Maccarone v. Siemens Industry, Inc.

• Court: Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
• Decided: January 29, 2026
• Docket: 25-1219
• Status: Published

Opinion

United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit

No. 25-1219

ANN MARIE MACCARONE,

Plaintiff, Appellant,

v.

SIEMENS INDUSTRY, INC.,

Defendant, Appellee.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND

[Hon. John J. McConnell, Jr., U.S. District Judge]

Before

Gelpí, Lynch, and Howard, Circuit Judges.

Sonja Linnea Deyoe and Law Offices of Sonja L. Deyoe on brief for appellant.

Jillian S. Folger-Hartwell, Dimitrios Markos, and Littler Mendelson, on brief for appellee.

January 29, 2026 GELPÍ, Circuit Judge. This dispute stems from a

disregarded settlement agreement. Plaintiff-Appellant Ann Marie

Maccarone brought suit in the Rhode Island Superior Court for

alleged violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), 29

U.S.C. § 201 et seq., and of Rhode Island wage and hour laws by

her former employer, Defendant-Appellee Siemens Industry, Inc.

("Siemens"). On June 15, 2020, Siemens removed the case to the

United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island. On

December 15, 2023, at the close of discovery, the district court

granted in part and denied in part Siemens' motion for summary

judgment, leaving only Maccarone's FLSA claims for trial, and

subsequently scheduled jury selection and empanelment to begin on

April 29, 2024.

On March 6, 2024, the parties and counsel participated

in a court annexed settlement conference before a magistrate judge,

with Maccarone appearing by Zoom, and reached an oral settlement

agreement. The magistrate judge recited the essential terms of

the agreement on the record, as captured by the recording of the

conference. Those terms included that Siemens would pay Maccarone

a sum certain within approximately thirty days after execution of

the settlement paperwork; that the settlement agreement would

include non-defamation, no-rehire, and confidentiality provisions;

that the case would be dismissed with prejudice, with each party

to bear its own fees and costs; and that there would be a full

- 2 - release of all claims. Counsel for both parties orally agreed on

the record with the magistrate judge's recitation. The district

court placed a recording of the settlement conference on the docket

under seal and provided a copy to counsel, and, in reliance on the

reported settlement, canceled the scheduled jury selection and

empanelment.

Siemens prepared a written settlement agreement and

release, along with a stipulation of dismissal, reflecting the

terms agreed upon at mediation. There were email exchanges among

counsel. Maccarone informed her counsel that she would not sign

the settlement documents and wished to raise concerns about the

settlement. On May 21, 2024, Maccarone's counsel relayed

Maccarone's position in an email to Siemens and to the magistrate

judge's chambers, writing that "[m]y client generally feels as if

she was pressured to agree to settle her claim for the amount

offered and that the Defendant is getting away with what they did

to her." Although the magistrate judge offered to hold a meeting,

Maccarone's counsel indicated that Maccarone wanted to speak with

the district judge. In subsequent correspondence with the district

judge's chambers, the court advised that the appropriate course

was for Siemens to file a motion to enforce the settlement

agreement, and that any hearing would occur only after briefing on

such a motion.

- 3 - On July 16, 2024, Siemens filed a motion to enforce the

settlement agreement. Maccarone filed an opposition on August 7,

2024, in which she requested an evidentiary hearing. She

represented that she sought to testify that, in her view, no

enforceable settlement agreement had been reached because she

thought she had been subjected to undue influence, that three terms

she asserted were material were neither sufficiently definite nor

mutually agreed upon, and that the agreement had not been placed

on the record because no stenographer was present and the parties

were not sworn. On August 28, 2024, Siemens filed a reply, arguing

that Maccarone had identified no true ambiguity in any material

term, had not negotiated the supposedly ambiguous terms at

mediation, and had neither specified any statements or conduct

constituting undue influence nor cited authority entitling her to

an evidentiary hearing on that issue.

On September 4, 2024, the district court granted

Siemens' motion to enforce the settlement agreement, finding that

the written settlement documents accurately reflected the parties'

agreement on all material terms. The court denied Maccarone's

request for an evidentiary hearing on the issue of undue influence

because she had not "set forth any factual basis for her

unsupported allegation," ordered Maccarone to execute the

- 4 - settlement documents, and cautioned that failure to do so could

result in dismissal of the case with prejudice.1

The following day, Maccarone filed a motion for

reconsideration under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1).

She asserted that she had relied on an email from the district

judge's chambers to counsel that Maccarone characterized as

promising an evidentiary hearing on Siemens' motion to enforce;

that no such hearing was held despite her request; and that,

because she believed she had been misled on that point, the court's

order should be vacated on the ground of mistake or excusable

neglect and an evidentiary hearing held. On September 19, 2024,

Siemens filed an opposition, arguing that Maccarone's arguments

were meritless, had been or could have been raised in response to

the motion to enforce, and did not require an evidentiary hearing

because there was no genuine dispute of material fact.

