Madison v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration

• Court: District Court, D. Arizona
• Decided: September 22, 2025
• Docket: 2:24-cv-02421
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 Desiree Madison, No. CV-24-02421-PHX-DWL

10 Plaintiff, ORDER

11 v.

12 Commissioner of Social Security Administration, 13 Defendant. 14 15 Plaintiff challenges the denial of her application for benefits under the Social 16 Security Act (“the Act”) by the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration 17 (“Commissioner”). The Court has reviewed Plaintiff’s opening brief (Doc. 10) and the 18 Commissioner’s answering brief (Doc. 17), as well as the Administrative Record (Docs. 8- 19 9, “AR”), and now affirms the Administrative Law Judge’s (“ALJ”) decision. 20 I. Procedural History 21 Plaintiff filed an application for Title II disability and disability insurance benefits 22 (“DIB”) on March 3, 2021, eventually alleging a disability onset date of February 1, 2023. 23 (AR at 15.) The Social Security Administration (“SSA”) denied Plaintiff’s application at 24 the initial and reconsideration levels. (Id.) On January 17, 2024, following a telephonic 25 hearing, the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision. (Id. at 15-25.) The Appeals Council later 26 denied review. (Id. at 1-3.) 27 II. The Sequential Evaluation Process and Judicial Review 28 To determine whether a claimant is disabled for purposes of the Act, the ALJ 1 follows a five-step process. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a). The claimant bears the burden of 2 proof at the first four steps, but the burden shifts to the Commissioner at step five. Tackett 3 v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999). At the first step, the ALJ determines whether 4 the claimant has engaged in substantial, gainful work activity. 20 C.F.R. 5 § 416.920(a)(4)(i). At step two, the ALJ determines whether the claimant has a “severe” 6 medically determinable physical or mental impairment. Id. § 416.920(a)(4)(ii). At step 7 three, the ALJ considers whether the claimant’s impairment or combination of impairments 8 meets or medically equals an impairment listed in Appendix 1 to Subpart P of 20 C.F.R. 9 Part 404. Id. § 416.920(a)(4)(iii). If so, the claimant is disabled. Id. If not, the ALJ 10 assesses the claimant’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”) and proceeds to step four, 11 where the ALJ determines whether the claimant is still capable of performing past relevant 12 work. Id. § 416.920(a)(4)(iv). If not, the ALJ proceeds to the fifth and final step, where 13 the ALJ determines whether the claimant can perform any other work in the national 14 economy based on the claimant’s RFC, age, education, and work experience. Id. 15 § 416.920(a)(4)(v). If not, the claimant is disabled. Id. 16 An ALJ’s factual findings “shall be conclusive if supported by substantial 17 evidence.” Biestek v. Berryhill, 587 U.S. 97, 102 (2019) (internal quotations omitted). The 18 Court may set aside the Commissioner’s disability determination only if it is not supported 19 by substantial evidence or is based on legal error. Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th 20 Cir. 2007). Substantial evidence is relevant evidence that a reasonable person might accept 21 as adequate to support a conclusion considering the record as a whole. Id. Generally, 22 “[w]here the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, one of which 23 supports the ALJ’s decision, the ALJ’s conclusion must be upheld.” Thomas v. Barnhart, 24 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted). In determining whether to reverse 25 an ALJ’s decision, the district court reviews only those issues raised by the party 26 challenging the decision. Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 517 n.13 (9th Cir. 2001). 