Mabon v. Kulongoski

896 P.2d 574, 321 Or. 247, 1995 Ore. LEXIS 47
CourtOregon Supreme Court
DecidedJune 15, 1995
DocketSC S42044; SC S42070
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 896 P.2d 574 (Mabon v. Kulongoski) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Oregon Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Mabon v. Kulongoski, 896 P.2d 574, 321 Or. 247, 1995 Ore. LEXIS 47 (Or. 1995).

Opinion

*249 GRABER, J.

In this original proceeding, two sets of petitioners challenge the ballot title for a proposed initiative measure. Petitioners are electors who, in a timely manner, submitted written comments about the Attorney General’s draft ballot title, pursuant to ORS 250.067(1). Accordingly, petitioners are entitled to seek a different title in this court. ORS 250.085(2). The arguments that they make here relate to the comments that petitioners made during the administrative process. We modify the ballot title in certain respects and, as modified, certify it to the Secretary of State.

The proposed initiative measure reads as follows:

“AN ACT:
“BE IT ENACTED BY THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF OREGON:
“The Constitution of the State of Oregon is Amended by creating a new section to be added to and made a part of Article 1.
“Section 42: LATE TRIMESTER ABORTIONS PROHIBITED.
“(1) An abortion performed when a preborn baby is in the second or third trimester of the mother’s pregnancy is prohibited, except when it becomes necessary in order to save the life of the mother.
“(2) The legislative assembly shall adopt enabling legislation. The People’s mandate given to their elected representatives, including the Governor, is to create an adequate deterrent so that the Peoples’ desire to protect lives of their preborn children in late stages of development will be safe from violations. That enabling legislation shall be established within the legislative session immediately following the passage of this Act. That legislative session shall not end until said enabling legislation shall be signed into law.
“The passage of this Act is not a statement that denies or diminishes the value of human life at all stages of human development, but is instead a realization that at this time a political consensus does exist that will save the lives of those preborn babies living within the second and third trimester.
“When the legislature fulfills the requirements herein set forth, subsection 2 of this Act shall be deleted from Oregon’s *250 Constitution, but remain in the legislative record as a statement of intent.
“(3) The PEOPLE INTEND, that if any part of this enactment be found unconstitutional, the remaining parts shall survive in full force and effect. This Act shall be in all parts self-executing. For the purpose of this Act every Oregon resident and non-profit entity doing business in this state has standing.”

For that measure, the Attorney General certified this ballot title to the Secretary of State:

“AMENDS CONSTITUTION: BANS SECOND, THIRD TRIMESTER ABORTIONS WITH ONE EXCEPTION
“QUESTION: Shall state constitution ban second and third trimester abortions except when needed to save pregnant woman’s life; require enabling legislation?
“SUMMARY: Adds new section to state constitution. Section would ban second and third trimester abortions except when needed to save the pregnant woman’s life. It would require the legislature to adopt laws adequate to deter violations. The legislature must adopt those laws in the next session after the measure passes. The session could not end until the new legislation was signed into law. When legislature fulfills its duty, the measure’s provision on legislation would be deleted from the constitution but remain part of the legislative record.”

This court reviews ballot titles for “substantial compliance with the requirements of ORS 250.035 and 250.039.” ORS 250.085(5). ORS 250.035(l)(a) requires that a ballot title contain a “caption of not more than 10 words which reasonably identifies the subject of the measure.” ORS 250.035(l)(b) requires that aballot title also contain a “question of not more than 20 words which plainly phrases the chief purpose of the measure.” Finally, ORS 250.035(l)(c) requires that a ballot title contain a “concise and impartial statement of not more than 85 words summarizing the measure and its major effect.” 1

The two sets of petitioners make different arguments. We will thus consider their arguments separately.

*251 PETITIONER MABON’S CHALLENGE

Petitioner Mabon asserts that the Question and Summary portions of the Attorney General’s ballot title fail to comply substantially with the requirements of ORS 250.035(l)(b) and (c), because they use the term “pregnant woman,” whereas the text of the proposed measure uses the term “mother.” We are not persuaded.

The text of the proposed measure applies to all pregnant women; thus, the Attorney General’s phrasing accurately conveys the chief purpose and major effect of the measure. See Oregon Citizen’s Alliance v. Roberts, 308 Or 599, 603-04, 783 P2d 1001 (1989) (explaining use of the term “pregnant woman” in a ballot title for a similar measure). In this respect, the Attorney General’s ballot title complies substantially with the requirements of ORS 250.035(l)(b) and (c).

CHALLENGE OF PETITIONERS ARMSTRONG, HOROWITZ, AND STICKNEY

The remaining petitioners challenge all three portions of the ballot title. According to petitioners, their “[mjost significant” objection is that the ballot title omits any mention of the following provision of the measure: “For the purpose of this Act every Oregon resident and non-profit entity doing business in this state has standing.” Petitioners assert that the provision for standing is a subject, a chief purpose, and a major effect of the measure. They argue that “the voters have a right to know that the initiative will authorize and encourage litigation.”

The Attorney General responds that the provision for standing is unclear. He argues that “standing” may or may not mean standing to sue in court to enforce or to challenge the terms of the proposed initiative measure.

We disagree with the Attorney General’s position for two reasons.

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Related

Mabon v. Kulongoski
925 P.2d 1234 (Oregon Supreme Court, 1996)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
896 P.2d 574, 321 Or. 247, 1995 Ore. LEXIS 47, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mabon-v-kulongoski-or-1995.