Madden v. Secretary of the Commonwealth

153 N.E.2d 321, 337 Mass. 758, 1958 Mass. LEXIS 733
CourtMassachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
DecidedOctober 14, 1958
StatusPublished
Cited by12 cases

This text of 153 N.E.2d 321 (Madden v. Secretary of the Commonwealth) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Madden v. Secretary of the Commonwealth, 153 N.E.2d 321, 337 Mass. 758, 1958 Mass. LEXIS 733 (Mass. 1958).

Opinions

Wilkins, C.J.

The petitioner, a resident and registered voter of the town of Lexington, is the Democratic candidate for the office of senator in the Seventh Middlesex Senatorial District. By this petition for a writ of mandamus he seeks an order that the respondent Secretary of the Commonwealth print ballots for the forthcoming State election without the name of the intervening respondent, William E. Maloney, as the Republican candidate for that office. The case is reserved and reported without decision.

The petition is assertedly brought to enforce the performance by the Secretary of a duty owed to the public in general,1 and in support there are cited to us Brewster v. Sherman, 195 Mass. 222, and Kaplan v. Bowker, 333 Mass. 455, 460. But there has been no case holding that a member of one political party has standing to enforce our election statutes in such a way as to challenge the action of members of another political party in making a party nomination. However that may be, we are stringently limited as to time and prefer to decide other issues. Since the result will be the same, we shall assume, without so deciding, that the petitioner has such right.

The facts are admitted in the pleadings or have been agreed. The Seventh Middlesex Senatorial District comprises four wards of the city of Lowell and nine towns. G. L. c. 57, § 3 (as amended through St. 1948, c. 250, § 2). In the primary on September 9, 1958, Charles Gibbons was nominated as the Republican candidate in this district, and also received the Republican nomination for Governor to replace an unopposed candidate for that office who had died. On September 10 Mr. Gibbons filed in the office of the Secre[760]*760tory a withdrawal of his senatorial nomination. On September 15 there was filed in the office of the Secretary a certificate purporting to nominate the respondent Maloney in place of Mr. Gibbons.

The questions before us relate entirely to the validity of that certificate, which was made upon a form furnished by the Secretary, a form which had been in existence for a number of years. The certificate, which is dated at Lexington on September 12, recites: “Charles Gibbons having withdrawn on the tenth day of September 1958 as a candidate for the office of State Senator, Seventh Middlesex District under the political designation of Republican, We, a majority of the Ward and/or Town Committees in said district or the delegates chosen by same, hereby make the following nomination to fill the vacancy: — William E. Maloney 289 Bedford St Lexington.” The italicized words were filled in on the form. There.follow fourteen or fifteen blank lines of the form bulging with the closely written signatures of seventy-four persons who severally made oath before a notary public that the certificate is true. At the foot of the certificate is the written acceptance of the respondent Maloney. There is no place designated on the form for the signatures of the chairman and secretary of the meeting as such, or any indication that it is to be signed solely by them.

The petition alleges that the certificate “is void on its face, is not in apparent conformity with law, and did not have the effect of nominating William E. Maloney for the office of senator in the 7th Middlesex District. More particularly, the paper in question fails to comply with the requirements of G. L. c. 53, §§ 14 and 15.”

■ An amendment to the petition alleges that “the only method provided by law by which the vacancy . . . could be filled is provided by G. L. c. 53, § 14, and requires in the casé of a district composed of more than one municipality, the election of delegates by each ward and town committee in the district from its own members. . . . OETjuch delegates were not properly elected, nor was the Secretary of State properly notified of their election forthwith, as required .... [761]*761Many of the persons whose signatures appear . . . are not members of any ward or town committee, as shown by the records on file with the Secretary of the Commonwealth, and, therefore, could not properly act as delegates.”

A total of eighty-seven delegates could lawfully have been chosen to attend the meeting to fill the vacancy. Actually seventy-eight were chosen, and as to these reports of the selection of seventy-three are on file with the Secretary of the Commonwealth. There was no report as to the five delegates chosen by the town committee of Wilmington from its membership. On September 12 in Lexington there were present seventy-five persons purporting to act as delegates. These seventy-five persons include the seventy-four persons who signed and made oath to the certificate and one Donald A. Lawson, who was chairman of the meeting, but did not sign the certificate. One of the seventy-four, Marion D. Gould, served as secretary, although not so described on the certificate. The records of the meeting show that the respondent Maloney was nominated by acclamation.

It is an elementary principle that mandamus will not lie where there is available another and effective remedy. Iannelle v. Fire Commr. of Boston, 331 Mass. 250, 253. Duncan v. School Comm. of Springfield, 331 Mass. 738, 741-742. Gavin v. Purdy, 335 Mass. 236, 238. The respondents contend, and the petitioner denies, that the petitioner had such a remedy in filing objections with the State Secretary to be heard by the State ballot law commission. We quote from certain sections of G. L. c. 53, relating in part to “Nominations,” which are the basis of this issue. “Objections to nominations for state offices, and all other questions relating thereto, shall be considered by the state ballot law commission . . ..” G. L. c. 53, § 12 (as amended through St. 1943, c. 334, § 7). “If a candidate nominated for a state . . . office . . . withdraws his name from nomination . . . the vacancy . . . may be filled by the same political party or persons who made the original nomination, and in the same manner; or, if the time is insufficient there[762]*762for, the vacancy may be filled, if the nomination was made by a convention or caucus, in such manner as the convention or caucus may have prescribed, or, if no such provision has been made, by a regularly elected general or executive committee representing the political party or persons who held such convention or caucus. In the event of the withdrawal ... of any candidate of a political party nominated by direct nomination for any office, the vacancy may be filled by a regularly elected general or executive committee representing the election district in which such vacancy occurs, or, if no such committee exists by the members of the town committee in any town comprising such district, by the members of the ward committee or committees in the ward or wards comprising such district if within the limits of a single city, or by delegates chosen ... by and from the members of the ward and town committees in the wards and towns comprising such district if within the limits of more than one municipality, at a meeting to be called Each ward and town committee in the wards and towns comprising such a district within the limits of more than one municipality shall, as occasions arise, choose from its members delegates to fill vacancies as hereinbefore provided, in such manner as it may determine . . . and shall forthwith notify the state secretary of the delegates so chosen. . . .

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Madden v. Secretary of the Commonwealth
153 N.E.2d 321 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 1958)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
153 N.E.2d 321, 337 Mass. 758, 1958 Mass. LEXIS 733, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/madden-v-secretary-of-the-commonwealth-mass-1958.