Maffick LLC v. Facebook Inc.

District Court, N.D. California·Decided September 3, 2020·No. 3:20-cv-05222·Unknown

Opinion

MAFFICK LLC, Case No. 20-cv-05222-JD

Plaintiff, ORDER RE APPLICATION FOR v. TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER

FACEBOOK, INC., Re: Dkt. No. 3 Defendant.

Plaintiff Maffick LLC seeks a temporary restraining order directing defendant Facebook, Inc., to take down a “Russia state-controlled media” label that Facebook posted on Maffick’s “In the Now,” “Waste-Ed” and “Soapbox” pages. Dkt. No. 3. A TRO is denied, and the Court will set the case for trial on an expedited schedule. A temporary restraining order enjoins conduct pending a hearing on a preliminary injunction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b). When, as here, “notice of a motion for a temporary restraining order is given to the adverse party, the same legal standard as a motion for a preliminary injunction applies.” Fang v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., No. 16-cv- 06071-JD, 2016 WL 9275454, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 10, 2016), aff’d, 694 F. App’x 561 (9th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted). The Supreme Court has emphasized that injunctive relief is “an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right.” Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008). “A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” Alliance for the Wild Alternatively, a preliminary injunction may issue where “serious questions going to the merits were raised and the balance of hardships tips sharply in plaintiff’s favor,” if the plaintiff “also shows that there is a likelihood of irreparable injury and that the injunction is in the public interest.” Id. at 1135. This reflects our circuit’s “sliding scale” approach, in which “the elements of the preliminary injunction test are balanced, so that a stronger showing of one element may offset a weaker showing of another.” Id. at 1131; see also Arc of California v. Douglas, 757 F.3d 975, 983 (9th Cir. 2014). In all cases, at an “irreducible minimum,” the party seeking an injunction “must demonstrate a fair chance of success on the merits, or questions serious enough to require litigation.” Pimentel v. Dreyfus, 670 F.3d 1096, 1105-06 (9th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation and citation omitted); see also Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733, 740 (9th Cir. 2015) (“The first factor under Winter is the most important -- likely success on the merits.”). Because of this importance, when “a plaintiff has failed to show the likelihood of success on the merits, we need not consider the remaining three [Winter elements].” Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted). Maffick’s TRO application also raises a concern about prior restraint. A court order that forbids speech activities, which is what Maffick seeks, is a “classic prior restraint of speech.” Garcia, 786 F.3d at 747 (citing Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 550 (1993)). “Prior restraints pose the ‘most serious and the least tolerable infringement on First Amendment rights,’” and there is a “historical and heavy presumption against such restraints.” Id. (citation omitted). Although Maffick asserted six causes of action against Facebook in its complaint, Dkt. No. 1, it seeks a TRO on just four of those claims: (1) libel under California Civil Code Section 45; (2) Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act (15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A)); (3) the California Unfair Competition Law (Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200); and (4) interference with prospective economic advantage claim under California state law. Dkt. No. 3-1 at 11-18. The merits inquiry is considerably streamlined by the fact that all four claims hinge on the proposition that the Russian media label is false. See Dkt. No. 3-1 at 11 (for libel claim, asserting clearly fits the definition” of libel in Cal. Civil Code § 45); id. at 14 (for Lanham Act § 43(a) claim, arguing “Facebook’s conduct fits squarely within the statutory prohibition” because “Facebook made a false representation of fact.”); id. at 17 (UCL claim “likely to succeed for the same reasons as its Lanham Act claims.”); id. at 18 (for interference with prospective economic advantage claim, asserting that “[a]s a result of Facebook’s false designation of Maffick’s social media pages as ‘Russia state-controlled media,’ Maffick’s viewer[s] have been misled, Maffick’s monetization from its Facebook pages for the month of July 2020 dropped by 50% and its viewership and ‘reach’ have decreased dramatically.”). Consequently, to win a TRO, Maffick must demonstrate that it is likely to succeed in showing that the “Russia state-controlled media” label is false. It has not crossed that threshold. Even assuming that the “Russia state-controlled media” label is a statement of fact -- and not merely an opinion, as Facebook contends -- the record before the Court establishes only that the question of falsity is disputed. Facebook, on its part, has tendered a substantial amount of evidence in support of its view that Maffick is linked to the Russian government. For example, Facebook has established, without dispute by Maffick, that a prior entity, Maffick Media GmbH (“Maffick Media”), openly acknowledged significant ties to the Russian government. See, e.g., Dkt. No. 10-5. Maffick’s Soapbox, Waste-Ed, and In the Now channels on Facebook are virtually identical to the same channels Maffick Media previously sponsored under the same names. Id.; Dkt. No. 10-1.1 Maffick still uses Maffick Media email addresses for these channels -- “hello@maffick.media” for In the Now; “waste-ed@maffick.media” for Waste-Ed; and “soapbox@maffick.media” for Soapbox. Dkt. No. 10-10. Maffick’s current CEO, Anissa Naouai, expressly stated in a declaration accompanying the TRO application that she “owned a 49% interest” in Maffick Media, and that another “part-owner” was an entity known as Ruptly GmbH. Dkt. No. 3-2 ¶ 15. Facebook submitted evidence that Ruptly is a subsidiary of RT (formerly Russia Today), which is “funded by the Russian government.” Dkt. No. 10-1; Dkt. No. 10-6. A 1 Maffick’s hearsay objection to Facebook’s evidence, Dkt. No. 17, is overruled. See Johnson v. Couturier, 572 F.3d 1067, 1083 (9th Cir. 2009) (“A district court may . . . consider hearsay in “2017 report from the U.S. Director of National Intelligence about Russia’s meddling in the 2016 U.S. presidential election” stated that “RT is considered the ‘Kremlin’s principal international propaganda outlet.’” Dkt. No. 10-1. When Facebook temporarily suspended these pages in February 2019, “RT’s editor-in-chief, Margarita Simonyan, tweeted . . . : ‘Facebook has blocked our projects with billions of views!!!’” Dkt. No. 10-5. Naouai’s reply declaration also states that while she is a United States citizen, she lived for years in Moscow, was employed by Russia Today, and hosted an opinion show for RT called “In the Now.” Dkt. No. 17-1 ¶¶ 5-9. This is a considerable amount of evidence in Facebook’s favor, and Maffick does not meaningfully contest it. Rather than challenging this evidence directly, Maffick relies almost entirely on declarations by Naouai, its CEO. For the most part, the declarations offer purely conclu

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