27 III. The ALJ’s Decision 28 The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial, gainful work 1 activity since the alleged amended onset date and that Plaintiff had the following severe 2 impairments: “lumbago and degenerative changes of the cervical spine, anxiety, 3 depression/bi-polar, post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and personality disorder.” (AR 4 at 17-18.)1 5 Next, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff’s impairments did not meet or medically 6 equal a listing. (Id. at 18-20.) Next, the ALJ calculated Plaintiff’s RFC as follows: 7 [T]he claimant had the residual functional capacity to perform light work as 8 defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) except she should never climb ropes, ladders or scaffolds. She could frequently climb ramps and stairs, balance, stoop, 9 kneel, crouch, and crawl. She should avoid concentrated exposure to 10 unprotected heights and moving and dangerous machinery. She was able to understand, remember, and carry out simple instructions and tasks. She 11 could respond appropriately to supervisors and co-workers in a task-oriented setting where contact with others was no more than occasional. She should 12 not work in a setting with constant/regular contact with the general public or 13 more than occasional handling of customer complaints. 14 (Id. at 20.) 15 As part of this RFC determination, the ALJ evaluated Plaintiff’s symptom 16 testimony, concluding that Plaintiff’s “statements concerning the intensity, persistence and 17 limiting effects of [her] symptoms were not entirely consistent with the medical evidence 18 and other evidence in the record for the reasons explained in this decision.” (Id. at 23.) 19 The ALJ also evaluated opinion evidence from various medical sources, concluding 20 as follows: (1) Dr. Rubin, state agency reviewing physician (“persuasive”); (2) Dr. Meier, 21 state agency reviewing physician (“persuasive”); (3) Dr. Mallik, state agency reviewing 22 physician (“persuasive”); and (4) Dr. Kuge, state agency reviewing physician 23 (“persuasive”). (Id. at 22-23.) The ALJ clarified that “[w]hile the undersigned has not 24 adopted these opinions verbatim, the limitation to a range of light work that was simple, 25 unskilled and limited her social interactions was generally consistent with the restrictions 26 27 1 The ALJ also determined that Plaintiff had the non-severe impairments of 28 “refractive visual error; history of hematuria; indigestion; fatty liver; remote history of hepatitis C; osteoporosis; idiopathic neuropathy; menopause.” (AR at 18.) 1 determined herein.” (Id. at 22.) The ALJ also “considered two third party function reports, 2 submitted by the claimant’s daughter,” but deemed them “minimally persuasive.” (Id. at 3 23.) 4 Based on the testimony of a vocational expert (“VE”), the ALJ concluded that 5 although Plaintiff was unable to perform her past relevant work as a medical assistant, she 6 was capable of performing three jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national 7 economy: “[1] ‘marker’ (DOT# 209.587-034) with over 136,000 jobs in the U.S., [2] 8 ‘housekeeper/cleaner’ (DOT# 323.687-014) with over 177,000 jobs in the U.S. and [3] 9 ‘router’ (DOT# 222.587-038) with over 25,000 jobs in the U.S. These jobs are unskilled, 10 SVP2.” (Id. at 23-24.) Thus, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled. (Id. at 11 24-25.) 12 IV. Discussion 13 A. Whether Plaintiff Was “Automatically” Entitled To DIB Benefits Based 14 On The Earlier Award Of SSI Benefits 15 1. The Parties’ Arguments 16 Plaintiff’s first assignment of error is that “[t]he Commissioner erred in finding 17 Plaintiff not disabled under Title II (‘DIB’), while already finding her disabled under Title 18 XVI (‘SSI’) of the Social Security.” (Doc. 10 at 3-9.) The gravamen of this argument is 19 that because “the medical standards for disability are the same in both DIB and SSI 20 programs for individuals age 18 or older,” Plaintiff successfully applied for SSI benefits in 21 2001, and Plaintiff “has continued to receive SSI benefits since the claim of 2001 except 22 for periods of time wherein she earned wages under the Commissioner’s Ticket-To-Work 23 program,” “[t]he