MacMillan Co. v. United States

11 Ct. Cust. 466, 1923 WL 23853, 1923 CCPA LEXIS 16
CourtCourt of Customs and Patent Appeals
DecidedMarch 17, 1923
DocketNo. 2203
StatusPublished
Cited by17 cases

This text of 11 Ct. Cust. 466 (MacMillan Co. v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Customs and Patent Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
MacMillan Co. v. United States, 11 Ct. Cust. 466, 1923 WL 23853, 1923 CCPA LEXIS 16 (ccpa 1923).

Opinion

Smith, Judge,

delivered the opinion of the court:

Certain books and printed matter imported by the appellant at the port of New York were entered for consumption at the customhouse on the 24th of March, 1920. The collector designated two cases of the importation for examination and transmitted the invoice to the appraiser’s stores, at which place it reached the hands of the examiner on the 26th of March, 1920. One of the cases designated for examination came under the observation of the examiner on the 5th and the other on the 6th of April, 1920.

On the 8th of April, 1920, the importer applied to the collector for leave to amend its entry by adding to the market value certain discounts which had been deducted by the custom brokers acting for the importer. The collector refused to allow any amendment to the entry on the ground that the invoice and merchandise had come under the observation of the appraiser before application to amend was made.

The examiner on the 26th of April, 1920, reported to the assistant appraiser, first, that all discounts claimed in the entry and in excess of 33¿ per cent should be disallowed; second, that the value of the importation should be advanced to the extent of the disallowed discounts. On the day on which that report was made it was passed by the assistant appraiser to the appraiser, who approved the action of the assistant appraiser on the 27th of April, 1920.

Neither the invoice nor the merchandise was seen or considered by the appraiser or deputy appraiser or assistant appraiser prior to the 26th of April, 1920.

The collector liquidated the entry on the 8th of December, 1920, and because of the advance in value resulting from the disallowance of some of the discounts deducted in the entry he assessed in addition to the regular duties, a duty of one per cent of the total appraised value of the merchandise for each one per cent that such appraised value exceeded the value declared in the entry as originally made.

The importer protested against the levy of the additional duties and the Board of General Appraisers having overruled the protest the importer appealed.

[468]*468The board held that the examiner was the eyes, hand, and voice of the appraiser and that therefore the date on which the invoice and the merchandise covered thereby came to the observation of an examiner of merchandise was the date on which such invoice and such merchandise came to the observation of the appraiser. That holding is not warranted in our opinion either by the plain terms of the statute or by the official status of the appraiser or by the powers of the examiner and apparently has nothing to support it except assumed administrative expediency. Indeed, the board frankly bases its decision on the ground that the volume of business at such a port as New York is so great that the appraiser can not take note of all invoices which come to his office and can not personally appraise all merchandise which it is his duty to appraise.

That the appraiser, unaided by the reports of competent subordinates, can not consider all the invoices filed with the collector or examine all the merchandise that comes into the port of New York must be admitted. Nevertheless that condition does not excuse 'a judicial amendment of the law and does not justify the extra-official substitution of the word “examiner” for the word “appraiser” in paragraph I of. section III. We are quite certain, however, that the substitution of one word for the other is not imperatively demanded by the exigencies of the service and that if the language of paragraph I is given its plain ordinary meaning administrative efficiency will not thereby be affected or impaired.

If at the outset the appraiser does not see the invoice or examine the merchandise, sooner or later the invoice checked up with the goods by the examiner and accompanied by the advisory reports of the examiner and the assistant appraiser as to the nature and value of the merchandise does come to the appraiser for consideration, and until that happens he does not see, can not see, and consequently can not officially observe or know what the examiner and assistant appraiser saw or thought they saw.

When the invoice and the official reports of his subordinates as to the nature and value of the merchandise come to the appraiser for his consideration, then for the first time does he see the invoice and merchandise through the eyes of the examiner or through those of the assistant appraiser, and then for the first time may it be truly said that the invoice and merchandise have come either actually or constructively under the observation of the appraiser. The observation and judgment of the examiner and assistant appraiser do not, however, become the observation and judgment of the appraiser until he approves their reports. (Articles 1120 and 1123, Customs Regulations of 1915.)

[469]*469On the 8th of April, 1920, the appraiser had not seen or considered the invoice or merchandise, and inasmuch as no official report concerning such invoice or merchandise was seen or considered by him or in fact by the deputy appraiser or assistant appraiser prior to the 26th day of April we must hold that the application to amend the entry was made before the invoice or merchandise came either actually or constructively under the observation of the appraiser. The application to amend was therefore made within the time prescribed by paragraph I, section III of the act of 1913, and should have been allowed by the collector.

That Congress had no intention to cut off the right of amendment once the invoice or merchandise came to the observation of the examiner is manifest not only from the terms of the statute but from the history of the legislation as well.

Under section 7 of the act of June 10, 1890, the owner, consignee, or agent of imported merchandise might at the time he made entry, hut not afterwards, make such addition to the invoice cost or value as would in his opinion raise such cost or value to the actual market, value. That addition might avoid the imposition of additional duties, but it had no effect whatever on the regular duties which were required to be assessed upon an amount not less than the invoice or entered value. The fact that the section did not permit the lowering of the invoice value and required that duty should be taken on not less than the invoice or entered value resulted in serious injustice to importers who in good faith relied on invoices made abroad over which they had and could have no effective control.

Section 7 of the act of June 10, 1890, was consequently amended by section 28 of the act of 1909, in such a way that at the time of entry, hut not afterwards, the importer was permitted to increase or reduce the invoice value in order to make market value. Notwithstanding that amendment, however, it was still necessary to rely on invoices in making the original entry and as the entry once made could not be altered or amended importers continued to be penalized for overvaluation and undervaluations, which although made in good faith could not be corrected. That unfortunate situation was expressly called to the attention of Congress and brought about a further amendment of section 7 of the act of June 10, 1890, and a modification of the harsh rigid rule making the original entered value determinative of the duties and additional duties, if any, which should be assessed on ad valorem goods. (See Tariff Hearings, 1913, Vol. VI, pp.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
11 Ct. Cust. 466, 1923 WL 23853, 1923 CCPA LEXIS 16, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/macmillan-co-v-united-states-ccpa-1923.