Maddox v. Massanari

199 F. Supp. 2d 928, 2001 WL 1862801
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Missouri
DecidedAugust 29, 2001
Docket2:00 CV 34 DDN
StatusPublished

This text of 199 F. Supp. 2d 928 (Maddox v. Massanari) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Missouri primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Maddox v. Massanari, 199 F. Supp. 2d 928, 2001 WL 1862801 (E.D. Mo. 2001).

Opinion

199 F.Supp.2d 928 (2001)

Summer S. MADDOX, Plaintiff,
v.
Larry G. MASSANARI, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant.

No. 2:00 CV 34 DDN.

United States District Court, E.D. Missouri, Northern Division.

August 29, 2001.

*929 Karen Kraus Bill, Law Office of Karen Kraus Bill, Columbia, MO, for plaintiff.

Wesley D. Wedemeyer, Office of U.S. Attorney, St. Louis, MO, for defendant.

MEMORANDUM

NOCE, United States Magistrate Judge.

This action is before the court for judicial review of the final decision of the defendant Commissioner of Social Security denying plaintiff's applications for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income (SSI) benefits under, respectively, Title II of the Social Security Act (the Act), 42 U.S.C. §§ 401 et seq., and Title XVI of the Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381 et seq. The parties have consented to the exercise of jurisdiction by the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).

Summer Maddox filed applications for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income benefits on April 23, 1997, alleging disability from August 23, 1996, by reason of fibromyalgia, blurred vision, and affective mood disorder. (Tr. 56-58, 100-02, 190-211). The applications were denied initially (Tr. 52-55, 70-71, 85-88) and on reconsideration (Tr. 46-50, 68-69, 79-83).

*930 Following a hearing on January 27, 1998, an administrative law judge (ALJ) found that plaintiff, although suffering from certain enumerated impairments, retained the residual functional capacity to perform the full range of sedentary work. Finding the absence of non-exertional limitations upon the plaintiff's ability to perform the full range of sedentary work, and in light of her age and education, the ALJ determined that plaintiff was not disabled by application of the medical-vocational guidelines. (Tr. 15-23). Additional evidence was submitted to the Appeals Council to support plaintiff's request for review (Tr. 6, 10-11, 341-55), but the Council denied plaintiff's request. (Tr. 4-5). Thus, the decision of the ALJ became the final decision of the Commissioner.

In this proceeding the plaintiff challenges the ALJ's determination that she does not suffer from any non-exertional impairments which substantially reduce her ability to engage in the full range of sedentary work, and consequently, also challenges the ALJ's reliance on the medical-vocational guidelines in rendering his determination rather than seeking the testimony of a vocational expert. Relevant to the issues presented herein, the ALJ determined in his decision of June 26, 1998, that:

1. Plaintiff met the disability insured status requirements of the Act on August 23, 1996, the date plaintiff alleges she became unable to work, and continued to meet them through June 30, 1998.
2. Plaintiff has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since August 1996.
3. The medical evidence established that plaintiff suffers from obesity, fibromyalgia and myofascial pain syndrome, and a depressive disorder but that the impairments, singly or in combination, were not listed in nor were equivalent to one listed in the Commissioner's List of Disabling Impairments.
4. Plaintiff's complaints of disabling pain, fatigue and insomnia were not supported by the evidence and were not credible.
5. Plaintiff had the residual functional capacity to perform work, except for prolonged walking and standing or lifting more than 10 pounds and that there were no non-exertional limitations diminishing the full range of sedentary work.
6. Plaintiff was unable to perform her past relevant work of assembly line worker.
7. The Guideline Rules 201.27 and 201.28 direct a conclusion that in considering plaintiff's residual functional capacity, age, education, and work experience, plaintiff was not disabled.
8. Consequently, plaintiff was not disabled under the Act.

(Tr. 15-23).

The court must affirm findings of the ALJ that are supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Wilcutts v. Apfel, 143 F.3d 1134, 1136 (8th Cir.1998). Substantial evidence is evidence of sufficient quality that a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971); Singh v. Apfel, 222 F.3d 448, 451 (8th Cir.2000). In reviewing the record, the court may not make its own findings of fact or substitute its own judgment for that of the Commissioner. Locher v. Sullivan, 968 F.2d 725, 727 (8th Cir.1992). Nevertheless, when the court reviews the record for substantial evidence, it must review the entire record and consider whatever detracts from the weight of the evidence invoked by the ALJ. Singh, 222 *931 F.3d at 451; Piercy v. Bowen, 835 F.2d 190, 191 (8th Cir.1987). See also Wilcutts, 143 F.3d at 1136-37. Thus, substantial evidence on the record as a whole requires the court to "take into consideration the weight of the evidence in the record and apply a balancing test to evidence which is contradictory." Wilcutts, 143 F.3d at 1136 (quoting Gavin v. Heckler, 811 F.2d 1195, 1199 (8th Cir.1987)). However, reversal is not proper just because there is substantial evidence which might have supported an opposite result. Boyd v. Sullivan, 960 F.2d 733, 736 (8th Cir.1992).

Evidence Before the ALJ

At the hearing conducted on January 27, 1998, the plaintiff testified that she was 20 years old, single, lived with her parents, had a high school education, was 5'7" tall, and weighed between 270 and 280 pounds. (Tr. 30-31). She drove for approximately one hour to attend the hearing. (Tr. 42).

She testified that she had last worked from approximately September 1996 through February 1997 as a full-time assembly line worker for a manufacturer of bank vaults. In this job she was regularly required to lift 30 pounds. She tried to transfer to a different job with this employer, but was unable to do so. She quit because she was not able to physically work 40 hours per week and perform the lifting requirements. Prior to quitting, she had missed quite a few days of work and believed she was in danger of losing her job. While working 40 hours per week, she would go to bed when she got home. (Tr. 32-33, 39).

Plaintiff testified that she was disabled due to fibromyalgia.

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Related

Richardson v. Perales
402 U.S. 389 (Supreme Court, 1971)

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Bluebook (online)
199 F. Supp. 2d 928, 2001 WL 1862801, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/maddox-v-massanari-moed-2001.