MacLean-Fogg Co. v. United States

853 F. Supp. 2d 1336, 2012 CIT 99, 2012 WL 3095305, 34 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1871, 2012 Ct. Intl. Trade LEXIS 101
United States Court of International Trade·Decided July 30, 2012·No. Consol. 11-00209·Published·Cited by 8 cases

Opinion

*1338 OPINION AND ORDER

POGUE, Chief Judge:

This case returns to the court following remand in Maclean-Fogg Co. v. United States, 36 CIT —, 836 F.Supp.2d 1367 (2012) (“Maclean-Fogg I ”). In Maclean-Fogg I, and again upon Plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration in MacLean-Fogg Co. v. United States, 36 CIT —, 853 F.Supp.2d 1253 (2012) (“MacLean-Fogg II ”), the court found that the Department of Commerce’s (“the Department” or “Commerce”) calculation of the all-others 374.15% countervailing duty (“CVD”) rate, 2 based solely on mandatory respondents’ adverse facts available (“AFA”) rate, while legally permissible, was neither reasonable in this instance or based on a reasonable reading of the record. Maclean-Fogg I, 36 CIT at —, 836 F.Supp.2d at 1375-76. The court ordered Commerce to either explain how its conclusion is reasonable or, alternatively, recalculate the all-others rate. Id. On remand, Commerce continues to base the all-others rate solely on the mandatory respondents’ AFA rate, explaining that this is reasonable because the mandatory respondents represent a significant portion of the market and are therefore representative of the all-others companies. Final Results of Remand Redetermination, ECF No. 62-1, at 1 (“Remand Results”). Plaintiffs, who are some of the all-others companies to whom the rate applies, again seek review of this rate.

Because Commerce failed to explain how the assumption that Respondents used 100% of the subsidies available throughout the entire People’s Republic of China (“PRC”) is remedial not punitive — providing no more than an appropriate level of deterrence — the court again remands the rate to Commerce.

This court has jurisdiction pursuant to Section 516(a)(2)(B)(I) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, 19 U.S.C. § 1516(a)(2)(B)(I) (2006) and 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c). 3

BACKGROUND 4

In its investigation of Chinese producers and exporters of aluminum extrusions, Commerce designated the three largest exporters as mandatory respondents. 5 *1339 These mandatory respondents failed to respond to Commerce’s questionnaire. Maclean-Fogg I, 36 CIT at —, 836 F.Supp.2d at 1370. Because the mandatory respondents failed to cooperate, Commerce relied on facts available when calculating the mandatory respondents’ CVD rates. 19 U.S.C. § 1677m. Using information provided by the domestic industry, Commerce listed 59 subsidy programs that the importer producers could have availed themselves of and calculated an AFA CVD rate using the highest possible subsidization rate for each of these 59 programs. I & D Memo at Comment 8, 67. 6 The resulting AFA rate for the mandatory respondents was 374.15%. Maclean-Fogg I, 36 CIT at —, 836 F.Supp.2d at 1371. By contrast, two companies that were selected as voluntary respondents received much lower individual rates of 8.02% and 9.94% respectively. Id.

When calculating the “all-others” rate for the remaining companies, Commerce excluded the voluntary respondents’ rates from its calculations in accordance with its regulation, 19 C.F.R. § 351.204(d)(3). Maclean-Fogg I, 36 CIT at —, 836 F.Supp.2d at 1371. Commerce instead averaged the mandatory respondents’ rate, resulting in an all-others rate identical to the AFA rate. Id. In Maclearir-Fogg I, Plaintiffs challenged the regulation, the use of AFA rate in the calculation of the all-others rate, and the exclusion of the voluntary respondents’ rate, contending that the governing statute, 19 U.S.C. § 1671d(c)(5)(A)(i)-(ii), unambiguously required Commerce to use the rates of all individually investigated respondents when calculating the all-others rate. Id. at 1372-73. This court concluded in Maclean-Fogg I that this statute was ambiguous, allows the use of facts available in a reasonable manner, and permits Commerce to use mandatory respondents’ AFA rates in the calculation of the all-others rate without a finding of noncooperation. Id. at 1374 n. 9. Therefore Commerce’s regulation and methodology were reasonable. However, the court found that Commerce’s methodology was not supported by substantial evidence because it failed to articulate a logical connection for attributing the high mandatory respondents’ rate to the all-other companies, and failed to address whether the rate was remedial rather than punitive. Id. at 1375-76.

On remand, Commerce chose to use the same methodology and provided additional explanation for its decision. Remand Results at 1. In addition to reiterating its earlier concerns with rate manipulation, Commerce further explained that the mandatory respondents’ exports represent a significant portion of the sales of subject merchandise. Id. at 4-7. By comparison, the voluntary respondents make up a tiny fraction of that market. Id. at 6-7. In light of these significant differences in market share, the Department stated that its continued exclusive use of only the mandatory respondents’ rate in the calculation of the all-others rate is a reasonable *1340 and reliable reading of record evidence because such a large portion of the market is highly representative of the entire market as a whole. Id. at 8. Commerce considered voluntary respondents’ share of the industry too low to be probative of the industry’s level of subsidization or to validly challenge the representativeness of mandatory respondents’ rate. Id. at 7. Moreover, to include the voluntary respondents’ rates would have run contrary to the policy reasons underpinning Commerce’s regulation — namely, a fear of manipulation of the all-others rate and a desire to maintain its integrity from potential distortions. Id. at 4-5; see also Anti-dumping Duties; Countervailing Duties, 62 Fed.Reg. 27,296, 27,310 (Dep’t Commerce May 19, 1997). Specifically, Commerce stated that voluntary respondents are more likely self-selected because they know that their CVD rates will be lower. Remand Results at 5. As such, their rates could potentially distort the representativeness of the all-others rate, especially here where such a significant segment of the industry failed to participate, as opposed to the small percentage of the industry that did. Id.

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MacLean-Fogg Co. v. United States, 853 F. Supp. 2d 1336, 2012 CIT 99, 2012 WL 3095305, 34 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1871, 2012 Ct. Intl. Trade LEXIS 101 (cit 2012).

853 F. Supp. 2d 1336 (MacLean-Fogg Co. v. United States) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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