ongoing receipt of SSI benefits under Title XVI evidences that [Plaintiff] 24 always met the medical criteria for disability, yet the agency has treated her DIB or Title 25 II claims differently in error.” (Id. at 3-5.) Plaintiff elaborates: “[T]he issue of [Plaintiff’s] 26 disability was previously determined, and she is disabled. Despite having satisfied the 27 medical determination of disability for SSI, the Commissioner treated [Plaintiff’s] DIB 28 claim differently for unknown reasons. Plaintiff is and has been disabled for several years, 1 but the DIB claim was processed as though no prior favorable decision had been made. 2 When Plaintiff acquired sufficient DIB coverage, she should have automatically been 3 awarded DIB benefits.” (Id. at 8.) 4 The Commissioner responds that the ALJ permissibly “found that Plaintiff was not 5 disabled, and that therefore the 2001 determination was wrong.” (Doc. 17.) The 6 Commissioner contends the ALJ was entitled to reach this determination under 20 C.F.R. 7 § 404.950(f), which allows an ALJ to disregard an earlier determination of disability if 8 “there are reasons to believe that it was wrong.” (Id.) The Commissioner contends this 9 standard was satisfied here because, as noted by the state agency reviewer, the SSA adopted 10 “mental listing changes” in 2017 and “Plaintiff’s impairments no longer met the updated 11 mental Listing.” (Id. at 3-5, citing AR at 74-76.) The Commissioner also emphasizes that 12 by 2021, Plaintiff had “spent several years working,” which is further evidence she is not 13 disabled. (Id. at 4.) 14 Plaintiff did not file a reply. 15 2. Analysis 16 Under the SSA regulations, if “a fact . . . has already been decided in one of our 17 previous determinations or decisions in a claim involving the same parties, but arising 18 under a different title of the Act,” “the administrative law judge will not consider the issue 19 again, but will accept the factual finding made in the previous determination or decision 20 unless there are reasons to believe that it was wrong.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.950(f) (emphasis 21 added). Thus, even assuming the finding of disability in Plaintiff’s earlier SSI proceeding 22 constitutes a factual determination that was presumptively entitled to preclusive effect in 23 this DIB proceeding, that presumption could be overcome if the ALJ identified “reasons to 24 believe” the earlier determination “was wrong.” See, e.g., Terry M. v. Kijakazi, 2023 WL 25 5035414, *7-9 (D. Nev. 2023) (“[T]he ALJ found that the SSI decision was wrong and 26 sufficiently articulated his reasons for that finding. . . . [T]here is no error in the ALJ’s 27 finding that collateral estoppel did not apply to T.M.’s DIB application.”); Russell C. v. 28 Saul, 2021 WL 130025, *6-7 (S.D. Cal. 2021) (finding “no error in the ALJ’s finding that 1 collateral estoppel does not apply to the Title II application” where “[e]ven assuming 2 arguendo that the SSI decision is a ‘prior determination or decision,’ the ALJ explained 3 why the SSI decision was wrong: Plaintiff's post-onset work activity at Interfaith 4 constituted substantial gainful activity”). The ALJ did just that—the ALJ deemed 5 “persuasive” the opinions of Dr. Rubin (AR at 22), and one of Dr. Rubin’s opinions was: 6 “Cannot [apply] collateral estoppel d/t [due to] mental listing changes 03/2017.” (AR at 7 74.) Accordingly, to the extent Plaintiff challenges the ALJ’s failure to “automatically” 8 award DIB benefits to her based on the earlier award of SSI benefits (Doc. 10 at 8), the 9 Court finds no error in that approach. 