MAGSIL CORP. v. Seagate Technology

692 F. Supp. 2d 402, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69352, 2010 WL 745454
CourtDistrict Court, D. Delaware
DecidedMarch 1, 2010
DocketCivil Action 08-940
StatusPublished

This text of 692 F. Supp. 2d 402 (MAGSIL CORP. v. Seagate Technology) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Delaware primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
MAGSIL CORP. v. Seagate Technology, 692 F. Supp. 2d 402, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69352, 2010 WL 745454 (D. Del. 2010).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM

BARTLE, Chief Judge.

Plaintiffs MagSil Corporation and Massachusetts Institute of Technology bring this action against defendants Western Digital Corporation, Western Digital Technologies Inc., Hitachi Global Storage Technologies Inc., Hitachi America Ltd., Hitachi Data Systems Corporation, and Shenzhen ExcelStor Technology, Ltd. 1 for infringement of U.S. Patent No. 5,629,922 (the “'922 patent”), entitled “Electron Tunneling Device Using Ferromagnetic Thin Films.”

Now before the court are the parties’ proposed constructions for disputed terms in claims 1, 23, and 29 of the '922 patent. The parties briefed their respective positions, and on February 4, 2010 the court held a Markman hearing. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 116 S.Ct. 1384, 134 L.Ed.2d 577 (1996).

The '922 patent pertains to the use of electron tunneling, which is “a quantum phenomenon in which electric current can pass from one electrode through a thin insulating barrier layer into a second electrode.” '922 patent at 1:18-20. The strength of the resistance exhibited by the electrical current flowing between the electrodes is dependent on the relative magnetization directions of those electrodes. The resistance is lowest when their magnetization directions are parallel to one another, and it is highest when they are antiparallel. The level of resistance can therefore be controlled by manipulating the relative alignment of the magnetization directions of the electrodes. The patent contemplates that the invention could be used in memory or sensor devices such as computer hard drives. 2

I.

The Patent Act requires all patents to include “one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention.” 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006). Interpretation of the terms within each claim is a matter of law which must be decided by the court. Markman, 517 U.S. at 391, 116 S.Ct. 1384; 02 Micro Int’l Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co., 521 F.3d 1351, 1361 (Fed.Cir.2008).

“It is a ‘bedrock principle’ of patent law that ‘the claims of a patent define the invention to which the patentee is entitled the right to exclude.’ ” Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed.Cir.2005) (quoting Innova/Pure Water, Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Systems, Inc., 381 F.3d 1111, 1115 (Fed.Cir.2004)). Accordingly, “we look first to the words of the claims themselves, both asserted and nonasserted, to define the scope of the patented invention.” Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed.Cir.1996). Words in a claim are generally given their “ordinary and customary mean *406 ing,” that is, “the meaning that the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of the invention, i.e., as of the effective filing date of the patent application.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313.

As would the person of ordinary skill in the art, we read the claim terms in context, including not only the particular claims in which the terms appear but also in the context of the entire patent, including the specification and, if in evidence, the prosecution history. Id. For example, the doctrine of claim differentiation provides that when a broadly drafted independent claim is followed by a dependent claim that adds a particular limitation, a presumption arises “that the limitation in question is not found in the independent claim.” Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 358 F.3d 898, 910 (Fed.Cir.2004).

In addition to the context provided by the claims themselves, the patent specification is an invaluable resource during the interpretive process. The specification is defined in the Patent Act as:

a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.

35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006). As the Federal Circuit instructs, “the specification ‘is always highly relevant to the claim construction analysis. Usually it is dispositive; it is the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term.’ ” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1315 (quoting Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582). The specification may reveal that the patentee has given a particular claim term a special definition which differs from its ordinary meaning. In such a ease, “the inventor’s lexicography governs.” Id. at 1316. Similarly, “the specification may reveal an intentional disclaimer, or disavowal, of claim scope by the inventor.” Id.

Although the specification can shed light on the meaning of claim terms, “it is improper to read a limitation from the specification into the claims.” Liebel-Flarsheim, 358 F.3d at 904. However, “ ‘there is sometimes a fine line between reading a claim in light of the specification, and reading a limitation into the claim from the specification.’ ” Id. (quoting Comark Commc’ns, Inc. v. Harris Corp., 156 F.3d 1182, 1186-87 (Fed.Cir.1998)).

The danger of reading limitations into the claims is of particular concern when examining the preferred embodiments. The Federal Circuit has “repeatedly warned against confining the claims to [the] embodiments” and has “expressly rejected the contention that if a patent describes only a single embodiment, the claims of the patent must be construed as being limited to that embodiment.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1323. Rather, “[e]ven when the specification describes only a single embodiment, the claims of the patent will not be read restrictively unless the patentee has demonstrated a clear intention to limit the claim scope using ‘words or expressions of manifest exclusion or restriction.’ ” Liebel-Flarsheim, 358 F.3d at 906 (quoting Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa N. Am. Corp.,

Related

Vitronics Corporation v. Conceptronic, Inc.
90 F.3d 1576 (Federal Circuit, 1996)
Comark Communications, Inc. v. Harris Corporation
156 F.3d 1182 (Federal Circuit, 1998)
In Re Cruciferous Sprout Litigation
301 F.3d 1343 (Federal Circuit, 2002)
The Gillette Company v. Energizer Holdings, Inc.
405 F.3d 1367 (Federal Circuit, 2005)
Roche Diagnostics Operations, Inc. v. Abbott Diabetes Care
667 F. Supp. 2d 429 (D. Delaware, 2009)

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