On October 15, 2024, the district court denied the

motion for reconsideration. The court found "no independent

evidence of Ms. Maccarone's impaired physical or mental capacity"

or of any undue influence; concluded that Maccarone's arguments

could have been raised in response to the motion to enforce; and

explained that even if a hearing had been promised, one was not

required absent a genuine question of fact. The court further

1 The court also determined that the FLSA settlement was fair and reasonable.

- 5 - observed that the case "smacks of buyer's remorse," which, it

explained, is not a valid reason for denying enforcement of a

knowing and voluntary settlement. The court ordered Maccarone to

execute the settlement documents by October 25, 2024, failing

which the court would entertain a motion to dismiss the case with

prejudice for failure to comply.

On November 13, 2024, Maccarone's counsel informed

Siemens by email that there was no indication Maccarone would sign

the settlement documents. In response, Siemens filed a motion to

dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) on December 16,

2024, based on Maccarone's failure to comply with the court's

enforcement order. Maccarone filed an opposition on December 23,

2024, in which she acknowledged that her case was subject to

dismissal under Rule 41(b) but argued that she would not sign the

release because she believed the court's decisions enforcing the

settlement agreement and declining to vacate the enforcement order

were "unjust," and that the procedures used to determine that the

agreement would be enforced were "misleading[] and fundamentally

flawed." Siemens filed a reply on January 8, 2025, contending

that based on Maccarone's concessions and misconduct, the case

must be dismissed with prejudice. On February 6, 2025, the

district court granted Siemens' motion to dismiss, entered

judgment in Siemens' favor, and dismissed the case pursuant to

Rule 41(b).

- 6 - On appeal, Maccarone argues that the district judge

erred in determining that she entered into a binding settlement

agreement at the time of the settlement conference. That argument

is meritless.

A district court's "determination that an enforceable

settlement agreement existed is a mixed question of fact and law,

which we review on a sliding scale standard of review under the

label of clear error review." Mongue v. Wheatleigh Corp., No.

24-1488, 2026 WL 161301, at *5 (1st Cir. Jan. 21, 2026) (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted). The more a district court's

"conclusions are characterized as factual conclusions, the more

our review of those facts is for clear error; the more [a] district

court's conclusions are conclusions of law, the more independent

review we give." Id. (quoting Quint v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 246

F.3d 11, 14 (1st Cir. 2001)).

"Settlement agreements enjoy great favor with [this

Circuit] 'as a preferred alternative to costly, time-consuming

litigation.' Thus, a party to a settlement agreement may seek to

enforce [its] terms when the other party refuses to comply." Fid.

and Guar. Ins. v. Star Equip. Corp., 541 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2008)

(citation omitted). "[O]ral settlement agreements are enforceable

as long as the parties have mutually assented to all of their

material terms." Commonwealth Sch., Inc. v. Commonwealth Acad.

Holdings LLC, 994 F.3d 77, 86 (1st Cir. 2021) (remanding case for

- 7 - enforcement of an oral settlement agreement notwithstanding the

parties' after-the-fact disputes about performance and the absence

of a final writing memorializing the agreement). The refusal to

sign a subsequent writing memorializing the orally agreed upon

terms does not preclude enforcement of the settlement agreement by

the district court. See Román Oliveras v. P.R. Elec. Power Auth.

(PREPA), 797 F.3d 83, 85 n.2, 87 (1st Cir. 2015) (affirming

enforcement of an oral settlement agreement, though plaintiffs

"declined to sign" the written agreement). Nor does a party's

later change of heart furnish grounds to undo a knowing and

voluntary settlement. See Quint, 246 F.3d at 12-15 (affirming

enforceability of oral settlement agreement despite plaintiff's

desire to "withdraw from the settlement" and "back out").

At the March 6, 2024 settlement conference, the parties

actively engaged in negotiations before the magistrate judge and

ultimately agreed on the material terms recited on the record.

When the magistrate judge carefully recited and memorialized those

terms, Maccarone did not object or condition her assent, nor did

her counsel. To the contrary, her counsel expressly confirmed her

agreement, and Maccarone -- who was present over Zoom and able to

do so -- raised no objections or concern at the time. Maccarone's

subsequent objections as to alleged ambiguities and tax

consequences surfaced only after the agreement had been reached

and were properly rejected by the district court as insufficient

- 8 - to undermine the parties' objective manifestation of assent. These

very same arguments now raised on appeal are meritless, to say the

least. The district court did not err, clearly or otherwise, in

concluding that the parties had entered into a valid and binding

settlement agreement. See Mongue, 2026 WL 161301, at *5.

