Maddox v. State
This text of 317 S.E.2d 617 (Maddox v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
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Atlanta police Lieutenant Nash was on routine patrol in the Luckie Street area of downtown Atlanta at about 1:30 p.m. on a Saturday afternoon when he saw two young black males run across the street and go over a fence enclosing the premises of an automobile parts firm which, like most other businesses in the area, was not open on a Saturday afternoon. Nash halted his car and ran to a position from which he could observe the two men. He saw them climbing the opposite fence and running to a waiting van, which immediately started up. Nash then summoned officers patrolling nearby. When the van’s driver saw the oncoming patrol car occupied by officers Fox and Fouchia, who were responding to Nash’s call, he took evasive action, with the result that the van apparently stalled, and rolled to a stop. Officer Fox chased the two men who leaped out and caught one, later identified as appellant Maddox, but the other, identified by appellants as “Johnny Hill,” got away. Nothing further is known of the whereabouts or subsequent activities of that person.
In the meanwhile, officer Fouchia attempted to approach the van from the rear but was forced to run for cover behind the patrol car when the van suddenly began to back rapidly down the sidewalk toward him. The van collided with the patrol car and finally came to rest against a wall, at which point a third black male, whom Fouchia recognized as having been at the wheel during the head-on encounter a few moments previous, leaped out and ran. He was apprehended and subsequently identified as appellant Norris. The van was found to have been “hot-wired.” The patrol car sustained slightly more than $1,000 in damages.
Norris was indicted on three counts of aggravated assault, criminal interference with government property, and. theft by taking. Maddox was charged with theft by taking only. They were tried jointly. At trial the van’s owner testified that at 1:00 p.m., when he had closed his business — located four to five miles from the scene of the apprehension, the locked van was parked in its customary place, with the key inside the locked office. He knew neither of the accused and neither had permission to enter or drive the van. A jury found both appellants guilty. They appeal from this judgment, assigning as error the denial of their motions for directed verdicts of acquittal and the court’s refusal to give certain jury instruction, and the giving of two instructions. Held:
1. The trial court did not err in denying appellant’s motions for directed verdicts of acquittal. The statutory standard for application by a trial court to decide a motion for a directed verdict of acquittal [499]*499is “[w]here there is no conflict in the evidence and the evidence with all reasonable deductions and inferences therefrom shall demand a verdict of acquittal . . . the court may direct the verdict of acquittal . . OCGA § 17-9-1 (a). Review of the evidence adduced at trial reveals there was ample evidence sufficient to enable any rational trier of facts to find the existence of the offenses charged beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560); Stinson v. State, 244 Ga. 219 (4) (259 SE2d 471). Thus, it was not error for the trial court to refuse to grant the motions for directed verdicts of acquittal. Lee v. State, 247 Ga. 411, 412 (6) (276 SE2d 590).
2. Also without merit are appellant’s third and fourth enumerations. Contrary to appellants’ contentions, the jury instructions on recent possession of stolen goods and on the meaning of actual and constructive possession were not such as either to confuse the jury or to deprive appellants of due process. The court’s definitions of actual and constructive possession adequately presented the law on these subjects (see State v. Lewis, 249 Ga. 565 (292 SE2d 667)), and the instruction on recent possession, particularly in the context of the court’s emphasis on presumption of innocence, could by no means be considered prejudicial to the defendants. This latter instruction authorized the jury to infer guilt, if they saw fit to do so, from recent possession of the stolen property unless the defendants should make a satisfactory explanation of their possession. The explanation offered was that the elusive “Johnny Hill” had come by in the stolen van and offered to take them to buy some beer and then to Georgia Tech to sign up to work at the football game. Such explanation must have been unpersuasive in view of their observed conduct at the closed auto parts firm and subsequent flight. The instruction given was clear and correct and did not shift the burden of proof to the defendants. Jackson v. State, 159 Ga. App. 287 (283 SE2d 353); James v. State, 162 Ga. App. 490 (292 SE2d 91).
3. Appellants’ final enumeration of error is that the court refused to instruct on the legal effect of the accused’s presence at the crime scene. “It is, of course, true that mere proof of the accused’s presence at the scene of the crime, without any evidence to show further participation in the commission of the crime, is insufficient to authorize a conviction. [Cits.] However, in the present case, the state’s evidence showed more than the mere presence of the appellant at the scene of the crime.” Muhammad v. State, 243 Ga. 404, 405 (254 SE2d 356). In the instant case we have the additional evidence of flight. The instructions were full and fair on the presumption of innocence, burden of proof, and reasonable doubt. The court’s charge to the jury must be looked at as a whole, and the record discloses that the instructions as a whole were accurate, impartial, and in no way prejudicial to the [500]*500defendants. Lavender v. State, 234 Ga. 608 (216 SE2d 855).
Judgment affirmed.
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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
317 S.E.2d 617, 170 Ga. App. 498, 1984 Ga. App. LEXIS 2894, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/maddox-v-state-gactapp-1984.