10 B. Whether The ALJ Committed Harmful Error By Failing To 11 Incorporate, In The RFC, Certain Limitations Identified By Dr. Rubin 12 1. The Parties’ Arguments 13 Plaintiff’s final assignment of error is: “The ALJ erred when evaluating the full 14 extent of limitations caused by Plaintiff’s severe mental impairments. The RFC fails to 15 account for [Plaintiff’s] diminished mental capacity to understand, remember, and carry 16 out no more than 1-2 step instructions and tasks as supported by the medical opinion 17 evidence found persuasive by the ALJ. The ALJ also erred by failing to incorporate 18 Plaintiff’s restriction to superficial interaction with others.” (Doc. 10 at 9.) The foundation 19 for this argument is the ALJ’s determination that the opinions of Dr. Rubin were 20 “persuasive.” (Id. at 9-11.) First, Plaintiff notes that Dr. Rubin found she is “profoundly 21 restricted in her ability to understand, remember, and apply information, as well as in her 22 capacity to maintain concentration, persistence” and would be limited to “carrying out no 23 more than 1-2 step instructions, and 1-2 step tasks.” (Id. at 10-11.) Plaintiff argues that 24 because the ALJ deemed Dr. Rubin’s opinions persuasive, the ALJ was required to 25 incorporate all of these limitations into the RFC, yet the ALJ failed to do so: “The ALJ 26 offered no explanation why the 1-2 step instructions and tasks restrictions were excluded 27 from the RFC, including how any evidence of record contradicted Dr. Rubin. To the 28 contrary, the ALJ took no issue with the supportability of Dr. Rubin’s opinion, and even 1 held that his conclusion was ‘supported by the medical evidence of record.’” (Id. at 12. 2 See also id. at 14 [“Dr. Rubin’s assessment that Plaintiff is limited to 1-2 step task 3 instructions and tasks was unchallenged by the ALJ, and the ALJ’s failure to include these 4 limitations as part of the RFC was improper.”].) Plaintiff further contends this error was 5 not harmless because “the jobs found suitable by the ALJ . . . require more than one and 6 two-step instructions and tasks.” (Id. at 14.) Second, in a similar vein, Plaintiff notes that 7 Dr. Rubin also opined that she would be restricted to no more than “superficial” and 8 “occasional” interaction with others; argues that the ALJ was therefore required to 9 incorporate both of these social interaction limitations into the RFC; and argues that the 10 ALJ’s failure to do so was not harmless because such limitations would “contradict[] the 11 demands of all the jobs found suitable by the ALJ when considering Plaintiff’s diminished 12 capacity to understand, remember, and carry out instructions.” (Id. at 17-22.) Plaintiff 13 concludes that, in light of these errors, reversal is warranted under Leach v. Kijakazi, 70 14 F.4th 1251 (9th Cir. 2023). (Id. at 22-23.) 15 In response, the Commissioner seemingly does not dispute that the ALJ was 16 required to include, in the RFC, Dr. Rubin’s opined-to limitations to one- or two-step 17 instructions and one- or two-step tasks. (Doc. 17 at 5-6.) Instead, the Commissioner 18 contends the omission of those limitations from the RFC was harmless because one of the 19 jobs identified by the VE was housekeeping cleaner and “a restriction to one- to two-step 20 tasks would not preclude work as a housekeeping cleaner. The housekeeping cleaner 21 position has a reasoning level of one.” (Id.) As for the ALJ’s purported failure to include, 22 in the RFC, both of Dr. Rubin’s opined-to social interaction limitations, the Commissioner 23 contends that “the ALJ’s translation of Dr. Rubin’s limitations rationally included both the 24 quantitative and qualitative restrictions” and that “[t]he ALJ reasonably translated 25 superficial contact as a limitation to working in a task-oriented setting.” (Id. at 6-7.) 26 Alternatively, the Commissioner contends that “[e]ven if the Court were to find this was 27 not a rational translation, the Ninth Circuit has held that there is no obvious inconsistency 28 between a doctor’s opinion that an individual could relate to others on a superficial work 1 basis and a [RFC] finding the claimant was capable of occasional interaction with 2 coworkers. And while Plaintiff correctly notes that the housekeeping cleaner position is 3 required to render personal assistance to patrons, the Ninth Circuit has found that this job’s 4 occasional interaction with hotel guests does not amount to more than minimal or 5 superficial contact with the public.” (Id. at 7, cleaned up.) The Commissioner concludes: 6 “It is clear from the record that the housekeeping cleaner job does not require more than 7 one- to two-step tasks. Moreover, the Ninth Circuit has found that this job does not require 8 more than superficial interaction with others. Under Leach, these errors are 9 inconsequential and do not require remand.” (Id. at 7-8, cleaned up.) 10 As noted, Plaintiff did not file a reply. 