NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FEB 25 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
CONG MA, No. 21-325 Agency No. Petitioner, A209-779-453 v. MEMORANDUM* PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted February 13, 2026** Honolulu, Hawaii
Before: BYBEE, R. NELSON, and FORREST, Circuit Judges. Dissent by Judge FORREST,
Cong Ma petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA)
decision to deny asylum and withholding of removal. We deny the petition. We
also deny the motion to stay removal. See Dkt. No. 3.
“Our review is limited to those grounds explicitly relied upon by the Board.”
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Budiono v. Lynch, 837 F.3d 1042, 1046 (9th Cir. 2016). “Because the BIA expressed
agreement with the reasoning of the IJ, this court reviews both the IJ and the BIA’s
decisions.” Kumar v. Holder, 728 F.3d 993, 998 (9th Cir. 2013). We review the
agency’s factual findings under the substantial evidence standard and must treat
those findings as conclusive “unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled
to conclude to the contrary.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); see Garland v. Ming Dai,
593 U.S. 357, 368 (2021).
Under that standard, the agency provided sufficient grounds to support the
adverse credibility determination. Ma’s asylum interview and later testimony before
the immigration judge were inconsistent as to how much compensation her family
was offered for the demolition. It was also inconsistent as to the size of the
demolished home—with Ma stating in her asylum interview that the home was about
400 square meters and stating it was 200 square meters in immigration court. Ma
also failed to submit photos she allegedly possessed showing the threats that were
inscribed on her home, or photos of the home before and after the demolition. We
must treat the BIA’s findings as “conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator
would be compelled to conclude to the contrary,” and the analysis by the
immigration and the BIA are more than sufficient to uphold the adverse credibility
determination. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); see also Ming Dai, 593 U.S. at 368;
2 21-325 Shrestha v. Holder, 590 F.3d 1034, 1039 (9th Cir. 2010).
Nor does Ma’s argument that her asylum interview notes should not have been
admitted change this conclusion. Ma argues that the admission of the notes was
unfair because she could not cross-examine the asylum officer. But Ma was asked
about those discrepancies on her own cross-examination and given ample
opportunity to make any clarifications before the IJ. Ma argues she addressed those
concerns, but the IJ was not required to accept her explanation for the discrepancies.
Li v. Garland, 13 F.4th 954, 961 (9th Cir. 2021). None of Ma’s arguments suffice
to demonstrate that any reasonable factfinder would be compelled to find her
credible. See Farah v. Ashcroft, 348 F.3d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 2003).
Finally, the immigration judge and the BIA’s treatment of Ma’s corroborating
evidence does not warrant granting her petition. The agencies’ adverse credibility
finding—even when considering the corroborating evidence—survives the
applicable “highly deferential standard of” whether “any reasonable adjudicator
would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” Aden v. Holder, 589 F.3d 1040,
1046 (9th Cir. 2009). The corroborating evidence does nothing to rebut the
inconsistencies the IJ pointed to in Ma’s testimony to find her not credible (namely
inconsistencies in the amount the Chinese government offered for the house,
inconsistencies in the size of the house, and Ma’s failure to show relevant photos).
And the evidence of demolition the dissent discusses does not undermine the specific
3 21-325 justifications the IJ provided in making an adverse credibility determination either.
PETITION DENIED.
4 21-325 FILED FEB 25 2026 Ma v. Bondi, No. 21-325 FORREST, Circuit Judge, dissenting: MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
I cannot join the majority in upholding the agency’s adverse credibility finding
on the present record. Assessing a petitioner’s credibility “under the REAL ID Act
must be based on the totality of the circumstances.” Shrestha v. Holder, 590 F.3d
1034, 1044 (9th Cir. 2010) (emphasis added) (citation omitted). The agency “should
consider and address” relevant evidence that both detracts from and supports a
person’s credibility. Id. And it is well settled that when an applicant’s testimony is
not sufficiently credible to support her claim, “the [Immigration Judge] must give
the applicant notice of the corroboration that is required and an opportunity either to
produce the requisite corroborative evidence or to explain why that evidence is not
reasonably available.” Yali Wang v. Sessions, 861 F.3d 1003, 1009 (9th Cir. 2017)
(citation omitted). In this case, the Immigration Judge (IJ) concluded that
corroborating evidence was necessary, and Petitioner Cong Ma presented such
evidence, but neither the IJ nor the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) considered
it in full. That error requires a remand.
