OPINION
WARREN, Justice.
A jury found appellant guilty of driving while intoxicated and assessed his punishment at 120 days in jail, probated for two years and an $800 fine.
In eight grounds of error appellant alleges that the trial court erred in overruling his motion to dismiss, refusing his requested jury charges, and overruling his motion to quash the information.
On January 9,1984, appellant was arrested in Fort Bend County and charged with driving while intoxicated. After the arrest, appellant was given an intoxilyzer test, but no video tape of appellant was made. It is undisputed that on the date of appellant’s arrest, Fort Bend County did not have the equipment to videotape a person arrested for driving while intoxicated.
Appellant does not contest the sufficiency of the evidence to support the conviction, but mainly contends that the county’s failure to maintain the equipment to videotape his actions after being arrested for driving while intoxicated, as required by law, entitled him to a dismissal or acquittal. [741]*741Appellant also alleges that the information was defective and that the court erroneously refused his proffered jury instruction pertaining to intoxication.
Appellant’s first ground of error alleges that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss. This ground of error does not set out appellant’s contentions or authority supporting his contentions, but refers us to a memorandum brief filed in the trial court. We must respectfully decline appellant’s request that we review this ground of error, because it does not comply with art. 40.09(9), Tex.Code Crim.P.
Appellant’s second and third grounds of error complain of the trial court’s refusal to submit the following two requested charges:
(1) The laws of the State of Texas provide that the State shall provide to the Defendant all evidence under its control that is or could be favorable to the Defendant.
You are instructed that the laws of the State of Texas provide that as of January 1, 1984 the Sheriff of all counties of a population of 25,000 or more, Fort Beiid County being one such county, shall maintain videotape equipment for the purpose of taping those arrested for driving while intoxicated.
If you find that the Sheriff of Fort Bend County did not have the required equipment then you shall find the Defendant “Not Guilty.” .
(2) The laws of the State of Texas provide that the State shall provide to the Defendant all evidence under its control that is or could be favorable to the Defendant.
You are instructed that the laws of the State of Texas provide that as of January 1, 1984 the Sheriff of all counties of a population of 25,000 or more, Fort Bend County being one such county, shall maintain video tape equipment for the purpose of taping those arrested for driving while intoxicated.
If you find that the Sheriff of Fort Bend County did not have the required equipment, then you shall find that this violation of the law of the State of Texas denies the Defendant evidence which is or could be favorable to the Defendant so as to create a reasonable doubt as to the Defendant’s guilt and you must find the Defendant “Not Guilty.”
The law requires, effective January 1, 1984, that counties having a population over 25,000 (which includes Fort Bend County) maintain electronic devices capable of visually recording a person arrested for driving while intoxicated. It further provides that if a county is required to maintain such electronic equipment and a person arrested for driving while intoxicated in that county is not visually recorded, those facts are admissible at the trial of the one arrested. The statute imposes no other sanctions for the county’s failure to maintain or use the video equipment.
Both of appellant’s requested charges would have required the jury, under the undisputed facts, to acquit appellant. As appellant was not entitled to an acquittal under the law because of the county’s failure to maintain or use the video equipment, the court did not err in refusing to submit the requested jury instructions. See Weaver v. State, 700 S.W.2d 776 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1985, writ pending).
Appellant’s fourth, fifth, sixth, and seventh grounds of error attack the information and the court’s charges pertaining to the information.
The information, in pertinent part, alleged that:
On or about the 9th day of January 1984, ... William Ayers Maddox did then and there while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, drive and operate a motor vehicle in a public place, to wit: a public road and highway, situated within said County and State.
Appellant’s motion to quash alleged that the information failed to allege an offense against the laws of the State of Texas because operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor is not a violation of Texas law.
[742]*742Appellant’s contention is based on the wording of Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 6701 i-1 sec. (b) (Vernon Supp.1984), effective January 1, 1984, which states, in part: “A person commits an offense if the person is intoxicated while driving or operating a motor vehicle in a public place.” Before its amendment, effective on January 1, 1984, the statute stated in part, “any person who drives or operates an automobile ... while such person is intoxicated or under the influence of intoxicating liquor shall be guilty of a misdemeanor....”
Appellant contends that under the 1984 amendment to art. 6701Í-1, sec. (b), driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor is not the same as driving while intoxicated. We disagree. The same contention was urged in Sorg v. State, 688 S.W.2d 133 (Tex.App. — Beaumont 1985, no pet.). That court held that even though the present statute deleted the phrase “or under the influence of intoxicating liquors”, that phrase is essentially codified in the definition of “intoxicated” in the new statute. Under the 1984 amendment, “intoxicated” is defined as: (A) not having the normal use of mental or physical faculties by reason of the introduction of alcohol, a controlled substance, a drug, or a combination of two or more of those substances into the body; or (B) having an alcohol concentration of more than 0.10 or more.