11 2. Analysis 12 One of the positions identified by the VE was housekeeping cleaner, and Plaintiff 13 does not challenge the ALJ’s determination that this position, alone, exists in significant 14 numbers in the national economy. (AR at 24 [“The vocational expert testified that, given 15 all of these factors, the individual would be able to perform the requirements of 16 representative occupations such as . . . ‘housekeeper/cleaner’ (DOT# 323.687-014) with 17 over 177,000 jobs in the U.S. . . .”].) 18 As Plaintiff acknowledges, the position of housekeeping cleaner only “requires 19 Reasoning Level One.” (Doc. 10 at 21.)2 Although Plaintiff contends this position 20 nevertheless “requires greater than one or two steps” (Doc. 10 at 15), the Ninth Circuit has 21 rejected this contention and concluded that jobs requiring Reasoning Level One may be 22 performed by a claimant who is limited to one- or two-step tasks and instructions. See, 23 e.g., Davis v. Saul, 846 F. App’x 464, 466 (9th Cir. 2021) (“A finding that Davis had the 24 [RFC] to do only one- or two-step tasks would require the ALJ to find her able to perform 25 jobs requiring no more than Reasoning Level 1.”); Keifer v. Saul, 789 F. App’x 581, 582 26 (9th Cir. 2020) (“The ALJ found Keifer’s [RFC] limited her to jobs involving one- to two-

27 2 See also Cleaner, Housekeeping, Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT) 323.687- 014, 1991 WL 672783 (“Reasoning: Level 1 - Apply commonsense understanding to carry 28 out simple one- or two-step instructions. Deal with standardized situations with occasional or no variables in or from these situations encountered on the job.”). 1 step instructions, meaning she was limited to DOT Reasoning Level 1 jobs.”); Bordbar v. 2 Astrue, 475 F. App’x 214, 215 (9th Cir. 2012) (“[T]he ALJ described someone limited to 3 ‘one to two-step simple instruction kinds of jobs,’ which parallels the language used to 4 describe jobs at Reasoning Level One . . . .”). 5 Given this backdrop, even assuming the ALJ erred by failing include, in the RFC, 6 Dr. Rubin’s opined-to limitations to one- or two-step tasks and instructions, that error was 7 harmless. See, e.g., Dakota L. v. King, 2025 WL 806381, *1 (C.D. Cal. 2025) (“Plaintiff 8 argues that the ALJ erred when he failed to include in the RFC a mental limitation to simple 9 one- to two-step tasks as recommended by the consultative examining psychologist and the 10 State Agency medical consultants. Even if the ALJ erred by failing to include that 11 limitation, any error was harmless. A limitation to one- and two-step tasks would preclude 12 two of the occupations identified by the ALJ at step five as examples of work Plaintiff 13 could perform: marker and router . . . [because] those jobs require Reasoning Level 2. And 14 the Ninth Circuit has held that a Reasoning Level 2 occupation requires more than one- to 15 two-step tasking. But the third position identified by the ALJ at step five was 16 [housekeeping cleaner], which requires only Reasoning Level 1. Reasoning Level 1 is 17 consistent with a limitation to one- and two-step tasks, and the vocational expert testified 18 that a person with this restriction could perform the job of cleaner.”); Rebecca R. v. 19 Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 2025 WL 372096, *2-3 (D. Or. 2025) (where one of the jobs 20 identified at step five was “housekeeping cleaner,” any error in failing to incorporate all of 21 a medical source’s opined-to limitations in the RFC “was harmless because the ALJ 22 identified sufficient reasoning level one jobs