of the construction and application of tariff legislation as evidenced by the deliverances of this and the Customs Court in such cases as: United States v. Geo. Wm. Rueff, Inc., 41 CCPA 95, C.A.D. 535 (1953); Bob Stone Cordage Co. v. United States, 51 CCPA 60, C.A.D. 838 (1964); Geo. Wm. Rueff, Inc. v. United States, 72 Treas. Dec. 290, T.D. 49151 (1937); Independent Cordage Co., Inc. v. United States, 3 Cust. Ct. 157, C.D. 223 (1939); Alberto Vales v. United States, 9 Cust.Ct. 219, C.D. 698 (1942).

In the Geo. Wm. Rueff case this court noted the comprehensive sweep of paragraph 1622, holding that importations of baler twine approximating 200 feet to the pound and chiefly used for baling hay, came within the scope of the provision for “all binding twine.” The decision indicated that paragraph 1622 would encompass all twine made from the material enumerated therein which did not exceed the limitation of 750 feet to the pound and chiefly used in the agricultural pursuit of tying grains or harvesting.

In the Bob Stone Cordage case this court affirmed the overruling of a protest asserting that merchandise invoiced as “binder twine” was such twine as was encompassed by paragraph 1622 on the principal ground of a failure to show that the uses of the importation were chiefly agricultural. The court’s decision was predicated on a combination of factors, succinctly and fairly analyzed, we think, in the lower court’s opinion in the instant appeal as follows:

First, plaintiffs’ witnesses testified that twine which fell more than 5 percent below 500 feet to the pound [924]*924would not be acceptable as binder twine. Second, reports from Government chemists that samples of the merchandise in issue measured from 352 to 473 feet per pound were not disputed. Third, none of the witnesses could testify that the merchandise in issue conformed to the acknowledged standard of 500 feet per pound, nor could they state that nonconforming twine would consciously be used for binding purposes in farm operations. The court also was of the opinion that the witnesses lacked familiarity with the disputed importation and that the testimony concerning other binder twine did not cover a geographical area broad enough to support a showing of chief use.

A vital deficiency from the standpoint of appellants’ proof in Bob Stone Cordage was a failure to correlatively adapt the testimony of its witnesses to the importation in issue which the record fairly indicated to be of a variety yielding less than 475 feet per pound and thus a class or kind other than standard binder twine.

The issues in Bob Stone Cordage bear striking similarity to those which confront us here. There, as here, no samples of the imported merchandise were before the court, the exhibits were all illustrative and no testimony was introduced that any of the goods imported actually went into agricultural use.

In the proceedings below in the instant case, plaintiffs introduced a formidable array of witnesses knowledgeable in their areas of endeavors. It may well be said that theirs was a valiant effort to meet the criteria of proof, lacking which proved fatal to plaintiffs in Bob Stone Cordage. As noted by the court below, the testimony of these witnesses with regard to recognized binder twine was related to four areas, viz., the events surrounding the classification of the twine, its manufacture and physical characteristics, the merchandising process and the use of the twine.

V. J. Peuler who, as customs line examiner at the port of New Orleans, had advisorily classified the merchandise in six of the eight consolidated protests herein was called for the purpose of adducing those factors which induced him to deny duty-free status to the items involved. As stated by the' trial court, he “was unable to recall the details of these proceedings or to state to what extent the lengths per pound reported by "the customs laboratory were determinative of his advisory classification.”

A. E. Hodapp, chemist and chief of the Organic Division of the Customs Laboratory at New Orleans, stated that samples of items invoiced as binder twine were analyzed under his supervision for weight, oil content, and length per pound. He stated that plaintiffs’ illustrative exhibits 1, 2, and 3 possessed certain characteristics of twine that measured five hundred feet per pound. However, the reports of the laboratory attached to the invoices on the entries involved herein reveal that the lengths of the sampled balls ranged from 379 to 473 feet per pound.

It is pertinent to here point out that plaintiffs’ illustrative exhibits 1-5, inclusive, were simply representative of the general characteristics of that class of goods acknowledged as binder twine. They were not samples of the importation in issue nor was their length-weight ratio established.

Mixel J. Jaeobo, foreign sales manager of an organization of Mexican cordage manufacturers, testified regarding the manufacture and physical characteristics of binder twine that it is single ply made of sisal or henequen fiber, oiled, treated with rodent and insect repellent and that while the nature of the manufacturing process made some fluctuations in the length-weight ratio unavoidable, it is nevertheless manufactured to yield 500 feet per pound and is understood to be 500 feet per pound. The testimony of the other trade witnesses generally coincided with that of Jaeobo to the effect that when ordering binder twine it was [925]

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Maher-App & Co. v. The United States
418 F.2d 922 (Customs and Patent Appeals, 1969)

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Bluebook (online)
418 F.2d 922, 57 C.C.P.A. 31, 1969 CCPA LEXIS 231, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/maher-app-co-v-the-united-states-ccpa-1969.