Ma alleges that she came to the Unites States after Chinese authorities
demolished her family’s home and refused to pay fair compensation, which she
protested. Because of discrepancies in Ma’s statements about the size of the home
and the compensation offered by Chinese authorities, among other things the IJ
1 deemed implausible about Ma’s testimony, the IJ did not believe Ma’s story and
stated that she “needs corroboration.” Specifically, the IJ explained that
corroboration was necessary to show that Ma’s “family owned the house.” Ma
presented corroborating evidence, but the IJ addressed only part of it. For example,
while the IJ discussed documentation related to the property, the IJ incorrectly
asserted that the letter from Ma’s parents “does not discuss the demolition at all,
strangely enough.” In fact, this letter stated that “[their] entire village was
demolished by the government” and they “could not imagine[] [their] daughter
would have been arrested and beaten by the government because she went to protest
[their] rights to the government.”
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FEB 25 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
CONG MA, No. 21-325 Agency No. Petitioner, A209-779-453 v. MEMORANDUM* PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted February 13, 2026** Honolulu, Hawaii
Before: BYBEE, R. NELSON, and FORREST, Circuit Judges. Dissent by Judge FORREST,
Cong Ma petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA)
decision to deny asylum and withholding of removal. We deny the petition. We
also deny the motion to stay removal. See Dkt. No. 3.
“Our review is limited to those grounds explicitly relied upon by the Board.”
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Budiono v. Lynch, 837 F.3d 1042, 1046 (9th Cir. 2016). “Because the BIA expressed
agreement with the reasoning of the IJ, this court reviews both the IJ and the BIA’s
decisions.” Kumar v. Holder, 728 F.3d 993, 998 (9th Cir. 2013). We review the
agency’s factual findings under the substantial evidence standard and must treat
those findings as conclusive “unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled
to conclude to the contrary.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); see Garland v. Ming Dai,
593 U.S. 357, 368 (2021).
Under that standard, the agency provided sufficient grounds to support the
adverse credibility determination. Ma’s asylum interview and later testimony before
the immigration judge were inconsistent as to how much compensation her family
was offered for the demolition. It was also inconsistent as to the size of the
demolished home—with Ma stating in her asylum interview that the home was about
400 square meters and stating it was 200 square meters in immigration court. Ma
also failed to submit photos she allegedly possessed showing the threats that were
inscribed on her home, or photos of the home before and after the demolition. We
must treat the BIA’s findings as “conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator
would be compelled to conclude to the contrary,” and the analysis by the
immigration and the BIA are more than sufficient to uphold the adverse credibility
determination. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); see also Ming Dai, 593 U.S. at 368;
2 21-325 Shrestha v. Holder, 590 F.3d 1034, 1039 (9th Cir. 2010).
Nor does Ma’s argument that her asylum interview notes should not have been
admitted change this conclusion. Ma argues that the admission of the notes was
unfair because she could not cross-examine the asylum officer. But Ma was asked
about those discrepancies on her own cross-examination and given ample
opportunity to make any clarifications before the IJ. Ma argues she addressed those
concerns, but the IJ was not required to accept her explanation for the discrepancies.
Li v. Garland, 13 F.4th 954, 961 (9th Cir. 2021). None of Ma’s arguments suffice
to demonstrate that any reasonable factfinder would be compelled to find her
credible. See Farah v. Ashcroft, 348 F.3d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 2003).
Finally, the immigration judge and the BIA’s treatment of Ma’s corroborating
evidence does not warrant granting her petition. The agencies’ adverse credibility
finding—even when considering the corroborating evidence—survives the
applicable “highly deferential standard of” whether “any reasonable adjudicator
would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” Aden v. Holder, 589 F.3d 1040,
1046 (9th Cir. 2009). The corroborating evidence does nothing to rebut the
inconsistencies the IJ pointed to in Ma’s testimony to find her not credible (namely
inconsistencies in the amount the Chinese government offered for the house,
inconsistencies in the size of the house, and Ma’s failure to show relevant photos).