that fit plaintiff’s RFC”); Ariceli D. H. v. 23 Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 2023 WL 5321068, *3-4 (D. Or. 2023) (“[T]he ALJ erred when 24 he found Dr. Mohney’s medical opinion persuasive that limited Plaintiff to one and two 25 step tasks, but then implicitly rejected or ignored that opinion when he created an RFC that 26 limited her only to simple, repetitive, and routine tasks, without explanation. The next 27 issue is whether such error was harmless. . . . [A]lthough each job cited by the VE at step 28 five required Level Two reasoning, the ALJ first found that Plaintiff could do her past 1 relevant work of housekeeping cleaner at step four. Housekeeping cleaner requires Level 2 One reasoning. . . . This Level One reasoning is consistent with Dr. Mahoney’s 3 recommendation of ‘1 & 2 step tasks.’ Therefore, even if the ALJ had included the 4 limitation in the RFC, the Commissioner still would have met its burden because the ALJ 5 found that Plaintiff could perform her past relevant work of housekeeping at step four, 6 which is a job that requires Level One reasoning.”). Cf. Keifer, 789 F. App’x at 582 (“The 7 ALJ found Keifer’s [RFC] limited her to jobs involving one- to two-step instructions, 8 meaning she was limited to DOT Reasoning Level 1 jobs. The VE testified that Keifer 9 could have worked as an eye-dropper assembler (Reasoning Level 2), a stuffer (Reasoning 10 Level 2), or a final assembler (Reasoning Level 1). Relying on the VE’s testimony, the 11 ALJ found Keifer could have worked in any of these three occupations, even though the 12 occupations of eye-dropper assembler and stuffer require Level 2 Reasoning. Although 13 the ALJ did not resolve this conflict between the VE’s testimony and the DOT, we conclude 14 any error was harmless. The VE’s testimony was consistent with the DOT with respect to 15 the occupation of final assembler, and the ALJ found there were a significant number of 16 final assembler jobs—108,750 in the national economy—for which Keifer was 17 qualified.”). Leach does not require a different result. Leach, 70 F.4th at 1255 (even when 18 “an ALJ inaccurately summarizes a claimant’s limitations,” reversal is not warranted if 19 “the error was inconsequential”). 20 This leaves the ALJ’s purported failure to include, in the RFC, both of the social 21 interaction limitations to which Dr. Rubin opined. Once again, the Court agrees with the 22 Commissioner that any error was harmless. Even assuming, as Plaintiff contends (Doc. 10 23 at 17), that the ALJ should have interpreted Dr. Rubin’s opinion as limiting Plaintiff to no 24 more than “superficial” and “occasional” interaction with others (rather than only to 25 “occasional” interaction), the Ninth Circuit has held that “a hotel housekeeper’s occasional 26 interaction with hotel guests does not amount to more than minimal or superficial contact 27 with the public.” Young v. Colvin, 610 F. App’x 615, 616 (9th Cir. 2015). See also Cranor 28 v. Kijakazi, 2022 WL 14936052, *3 (9th Cir. 2022) (concluding that “substantial evidence □□ supports the ALJ’s findings” where the ALJ found that the claimant had “the 2|| ‘nonexertional limitations’ of only “occasional superficial interaction with the general public” and “made a step-five finding that Cranor could work as a housekeeping cleaner’’); Hulsey v. Astrue, 622 F.3d 917, 925 (10th Cir. 2010) (where “[t]he ALJ’s hypothetical . . . limited Hulsey to ‘work of an unskilled nature involving only superficial interpersonal contact,’” “[t]he requirements for the ‘cleaner, housekeeping’ position are not incompatible with the impairments described in the ALJ’s most recent hypothetical”). 8 Accordingly, 9 IT IS ORDERED that the decision of the ALJ is affirmed. The Clerk shall enter judgment accordingly and terminate this action. 11 Dated this 22nd day of September, 2025. 12 13 Lam a’ 14 f t _o———— Dominic W. Lanza 15 United States District Judge 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

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