MacKlin v. Mueck

373 F. Supp. 2d 1334, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18040, 2005 WL 1524926
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Florida
DecidedJune 10, 2005
Docket00-14092-CIV-MOORE
StatusPublished

This text of 373 F. Supp. 2d 1334 (MacKlin v. Mueck) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
MacKlin v. Mueck, 373 F. Supp. 2d 1334, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18040, 2005 WL 1524926 (S.D. Fla. 2005).

Opinion

*1335 ORDER

K. MICHAEL MOORE, District Judge.

THIS CAUSE came before the Court upon Defendants’ Motion to Vacate this Court’s March 9, 2005 Order (DE # 179).

UPON CONSIDERATION of the motion, responses and the pertinent portions of the record, the Court enters the following Order.

Defendants move to vacate this Court’s March 9, 2005 Order which awarded Plaintiff $300,000, the maximum statutory damages permitted under the statute, jointly and severally against Defendants, National Library of Poetry, International Library of Poetry, Poetry.com, Eric Mueck and Alex Hanley (DE # 176). That Order modified the Court’s January 24, 2005 Order which awarded Plaintiff $300,000, the maximum statutory damages permitted under the statute, jointly and severally against Defendants, National Library of Poetry, International Library of Poetry, and Poetry.com (DE # 174).

In the instant Motion Defendants raise three arguments. First, Defendants argue that this Court is without subject matter jurisdiction over this case because Plaintiff never had a valid copyright. Def. Mot. at 5-6. Second, Defendants argue that this Court should vacate, alter or amend the Amended Default Judgment because Defendants were entitled to a jury trial on the issue of damages. Id. at 8-10. Third, Defendants argue that they are entitled to a rehearing on the damages issues surrounding the Amended Default Judgment because they failed to receive a number of filings in this case. Id. at 6-8.

First, as to Defendants’ argument that Plaintiff does not have a valid copyright and therefore this Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction, the following facts are contained in the record. On November 14, 1986 Plaintiff filed his copyright registration application Form TX for the poems at issue in this lawsuit. See Ex. to PI. Opp. to Def. Mot. to Vacate. On December 16, 1986 Plaintiffs application was processed and the “effective date of registration” of TXu-262-264 was stamped December 16, 1986. Id. On January 24, 2001 Plaintiff sent a letter to the U.S. Copyright Office concerning Txu-262-264. Id. On February 7, 2001 the U.S. Copyright Office responded to Plaintiffs letter and stated that the fee for an additional certificate of copyright registration is $25.00. Id. On March 19, 2001 the U.S. Copyright Office acknowledged receipt of $25.00 and sent Plaintiff an additional certificate of copyright registration. Id. On March 28, 2001 Plaintiff returned the original additional certificate of copyright registration to the U.S. Copyright Office and informed the U.S. Copyright Office that he requested certified copies of his two poems that are the subject of this litigation and not an additional certificate of registration. See Ex. to PI. Supp. Resp. to Def. Mot. to Vacate. On June 10, 2003 Plaintiff wrote a letter to the U.S. Copyright Office wherein he stated that he received the U.S. Copyright Office’s May 27, 2003 letter in which the U.S. Copyright Office concluded that Plaintiffs registration was cancelled for non-payment due to a dishonored check. Id. On April 26, 2005 Defendants provided this Court with a copy of a certificate from the U.S. Copyright Office stating that Plaintiffs copyright TXu-262-264 was can-celled due to uncollectible funds.

It is well settled in this Circuit that “[t]he registration requirement is a jurisdictional prerequisite to an infringement suit.” Brewer-Giorgio v. Producers Video, Inc., 216 F.3d 1281, 1285 (11th Cir.2000) (“Although a copyright need not have been registered in all cases before it may be infringed, the owner of that copyright must register the copyright before a federal court can entertain an infringement suit”) (internal citations omitted); 17 *1336 U.S.C. § 411 (“no action for infringement of the copyright in any work shall be instituted until registration of the copyright claim has been made”).

The record in this case indicates that at the time of the alleged infringements and at the time that this suit was instituted on April 6, 2000 Plaintiff had a valid copyright registration as demonstrated by the March 2001 additional certificate of copyright registration. See Copyright Office Practices, Chapter 1900, 1906 (“Additional certificates are certified copies of the record of registration and have the same legal effect as the original certificate”); see also 17 U.S.C. § 410(c) (a certificate of copyright registration is “prima facie evidence of the validity of the copyright and of the facts stated in the certificate”).

While the copyright registration appears to have been cancelled in 2003. Defendants have failed to cite any case law that stands for the proposition that a District Court is divested of subject matter jurisdiction during the prosecution of a lawsuit, where it had subject matter jurisdiction at the commencement of the lawsuit, but where the copyright registration has lapsed during the prosecution of that suit. Furthermore, the Court has uncovered no such case law in its own research. Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion to Vacate this Court’s March 9, 2005 Order on the ground that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction is DENIED.

Second, Defendants argue that this Court should vacate, alter or amend the Amended Default Judgment because Defendants are entitled to a jury trial on the issue of damages. In the instant motion Defendants specifically ask this Court to vacate its March 9, 2005 Order. That Order modified this Court’s January 24, 2005 Order by expanding joint and several liability to Defendants Eric Mueck and Alex Hanley. This Court finds that Defendants waived their right to object to this Court’s determination of statutory damages by failing to timely object to this Court’s January 24, 2005 Order. 1 The Court’s January 24, 2005 Order originally concluded that Plaintiff was entitled to the maximum statutory damages of $300,000 and specifically stated that “because a default judgment has been entered against the Defendants, a jury trial to determine the amount of statutory damages is impracticable. Therefore, this Court will make a determination on the pleadings, awarding Plaintiff the maximum damages allowed by the statute.” January 24, 2005 Order at 2. In addition, it is worth noting, that on December 19, 2004 this Court issued an Order of Reference referring Plaintiffs Notice of Proof of Damages to the Magistrate for Determination (DE # 171). The Magistrate then issued its Report and Recommendation as to the amount of damages to be awarded to Plaintiff (DE # 172). In not one of these instances did Defendants object to the Court’s determination of damages. Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion to Vacate on this ground is DENIED.

Third, Defendants argue that because they failed to receive 15 of the 17 most recent filings in this action, they have been denied their procedural due process rights to notice and an opportunity to be heard. Defendants argue that they did not receive any of the filings referenced in docket entries 160-165 and 167-175.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

§ 411
336 U.S.C. § 411
§ 411
36 U.S.C. § 411

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
373 F. Supp. 2d 1334, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18040, 2005 WL 1524926, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/macklin-v-mueck-flsd-2005.