As an alternative justification to undo the settlement,

Maccarone argues that the district judge abused his discretion in

denying her Rule 60(b) motion to reconsider by declining to hold

an evidentiary hearing at which she could testify that she was

incapacitated or unduly influenced at the time of the settlement.

See Bos. Parent Coal. for Acad. Excellence Corp. v. Sch. Comm. for

City of Bos., 89 F.4th 46, 62 (1st Cir. 2023) (reviewing district

court's denial of Rule 60(b) motion for abuse of discretion). We

find no such error, particularly when such a barebones claim was

presented to the district court only after it granted Siemens'

enforcement motion and, even then, only in her reply brief in

support of reconsideration. Brox v. Woods Hole, No. 24-1063, 2026

WL 73794, at *4 (1st Cir. Jan. 9, 2026) (noting arguments first

raised in the district court in a reply brief are waived and "not

properly preserved for appeal").2

2 Maccarone's opening brief relies heavily on an email from the district judge's senior case manager to the parties' counsel referencing the possibility of a hearing at which Maccarone might have been permitted to testify. That email does not bear the weight she places on it. The email states, in relevant part, that the judge did not "see any way forward other than the Defendants

- 9 - Even if the argument were preserved, it would plainly

fail. Where there is no genuine dispute of material fact as to

the existence or terms of a settlement agreement, a court need not

hold an evidentiary hearing. See McKenzie v. Brannan, 19 F.4th 8,

20 (1st Cir. 2021). As the district court correctly found,

Maccarone could have, but did not, present any facts supporting

her allegation of undue influence in her opposition to Siemens'

motion to enforce. The first time she submitted an affidavit

bearing on that allegation was nearly a month after the court

entered its enforcement order, and only in connection with her

Rule 60(b) motion to reconsider. A bare desire to testify about

alleged feelings of undue influence does not create a genuine

factual dispute requiring an evidentiary hearing.

We also reiterate that relief under Rule 60(b) is

"extraordinary in nature" and "granted sparingly."

Fontanillas-Lopez v. Morell Bauzá Cartagena & Dapena, LLC, 832

F.3d 50, 63 (1st Cir. 2016) (quoting Rivera-Velazquez v. Hartford

moving to Enforce" and that, once Maccarone responded to that motion and Siemens filed a reply, the judge would "have a hearing and likely allow Ms. Maccarone to be called to the stand if that's the route [Maccarone's counsel] cho[se]." Sent before Siemens' motion to enforce was fully briefed, this informal communication from chambers staff was not a court order and did not guarantee that testimony would be received or that an evidentiary hearing would be required. At most, it reflected an expectation that the court would hold proceedings after briefing and that testimony might be permitted depending on how counsel elected to proceed and on the court's review of the parties' submissions.

- 10 - Steam Boiler Inspection & Ins., 750 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 2014));

see also Coney Island Auto Parts Unlimited, Inc. v. Burton, 607

U.S. ___ (2026) (holding that Rule 60(c)(1)'s requirement that

parties make Rule 60(b) motions within a "reasonable time" applies

even to a motion seeking relief from an allegedly void judgment

under Rule 60(b)(4)). We will reverse a district court's decision

to withhold such exceptional relief "only if it plainly appears

that the court below committed a meaningful error of judgment."

Fontanillas-Lopez, 832 F.3d at 63 (quoting West v. Bell Helicopter

Textron, Inc., 803 F.3d 56, 66 (1st Cir. 2015)). No such error

occurred here.

Upon finding in favor of enforceability, and then

denying Maccarone's Rule 60(b) motion, the district judge provided

her with a final opportunity to execute the agreement, with the

clear admonition that noncompliance would result in dismissal of

the action with prejudice. She did not take this opportunity.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) allows a district judge to

dismiss any claim or action in which a plaintiff fails to comply

with a court order. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Nargol v.

DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc., 69 F.4th 1, 13-15 (1st Cir. 2023)

(reviewing dismissal of a case pursuant to Rule 41(b) for abuse of

discretion, and noting that "disregard of court orders qualifies

as extreme behavior" which justifies dismissal (citation

omitted)). That is exactly what the district judge here did.

- 11 - Given the settlement context in which the district judge

dismissed the case, we need not address Maccarone's separate

argument as to whether summary judgment was improperly entered.

See Shelby v. Superformance Int'l., Inc., 435 F.3d 42, 45 (1st

Cir. 2006) ("[A] global settlement moots an action between the

settling parties arising out of the same subject matter.").

Federal judges in the five districts within the First

Circuit are extremely busy. Just as parties to litigation expect

judges to diligently manage their dockets, a federal judge's highly

congested calendar cannot be manipulated by disgruntled litigants,

such as Maccarone, who have second thoughts after settlement.

For the foregoing reasons, the district court's judgment

is affirmed. Costs and attorney fees are awarded to Siemens.

- 12 -