M-11 Ltd. Partnership v. Gommard

330 P.3d 356, 235 Ariz. 166, 688 Ariz. Adv. Rep. 12, 2014 WL 2615014, 2014 Ariz. App. LEXIS 108
CourtCourt of Appeals of Arizona
DecidedJune 12, 2014
Docket1 CA-CV 13-0582
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 330 P.3d 356 (M-11 Ltd. Partnership v. Gommard) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Arizona primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
M-11 Ltd. Partnership v. Gommard, 330 P.3d 356, 235 Ariz. 166, 688 Ariz. Adv. Rep. 12, 2014 WL 2615014, 2014 Ariz. App. LEXIS 108 (Ark. Ct. App. 2014).

Opinion

OPINION

GEMMILL, Judge.

¶ 1 M-ll Limited Partnership (“M-ll”) appeals the superior court’s dismissal of M-ll’s appeal of an administrative decision of the Arizona Department of Transportation, Motor Vehicle Division (“ADOT”). Because we conclude the superior court erred in not applying Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 60(a) to determine if the record contained a clerical error regarding the date of filing of M-ll’s appeal, we vacate and remand for further proceedings.

BACKGROUND

¶ 2 In December 2011, ADOT administratively extinguished M-ll’s title to a 1965 mobile home trailer and awarded title to *168 Daniel Gommard. The final ADOT decision and order, dated June 19, 2012, was mailed to the parties on June 20, 2012. Arizona Revised Statutes (“AR.S.”) section 12-904(a) sets forth the procedure and deadline for commencing judicial review (appeal) of a final administrative decision:

An action to review a final administrative decision shall be commenced by filing a notice of appeal within thirty-five days from the date when a copy of the decision sought to be reviewed is served upon the party affected____Service is complete on personal service or five days after the date that the final administrative decision is mailed to the party’s last known address.

(Emphasis added). In accordance with AR.S. § 12-904(a), M-ll’s notice of appeal or complaint for judicial review was required to be filed within 40 days of the mailing on June 20, 2012, thereby making July 30, 2012, the last day to timely file. The superior court’s appellate jurisdiction over such an appeal is statutory. See Guminski v. Ariz. State Veterinary Med. Examining Bd., 201 Ariz. 180, 182, ¶8, 33 P.3d 514, 516 (App. 2001). The timely filing of an appeal under AR.S. § 12-904(a) is a jurisdictional requirement, and a tardy filing results in a lack of subject matter jurisdiction and the appellant’s loss of its right to seek judicial review. See id. The superior court “may not extend the time for the filing of a notice of appeal pursuant to AR.S. § 12-904:” Ariz. R.P. Jud. Rev. Admin. Dee. 2.

¶ 3 M-ll sought judicial review of ADOTs administrative decision. It signed and dated its complaint for judicial review on July 18, 2012, and certified that it was mailed that day to the clerk of the Maricopa County Superior Court and to ADOT. According to the superior court record, the complaint was filed in the superior court clerk’s office on August 7, 2012, eight days after the July 30 deadline.

¶ 4 ADOT filed a motion to dismiss under Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), arguing that the superior court lacked jurisdiction because M-ll failed to timely file its complaint or notice of appeal. Gommard joined in the motion. 1 M-ll opposed the motion, arguing that its complaint was timely mailed and should be deemed to have been timely received for filing by the clerk of the superior court. M-ll pointed out that it mailed the complaint to ADOT on the same day-July 18-that it mailed the complaint to the superior court for filing, and ADOT received its copy on July 20, well before the July 30 deadline.

¶5 Based on the superior court record showing the complaint for judicial review was filed on August 7, 2012, the superior court concluded it lacked jurisdiction to consider M-ll’s appeal and therefore granted ADOTs motion and dismissed M-ll’s complaint against ADOT and Gommard. M-ll timely appeals, and we have jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(1).

ANALYSIS

¶ 6 We review de novo a superior courts grant of a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Church of Isaiah 58 Project of Ariz., Inc. v. La Paz County, 233 Ariz. 460, 462, ¶ 9, 314 P.3d 806, 808 (App.2013). We also review de novo the interpretation of statutes and rules. Schwab Sales, Inc. v. GN Const. Co., Inc., 196 Ariz. 33, 35-36, ¶¶ 3, 9, 992 P.2d 1128, 1130-31 (App.1998).

¶ 7 Documents delivered by mail are considered filed as of the date of receipt by the clerk of the court. See Crye v. Edwards, 178 Ariz. 327, 330, 873 P.2d 665, 668 (App.1993) (“The duty to file a paper is discharged when the filer places the paper in the hands of the proper custodian at the proper time and in the proper place.”); see also Filing by Mail, from the website of the Clerk of the Court, Maricopa County Superi- or Court, http://www.elerkofeourt.maricopa. gov/filing-by-mail.asp (last visited June 3, 2014) (“A person may file a document with the Clerk of the Court’s Office by mail for civil, family, and probate matters____ The date of filing will be the date the documents are received by the Clerk’s Office”).

¶ 8 In its opposition to ADOTs motion to dismiss, M-ll first contended that the “mail *169 delivery rule” should be applied to establish that its complaint for judicial review was timely received by the clerk of the superior court. In Lee v. State, 218 Ariz. 235, 182 P.3d 1169 (2008), our supreme court summarized the common-law mail delivery rule:

We have long recognized what is best termed a “mail delivery rule” This common law rule has two components: one a presumption, and one a rule regarding the sufficiency of evidence. Under the mail delivery rule, there is a presumption that a “letter properly addressed, stamped and deposited in the United States mail will reach the addressee” That is, proof of the fact of mailing will, absent any contrary evidence, establish that delivery occurred. If, however, the addressee denies receipt, the presumption of delivery disappears, but the fact of mailing still has evidentiary force. The denial of receipt creates an issue of fact that the factfinder must resolve to determine if delivery actually occurred.

218 Ariz. at 237, ¶ 8, 182 P.3d at 1171 (citations omitted). We decline to determine if the mail delivery rule applies to an initial filing in superior court that commences a new action, see Lee, 218 Ariz. at 241-42, ¶¶ 28-34, 182 P.3d at 1175-76 (McGregor, C.J., dissenting), because even if generally applicable, the mail delivery rule addresses the issue of whether a document was received, not the issue of when a document was received by the clerk’s office. Because the superior court clerk’s office received M-ll’s complaint for judicial review, the mail delivery rule has no application here.

¶ 9 We conclude, therefore, that the superior court correctly rejected M-ll’s argument based on the mail delivery rule.

Rule 60(a)

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Bluebook (online)
330 P.3d 356, 235 Ariz. 166, 688 Ariz. Adv. Rep. 12, 2014 WL 2615014, 2014 Ariz. App. LEXIS 108, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/m-11-ltd-partnership-v-gommard-arizctapp-2014.