And the evidence of demolition the dissent discusses does not undermine the specific
3 21-325 justifications the IJ provided in making an adverse credibility determination either.
PETITION DENIED.
4 21-325 FILED FEB 25 2026 Ma v. Bondi, No. 21-325 FORREST, Circuit Judge, dissenting: MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
I cannot join the majority in upholding the agency’s adverse credibility finding
on the present record. Assessing a petitioner’s credibility “under the REAL ID Act
must be based on the totality of the circumstances.” Shrestha v. Holder, 590 F.3d
1034, 1044 (9th Cir. 2010) (emphasis added) (citation omitted). The agency “should
consider and address” relevant evidence that both detracts from and supports a
person’s credibility. Id. And it is well settled that when an applicant’s testimony is
not sufficiently credible to support her claim, “the [Immigration Judge] must give
the applicant notice of the corroboration that is required and an opportunity either to
produce the requisite corroborative evidence or to explain why that evidence is not
reasonably available.” Yali Wang v. Sessions, 861 F.3d 1003, 1009 (9th Cir. 2017)
(citation omitted). In this case, the Immigration Judge (IJ) concluded that
corroborating evidence was necessary, and Petitioner Cong Ma presented such
evidence, but neither the IJ nor the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) considered
it in full. That error requires a remand.
Ma alleges that she came to the Unites States after Chinese authorities
demolished her family’s home and refused to pay fair compensation, which she
protested. Because of discrepancies in Ma’s statements about the size of the home
and the compensation offered by Chinese authorities, among other things the IJ
1 deemed implausible about Ma’s testimony, the IJ did not believe Ma’s story and
stated that she “needs corroboration.” Specifically, the IJ explained that
corroboration was necessary to show that Ma’s “family owned the house.” Ma
presented corroborating evidence, but the IJ addressed only part of it. For example,
while the IJ discussed documentation related to the property, the IJ incorrectly
asserted that the letter from Ma’s parents “does not discuss the demolition at all,
strangely enough.” In fact, this letter stated that “[their] entire village was
demolished by the government” and they “could not imagine[] [their] daughter
would have been arrested and beaten by the government because she went to protest
[their] rights to the government.”
The IJ also ignored other potentially corroborating evidence entirely,
including letters from one of Ma’s neighbors who stated that she “share[d] the same
experience in regard to forced demolition of [their] homes,” and a co-worker who
stated that she spoke to Ma during and after the demolition and visited her in the
hospital after her beating. See Cole v. Holder, 659 F.3d 762, 772 (9th Cir. 2011)
(noting that indications that the agency did not consider the full record “include
misstating the record and failing to mention highly probative or potentially
dispositive evidence”). Ma raised this overlooked evidence on appeal to the BIA, but
the BIA worsened the problem by ignoring Ma’s corroborating evidence entirely. As
a result, we can only speculate whether the BIA considered the entire record.
2 The majority sidesteps the agency’s failure by reasoning that there were
“sufficient grounds to support the adverse credibility determination.” Maj. Op. at 2.
In doing so, it offers a post-hoc rationalization for the agency’s decision—something
longstanding precedent does not allow us to do. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S.
194, 196 (1947); accord Recinos De Leon v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 1185, 1189 (9th Cir.
2005). We have little reason to think that the IJ’s adverse credibility decision was
based on anything other than her doubt that Ma’s family in fact owned a house that
was demolished by the government, given that her (incomplete) corroboration
analysis centered on potential proof of those facts. Because the potential
corroborating evidence ignored by the IJ directly opposes the basis of her adverse-
credibility determination, I disagree with the majority that it “does not undermine
the . . . justifications the IJ provided,” Maj. Op. at 3–4, and I respectfully dissent. I
would grant Ma’s petition and remand with instructions for the agency to consider
all the evidence in rendering its decision.