We hold that the information, though not in the exact wording of the statute, was sufficient to allege an offense under the present statute.
Appellant next contends that the court erred in denying requested charges (1) and (2) and in charging the jury on (3):
(1) The Defendant, William A. Maddox, stands charged by information with, while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, drive and operate a motor vehicle in a public place, to-wit: a public road and highway, situated in Fort Bend County, Texas, on or about January 9 A.D., 1984. To which the Defendant has pleaded “Not Guilty.”
(2) Our law does not provide that a person commits an offense will [sic] driving and operating a motor vehicle in a public place while under the influence of intoxicating liquor and you shall therefore find the Defendant “Not Guilty.”
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OPINION
WARREN, Justice.
A jury found appellant guilty of driving while intoxicated and assessed his punishment at 120 days in jail, probated for two years and an $800 fine.
In eight grounds of error appellant alleges that the trial court erred in overruling his motion to dismiss, refusing his requested jury charges, and overruling his motion to quash the information.
On January 9,1984, appellant was arrested in Fort Bend County and charged with driving while intoxicated. After the arrest, appellant was given an intoxilyzer test, but no video tape of appellant was made. It is undisputed that on the date of appellant’s arrest, Fort Bend County did not have the equipment to videotape a person arrested for driving while intoxicated.
Appellant does not contest the sufficiency of the evidence to support the conviction, but mainly contends that the county’s failure to maintain the equipment to videotape his actions after being arrested for driving while intoxicated, as required by law, entitled him to a dismissal or acquittal. [741]*741Appellant also alleges that the information was defective and that the court erroneously refused his proffered jury instruction pertaining to intoxication.
Appellant’s first ground of error alleges that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss. This ground of error does not set out appellant’s contentions or authority supporting his contentions, but refers us to a memorandum brief filed in the trial court. We must respectfully decline appellant’s request that we review this ground of error, because it does not comply with art. 40.09(9), Tex.Code Crim.P.
Appellant’s second and third grounds of error complain of the trial court’s refusal to submit the following two requested charges:
(1) The laws of the State of Texas provide that the State shall provide to the Defendant all evidence under its control that is or could be favorable to the Defendant.
You are instructed that the laws of the State of Texas provide that as of January 1, 1984 the Sheriff of all counties of a population of 25,000 or more, Fort Beiid County being one such county, shall maintain videotape equipment for the purpose of taping those arrested for driving while intoxicated.
If you find that the Sheriff of Fort Bend County did not have the required equipment then you shall find the Defendant “Not Guilty.” .
(2) The laws of the State of Texas provide that the State shall provide to the Defendant all evidence under its control that is or could be favorable to the Defendant.
You are instructed that the laws of the State of Texas provide that as of January 1, 1984 the Sheriff of all counties of a population of 25,000 or more, Fort Bend County being one such county, shall maintain video tape equipment for the purpose of taping those arrested for driving while intoxicated.
If you find that the Sheriff of Fort Bend County did not have the required equipment, then you shall find that this violation of the law of the State of Texas denies the Defendant evidence which is or could be favorable to the Defendant so as to create a reasonable doubt as to the Defendant’s guilt and you must find the Defendant “Not Guilty.”
The law requires, effective January 1, 1984, that counties having a population over 25,000 (which includes Fort Bend County) maintain electronic devices capable of visually recording a person arrested for driving while intoxicated. It further provides that if a county is required to maintain such electronic equipment and a person arrested for driving while intoxicated in that county is not visually recorded, those facts are admissible at the trial of the one arrested. The statute imposes no other sanctions for the county’s failure to maintain or use the video equipment.
Both of appellant’s requested charges would have required the jury, under the undisputed facts, to acquit appellant. As appellant was not entitled to an acquittal under the law because of the county’s failure to maintain or use the video equipment, the court did not err in refusing to submit the requested jury instructions. See Weaver v. State, 700 S.W.2d 776 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1985, writ pending).
Appellant’s fourth, fifth, sixth, and seventh grounds of error attack the information and the court’s charges pertaining to the information.
The information, in pertinent part, alleged that:
On or about the 9th day of January 1984, ... William Ayers Maddox did then and there while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, drive and operate a motor vehicle in a public place, to wit: a public road and highway, situated within said County and State.
Appellant’s motion to quash alleged that the information failed to allege an offense against the laws of the State of Texas because operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor is not a violation of Texas law.
[742]*742Appellant’s contention is based on the wording of Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 6701 i-1 sec. (b) (Vernon Supp.1984), effective January 1, 1984, which states, in part: “A person commits an offense if the person is intoxicated while driving or operating a motor vehicle in a public place.” Before its amendment, effective on January 1, 1984, the statute stated in part, “any person who drives or operates an automobile ... while such person is intoxicated or under the influence of intoxicating liquor shall be guilty of a misdemeanor....”
Appellant contends that under the 1984 amendment to art. 6701Í-1, sec. (b), driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor is not the same as driving while intoxicated. We disagree. The same contention was urged in Sorg v. State, 688 S.W.2d 133 (Tex.App. — Beaumont 1985, no pet.). That court held that even though the present statute deleted the phrase “or under the influence of intoxicating liquors”, that phrase is essentially codified in the definition of “intoxicated” in the new statute. Under the 1984 amendment, “intoxicated” is defined as: (A) not having the normal use of mental or physical faculties by reason of the introduction of alcohol, a controlled substance, a drug, or a combination of two or more of those substances into the body; or (B) having an alcohol concentration of more than 0.10 or more.
We hold that the information, though not in the exact wording of the statute, was sufficient to allege an offense under the present statute.
Appellant next contends that the court erred in denying requested charges (1) and (2) and in charging the jury on (3):
(1) The Defendant, William A. Maddox, stands charged by information with, while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, drive and operate a motor vehicle in a public place, to-wit: a public road and highway, situated in Fort Bend County, Texas, on or about January 9 A.D., 1984. To which the Defendant has pleaded “Not Guilty.”
(2) Our law does not provide that a person commits an offense will [sic] driving and operating a motor vehicle in a public place while under the influence of intoxicating liquor and you shall therefore find the Defendant “Not Guilty.”
(3) The Defendant, William Ayers Maddox, stand charged by information with the offense of driving a motor vehicle while intoxicated in a public place, it being alleged that said offense was committed in Fort Bend County, State of Texas, on or about the 9th Day of January, A.D., 1984. To which charge the Defendant has pleaded “Not Guilty.”
Appellant’s argument under these contentions presumes that the information does not state a cause of action.
Appellant’s above requested charge (1) sets out that with which appellant was charged more clearly than the introductory language given in (3) above.
However, we are of the opinion that the difference between (1) and (3) was immaterial because both driving while intoxicated and driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor are offenses under the statute.
The second charge requested above incorrectly instructs the jury that fact matters stated in the first requested charge do not constitute an offense under the law.
The charge given by the court, to which appellant objects, informed the jury that appellant was charged with driving a motor vehicle while intoxicated, when literally appellant was charged with driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. As we have held that the term “driving while intoxicated” includes the act of “driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor”, we see no harm. There was no testimony showing that appellant was intoxicated by reason of ingesting a substance other than intoxicating liquor; in fact, the application paragraph of the charge limited the finding of intoxication by requiring the jury to find intoxication only by reason of appellant’s introduction of alcohol into his body. Appellant received a fair trial, and the evidence was more than sufficient to support the jury’s [743]*743finding of guilty. Any error by the court in instructing the jury that appellant was charged with driving a motor vehicle while intoxicated, rather than charging that appellant was charged with driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquors, was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157 (Tex.Crim.App.1985), (on rehearing).
Appellant’s last ground of error contends that the trial court erred in refusing to submit the following charge:
You are further instructed that “Intoxicated” means (A) not having the normal use of mental or physical faculties by reason of the introduction of alcohol into the body; or (B) having an alcohol concentration of 0.10% or more.
“Alcohol concentration” means:
(A) the number of grams of alcohol per 100 millileters of blood;
(B) the number of grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath; or
(C) the number of grams of alcohol per 67 millileters of urine.
Appellant cites no authority in support of his contention, but alleges the requested charge “is well based in evidentiary testimony as well as statutory authority.”
Appellant claims that the testimony of the State.’s toxicologist witness, while testifying in response to a hypothetical question which embraced appellant’s uncontroverted testimony, stated that using appellant’s Whitmark mathematical calculation formula resulted in a blood alcohol concentration in appellant of .067, well below the arbitrary statutory figure of .10% concentration. Initially, we observe that the hypothetical question relied on by appellant could not have scientifically shown appellant’s blood level to be less than .10% concentration. Most of the figures appellant’s counsel presented to the witness were not accepted by the witness as scientific facts, but were accepted as true only so that he could answer the question.
Further, the figures used in the hypothetical question were never shown by other evidence to be scientifically correct.
Nevertheless, the jury could have considered the testimony and appellant’s counsel’s argument and entertained a reasonable doubt that appellant’s blood alcohol concentration was less than .10% when the intoxilyzer test was administered.
The court’s instruction was identical to that requested by appellant except that it did not include the definitions of alcohol concentration as they pertained to blood or urine. Neither instruction was required. The intoxilyzer measures alcohol concentration by means of a breath test, and the State’s witness testified that the intoxilyzer showed appellant to have an alcohol concentration in excess of .10%. The definitions of alcohol concentration pertaining to blood or urine were not material.
Each of appellant’s grounds of error is overruled.
Affirmed.
LEVY, J., dissents.